ML18005A194

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Provides Addl Info Re Proposed Change to Tech Specs,Allowing Handling & Storage of Fuel W/Increased Fuel Enrichment to 4.2 Weight Percent U-235,per 870827 Request.Proposed Amend Involves No Significant Increase in Effluent Releases
ML18005A194
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/02/1987
From: Zimmerman S
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
NLS-87-220, NUDOCS 8711060108
Download: ML18005A194 (34)


Text

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'ACCESSION NBR: 8711060108 DQC. DATE: 87/11/02 NOTARIZED: NQ DOCKET 0 FACIL:,50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Planti Unit ii Carolina 05000400 AUTH.'NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ZIMMERMANiS. R. Carolina Power Sc Light Co.

RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Provides addi info re proposed change to Tech Specsi allowing handling 8c storage of. fuel w/increased fuel enrichment to

4. 2 weight percent U-235'er 870827 request. Proposed amend involves no significant increase in e{'fluent releases.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A001D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR Submittal: General Distribution J ENCL I SIZE:

TITLE: OR NOTES:,Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 REC IP IENT COPIES RECIPIENT 'COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR 'ENCL PD2-1 LA 0 PD2-1 PD 5 5 BUCKLEY'S B 1 1 INTERNAL: ARM/DAF/LFMB 1 0 NRR/DEST/ADS 1 1 NRR/DEST/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 1 1 NRR/DQEA/TSB 1 NR ILRB 1 1 OGC/HDS1 1 0 REG F 01 1 1 RES/DE/EIB 1 1 EXTERNAL: EGSG BRUSKEi S LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR NSIC 1 1

'TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 21 ENCL 18

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@!@K Carolina Power & Light Company SERIAL: NLS-87-220 10CFR50.90 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-000/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONALINFORMATION INCREASED FUEL ENRICHMENT TO 0.2 PERCENT Gentlemen:

Carolina Power R Light Company (CPRL) hereby submits additional information concerning a proposed change to the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP)

Technical Specifications that would allow the handling and storage of fuel with an increased fuel enrichment to 0.2 weight percent Uranium-235. This information is submitted in response to an NRC letter dated August 27, 1987 requesting additional information required by the NRC staff to review and assess the environmental impact of an increase in fuel enrichment. The attached information supplements our previous submittal dated May 26, 1987 concerning this issue.

In addition, CPRL has reviewed the proposal change to the Technical Specifications and has determined that:

1. The proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. This was demonstrated in CPRL's May 26, 1987 submittal.
2. The proposed amendment involves no significant change in the type or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released off site. The amendment will permit the storage of more highly enriched fuel elements designed to achieve longer cycle lengths and higher burnups. Under normal conditions, there are no changes in effluents from the plant as the fission product inventory associated with higher burnup is retained within the fuel cladding. Accidents and fuel failure scenarios would result in no significant increase in effluents as the most important isotopes are relatively short-lived and thus in equilibrium and not significantly changed with burnup.

Effluents released by the nuclear fuel cycle are little changed by high burnup. Chemical effluents may be slightly higher (< 196) in the range of 50,000 - 60,000 MWD/MT due to the logarithmic relationship of enrichment and separative work. Radiological effluents associated with the front end of the fuel cycle decrease due to reduced ore and yellow cake requirements as burnup increases. The release of relatively short-lived fission products would decrease since these fission products do not increase with burnup and fewer fuel assemblies are discharged. The potential release of long-lived radionuclides is essentially unchanged as the increase due to higher burnup is offset by the need for fewer fuel assemblies.

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3. The proposed amendment involves no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Under normal conditions the shielding of spent fuel assemblies by the fuel pool water would result in insignificant increases in individual occupational exposure even with higher bundle specific activity. Cumulative occupational exposure will be reduced as fewer assemblies would be handled during a refueling and refuelings are less frequent. Under accident scenarios, there would be no significant increase in radiation exposure as the major contributors are relatively short-lived gaseous or volatile radioisotopes which are in equilibrium and whose amounts are not significantly increased by burnup. The major exception is Kr 85, which is a small contributor to the dose resulting from an accident. The expected increase in Kr 85 would not result in a significant change to accident doses.

