ML063120601
| ML063120601 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 11/08/2006 |
| From: | Richard Skokowski NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB3 |
| To: | Crane C Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2010-0209 IR-06-004 | |
| Download: ML063120601 (47) | |
See also: IR 05000456/2006004
Text
November 8, 2006
Mr. Christopher M. Crane
President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Exelon Nuclear
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000456/2006004; 05000457/2006004
Dear Mr. Crane:
On September 30, 2006 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
integrated inspection at your Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents
the inspection results, which were discussed on October 10, 2006, with Mr. T. Coutu and other
members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). The
issue was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. In addition, a licensee-
identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in this
report. However, because of the very low safety significance of the violations and because they
were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these violations as
non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date
of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-001, with a copy to the
Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III, 2443 Warrenville
Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the
Braidwood facility.
Crane -2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA D.Smith acting for/
Richard A. Skokowski, Chief
Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000456/2006004; 05000457/2006004
w/Attachments 1: Supplemental Information
2: Confirmatory Measurements Comparison Chart
3: Tritium Sample Results
cc w/encl: Site Vice President - Braidwood Station
Plant Manager - Braidwood Station
Regulatory Assurance Manager - Braidwood Station
Chief Operating Officer
Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services
Vice President - Operations Support
Director Licensing
Manager Licensing - Braidwood and Byron
Senior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Document Control Desk - Licensing
Assistant Attorney General
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
State Liaison Officer
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
Crane -2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA D.Smith acting for/
Richard A. Skokowski, Chief
Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000456/2006004; 05000457/2006004
w/Attachments 1: Supplemental Information
2: Confirmatory Measurements Comparison Chart
3: Tritium Sample Results
cc w/encl: Site Vice President - Braidwood Station
Plant Manager - Braidwood Station
Regulatory Assurance Manager - Braidwood Station
Chief Operating Officer
Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services
Vice President - Operations Support
Director Licensing
Manager Licensing - Braidwood and Byron
Senior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Document Control Desk - Licensing
Assistant Attorney General
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
State Liaison Officer
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
DOCUMENT NAME:G:\BRAI\BRAI 2006004 final.wpd
G Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive G Non-Sensitive
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy
OFFICE RIII RIII RIII RIII
NAME /RS DSmith for/ DSmith
RSkokowski
DATE 11/08/06 11/08/06
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Crane -3-
DISTRIBUTION:
DXC1
TEB
RFK
RidsNrrDirsIrib
GEG
KGO
GLS
SPR
CAA1
LSL (electronic IRs only)
C. Pederson, DRS (hard copy - IRs only)
DRPIII
DRSIII
PLB1
TXN
ROPreports@nrc.gov (inspection reports, final SDP letters, any letter with an IR number)
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket Nos: 50-456; 50-457
Report No: 05000456/2006004; 05000457/2006004
Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: Braceville, IL
Dates: July 1 through September 30, 2006
Inspectors: Steven Ray, Senior Resident Inspector
G. Roach, Resident Inspector
J. Cassidy, Radiation Specialist
M. Holmberg, Reactor Inspector
M. Jordan, Reactor Inspector
A. Klett, Reactor Inspector
R. Ng, Resident Inspector Byron
S. Orth, Health Physics Program Manager
M. Perry, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Observers: J. Dalzell, Summer Hire
Approved by: R. Skokowski, Chief
Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000456/2006004, 05000457/2006004; 04/01/2006 - 06/30/2006; Braidwood Station,
Units 1 & 2; Fire Protection.
This report covers a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced
baseline inspections by regional inspectors in Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/169, Mitigating
Systems Performance Index Verification. One Green finding, which was a non-cited violation
was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White,
Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination
Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a
severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe
operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor
Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Braidwood Facility Operating
License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77, Condition 2.E, for failing to maintain electrical
supervision for fire doors between the diesel generator rooms and their associated
ventilation shaft rooms as required by the approved Fire Protection Report. The diesel
generator rooms were protected by automatic total flooding gas suppression systems for
which NRC fire protection regulations require electrical supervision or that a justification
for an exception be given in the Fire Protection Report. The licensee had taken no
exception for those doors. The licensee entered the issue into its corrective action
program for resolution, and evaluated the condition as being acceptable in the interim
due to frequent surveillance of the doors and the infrequency of their use.
This finding was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems
Cornerstone objective to ensure that external factors (i.e., fire, flood, etc) do not impact
the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The
finding was of very low safety significance because the issue only affected suppression,
not detection or ignition, and a review of the history of the doors indicated that finding
them open during the daily surveillances was extremely rare. In addition, failure of the
gaseous suppression system to extinguish a diesel room fire due to one of the doors
being open, would not lead to the fire spreading to other areas except for the ventilation
shaft, which was in the same fire zone. (Section 1R05)
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee has been
reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have
been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and corrective
actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
1 Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Both units operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to severe thunderstorm warnings in the
area including compensatory measures taken before and during the event. The
inspectors verified that minor issues identified during this inspection were entered into
the licensees corrective action program. Documents reviewed in this inspection are
listed in Attachment 1.
This review constituted one sample of the inspection requirement.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
Partial Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the accessible portions of risk-significant
system trains during periods when the train was of increased importance due to
redundant trains or other equipment being unavailable. The inspectors utilized the valve
and electric breaker listed to determine whether the components were properly
positioned and that support systems were aligned as needed. The inspectors also
examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters
of equipment to determine whether there were any obvious deficiencies. The inspectors
reviewed issue reports (IRs) associated with the train to determine whether those
documents identified issues affecting train function. The inspectors used the information
in the appropriate sections of the Technical Specifications (TS) and the Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to determine the functional requirements of the system.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees identification of and the controls over the
redundant risk-related equipment required to remain in service. The inspectors verified
that minor issues identified during this inspection were entered into the licensees
2 Enclosure
corrective action program. Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in
Attachment 1.
The inspectors completed three samples of this requirement by walkdowns of the
following trains:
- 2A residual heat removal (RH) while the 2B RH train was out of service;
- 2A and 2B auxiliary feedwater while valve 2SI8804B was out of service.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
Quarterly Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability,
accessibility, and the condition of fire fighting equipment, the control of transient
combustibles and ignition sources, and on the condition and operating status of installed
fire barriers. The inspectors selected fire areas for inspection based on their overall
contribution to internal fire risk, as documented in the Individual Plant Examination of
External Events with later additional insights on their potential to impact equipment
which could initiate a plant transient or be required for safe shutdown. The inspectors
used the Fire Protection Report, Revision 21, to determine that: fire hoses and
extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; fire
detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; transient material loading was within the
analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in
satisfactory condition.
The inspectors completed nine samples of this inspection requirement during the
following walkdowns:
- A essential service water (SX) room;
- B SX room;
- DG rooms;
- auxiliary building 401 foot elevation common area;
- auxiliary building 426 foot elevation common area;
- plant outbuildings;
- Unit 2 hydrogen system;
- lake screenhouse; and
- Units 1 and 2 transformer yards.
The inspectors verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered
into the licensees corrective action program. Documents reviewed during this
inspection are listed in Attachment 1.
3 Enclosure
b. Findings
Failure to Electrically Supervise Doors in Accordance With Fire Protection Program
Introduction: The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited
violation (NCV) of Braidwood Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77,
Condition 2.E, for failing to have electrically supervised doors in areas protected by total
flooding gas suppression systems in the DG rooms, in accordance with the approved fire
protection program.
Description: Upon reviewing the requirements for fire doors in the DG rooms, the
inspectors identified that NRC fire protection requirements were that doors to total gas
suppression system areas be electrically supervised with monitoring at a continuously
manned area. The licensee had not taken exception to that requirement in its Fire
Protection Report (FPR). The doors in all four of the DG rooms between the main part
of the rooms and the ventilation shafts were not electrically supervised in any way, nor
were they locked. As a result of this issue, the licensee was performing an extent of
condition review and had determined that some doors in the cable spreading rooms
were also not electrically supervised. All of the above mentioned areas were protected
by total flooding gas suppression systems.
The inspectors reviewed the FPR and did not identify any existing justifications allowing
for the existence of this condition. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective
action program for resolution. The licensee determined that interim compensatory
actions were not needed because the doors were in area infrequently accessed and they
were checked daily to ensure they were properly closed. Long term corrective actions
were still being reviewed at the conclusion of this inspection.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to electrically supervise
the doors or justify an exception in the FPR was a performance deficiency warranting a
significance determination. Furthermore, the issue was considered more than minor
because the finding affected the attribute of protection against external factors (i.e. fire)
of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors assessed the finding using
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance
Determination Process, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance
(Green). The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue only affected
suppression, not detection or ignition, and a review of the history of the doors indicated
that finding them open during the daily surveillances was extremely rare. In addition,
failure of the gaseous suppression system to extinguish a diesel room fire due to one of
the doors being open, would not lead to the fire spreading to other areas except for the
ventilation shaft, which was in the same fire zone. This issue has existed since initial
licensing and, as such, was not considered to have cross-cutting aspects for current
plant performance.
