ML19210A240

Nonroutine 30-Day Rept 75-07 Re Deficient Seismic Class 1 Analysis of Main Steam Valves MS-V-4A & B & Emergency Feedwater Valve EF-V-30A & B.Caused by Inadequate Interface Between Met Ed & B&W.Proper Seismic Valve Studies Completed

ML19210A240
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	09/30/1975
From:	METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19210A234	List: ML19210A233 ML19210A240 ML19210A244
References
75-07, 75-7, NUDOCS 7910240952
Download: ML19210A240 (3)

Text

- .

Metropolitan Edison Cc=pany (Met-Ed)

Three Mile Island Nuclear Statien Unit 1 (CMI-1)

Cperating Licence No DPE-50 Docket No. 50-2EV Ncn-Routine 30-Day Report 75-07 (Follev-Up)

1. Descripticn of Deficiency On August 15, 1975 it was discevered that Main Stea: Valves MS-V LA&3 and E=ergency Feedvater Valves EF-V-30A&E vere never analyzed to Seis=ic Class I requirements.

2. Designation of Arrarent Cause of Deficiency Upon determining that Main Sten = Valves , .KS-V hA&B, had never been formally qualified, Babcock & Wilcox (E&W) was i==ediately requested to determine whether any additional valves which were furnished under the B&W scope of supply for TMI-l had not been seismically qualified as required by the FSAR.

B&W was also requested to deter =ine why such qualificatiens had not been performed on MS-V hA&B. The subject valves are Fisher Centrol Valves which vere procured by Eailey Meter Co. for B&W.

After review of the above discrepancy, B&W stated that when the subject valves were originally purchased, the pcrtion of the Main Steam Systc= in which these valves were located were not regnired to be seismically qualified. As a result, no seismic require = ente sere invoked on the subject valves. However, during the course of the TMI-1 licensing process, a decision was =ade to upgrade the Seismic classificatien of additional portions of the Main Stea:

System and of the E=ergency Feed Syste=. The equipment furnished by B&W vhich were affected by this upgrading vere valves NS-V hA&B and EF *J-30A&B. Ecvever, the requirement to upgrade the above valves was overlooked. E&W also noted that all other valves provided by Bailey have been reviewed and verified as not requiring seismic qualification. B&W also noted that a review cf the valves provided directly thrcugh B&W has indicated they they.mre supplied to the necessary seis=ic requirements.

Based en the above, Met-Ed independently verified that the cnly valves procurred by Bailey which require seismic qualificatien were MS-V LA&E and EF-&-30A&3. In addition, prior to the time that the subject deficiency had been found, Met-Ed had reviewed several E&W valve specifications. These reviews were conducted in suppcrt of spare parts ordering and revealed no si=ilar deficiencies. It was, therefore, cencluded that the subject deficiency was limited to those valves supplied by E&W through 3ailey Meter Cc= par.y and that the deficiency only occurred on the above valves.

Based on the above, it has been determined that the lack of seismic qualificatien of these valves was caused by inadequate interface control between "et-Ed, Gilbert Asscciates Inc. and B&W in the area of balance of planc design.

3. Corrective Acticn In addition to the verificaticn of seismic requirements fer other valves

=entioned above, seis=ic calculatiens have been performed cn the four 4

\476 c vn oO -

2-valves and confirm that the valves are capable cf withstanding Seismic Class I loadings. These cair tlatiens are in the process of being transmitted to Met-Ed and should be in cur pcssessicn by October 10, 1975 1476 28I