While-fuel assembly radionuclide inventories may increase with burnup, the fewer number of fuel assemblies required in a high burnup fuel cycle would leave doses attributable to radionuclides released from the nuclear fuel cycle essentially unchanged.

Based on the above, CPRL has determined that the May 26, 1987 license amendment request fulfills the criteria of 10CFR51.22(c)(9). However, in order to expedite the NRC Staff review of this request, CPdcL has provided the attached responses to NRC questions concerning environmental effects of this change.

If you have any questions on this subject or require additional information, please contact me at (919) 836-6202, Yours very truly, S . Zi erman Ma ger SRZ/3CP/mss (5306A WS) Nuclear icensing Section Attachments cc: Mr. B. C. Buckley Dr. J. Nelson Grace Mr. G. F. Maxwell

~ t ATTACHMENT I RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONALINFORMATION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (5306AWS/cc J )

NRC UESTION I Need for the increases in enrichment and batch average discharge burnup (BADB).

SHNPP RESPONSE Increases in enrichment and BADB will lead to increased plant availability by lengthening the time between successive refueling outages. This will allow CPRL to meet its system needs using less nonrenewable energy sources such as coal and oil.

In addition, increased enrichment and subsequently higher BADB will reduce the number of fuel assemblies required over the life of the plant, thereby reducing uranium ore requirements, spent fuel interim storage, and long-term disposal requirements.

(5306Aws/pp )

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~NliC UESTI N The environmental impact of the proposed increases including:

a. An update of 10CFR50.51, Table S-3, "Table of Uranium Fuel Cycle Environmental Data," with respect to the enrichment and BADB increases.
b. An environmental impact of fuel and waste transportation in accordance with 10CFR51.52(b).

SHNPP RESPONSE The SHNPP response to this question is contained in Attachment 2, "Final Environmental Evaluation of Extended Fuel Burnup for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit l."

(5306AWS/pp )

NRC UESTION 3 Any adverse environmental effects which could not be avoided should these increases be implemented.

SHNPP RESPONSE There is no increase in any adverse environmental effect associated with the request. This is discussed in the attached environmental assessment (Attachment 2).

(5306AWS/pp )

~NRC ~ S N A discussion of alternatives to the proposed increases including no increase permitted above the current limits, SHNPP RESPONSE An alternative to the proposed increases would involve retaining the limits at the current values. This would require a larger number of assemblies over the life of the plant, thereby negatively impacting the environment. It would also create a larger volume of spent fuel and would increase CPRL's dependence on other energy sources (like coal and oio by reducing the plant's availability through more frequent refueling outages.

(5306AWS/pp )

NRC UESTION 5 The relationship between local short-term uses of the environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.

SHNPP RESPONSE The major short-term uses of the environment associated with the operation of SHNPP are the natural resources of land and water. The specific fuel enrichment increase requested has an impact on the amount of uranium ore consumed over the life of the plant. By increasing the enrichment to allow for'increased BADB, the actual amount of uranium ore consumed over the life of the plant would be reduced. This represents a permanent long-term enhancement to the environment.

(5306AWS/pp )

NRC UESTION 6 Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved if these increases in fuel enrichment or BADB should be implemented.

SHNPP RESPONSE The major resources to be committed irreversibly and irretrievably due to the operation of SHNPP are the land resources producing the uranium consumed by the reactor. Increasing the enrichment and BADB will decrease the amount of uranium ore consumed over the life of the plant and would, therefore, decrease the amount of resources irretrievably lost. All other resources are essentially unchanged.

(5306AWS/pp )

A NRC UESTION 7 Recent anomalies have been identified in the Quad Cities and Point Beach spent fuel pools due to Boraflex shrinkage caused by irradiation. Based on this, provide justification to demonstrate the continued acceptability of Boraflex for application in the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant spent fuel pool.