Enforcement: Braidwood Stations Operating License Condition 2.E stated, in part, that
The licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire
protection program as described in the UFSAR. Section 9.5.1 of the UFSAR stated that
The design bases, system descriptions, safety evaluation, inspection and testing
requirements, personnel qualification, and training are described in Reference 1 [the
4 Enclosure
FPR]. Chapter 3 of the FPR stated that areas protected by automatic total flooding gas
suppression systems should have electrically supervised self-closing fire doors or should
be kept closed and electrically supervised at a continuously manned location. The only
exception the licensee took to this requirement in the FPR was for the DG day tank
rooms and the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump day tank rooms. Contrary to this,
the doors between the DG rooms and their associated ventilation shaft rooms did not
have electrically supervised fire doors. The DG rooms were protected by automatic total
flooding carbon dioxide gas suppression systems. Because this issue was entered into
the corrective action program as IR 512899, and the finding was of very low safety
significance, this violation was being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A of
the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000456/2006004-01; 05000457/2006004-01,
Failure to Maintain Electrically Supervised Fire Doors in Accordance With the Fire
Protection Program. The finding was assigned to the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
for both units.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
Internal Flooding Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Braidwoods flood analysis and design basis documents to
identify design features important to internal flood protection, and reviewed the flood
protection measures in place to prevent or mitigate effects of internal flooding. For these
inspection samples, the inspectors focused on risk significant areas where the licensee
had recently experienced internal flooding problems. The inspectors reviewed the
licensee evaluations of the effects of leakage into these rooms and their actions and
plans to resolve the conditions. This review represented two annual inspection samples.
Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in Attachment 1. The specific
areas reviewed were the following:
- lower cable spreading rooms after chiller condensate water was diverted into the
rooms; and
- ground water intrusion into main steam isolation valve rooms.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)
Quarterly Review of Testing/Training Activity
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed operating crew performance during an evaluated simulator
examination scenario involving a faulted, ruptured steam generator and RH system leak.
The inspectors evaluated crew performance in the following areas:
5 Enclosure
- clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions in the safe direction;
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms;
- procedure use;
- control board manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- group dynamics.
Crew performance in these areas was compared to licensee management expectations
and guidelines.
The inspectors verified that the crew completed the critical tasks listed in the simulator
guide. The inspectors also compared simulator configurations with actual control board
configurations. For any weaknesses identified, the inspectors observed the licensee
evaluators to determine whether they also noted the issues and discussed them in the
critique at the end of the session. Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment 1. This
review constituted one sample of this inspection requirement.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
Routine Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees overall maintenance effectiveness for selected
plant systems. This evaluation consisted of the following specific activities:
- observing the conduct of planned and emergent maintenance activities where
possible;
- reviewing selected IRs, open work orders, and control room log entries in order
to identify system deficiencies;
- reviewing licensee system monitoring and trend reports;
- attending various meetings throughout the inspection period where the status of
maintenance rule activities was discussed;
- a partial walkdown of the selected system; and
- interviews with the appropriate system engineer.
The inspectors also reviewed whether the licensee properly implemented Maintenance
Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, for the chosen systems. Specifically, the inspectors determined
whether:
- the system was scoped in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65;
- performance problems constituted maintenance rule functional failures;
- the system had been assigned the proper safety significance classification;
- the system was properly classified as (a)(1) or (a)(2); and
6 Enclosure
- the goals and corrective actions for the system were appropriate.
The above aspects were evaluated using the maintenance rule program and other
documents listed in Attachment 1. The inspectors also verified that the licensee was
appropriately tracking reliability and/or unavailability for the systems. The inspectors
verified that minor issues identified during this inspection were entered into the licensees
corrective action program.
The inspectors completed two samples in this inspection requirement by reviewing the
following systems:
- instrument and service air system subsequent to numerous air compressor
equipment issues; and
- diesel fuel oil system subsequent to a failure of the fuel oil pump suction hose on
the 2A DG.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees management of plant risk during emergent
maintenance activities or during activities where more than one significant system or
train was unavailable. The activities were chosen based on their potential impact on
increasing the probability of an initiating event or impacting the operation of
safety-significant equipment. The inspections were conducted to determine whether
evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work were done in a manner to
reduce the risk and minimize the duration where practical, and that contingency plans
were in place where appropriate.
The licensees daily configuration risk assessment records, observations of operator
turnover and plan-of-the-day meetings, and observations of work in progress, were used
by the inspectors to verify that; the equipment configurations were properly listed;
protected equipment were identified and were being controlled where appropriate; work
was being conducted properly; and significant aspects of plant risk were being
communicated to the necessary personnel.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected issues, listed in Attachment 1, that the
licensee encountered during the activities, to determine whether problems were being
entered into the corrective action program with the appropriate characterization and
significance.
The inspectors completed seven samples by reviewing the following activities:
- 2B chemical and volume control (CV) pump scheduled work window;
- emergent Unit 2 fuel pool cooling valve work;
7 Enclosure
- 2B SX pump scheduled work window;
- 2A DG scheduled work window;
- Unit 2 component cooling (CC) heat exchanger scheduled outage;
- 2B safety injection (SI) pump scheduled work window; and
- emergent 0B control room chiller failure.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated plant conditions and selected IRs for risk-significant
components and systems in which operability issues were questioned. These conditions
were evaluated to determine whether the operability of components was justified. The
inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate section of the
UFSAR to the licensees evaluations presented in the IRs and documents listed in
Attachment 1 to verify that the components or systems were operable. The inspectors
also conducted interviews with the appropriate licensee system engineers and
conducted plant walkdowns, as necessary, to obtain further information regarding
operability questions. The inspectors verified that minor issues identified during this
inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action program. Documents
reviewed as part of this inspection are listed in Attachment 1.
The inspectors completed eight samples by reviewing the following operability
evaluations and conditions:
Unit 1 refueling outage;
- RH system operability with back leakage from reactor coolant system;
- containment operability with increased transient material storage;
- Unit 1 reactor coolant system unidentified leakage increase;
- Unit 1containment floor drain sump indication below zero;
- Unit 2 group step counter shutdown bank counter battery low;
- Unit 1 containment emergency core cooling system (ECCS) sump strainer
margin decreased due to additional unqualified coatings; and
- potential air entrainment in ECCS suction piping from the refueling water storage
tank.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)
Annual Review
8 Enclosure
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and vendor design documents, and
observed part of the licensees activities to implement a design change that affected
Unit 2 while online. Specifically, the licensee replaced both the safety related Instrument
Bus 212 7.5 KVA [kilovolt-amps] Inverter (2IP06E) with an AMETEK 10 KVA Inverter
and the corresponding constant voltage transformer with a design compatible with the
new inverter. The inspectors reviewed the associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against
the system design bases documentation to verify that the modifications had not affected
system operability/availability. The inspectors reviewed selected ongoing and completed
work activities to verify that installation was consistent with the design control
documents. Final completion of this modification, including replacement of the main
direct current power breaker to the inverter and wiring of an automatic swap feature to
the constant voltage transformer upon loss of the inverter will occur during the upcoming
Unit 2 outage in October 2006. Documents reviewed as part of this inspection are listed
in Attachment 1.
This review constituted one sample of the inspection requirement.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing activities associated with important
mitigating systems, barrier integrity, and support systems to ensure that the testing
adequately demonstrated system operability and functional capability. The inspectors
used the appropriate sections of the TS and UFSAR, as well as the Work Orders (WO)
for the work performed, to evaluate the scope of the maintenance and to determine
whether the post-maintenance testing was performed adequately, demonstrated that the
maintenance was successful, and that operability was restored. The inspectors
determined whether the tests were conducted in accordance with the procedures,
including establishing the proper plant conditions and prerequisites; that the test
acceptance criteria were met; and that the results of the tests were properly reviewed
and recorded. The activities were selected based on their importance in demonstrating
mitigating systems capability and barrier integrity. Documents reviewed as part of this
inspection are listed in Attachment 1.
Six samples were completed by observing post-maintenance testing of the following
components:
- 2B CV pump following a maintenance window;
- 2B SX pump following a maintenance window;
- 2A DG following a maintenance window;
- 2B containment spray (CS) pump following a maintenance window;
- 1B CS pump following a maintenance window; and
9 Enclosure
- 2B SI pump following a maintenance window.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20)
a. Inspection Scope
In preparation for an upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage, the inspectors monitored the
licensees new fuel receipt activities, including its identification of and response to a mis-
packed fuel shipment container and a stuck fuel assembly in the spent fuel pool. The
inspectors also met with the licensees outage work control manager to review the
outage schedule and outage risk management plans. Documents reviewed are listed in
Attachment 1. This inspection did not constitute an inspection sample. The refueling
outage sample will be completed in the next quarterly inspection period.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed surveillance testing activities associated with important
mitigating systems, barrier integrity, and support systems to ensure that the testing
adequately demonstrated system operability and functional capability. The inspectors
used the appropriate sections of the TS and UFSAR to determine whether the
surveillance testing was performed adequately and that operability was restored. The
inspectors determined whether the testing met the frequency requirements; that the tests
were conducted in accordance with the procedures, including establishing the proper
plant conditions and prerequisites; that the test acceptance criteria were met; and that
the results of the tests were properly reviewed and recorded. The activities were
selected based on their importance in demonstrating mitigating systems capability,
barrier integrity and the initiating events cornerstone. The inspectors verified that minor
issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action
program. Documents reviewed as part of this inspection are listed in Attachment 1.
Five samples were completed by observing and evaluating the following surveillance
tests, four of which are Routine samples and one is an In-Service Testing sample:
- 2A DG slave start and monthly operability run;
- 1A DG monthly operability run and fast restart test;
- Unit 1 reheat and intercept valve test in conjunction with a reheater drain tank
level adjustment; and
10 Enclosure
- liquid radioactive waste line process radiation monitor (0PR01J) digital calibration
prior to the resumption of normal radioactive liquid effluent release.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the installation of temporary modifications that could affect the
operability of risk significant equipment, the probability of an initiating event, or an
unauthorized radioactive material discharge. For each temporary modification, the
inspectors reviewed the associated design change paperwork, performed a walkdown
installation, and reviewed the affected TS and UFSAR. The inspectors also reviewed
the licensees plans schedules for removing the temporary modification or making it
permanent. Those documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in
Attachment 1. This review constituted two samples of this inspection requirement. The
following temporary modifications were reviewed:
- Engineering Change 362048; Temporarily Defeat the Trip and Alarms for the Unit
2 GIX Relay; and
- WO 00949935-01; Disposal of Low Level Tritiated Water Via the Station
Blowdown Line.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed licensee performance during one crew license examination
scenario on the simulator. The inspectors observed event classification and notification
activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also observed the critique of the
scenario to determine whether their observations were also identified by the licensee
evaluators and reviewed documents listed in Attachment 1 to determine whether
deficiencies were entered into the licensees corrective action system. This activity
constituted one inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2. RADIATION SAFETY
11 Enclosure
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03)
.1 Inspection Planning
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Braidwood Station UFSAR to identify applicable radiation
monitors associated with measuring transient high and very high radiation areas
including those used in remote emergency assessment. The inspectors identified the
types of portable radiation detection instrumentation used for job coverage of high
radiation area work including instruments used for underwater surveys, fixed area
radiation monitors used to provide radiological information in various plant areas, and
continuous air monitors used to assess airborne radiological conditions and work areas
with the potential for workers to receive a 50 millirem or greater committed effective dose
equivalent. Contamination monitors, whole body counters, and those radiation detection
instruments utilized for the release of personnel and equipment from the radiologically
controlled area were also identified. Documents reviewed during this inspection are
listed in Attachment 1.
These reviews represented two inspection samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Walkdowns of Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted walkdowns of selected area radiation monitors in the Unit 1
and 2 auxiliary buildings to verify that they were located as described in the UFSAR and
were adequately positioned relative to the potential source(s) of radiation they were
intended to monitor. Walkdowns were also conducted of those areas where portable
survey instruments were calibrated/repaired and maintained for radiation protection staff
use to determine if those instruments designated ready for use were sufficient in
number to support the radiation protection program, had current calibration stickers,
were operable, and were in adequate physical condition. Additionally, the inspectors
observed the licensees instrument calibration units and the radiation sources used for
instrument checks to assess their material condition and discussed their use with the
radiation protection (RP) staff to determine if they were used appropriately. Licensee
personnel demonstrated the methods for performing source checks of portable survey
instruments and for source checking personnel contamination and portal monitors used
at the egress to the radiologically controlled area. Documents reviewed are listed in
Attachment 1.
These reviews represented one inspection sample.
12 Enclosure
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Calibration and Testing of Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
a. Inspection Scope
Portable survey instrument calibrations were performed at an offsite Exelon facility.
Licensee personnel were observed performing source checks of selected instruments.
This included observing detector evaluation with check sources to determine if station
requirements were met. The inspectors reviewed records of calibration, operability, and
alarm setpoints of selected instruments and personnel monitoring devices. This review
included, but was not limited to the following:
- Certificate of Calibration for Eberline Radiation Detection Device Model ASP-1,
Serial No. 1268;
- Certificate of Calibration for Eberline Radiation Detection Device Model PRM-6,
Serial No. 1440;
- Certificate of Calibration for Eberline Radiation Detection Device Model PRM-6,
Serial No. 1368;
- Certificate of Calibration for Bicron Radiation Detection Device Model RSO-50E,
Serial No. B920Y;
- Certificate of Calibration for MGP Radiation Detection Device Model Telepole
WR, Serial No. 6603-137; and
- RP-BR-712 Ion Chamber Calibration Form, Serial Number C928H.
The inspectors evaluated those actions that would be taken when, during calibration or
source checks, an instrument was found to be out of calibration by more than
50 percent. Those actions included an investigation of the instruments previous usages
and the possible consequences of that since the last calibration or source check. The
inspectors also reviewed the licensees 10 CFR Part 61 source term analyses to
determine if the calibration sources used were representative of the plant source term.
Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment 1. This review represented one sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees self-assessments, audits, and condition reports
that involved personnel contamination monitor alarms due to personnel internal
exposures to determine if identified problems were entered into the corrective action
program for resolution. There were no internal exposure occurrences greater than
50 millirem committed effective dose equivalent that were evaluated during the
inspection. However, the licensees process for investigating this type of occurrence
13 Enclosure
was reviewed to determine if the affected personnel would be properly monitored
utilizing the appropriate equipment and if the data would be analyzed and internal
exposures properly assessed in accordance with licensee procedures. Documents
reviewed are listed in Attachment 1. This review represented one sample.
The inspectors reviewed corrective action program reports related to exposure of
significant radiological incidents that involved radiation monitoring instrument
deficiencies since the last inspection in this area. Staff members were interviewed and
corrective action documents were reviewed to determine if follow-up activities were
being conducted in an effective and timely manner commensurate with its importance to
safety and risk based on the following:
- initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking;
- disposition of operability/reportability issues;
- evaluation of safety significance/risk and priority for resolution;
- identification of repetitive problems;
- identification of contributing causes;
- identification and implementation of effective corrective actions;
- resolution of NCVs tracked in the corrective action system; and
- implementation/consideration of risk significant operational experience feedback.
Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment 1. This review represented one sample.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees self-assessment activities to determine if they
would identify and address repetitive deficiencies or significant individual deficiencies
observed in problem identification and resolution. Documents reviewed during this
inspection are listed in Attachment 1. This review represented one sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Radiation Protection Technician Instrument Use
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors determined if the calibration expiration and source response check data
records on radiation detection instruments staged for use were current and observed
radiation protection technicians for appropriate instrument selection and self-verification
of instrument operability prior to use. Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment 1.
This review represented one sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.6 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Maintenance/Inspection and User Training
a. Inspection Scope
14 Enclosure
The inspectors reviewed the status, maintenance and surveillance records of selected
self-contained breathing apparatuses staged and ready for use in the plant and
assessed the licensees capability for refilling and transporting self-contained breathing
apparatus air bottles to and from the control room during emergency conditions. The
inspectors determined whether control room operators and other emergency response
and radiation protection personnel were trained and qualified in the use of self-contained
breathing apparatuses including personal bottle change-out. The inspectors also
reviewed the training and qualification records for selected individuals on each control
room shift crew and selected individuals from each designated department that were
currently assigned emergency duties, including onsite search and rescue. Documents
reviewed are listed in Attachment 1. This review represented one sample.
The inspectors reviewed the self-contained breathing apparatus manufacturers
maintenance training certifications for licensee personnel qualified to perform self-
contained breathing apparatus maintenance on vital components (regulator and low
pressure alarm). The inspectors reviewed maintenance records for several self-
contained breathing apparatuses designated as ready for service. The inspectors
verified that maintenance was performed by qualified personnel over the past five years.
The inspectors also determined if the required, periodic air cylinder hydrostatic testing
was current and documented. The inspectors also evaluated if this licensees
maintenance procedures were consistent with the self-contained breathing apparatus
manufacturers maintenance manuals. Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment 1.
This review represented one sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems (71122.01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors continued to monitor the licensees activities resulting from previous
inadvertent leaks of tritiated liquid from the blowdown line to the Kankakee River. The
inspection activities included the following:
- emptying the temporary outside storage tanks and sending the water to be
reprocessed in the plant;
- moving some of the temporary tanks offsite and setting up a contingency area for
the remainder;
- operation of the pond remediation pumping system;
- response to increased tritium levels in the Unit 1 secondary plant;
- response to increased tritium discharges to the Braidwood cooling lake;
- response to tritium detection in the oil separator and plant ditches;
- several walkdowns of the blowdown line vacuum breakers;
- pumping of the temporary bladder storage units to the blowdown line;
- preparations for remediation of the area around vacuum breaker #1; and
15 Enclosure
- preparations for resumption of normal radioactive liquid releases to the Kankakee
River.
In addition, the inspectors attended and presented information at meetings, hosted by
the licensee, for interested community members and participated in tours of the affected
areas by public officials and NRC senior managers, including the Chairman of the NRC.
This inspection did not constitute a completed sample. Documents reviewed as part of
this inspection are listed in Attachment 1.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2PS3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) and Radioactive Material
Control Program (71122.03)
Reviews of Radiological Environmental Monitoring Reports, Data and Quality Control
a. Inspection Scope
The NRC performed a number of confirmatory measurements of water samples to
evaluate the licensees proficiency in collecting and in analyzing water samples for
tritium and other radioactive isotopes. The samples were collected independently by the
inspectors and/or by licensee personnel and sent to the NRCs contract laboratory for
the analysis of tritium. The NRC and licensee obtained these samples from surface
water and groundwater sampling points identified in the licensees Radiological
Environmental Monitoring Program and from onsite and offsite groundwater monitoring
wells. In particular, samples were obtained as part of the licensees environmental study
of tritium and potential groundwater contamination (ADAMS ML062760004) and as part
of the licensees evaluation of contamination from historical circulating water blowdown
line leakage that was described in NRC Inspection Report 05000456/2006008;
50000457/2006008 (ML061450522). While tritium was the primary radionuclide of
concern, selected samples were also analyzed for gamma emitting radionuclides and for
strontium. The inspectors performed these reviews to assess the licensees analytical
detection capabilities for radio-analysis of environmental samples and its ability to
accurately quantify radionuclides to an acceptable level of sensitivity. The criteria used
to compare the sample results is provided in Attachment 2, and the results of the
comparisons between the NRC and licensee results is provided in Attachment 3.