SHNPP RESPONSE Problems due to Boraflex shrinkage appear to have been caused by certain manufacturing methods including the use of clamps, adhesives, and stretching of the Boraflex. Westinghouse, the fabricator of the SHNPP spent fuel racks, has stated that adhesive was NOT used on the SHNPP racks, nor was the Boraflex stretched or clamped when it was placed in the cell wall. In the Westinghouse racks, the Boraflex is held against the stainless steel wall by enclosing it with a full-length stainless steel wrapper. The clearance between the 75 mil Boraflex sheets and wrapper walls is 15 to 25 mils allowing space for the Boraflex sheet to shrink, but preventing it from folding back on itself. An evaluation of the criticality analyses performed by Westinghouse in support of SHNPP indicates that a Keff less than 0.95 can be maintained assuming a 0-inch shrinkage of Boraflex from each end of the active fuel. As the Boraflex shrinks, it is conservative to assume that all the shrinkage will result in a reduction of length from the top since the Boraflex is free to move within the wrapper and would remain in contact with the bottom of the wrapper. As a result, the analysis conservatively covers a total shrinkage of four inches of Boraflex. A 0-inch shrinkage represents a 2.8 percent reduction in length from the design nominal length of 100+ q inch. This is greater than the maximum anticipated shrinkage resulting from tests performed and reported by BISCO Products, Inc.,

BISCO NS-1-050 (Interim) 3une 27, 1987, "Irradiation Study of Boraflex Neutron Absorber." Therefore, due to the differences in the SHNPP rack design, margin in the SHNPP criticality analysis bounding the maximum expected shrinkage, and a Boraflex surveillance program as described in the response to Question 8, CPRL concludes Boraflex is acceptable for application in the SHNPP spent fuel pool.

(5306AWS/ccj )

NRC UESTION 8 Based on the recent information pertaining to degradation of Boraflex, provide any changes to the in-service surveillance program for Boraflex and describe the frequency of examination and acceptance criteria for continued use.

SHNPP RESPONSE SHNPP will have a Boraflex surveillance program that examines Boraflex coupons following each refueling outage as well as every four years (or nearest refueling outage). The sample coupons examined at each refueling accumulate gamma radiation exposure more rapidly than the Boraflex in the storage racks because a freshly discharged assembly is maintained adjacent to the test coupons. This practice ensures that any radiation-induced effects are observed on the coupons before the Boraflex in the typical storage racks would be expected to experience the effects. The coupons examined on a four-year basis are subjected to a more typical gamma exposure.

Both programs include physical examination of test coupons in addition to examinations of hardness and neutron attenuation. Surveillance programs in place at other nuclear plants [e.g., CPRL's H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 (HBR2)] should provide information of any abnormal shrinkage or cracking well in advance of any similar problem at SHNPP, since first use of the SHNPP racks for spent fuel storage is not expected to occur before approximately mid-1988. The spent fuel racks for SHNPP and HBR2 were fabricated by Westinghouse in the same time frame. Appropriate acceptance criteria for continued use will be established when the Boraflex surveillance program is finalized.

(5306AWS/cc J )

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NRC UESTION 9 Describe the corrective actions to be taken if degraded Boraflex specimens or absorber sheets are found in the spent fuel pool.

SHNPP RESPONSE As indicated in the response to Question 7, shrinkage of the entire Boraflex sheet would result in a slightly shorter sheet. Axial gaps within the sheet caused by shrinkage (e.g., Quad Cities) should not occur for reasons described in our response to Question 7.

Westinghouse's calculation (assuming a 0-inch shrinkage from each end) indicates that the required shutdown margin (K ff < 0.95) is maintained. Thus, should the Boraflex degrade due to axial shrinkage, the spent fuel can still be stored in the SHNPP pools with K ff < 0.95.

In the unlikely event that unacceptable shrinkage or other modes of unacceptable degradation are identified, steps will be taken to identify the affected cells by analysis and/or measurement. Positive steps will be taken to ensure that Ke ff < 0.95 is assured. Such steps could be(l) use of physical obstructions to prevent use of affected cells, (2) checkerboarding or (3) relocation of fuel assemblies.

(5306AWS/pp )

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NRC UESTION 10 What are the manufacturing tolerances for fuel enrichment and fuel density and how have these been incorporated into the 95/95 probability/confidence Keff calculation?