The inspectors considered the following activities in evaluating the cause of any
comparisons that did not result in an agreement:
- re-analysis by licensee or NRCs contract laboratory;
- review of licensees interlaboratory cross check program results; and
- review of data for any apparent statistical biases.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
16 Enclosure
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
Cornerstones: Occupational and Public Radiation Safety
Radiation Safety Strategic Area
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled the licensees Performance Indicator (PI) submittals for the
periods listed below. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in
Revision 3 of Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
Performance Indicator Guideline, to verify the accuracy of the PI data. The following
PIs were reviewed:
- Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness: Units 1 and 2
The inspectors reviewed the licensees assessment of the PI for occupational
radiation safety, to determine if indicator related data was adequately assessed
and reported during the previous four quarters. The inspectors compared the
licensees PI data with the condition report database, reviewed radiological
restricted area exit electronic dosimetry transaction records, and conducted
walkdowns of accessible locked high radiation area entrances to verify the
adequacy of controls in place for these areas. Data collection and analysis
methods for PIs were discussed with licensee representatives to determine if
there were any unaccounted for occurrences in the Occupational Radiation
Safety PI as defined in Revision 3 of Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02,
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline. This review
represented one sample.
- Radiological Environmental Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation
Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences: Units 1 and 2
The inspectors reviewed data associated with the Radiological Environmental
Technical Specification/offsite dose Calculation Manual PI to determine if the
indicator was accurately assessed and reported. This review included the
licensees condition report database for the previous four quarters to identify any
potential occurrences such as unmonitored, uncontrolled or improperly calculated
effluent releases that may have impacted offsite dose. The inspectors also
selectively reviewed gaseous and liquid effluent release data and the results of
associated offsite dose calculations and quarterly PI verification records
generated over the previous four quarters. Data collection and analyses
methods for PIs were discussed with licensee representatives to determine if the
process was implemented consistent with industry guidance in Revision 3 of
Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline. This review represented one sample.
b. Findings
17 Enclosure
No findings of significance were identified. However, the inspectors reviewed the
adequacy of the licensees evaluation of abnormal radiological restricted area exit
electronic dosimetry transaction records. Specifically, the records for a condition
identified as Digi Reset were reviewed. Based on the licensees understanding, this
Digi Reset condition represented an event that indicates the dosimeter was not
functioning for some period of time while the dosimeter was in use. While the dosimeter
was not functioning, dose that was received by the worker would not be recorded by the
dosimeter. Therefore, this condition could represent an occurrence in the Occupational
Radiation Safety PI as defined in Revision 3 of Nuclear Energy Institute Document
99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline. At the time of this
inspection, the licensee had not determined the extent of the issue nor the impact of the
conditions on the workers dose records. The licensee planned to perform additional
evaluations to quantify the duration the dosimeter was not functioning, the amount of
dose that was missed during this time, and an evaluation of compliance with the
requirements specified in TS 5.7 Administrative Controls for High Radiation Areas.
Therefore, this issue remains unresolved pending NRC review of the licensees
evaluations, and therefore the issue is categorized as an Unresolved Item
05000456/2006004-02; 05000457/2006004-02.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,
and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
issued for follow-up, the inspectors performed screening of all items entered into the
licensees corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing the
description of each new IR and attending selective daily management review committee
meetings. Minor issues entered into the licensees corrective action program as a result
of the inspectors observations are generally denoted in Attachment 1. These activities
were part of normal inspection activities and were not considered separate samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Annual Sample - Operator Workarounds
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees ability to identify operator workarounds as well as
the timeliness by which they are addressed. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of
the plant both independently and with operators in order to assess for any deficiencies in
the plant that may prevent an operator from performing their job in a timely and safe
manner. In addition, a thorough records review was conducted which included the
adverse condition monitoring program, the list of equipment positioned by an equipment
status tag, the temporary configuration change log, the degraded equipment list, the
18 Enclosure
approved operator aid list, and a historical review of issue reports for potential operator
workarounds. Documents reviewed as part of this inspection are listed in Attachment 1.
This review represented one sample.
b. Assessment and Observations
The licensees corporate procedure for classifying operator workarounds created the
category of operator challenges which was differentiated from an operator workaround
based on the challenge being an obstacle to normal plant operation while the
workaround was described as an obstacle to emergency or safe plant operation
(TS/safety-related equipment). There were six items classified as operator challenges
and no identified operator workarounds. The inspectors observed a monthly meeting of
the plants Workaround Board, where three new challenges were added. The board
performed an effective review of various plant programs to assess for potential operator
workarounds and challenges, reviewed four issues raised by plant employees and the
NRC, and evaluated for any aggregate effects of the six open operator challenges. The
inspectors noted that the use of a separate category for operator challenges was an
acceptable management tool. However, it created a vulnerability allowing the licensee
to rationalize not always addressing operational issues in a timely manner. An example
of this can be seen in an operator challenge affecting the Unit 2 heater drain pumps,
which was first classified in 1995 and will not be completely addressed until the spring
of 2007, although no violations of NRC requirements are related to this, the failure to
address the concern placed an added burden on the operators.
4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)
Loss of Volume Control Tank Level due to Mispositioned Valve
a. Inspection Scope
On August 31, 2006 the inspectors responded to the Unit 1 control room when they were
informed that an unexplained lowering of level in the volume control tank (VCT) was
occurring. The licensee appropriately entered Abnormal Procedure 1BwOA PRI-1 for
excessive reactor coolant system leakage. This procedure directed the operators to
isolate letdown and charging which isolated the source of the leak from the reactor
coolant system. In parallel to the control room response the licensee dispatched
operators into the plant to determine the leak location. A non-licensed operator
discovered 1CV243, the VCT high point vent valve, a T handled globe valve, open and
noted flow noise through its pipe. The operator shut 1CV243, returning it to its normal
position, isolating flow from the VCT. The licensee determined the valve mis-positioning
resulted in approximately 175 gallons of water leaving the VCT at a maximum flow rate
of 7.5 gallons per minute.
No Emergency Action Levels were exceeded during this event. Subsequent licensee
investigation determined that a reactor protection technician had just completed loading
a 55 gallon drum being used to store spent resin fines into the VCT room. When the
drum was moved into the room it came into physical contact with the T handle of
1CV243 causing it to partially open. 1CV243 was especially susceptible to bumping
because of its location and because it only requires 1 rotation of its handle to fully
19 Enclosure
position open. The VCT room had been selected for storage of the radioactive 55 gallon
drum due to its proximity to the work site and since the VCT room was posted as a
Locked High Radiation Area and as a result would not normally be accessible. The
operations, radiation protection, and maintenance individuals involved with selecting the
temporary storage location for the drum did not take into account Braidwood procedures
for seismic spacing of objects in safety related spaces. This review represents one
inspection sample.
b. Findings
This issue was dispositioned in Section 4OA7.
4OA5 Other Activities
(Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/169: Mitigating Systems Performance
Index Verification
a. Inspection Scope
Between August 16 and September 28, 2006 the inspectors performed a detailed
records review of licensee reported unavailability and unreliability of mitigating systems
associated with TI 2515/169. The objective of this TI was to verify that the licensee
correctly implemented the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) guidance for
reporting unavailability and unreliability of monitored safety systems, and to verify the
accuracy of the licensee generated, plant specific MSPI basis document.
b. Evaluation of Inspection Requirements
In accordance with the requirements of TI 2515/169, the inspectors evaluated and
answered the following questions:
1. For the sample selected, did the licensee accurately document the baseline
planned unavailability hours for the MSPI systems?
No. The inspectors identified instances where cascaded unavailability time (inoperability
time associated with a support systems or related systems) were not uniformly reported
for the affected mitigating systems or in some instances not reported at all. In addition,
the inspectors noted a period of train unavailability that was not reported in its entirety for
the essential service water system, and the failure to report unavailability time of the
essential service water system during pump oil sampling even though the procedure
used was not listed in the MSPI basis document as one where unavailability time was
not recorded due to the short duration (<15 minutes)/simple recovery nature of the
procedure. These observations were captured in the licensees corrective action
program under IR 527253 (NRC noted November 2004 Diesel Generator data
incomplete), IR 531288 (Deficiencies found in MSPI baseline planned unavailability),
and IR 537269 (Correction for MSPI basis document identified by NRC audit). The
errors caused no change in PI color for any monitored mitigating system.
20 Enclosure
2. For the sample selected, did the licensee accurately document the actual
unavailability hours for the MSPI systems?
No. Concurrent with the inspectors review the licensee noted that unavailability was not
correctly reported for the residual heat removal system and the essential service water
system. This has been captured in the licensees corrective action system as IR 537472
(Self identified issues with in MSPI data for second quarter 2006). The licensee planned
to submit changes to the NRC on October 21, 2006 in accordance with NEI 99-02,
Revision 4. The errors caused no change in PI color for any monitored mitigating
system.
3. For the sample selected, did the licensee accurately document the actual
unreliability information for each MSPI monitored component?
Yes. The inspectors reviewed maintenance records, operator logs, and the corrective
action program database and found the unreliability information reported by the licensee
to be accurate.
4. Did the inspector identify significant errors in the reported data, which resulted in
a change to the indicated index color? Describe the actual condition and
corrective actions taken by the licensee, including the date when the revised PI
information was sent to the NRC.
No. Errors identified by the inspectors and the licensee were entered into the calculation
for unavailability index. The results showed no change in PI color for any monitored
mitigating system. The licensee planned to submit changes in the MSPI basis document
and the reported 2nd quarter 2006 unavailability index to the NRC on October 21, 2006.
5. Did the inspectors identify significant discrepancies in the basis document which
resulted in (1) a change to a system boundary; (2) an addition of a monitored
component; or (3) a change in reported index color? Describe the actual
condition and corrective actions taken by the licensee, including the date the
bases document was revised.
No errors identified by the inspectors in the basis document resulted in changes in
system boundaries, monitored components, or performance index color. The licensee
planned to submit a revised basis document to the NRC on October 21, 2006, which
was to include revisions of minor errors noted by the inspectors and the licensee during
the course of their review.
c. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting
21 Enclosure
On October 10, 2006, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to
Mr. T. Coutu and his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors asked the
licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered
proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
Interim exit meetings were conducted for:
- Occupational radiation safety program for radiation monitoring instrumentation
and protective equipment program with Mr. K. Polson and Mr. D. Ambler on
August 4, 2006.
- Performance indicator verification with Mr. D. Ambler and Mr. J. Moser on
September 7, 2006.
- Public radiation safety with Mr. T. Tierney on October 13, 2006 .
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the
licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of
the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a NCV.
Technical Specification 5.4 required implementation of the applicable procedures
recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. Regulatory
Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Part 6, Subsection w, recommended procedures for combating
emergencies and other significant events such as earthquakes. Contrary to this
requirement, the licensee failed to implement appropriate procedures for the temporary
storage of materials in a safety-related space. Specifically, BwAP 1100-23, Step 2.c.2,
required that all portable or mobile stored objects be placed a distance of one foot plus
the height of the stored object from any structures, systems, or components within the
auxiliary building in order to prevent physical contact during a postulated seismic event.
The failure to analyze the VCT room for seismic spacing resulted in a space without
adequate clearance being selected as a storage location for temporary solid radioactive
waste. This in turn led to the bumping event of August 31, 2006, which resulted in
approximately 175 gallons being drained from the Unit 1 reactor coolant system. This
issue was considered to be of very low safety significance because assuming worst case
degradation, the finding would not have exceeded the TS limit of 10 gpm for identified
leakage and could not have affected the ability of a mitigating system from performing its
safety function. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action
program as IR 526093.
ATTACHMENTS: 1. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
2. CONFIRMATORY MEASUREMENTS COMPARISON CRITERIA
3. TRITIUM SAMPLE RESULTS
22 Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
T. Coutu, Site Vice President
G. Boerschig Plant Manager
D. Ambler, Regulatory Assurance Manager
M. Cichon, Licensing Engineer
L. Coyle, Maintenance Director
G. Dudek, Operations Director
J. Moser, Radiation Protection Manager
A. Ronstadt, Maintenance Rule Coordinator
M. Smith, Engineering Director
P. Summers, Nuclear Oversight Manager
T. Tierney, Chemistry, Environmental, and Radioactive Waste Manager
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
R. Skokowski, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000456/2006004-01; NCV Failure to Maintain Electrically Supervised Fire Doors in
05000457/2006004-01 Accordance With the Fire Protection Program (Section
1R05)05000456/2006004-02; URI Impact of Nonfunctional Dosimeters on Dose Tracking and
05000457/2006004-02 Technical Specification Compliance (Section 4OA1.1)
Closed
05000456/2006004-01; NCV Failure to Maintain Electrically Supervised Fire Doors in
05000457/2006004-01 Accordance With the Fire Protection Program (Section
1R05)
Attachment 1
1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does
not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety but rather that
selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or
any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
0BwOA ENV-1; Adverse Weather Conditions Unit 0; Revision 104
IR 519265; Rain Blowing Into The Unit 2 Octopus; August 10, 2006 [NRC-Identified]
1R04 Equipment Alignment
IR 451462; Boric Acid Deposits Found on 2RH01PA Stud; February 8, 2006
IR 523818; Minor Oil Leak - Puddle on Floor (Source Unknown) - 2DG01KB;
August 25, 2006 [NRC-Identified]
IR 524993; Minor Oil Leak From Turbocharger Lube Oil Drains; August 29, 2006 [NRC-
Identified]
BwOP RH-E2; Electrical Lineup - Unit 2; Revision 4
BwOP RH-M3; Operating Mechanical Lineup Unit 2, 2A RH Train; Revision 8
WO 00931571; Unit Two ECCS Venting and Valve Alignment Surveillance Data Sheet;
July 16, 2006
DWG M - 137; Diagram of Residual Heat Removal (RH) Unit 2; May 5, 1976
BwOP DG-E1; Electrical Lineup - Unit 1, 1A Diesel Generator (DG); Revision 6
BwOP DG-E4; Electrical Lineup - Unit 2, 2B DG; Revision 4
BwOP DG-M1; Operating Mechanical Lineup - Unit 1, 1A DG; Revision 14
BwOP DG-M4; Operating Mechanical Lineup - Unit 2, 2B DG; Revision 10
BwOP AF-E2; Electrical Lineup - Unit 2 Operating; Revision 8
BwOP AF-M2; Operating Mechanical Lineup, Auxiliary Feedwater Unit 2; Revision 9
1R05 Fire Protection
IR 382828; B3 Trend code; 0TI-FP8023 As Found Values Out of Tolerance
Low/Defective; October 6, 2005
IR 486020; Unit Auxiliary Transformer 141-1 Deluge Valve Leaks By; May 3, 2006
IR 508168; NRC Identified Location Discrepancies on 2D-11 Preplan and Fire Protection
Report Drawing; July 11, 2006 [NRC-Identified]
IR 508296; NRC Identified Overhead Page Speaker Fouled; July 11, 2006 [NRC-
Identified]
IR 512899; Fire Door Design Deviation Not Documented in FPR; July 25, 2006 [IEMA-
Identified]
IR 516465; BwOP FP-100, Box Fan Improperly Stored Inside TB-451 Fire Protection
Cage; August 3, 2006 [NRC-Identified]
IR 527413; Create Sign for Operations B.5.b Building; September 5, 2006
ECR [Engineering Change Request] 376981; Fire Prevention Safeguards for Temporary
Occupancy of Warehouse #5 and Vahle Dome; Revision 0
IR 525203; High Hydrogen Usage on Unit 2, Leak Suspected; August 30, 2006
IR 525521; Wasps Nest Identified By NRC on Unit 2 Hydrogen Vent Line;
August 30, 2006 [NRC-Identified]
Attachment 1
2
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
Calculation 3C8-0685-002; Auxiliary Building Flood Level Calculations - Flood Zone
S8-4B/S8-4A, Elevation 439; Revision 3
IR 445675; Unacceptable Material Condition; January 24, 2006
IR 462469; Lack of Urgency to Address Material Condition (1B and 1C MSIV [Main
Steam Isolation Valve] Rooms); March 6, 2006
IR 466518; Extent of Condition (Poor Material Condition Unit 2 MSIV Rooms);
March 14, 2006
IR 470309; Compensatory Measure for Material Condition 1B/1C MSIV Rooms;
March 24, 2006
IR 470387; Develop/Implement plan, Address Water Intrusion MSIV Rooms;
March 24, 2006
IR 519023; Lower Cable Spreading Room Floor Drain Plugged; August 11, 2006
IR 525799; MSIV Room Material Condition; August 31, 2006
IR 526605; Ground Water Leak at Unit 1 Main Steam Tunnel; August 31, 2006
IR 529249; 439' U-2 Lower Cable Spreading Room Floor Drain Overflowing;
August 27, 2006
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Scenario Number BR-16; Respond to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture with a Faulted
Steam Generator and Miscellaneous Malfunctions; Revision 2006
IR 527932; Training Simulator Guide Enhancements Required; September 6, 2006
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria for Station Air to the Instrument Air System
Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria for Dry Filtered Instrument Air for Equipment
and Instruments
IR 358248; Unit 0 Service Air Compressor Shutdown Due to High Vibrations;
July 29, 2005
IR 502397; Potential Repetitive MPFF on U-2 Service Air Compressor Trip;
June 22, 2006
IR 509645; 2A DG Fuel Oil Leak. 1 Drop/2 sec at Strainer Hose Fitting; July 15, 2006
IR 512840; Missed Opportunity During 2SA01C Work Window; July 21, 2006
IR 523717; NRC Inspectors Concern with Classification of Equipment Failures;
August 25, 2006 [NRC-Identified]
Apparent Cause Report 352740; 1WS336 Failed to Open on Unit 1 Station Air
Compressor Start resulting in a Compressor Trip on High Oil Temperature;
July 13, 2005
Apparent Cause Report 501537; Unit 2 Station Air Compressor Tripped on High Inlet Oil
Temperature; June 19, 2006
Apparent Cause Report 502360; Unit 2 Station Air Compressor Tripped Due to Elevated
Vibrations; August 24, 2006
Apparent Cause Report 358367; Issues Identified Pertaining to the Unit Common Station
Compressor Following Recent Maintenance Window; Revision 1
Maintenance Rule Evaluation History; July 6, 2006
WO 970011807; 2A Emergency DG - Install Fuel Oil Filter/Strainer Mod per E20-96-61;
Revision 1
EC E20-2-96-261; Replace DG Fuel Oil Filter/Strainer with New Design; May 8, 2000
Attachment 1
3
WO 938594; 2A DG Fuel Oil Leak. 1 Drop/2 sec at Strainer Hose Fitting; July 15, 2006
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
IR 537089; 0B Control Room Chiller Found Inoperable During Walkdown;
September 27, 2006
2B CV Pump Work Window Protected Equipment; July 24, 2006
Paragon plant risk model with 2B CV pump out of service while performing 2B Solid
State Protection System surveillance; July 28, 2006
BwOP FC-11; Spent Fuel Pool Level Adjustment; Revision 28
Protected equipment with Unit 1 and Unit 2 fuel pool cooling pumps out of service;
August 15, 2006
Protected equipment for 2B essential service water (SX) pump out of service;
August 21, 2006
Protected equipment for 2A DG out of service; August 27, 2006
IR 514716; Unit 2 Risk Assessment Incorrect for 2A SX Pump Work; July 30, 2006
Protected Equipment Signs for the Unit 2 CC Heat Exchanger, September 11, 2006
Unit 0,1 Risk Assessment; Work Week 9/11/2006
Unit 2 Risk Assessment, Work Week 9/11/2006
On-Line Work Control Look ahead Schedule; September 12, 2006
2B SI Pump Work Window Protected Equipment; September 21, 2006