SHNPP RESPONSE Standard fabrication and installation tolerances have been included in the 95/95 criticality analysis. These include consideration of mechanical and material thickness tolerances, asymmetric positioning of fuel assemblies, minimum rack poison material loading, absence of assembly grid material, and absence of U-230 or U-236 in the fuel pellets. The Westinghouse manufacturing tolerance on enrichment and theoretical density is +0.05 w/o and +1.5 percent, respectively. The nominal design density is 95 percent of theoretical. The variation in enrichment for a nominal 0.20 w/o batch could, therefore, be 0.15 w/o to 0.25 w/o. A review of the analysis performed indicates that even for an infinite lattice of 0.25 w/o assemblies, the maximum Keff would be less than 0.95, therefore, a nominal batch enrichment up to 0.20 w/o is >ustified. The criticality analysis submitted was performed assuming 0.96 of theoretical density. Observed values are found to be less than 0.955. The possibility of delivery of fuel with a density of 0.965 is accounted for in the analysis by assuming a density of 0.96 and no pellet dishing which actually corresponds to a density greater than 0.965 when one accounts for the standard dishing found for Westinghouse fuel. Therefore, the analysis contains sufficient conservatism to address the manufacturing tolerances on fuel density and fuel enrichment.

(5306AWS/cc J )

ATTACHMENT2 FINAL ENVIRONMENTALEVALUATION OF EXTENDED FUEL BURNUP FOR THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (5306AWS/ccj )

'll sly FINAL ENVIRONMENTALEVALUATION EXTENDED FUEL BURNUP INTRODUCTION This Final Environmental Evaluation applies to the Carolina Power R Light Company proposal to increase the allowable fuel enrichment to 0.2 weight percent Uranium 235 and consequently .extend the fuel burnup on Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1.

As shown by the following evaluation, there is no significant environmental impact associated with the increased burnup up to 60,000 megawatt days per metric ton of fuel (MWD/MT).

EVALUATION The current generic assessment of the environmental impact of the nuclear fuel cycle contained in the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) and other NRC reports is not applicable to discharge fuel burnups beyond 33,000 MWD/MT.

The current generic assessments of the environmental impacts of the fuel cycle are contained in Table S-3 and S-0 of 10CFR51 and are reproduced in NUREG-0972, Final Environmental Statement Related to the Operation of Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, October 1983. Table S-3 presents the environmental impact of the fuel cycle in terms of natural resource use and chemical and radiological effluents.

Table S-0 presents the environmental impacts of the transportation of fresh fuel to, and spent fuel and solid waste from, a reference reactor. These analyses are supplemented by a generic analysis prepared by the NRC Staff on the release of Radon-222 and Technetium-99 and the environmental dose commitments associated with radionuclide releases from fuel cycle facilities.

A study was conducted by the Atomic Industrial Forum National Environmental Studies Project, AIF/NESP-032 dated June 1985 entitled "The Environmental Consequences of Higher Fuel Burnup." The results of this report are expressed in terms of extended values of Tables S-3 and S-O, extended burnup source terms for Rn-222 and TC-99, and environmental dose commitment. The study concluded that extending fuel bur nup up to

,60,000 MWD/MT results in environmental consequences which are either less than or virtually the same as those assumed in the current regulations. Accordingly, extended burnup does not result in any significantly increased environmental impact.

Data extracted from AIF/NESP-032 are reproduced in Table 1. The environmental impacts were prorated by the projected fuel cycle requirements at higher burnups.

AIF/NESP-032 used the following reference conditions for the development of the front-end requirements: a) 80 Percent Capacity Factor; b) 1000 MWe Reference Reactor; c) 0.25 w/o Tails; d) Uranium Recycle; e) 18-Month Refueling Cycle; f) U-236 neutron effect; g) 0.1 Percent Ore Grade; and h) 90 Percent Milling Efficiency. These reference conditions are the same as used by the NRC in Table S-3 except for the last four items which were updated to reflect current conditions or knowledge known more accurately. The 18-month cycle is considered more typical than the 12-month cycle previously used. The neutron poison effect of U-236 was included to maintain the conservative nature of the requirements. The ore grade and milling efficiency were reduced from previous values of 0.2 percent and 100 percent, respectively, to reflect expected average conditions over the next twenty years. AIF/NESP-032 also utilized the updated ORIGEN 2 code to determine the isotopics of the back end of the fuel cycle.