BwOP VC-1; Startup of Control Room HVAC [Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning]
System; Revision 9
BwOP VC-2; Shutdown of Control Room HVAC System; Revision 7
1R15 Operability Evaluations
DWG M - 137; Diagram of RH Unit 2; May 5, 1976
DWG M - 136; Diagram of Safety Injection Unit 2; May 5, 1976
NRC Contact Report in Reference to IR 518634; August 22, 2006
BwVSR 3.4.14.1; Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve Leakage
Surveillance; Revision 12
IR 343906; Disassemble and inspect 2SI8818C and D under WO 681808 AND
99176374 in A2R12; June 14, 2005
BwAR 2-6-B1; RH Pump 2A Discharge Pressure High; Revision 5E1
IR 518634; 2A RH Pump [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] ASME Pressure
Anomaly Noted; August 10, 2006
IR 522566; NRC Questions IR 518634, 2A RH Pump Operability; August 22, 2006
[NRC-Identified]
IR 518845; Lead Blankets Stored In Containment Exceed Evaluated Values;
August 10, 2006
EC 332151; Lead Shielding In Containment - Long Term Storage; July 22, 2002
BRW-S-2001-535; Storage of Lead Blankets Inside Containment Building; Revision 0
IR 447295; Unit 2 Group Step Counter Shutdown Bank C Flashing at 227;
January 29, 2006,
IR 477192; Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Leakrate Slightly Elevated; April 10, 2006
IR 447364; Shutdown Bank C Group Step Counter Declared Inoperable;
January 30, 2006,
IR 447884; Need WO Replace Unit 2 Digital Step Counter Batteries in A2R12;
January 30, 2006,
Attachment 1
4
IR 450704; ECCS Sump Strainer Margin Unqualified Coatings; February 6, 2006,
IR 484627; Potentially Unqualified Coating on Duct Work in Containment; April 28, 2006,
IR 486260; Need To Document Operability Bases for RF Sump Indication; May 2, 2006,
IR 486260; Assignment 2, Re-visit to Determine if Operable, If We Have Level
Indication; July 6, 2006,
IR 493933; Metallurgical Results Pressurizer Heater Sleeve; May 24, 2006
IR 501764; Possible Repetitive Functional Failure of Rod Drive Step Counter;
June 16, 2006
IR 506271; Increased Input to Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank; July 4, 2006
IR 506580; NRC Concern With Lack of Communication With Recent Issues; July 5, 2006
[NRC-Identified]
IR 510913; Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Trend; July 19, 2006
IR 518634; 2A RH Pump ASME Pressure Anomaly Noted; August 8, 2006
IR 533902; Gas Void Found in Byron ECCS Suction Piping; September 19, 2006
IR 531066; Enhancement Opportunity - Need Formal Document to Track Margins;
September 14, 2006 [NRC-Identified]
IR 525912; Review of Trend in Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate - Possible
Cause; August 31, 2006
Apparent Cause Report Rod Drive System Shutdown Bank C Step Counter Batteries
Failed Earlier than Expected; January 30, 2006
Functional Failure Cause Determination Evaluation, for Rod Control Shutdown Bank C
Step Counter Declared Inoperable; March 3, 2006
(a)(1) Determination Template; 501764-03 and previous IRs 500698 and 447295;
June 21, 2006
Expert Panel Meeting notes from July 25, 2006
Analysis BRW-98-0100-M/BYR98-030; Containment Sump Zone of Influence for Failed
Coatings; Revision 03A
Analysis CS-5; NPSHA for RHR and CS Pumps; Revision 03D
Westinghouse LTR_RCPL-06-75; Operability Assessment for Braidwood Units 1 and 2
and Byron Units 1 and 2 Pressurizer Heater Sleeves With Potential Circumferential
Cracking; May 26, 2006
Operability Evaluation 06-002; Unit 1 and Unit 2 Pressurizer heater Sleeves;
June 1, 2006
NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance; Operability Determinations and
Functionality Assessments of Degraded or Non-Conforming Conditions Adverse to
Quality or Safety; Appendix C
IR 517500; NRC Questions Surrounding Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Leakage
Increa
se;
August
3,
2006
[NRC-
Identifi
ed]
IR 522566; NRC Questions on IR 518634 Response; August 22, 2006 [NRC-Identified]
1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications
Attachment 1
5
EC 352346; Design Consideration Summary; Revision 1
BwOP IP-1; Instrument Bus Inverter Startup; Revision 17
EC 352346; Work Planning Instructions for Replacement of Instrument Power
Inverter 212 (2IP06E); Revision 1
BRW-S-2006-132; 50.59 Screening for Instrument Power Inverter Replacements;
Revision 0
IR 537137; 212 Inverter Placard Needs Removed; September 28, 2006
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
1BwVSR 5.5.8.CS.2; ASME Surveillance Requirements for 1B Containment Spray Pump
and Check Valves 1CS003B, 1CS011B; Revision 5
2BwVSR 5.5.8.CS.2; ASME Surveillance Requirements for 2B Containment Spray Pump
and Check Valves 2CS003B, 2CS011B; Revision 6
2BwVSR 5.5.8.SX.2; ASME Surveillance Requirements For 2B SX Pump; Revision 5
2BwVSR 5.5.8.SI.2; ASME Surveillance Requirements For The 2B Safety Injection
Pump; Revision 4
BwOP SI-1; Safety Injection System Startup; Revision 17
BwOP SI-2; Safety Injection System Shutdown; Revision 10
2BwOSR 3.8.1.2-1; 2A DG Operability Surveillance; Revision 20
IR 512946; No Procedure Exists for Gearbox Maintenance on the CV Pump;
July 25, 2006
IR 513689; Foreign Material Found in 2CV01PB Gear Case; July 27, 2006
IR 513620; Limiting Condition for Operations Action Requirement Exit Delays for 2B CV
Pump; July 26, 2006
2BwVSR 5.5.8.CV.2; ASME Surveillance Requirements for 2B Centrifugal Charging
Pump and Check Valve 2CV8480B Stroke Test; Revision 4
IR 514820; 2CV01PB Charging Pump Gear High Temperature; July 31, 2006
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
IR 513032; Fuel Assembly Will Not Move Up or Downward in Spent Fuel Pool Cell;
July 25, 2006
IR 513158; Foreign Material Exclusion Event - Portion of Burnable Poison Rodlet
Assembly found in Spent Fuel Pool Location; July 25, 2006
IR 519870; New Fuel Improperly Packaged by Westinghouse; August 14, 2006
WO 777264-01; Troubleshooting Log for Fuel Assembly S60S; July 25, 2006
1R22 Surveillance Testing
2BwOSR 3.3.2.8-611A; Unit 2 ESFAS [Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System]
Instrumentation Slave Relay Surveillance; Revision 4
2BwOSR 3.8.1.2-1; 2A DG Operability Surveillance; Revision 20
1BwOSR 3.3.2.8-611A; Unit 1 ESFAS Instrumentation Slave Relay Surveillance;
Revision 4
1BwOSR 3.8.1.15-1; Unit 1 1A DG Hot Restart Test; Revision 0
1BwVSR 5.5.8.CC.1; ASME Surveillance Requirements for Component Cooling Pump
1CC01PA and Discharge Check Valves; Revision 2
IR 521181; Unable to Fully Adjust Level in 1D 1ST Stage Reheater DrainTank;
August 17, 2006
IR 521525; EC361993 Doesnt Prevent HI-2 Level Alarm; August 18, 2006
Attachment 1
6
1BwOS TRM 3.3.g3; Unit One Turbine Overspeed Protection Systems Valve Stem
Freedom Checks; Revision 9a
0BwIS RETS 2.1-1; Digital Channel Operational Test of 0PR01J; Revision 9
IR 537503; RM-11 Problem During Functional Surveillance for 0PR01J;
September 28, 2006
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
EC 362048; Temporarily Defeat the Trip and Alarms for the Unit 2 GIX Relay; Revision 0
IR 514483; GIX-104 Has an Internal Interrupt Alarm In; July 28, 2006
IR 517637; Work Request to Have the Temporary Bladder Tanks Emptied;
August 7, 2006
50.59 Screening No. BRW-S-2006-181; Work Orders 949935, 949887, 950606 Disposal
of Low level Tritiated Water Via the Station blowdown Line; Revision 0
Tritium Sample Data Sheet; Bladders at Vacuum Breaker #1 (North) and #3;
August 23, 2006
Tritium Sample Data Sheet; Bladder at Vacuum Breaker #1 (South); August 31, 2006
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
Scenario Number BR-16; Respond to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture with a Faulted
Steam Generator and Miscellaneous Malfunctions; Revision 2006
IR 505980; Blank Severe Accident Management Guideline Procedure; July 3, 2006
[IEMA-Identified]
IR 527932; Training Simulator Guide Enhancements Required; September 6, 2006
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment
RP-BR-730; Operation and Verification of Counting Efficiencies for GM-Type
Contamination Survey Instruments; Revision 3
RP-BR-760; Operation and Calibration of the Radeco Portable Air Samplers; Revision 0
RP-BR-712; Operation and Calibration of Ionization Chamber Survey Instruments
RP-AA-700; Controls for Radiation Protection Instrumentation; Revision 1
IR 387631; Check-In Self-Assessment Report; RP Instrumentation Program Check-In:
Follow-up to NOS 2005 RP Fleet Assessment; July 26, 2006
NOSA-BRW-05-06 (IR 287716); Health Physics Functional Area NOS Audit;
June 22, 2005 Device Model ASP-1/AC3-7; Serial No. 652/724197; tested July 7, 2006
IR 344675; NOS ID: Calibration Dates Omitted from Calibration Forms; June 16, 2005
IR 344137; NOS ID (RP) 2004 WBC Calibration Beyond Required Frequency
June 14, 2005
IR 344702; NOS ID: RP Ann Cal Review and AF Data Reviews Not Performed;
June 16, 2005
IR 342624; NOS ID: (RP) Instrument Out of Tolerance Report(s) Deficiencies;
June 9, 2005
IR 344771; NOS ID: Out of Calibration Instruments on Inventory List; June 16,2005
IR 344716; NOS ID: RP Instrument Control Deficiency; June 16, 2005
IR 344848; NOS ID: Shepherd Source Certification/Characterization Issues;
June 16, 2005
RP-AP-605; Scaling Factor Determination, February 27, 2006
RP-BR-730; As Found Pre-Calibration Source Check Sheet; Instrument ASP-1