(5306AWS/pp )

The principal reason for the difference in the Table S-3, 33,000 MWD/MT values, and the NESP, 33,000 MWD/MT column in Table 1, is not due to extended burnup but due to the reduction in ore grade (from 0.2 percent to 0.1 percent) assumed in AIF/NESP-032.

A review of each category of effluents in Table 1 is briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.

The effects of extended burnup on the environmental impact of land use, as shown in Table 1, are that the impacts decrease with increasing burnup. This is to be expected since the land use attributed to the nuclear fuel cycle is predominantly due to the mining of ore, and since ore requirements decrease with increasing burnup, the land impacts decrease with increasing burnup.

The use of water and fossil fuel decreases with increasing burnup to 50,000 MWD/MT, and then increases with additional increases in burnup. At 60,000 MWD/MT, the fossil fuel use is similar to that at 33,000 MWD/MT. As burnup increases, the enrichment requirements increase. But because the separative work requirements increase logarithmically with enrichment level, the benefits of increased fuel utilization above 33,000 MWD/MT begin to be offset at burnups which exceed 50,000 MWD/MT. Chemical effluents behave in a manner similar to that for fossil fuel use because most of the chemical effluents are due to the combustion of fossil fuels.

Radiological effluents for natural radionuclide releases associated with the front end of the fuel cycle decrease with increasing burnup. This is primarily due to a reduction in ore and yellow cake requirements as burnup increases.

The release of relatively short-lived fission products from the back end of the fuel cycle decreases with increasing burnup. This occurs because the inventory of these radionuclides per MT of spent fuel is at equilibrium and does not increase with increasing burnup, while the number of MT of fuel discharged per referenced reactor year decreases in direct proportion to increases in fuel burnup.

The release of relatively long-lived radionuclides is essentially independent of burnup.

This occurs because at high burnup the increase in radionuclide inventory per metric ton (MT) of spent fuel is offset by the reduction in the number of MT of discharge fuel per referenced reactor year.

The radiation exposure models conservatively assume the radiation field is already at the regulatory limit for most instances. Extended burnup would not change the regulatory limits but would affect the exposure time. To a first order approximation, the exposure time would be proportional to shipment miles. Hence, the extended burnup radiation dose to workers and the general public would decrease slightly with increased burnup.

Likewise, extended burnup decreases the fuel throughput per reactor year at the reprocessing plant and, hence, occupational worker exposure time per reactor year is proportionally decreased.

A comparison of transportation impacts currently provided in Table S-0 of 10CFR51 and NUREG-0972, October 1983 with those for extended burnup shown in Table 2 reveals that the impacts either remain the same or decrease slightly. The controlling factor for this pattern is the reduced number of shipments required in support of extended burnup.

(5306AWS/pp )

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Table 3 presents the 100-year environmental dose commitment for radionuclide releases from the fuel cycle. The results from AIF/NESP-032 reveal that the environmental dose commitment (EDC) decreases with increasing burnup.- The table shows that the EDC calculated by NESP is approximately 20 percent greater than that calculated by NRC for 33,000 MWD/MT. The main reasons for the differences are due to increases in the EDC per curie released for the liquid release of Ra-226 and for the gaseous release of H-3.

These increases are the result of improvements which have been made to the RABGAD (NUREG-0002) and LADTAP (NUREG/CR-1276) codes since the original NRC analyses were made. Increases in Rn-222 were due to differences in assumptions used by NESP as previously discussed.

It is concluded that when these differences in assumptions are taken into account, along with the numerous conservations inherent in the analyses, the current NRC Staff assessment of the EDCs is considered applicable to the nuclear fuel cycle required to support higher burnup. These EDCs are small compared to exposures due to natural background radiation.

CONCLUSION When differences in'assumptions are taken into account, increasing allowable fuel enrichment and consequently extending fuel burnup results in environmental consequences which are either less than or virtually the same as those evaluated in 10CFR51 by the NRC and in NUREG-0972. The NRC evaluation is, therefore, considered applicable to the nuclear fuel cycle required to support CPRL's proposal to increase the allowable fuel enrichment to 0.2 weight percent Uranium-235 and consequently extending fuel burnup up to 60,000 MWD/MTU. Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that no unreviewed environmental question exists.