No. 1067; February 17, 2006
Attachment 1
7
RP-BR-730; Efficiency Verification Log Sheet; Instrument ASP-1 No. 1067;
March 13, 2006
RP-BR-730; As Found Pre-Calibration Source Check Sheet; Instrument RM-14
No. 7491; February 8, 2006
RP-BR-730; Efficiency Verification Log Sheet; Instrument RM-14 No. 7491;
February 8, 2006
Exelon Power Labs; Certificate of Calibration for Eberline Radiation Detection Device
Model ASP-1; Serial No. 1268; tested February 21, 2006
Exelon Power Labs; Certificate of Calibration for Eberline Radiation Detection Device
Model PRM-6; Serial No. 1440; tested February 27, 2006tion Detection Device Model
PRM-6; Serial No. 1368; tested March 1, 2006
Exelon Power Labs; Certificate of Calibration for Bicron Radiation Detection Device
Model RSO-50E; Serial No. B920Y; tested March 15, 2006
Exelon Power Labs; Certificate of Calibration for MGP Radiation Detection Device Model
Telepole WR; Serial No. 6603-137; tested May 18, 2006
RP-BR-712; Ion Chamber Calibration Form; Serial Number C928H, February 8, 2006
GM Source Check and SOP Checklist; dated July 31, 2006
RP-AA-440; Respiratory Protection Program; Revision 7
RP-AA-825; Maintenance, Care, and Inspection of Respiratory Protective Equipment;
Revision 2
RP-BR-827; Operation, Use, and Inspection of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
(SCBA), Revision 1
RP-BR-827; Attachment 3; ISI Viking Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Checklist;
August 2, 2006
IR 515952; Enhancement Identified in Storage of SCBA Corrective Lenses,
August 2, 2006
IR 516034; Shepherd calibrator Scale Deficiency, August 2, 2006
IR 516465; BWOP FP-100, Box Fan Improperly Stored Inside TB-451 FP Cage;
August 2, 2006
2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems
IR 527593; Exelon Pond Tritium is Higher Than 2862 pci/l; September 5, 2006
IR 531153; Tritium Concentration Exceeds 600 pci/l in the North Oil Separator;
September 14, 2006
IR 531688; Cooling Lake Tritium Concentration at 134 pci/l; September 15, 2006
IR 535874; Exelon Pond Flow Totalizer Reading Mismatch; September 25, 2006
Exelon Nuclear Braidwood Station Letter to NRC BW060085; Resumption of Liquid
Discharges Through Blowdown Line; September 1, 2006
EC 361965; Remediation of Tritium Contaminated Groundwater in the Vicinity of
Vacuum Breaker #1; Revision 0
Plant Operating Committee Meeting 06-027 Agenda Item; Resumption of Limited
Radwaste Liquid Release Via the Circulating Water blowdown Line; September 28, 2006
Plant Operating Committee Meeting 06-027 Agenda Item; Administrative Controls for
Vacuum Breaker 1 Remediation System; September 28, 2006
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
LS-AA-2140; Monthly Data Elements for NRC Occupational Exposure Control
Effectiveness; July 2005 through June 2006
Attachment 1
8
LS-AA-2150; Monthly Data Elements for RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent
Occurrences; July 2005 through June 2006
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
OP-AA-102-103; Operator Work-Around Program; Revision 1
Braidwood Station Work Around Board Meeting Handout; September 28, 2006
Temporary Configuration Change Monthly Review Sheet; September 14, 2006
Adverse Condition Monitoring Program Status Report; September 28, 2006
Approved Operator Aids; September 28, 2006
Operator Work-Around Status Update; August 3, 2006
IR 496552; 1B 1ST Stage RHDT HI-2 Alarm Failed to Reset During Reheat Valve/
Intercept Valve Surveillance; June 5, 2006
IR 526169; 1CV131 Pressure Swings in Auto or Manual Following Transient;
August 31, 2006
Braidwood Closed Operator Work-Around Log
Braidwood Closed Operator Challenge Log
4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Quick Human Performance Investigation Report; Unidentified Unit 1 Reactor Coolant
System Leakage Due to Bumping of 1CV243; September 6, 2006
BwAP 100-23; Seismic Housekeeping Requirements for the Temporary Storage of
Materials in Category 1 Areas; Revision 1
DWG M - 64; Diagram of the Chemical & Volume Control & Boron Thermal
Regeneration Systems; Sheet 4A
DWG M - 64; Diagram of the Chemical & Volume Control & Boron Thermal
Regeneration Systems; Sheet 4B
IR 526093; Unplanned LCOAR & BwOA Entry Due to 1CV243 Bumped;
August 31, 2006
1BwOA PRI-1; Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, Unit 1; Revision 101
4OA5 Other Activities
IR 225998; Unplanned LCO Entry for 2A Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) Pump Failure to Start;
June 4, 2004
IR 227302; 2A AF Pump Failed to Start From Main Control Room - Unplanned TRM
Entry; June 9, 2004
IR 527253; NRC Noted November 2004 DG Data Incomplete; September 5, 2006
[NRC-Identified]
IR 531288; Discrepancies Found in MSPI Baseline Planned Unavailability;
September 15, 2006 [NRC-Identified]
IR 537269; Corrections MSPI Basis Document Identified By NRC Audit;
September 28, 2006 [NRC-Identified]
IR 537472; Self Identified Issues in MSPI Data for Q2 2006; September 28, 2006
Maintenance Rule - Evaluation History; Chemical and Volume Control System; 2002 -
2006
Maintenance Rule - Evaluation History; Safety Injection System; 2002 - 2006
Maintenance Rule - Evaluation History; Residual Heat Removal System; 2002 - 2006
Maintenance Rule - Evaluation History; Auxiliary Feedwater System; 2002 - 2006
Maintenance Rule - Evaluation History; Diesel Generator System; 2002 - 2006
Attachment 1
9
Maintenance Rule - Evaluation History; Component Cooling Water System; 2002 - 2006
Maintenance Rule - Evaluation History; Essential Service Water System; 2002 - 2006
Focused Operator Log Review covering from January 2002 - June 2006
1BwOSR 3.3.2.3; Unit One Undervoltage Simulated Start of 1A Auxiliary Feedwater
Pump Surveillance; Revision 2
BB PRA-017.27A; Braidwood MSPI Basis Document; Revision 2
NEI 99-02 Appendix F; Methodologies for Computing the Unavailability Index,
Unreliability Index and Component Performance Limits; Revision 4
Attachment 1
10
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BwAP Braidwood Administrative Procedure
BwAR Braidwood Annunciator Response Procedure
BwOA Braidwood Abnormal Operating Procedure
BwOP Braidwood Operating Procedure
BwOSR Braidwood Operating Surveillance Requirement Procedure
BwVSR Braidwood Engineering Surveillance Requirement Procedure
CC Component Cooling
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CV Chemical and Volume Control
DG Diesel Generator
EC Engineering Change
ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System
ECR Engineering Change Request
ESFAS Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System
FPR Fire Protection Report
HVAC Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning
IEMA Illinois Emergency Management Agency
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
IR Issue Reports
KVA Kilovolt-Amps
LER Licensee Event Report
MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve
MSPI Mitigating System Performance Index
NCV Non-Cited Violation
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PARS Publicly Available Records
PI Performance Indicator
REMP Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
RP Radiation Protection
SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
SDP Significance Determination Process
SI Safety Injection
SX Essential Service Water
TI Temporary Instruction
TS Technical Specification
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
URI Unresolved Item
VCT Volume Control Tank
WO Work Order
Attachment 1
11
Confirmatory Measurements Comparison Criteria
The NRC applied the comparison criteria contained in NRC Inspection Procedure 84750,
Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring, dated
March 15, 1994, to determine if the licensees measurement results were in statistical
agreement with the NRC measurement results. For the purposes of this comparison, the NRC
result is divided by its associated uncertainty to obtain the resolution. (Note: For purposes of
this process, the uncertainty is defined as the relative standard deviation, one sigma, of the
NRCs contract laboratorys analysis.) The licensees result is then divided by the
corresponding NRC result to obtain the ratio (licensee result/NRC). The licensee's
measurement is in agreement if the value of the ratio fall within the limits shown in the following
table for the corresponding resolution.
Resolution Acceptance Range
(Licensee Result/NRC Result)
<4 Technical Judgement1
4-7 0.5-2.0
8-15 0.6-1.66
16-50 0.75-1.33
51-200 0.80-1.25
>200 0.85-1.18
For analyses that are below the minimum detectable concentration (either for the licensee or
NRCs contract laboratory), the measurements are determined to be in agreement if both are
below the minimum detectable concentration or if one has an uncertainty that is within the
minimum detectable concentration.
1
The inspectors used technical judgement in reviewing results having a relative 1 sigma
uncertainty greater than 25 percent (i.e., resolution less than 4). In these cases, the values
were typically very close to the laboratorys detection capabilities, and greater variability was
expected. Consequently, these sample comparisons were made based on the inspectors
qualitative review of the analytical results.