(5306Aws/pp )

TABLE 1 ENVIRONMENTALFUEL CYCLE IMPACTS AT EXTENDED BURNUP NESP NESP NATURAL RESOURCES USE 33,000 MWD/MT 60,000 MWD/MT Land (acres)

Temporarily committed 180 157 Undisturbed area 130 110 Disturbed area 06.5 02.8 Permanently committed 19.3 17.0 Overburden moved (million of MT) 6.69 6.32 Water (millions of gallons)

Discharged to air 271 263 Discharged to water bodies 12,800 12,900 Discharged to ground 300 288 Total 13,375 13,051 Fossil Fuel Electrical Energy (1000s of MWh) 375 370 Equivalent Coa)(f000s of MT) 137 137 Natural gas (10 x scf) 100 121 EFFLUENTS - CHEMICAL (MT)

Gases (including entrainment)

SOx 5,100 5,160 NOx 1,000 1,390 Hydrocarbons 18.1 17.7 CO 30.0 30.2 Particulates 1,300 1,350 Other gases F .753 .727 HCl .0136 .0075 Liquids SOg 11.2 11.0 NO3 26.2 15.9 Fluoride 13.8 11.0 Ca 6.20 6.28 Cl 9.78 9.80 Na 13.8 13.6 NH3 11.6 7.08 Fe .062 .065 Tailings Solutions (1000) 586 557 Solids 222,000 211,000 (5506AWS/pp )

TABLE 1 (Continued)

NESP NESP EFFLUENTS - RADIOLOGICAL(CURIES) 33,000 MWD/MT 60 000 MWD/MT Gases (including entrainment)

Rn-222 10,926 10,266 Ra-226 .022 .0209 Th-230 .022 .0209 Uranium .0372 .0350 Tritium (thousands) 18.5 17.7 C-10 19.6 15.3 Kr-85 (thousands) 330 308 RU-106 .136 .106 I-129 1.08 1.05 I-131 .928 .519 Tc-99 .13 .119 Fission Products R Transuranics .305 .227 Liquids Tc-99 1.072 .980 Uranium R Daughters 2.29 2.17 Ra-226 .00370 .00355 Th-230 .00165 .00157 Th-230 .01 .00551 Fission R Activation Products 5.9xlO 5.18xlO Solids (buried on site)

Other than high level (shallow) 11,000 11,300 TRU and HLW l. lxlO l. lxlO Ef fluents-thermal (billions BTU) 0,570 0,000 Transportation (person-rem)

Exposure of workers and 2.76 1.93 General Public Occupational Exposure 22.6 12.5 (5306AWS/pp )

6-TABLE 2 ENVIRONMENTALIMPACTS FROM TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVEMATERIALS FOR EXTENDED BURNUP NESP NESP 33 000 MWD/MT 60,000 MWD/MT Heat (BTU/hr.) 250,000 250,000

~Wet ht (lbs.i truck) 73,000 73,000 (tons/rail) 100 100 Traffic Truck (per day)

Rail (per month)

~Ex osure Workers (persons) 200 200 Dose (mrem/person) 0-300 0- 300 Total Worker Dose (man-rem) 3 Public (onlookers) 1,100 1,100 Dose (mrem/person) 0.003-1.3 0.003-1.3 Public (along route) 600,000 600,000 Dose (mrem/person) 0.0001-0.06 0.0001-0.06 Total Public Dose (man-rem) 3 2.1 Accidents Radiological Ef fects Small Small Common Causes (years between deaths) 126 202 (years between injury) 7 12 Property Damage per reactor year $ W5 $ 296 (5306AWS/cc J )

TABLE 3 ENVIRONMENTALDOSE COMMITMENT(Man-Rem)

(One-Hundred-Year Risk E uivalent Whole Bod Dose Commitment)

NESP NESP SOURCE 33,000 MWD/MT 60,000 MWD/MT Table S-3 Releases 811 707 Rn-222 Releases 1,632 1,550 Tc-99 Releases 0.02 0.13 Total 2,007 2,301 (5306Aws/pp )

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