1 Attachment 2
Attachment 3
Tritium Sample Results
Braidwood Generating Station
NRC Licensee Ratio:
Collection
Date Sample ID MDC Sample ID
pCi/L +/- uncertainty pCi/L +/- uncertainty to NRC
1 02/09/2006 BD-06-1-01 < MDC 200 GW-020906-JK-PWN-201 < 200 n/a Agreement
2 02/10/2006 BD-06-1-02 < MDC 200 GW-021006-MB-PWN-202 < 200 n/a Agreement
3 01/18/2006 BD-06-1-03 2650 180 200 GW-011806-MB-SW-2 2504 154 0.94 Agreement
4 01/30/2006 BD-06-1-04 < MDC 200 GW-013006-MB-SW-05 < 200 n/a Agreement
5 02/24/2006 BD-06-1-05 < MDC 200 GW-022406-MB-TB1-8D < 200 n/a Agreement
6 02/24/2006 BD-06-1-06 < MDC 200 GW-022406-MB-TB1-9D < 200 n/a Agreement
7 02/24/2006 BD-06-1-07 < MDC 200 GW-022406-MB-TB1-10D < 200 n/a Agreement
8 02/02/2006 BD-06-1-08 < MDC 200 GW-020206-MB-PW-3 < 200 n/a Agreement
9 01/30/2006 BD-06-1-09 < MDC 200 GW-013006-MB-PW-5 < 200 n/a Agreement
10 01/19/2006 BD-06-1-10 < MDC 200 PW-5 < 200 n/a Agreement
11 02/02/2006 BD-06-1-11 < MDC 200 GW-020206-MB-PW-6 < 200 n/a Agreement
12 02/07/2006 BD-06-1-12 < MDC 200 GW-020706-MB-PW-6P < 200 n/a Agreement
13 02/02/2006 BD-06-1-13 < MDC 200 GW-020206-MB-PW-11 < 200 n/a Agreement
14 01/30/2006 BD-06-1-14 < MDC 200 GW-013006-MB-PW-13 < 200 n/a Agreement
15 01/30/2006 BD-06-1-15 < MDC 200 GW-013006-MB-PW-14 < 200 n/a Agreement
16 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-16 570 270 420 GW-022006-SC-VB4-1 1401 132 2.46 Agreement
17 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-17 < MDC 420 GW-022006-SC-VB4-1D < 420 n/a Agreement
18 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-18 < MDC 420 GW-022106-SC-VB4-2 < 420 n/a Agreement
19 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-19 < MDC 420 GW-022106-SC-VB4-2D < 420 n/a Agreement
20 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-20 33900 1100 420 GW-022106-SC-VB4-3 31459 490 0.93 Agreement
21 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-21 < MDC 420 GW-022106-SC-VB4-3D < 420 n/a Agreement
22 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-22 < MDC 420 GW-022106-SC-VB4-4 < 420 n/a Agreement
Page 1 of 8
Attachment 3
Tritium Sample Results
Braidwood Generating Station
NRC Licensee Ratio:
Collection
Date Sample ID MDC Sample ID
pCi/L +/- uncertainty pCi/L +/- uncertainty to NRC
23 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-23 < MDC 420 GW-022106-SC-VB4-4D < 420 n/a Agreement
24 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-24 < MDC 420 GW-022106-SC-VB4-5 < 420 n/a Agreement
25 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-25 < MDC 420 GW-022106-SC-VB4-5D < 420 n/a Agreement
26 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-26 < MDC 420 GW-022106-SC-VB4-6 < 420 n/a Agreement
27 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-27 < MDC 420 GW-022106-SC-VB4-6D < 420 n/a Agreement
28 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-28 < MDC 420 GW-022106-SC-VB4-7 < 420 n/a Agreement
29 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-29 < MDC 420 GW-022106-SC-VB4-7D < 420 n/a Agreement
30 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-30 < MDC 420 GW-022106-JK-VB4-8 < 420 n/a Agreement
31 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-31 < MDC 420 GW-022106-JK-VB4-8D < 420 n/a Agreement
32 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-32 < MDC 420 GW-022106-SC-VB4-9 < 420 n/a Agreement
33 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-33 < MDC 420 GW-022106-SC-VB4-9D < 420 n/a Agreement
34 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-34 < MDC 420 GW-022106-JK-VB4-10 < 420 n/a Agreement
35 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-35 < MDC 420 GW-022106-JK-VB4-10D < 420 n/a Agreement
36 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-36 < MDC 410 GW-022006-SC-VB4-11 < 410 n/a Agreement
37 02/09/2006 BD-06-1-37 < MDC 410 GW-020906-MB-VB4-11 < 410 n/a Agreement
38 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-38 < MDC 410 GW-022006-SC-VB4-11D < 410 n/a Agreement
39 02/09/2006 BD-06-1-39 < MDC 410 GW-020906-MB-VB4-11D < 410 n/a Agreement
40 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-40 < MDC 410 GW-022006-SC-VB4-12 < 410 n/a Agreement
41 02/09/2006 BD-06-1-41 < MDC 410 GW-020906-MB-VB4-12 < 410 n/a Agreement
42 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-42 < MDC 410 GW-022006-SC-VB4-12D < 410 n/a Agreement
43 02/09/2006 BD-06-1-43 < MDC 410 GW-020906-MB-VB4-12D < 410 n/a Agreement
44 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-44 < MDC 410 GW-022106-SC-VB4-13 < 410 n/a Agreement
Page 2 of 8
Attachment 3
Tritium Sample Results
Braidwood Generating Station
NRC Licensee Ratio:
Collection
Date Sample ID MDC Sample ID
pCi/L +/- uncertainty pCi/L +/- uncertainty to NRC
45 02/09/2006 BD-06-1-45 < MDC 410 GW-020906-MB-VB4-13 < 410 n/a Agreement
46 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-46 < MDC 410 GW-022106-SC-VB4-13D < 410 n/a Agreement
47 02/09/2006 BD-06-1-47 < MDC 410 GW-020906-MB-VB4-13D < 410 n/a Agreement
48 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-48 < MDC 410 GW-022006-SC-VB4-14 < 410 n/a Agreement
49 02/09/2006 BD-06-1-49 < MDC 410 GW-020906-MB-VB4-14 < 410 n/a Agreement
50 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-50 < MDC 410 GW-022006-SC-VB4-14D < 410 n/a Agreement
51 02/09/2006 BD-06-1-51 < MDC 410 GW-020906-MB-VB4-14D < 410 n/a Agreement
52 02/22/2006 BD-06-1-52 < MDC 410 GW-022206-MB-VB5-2D < 410 n/a Agreement
53 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-53 < MDC 410 GW-022006-MB-VB5-3 < 410 n/a Agreement
54 02/22/2006 BD-06-1-54 < MDC 410 GW-022206-MB-VB5-3D < 410 n/a Agreement
55 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-55 < MDC 420 GW-022006-MB-VB5-4 < 420 n/a Agreement
56 02/22/2006 BD-06-1-56 < MDC 420 GW-022206-MB-VB5-4D < 420 n/a Agreement
57 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-57 < MDC 420 GW-022006-MB-VB5-2 < 420 n/a Agreement
58 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-58 2010 330 420 GW-022006-MB-VB6-2 2222 159 1.11 Agreement
59 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-59 < MDC 420 GW-022106-MB-VB6-2D < 420 n/a Agreement
60 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-60 < MDC 420 GW-022106-MB-VB6-3 < 420 n/a Agreement
61 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-61 < MDC 420 GW-022106-MB-VB6-3D < 420 n/a Agreement
62 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-62 < MDC 420 GW-022006-MB-VB6-4 < 420 n/a Agreement
63 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-63 < MDC 420 GW-022006-MB-VB6-4D < 420 n/a Agreement
64 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-64 < MDC 420 GW-022006-JK-VB7-1 < 420 n/a Agreement
65 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-65 < MDC 420 GW-022006-JK-VB7-1D < 420 n/a Agreement
66 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-66 < MDC 420 GW-022006-JK-VB7-2 < 420 n/a Agreement
Page 3 of 8
Attachment 3
Tritium Sample Results
Braidwood Generating Station
NRC Licensee Ratio:
Collection
Date Sample ID MDC Sample ID
pCi/L +/- uncertainty pCi/L +/- uncertainty to NRC
67 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-67 < MDC 420 GW-022106-JK-VB7-3 < 420 n/a Agreement
68 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-68 < MDC 420 GW-022006-JK-VB7-4 < 420 n/a Agreement
69 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-69 < MDC 420 GW-022006-JK-VB7-5 < 420 n/a Agreement
70 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-70 < MDC 420 GW-022006-JK-VB7-6 < 420 n/a Agreement
71 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-71 < MDC 420 GW-022006-JK-VB7-7 < 420 n/a Agreement
72 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-72 < MDC 420 GW-022006-JK-VB7-7D < 420 n/a Agreement
73 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-73 < MDC 420 GW-022006-JK-VB7-8 < 420 n/a Agreement
74 02/20/2006 BD-06-1-74 < MDC 420 GW-022006-JK-VB7-8D < 420 n/a Agreement
75 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-75 < MDC 410 GW-022106-MB-VB8-2 < 410 n/a Agreement
76 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-76 < MDC 410 GW-022106-MB-VB8-2D < 410 n/a Agreement
77 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-77 < MDC 410 GW-022106-MB-VB8-3 < 410 n/a Agreement
78 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-78 < MDC 410 GW-022106-MB-VB8-3D < 410 n/a Agreement
79 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-79 < MDC 410 GW-022106-MB-VB8-4 < 410 n/a Agreement
80 02/21/2006 BD-06-1-80 < MDC 410 GW-022106-MB-VB8-4D < 410 n/a Agreement
81 03/20/2006 BD-06-2-01 950 140 200 BDWW-1526 776 111 0.82 Agreement
82 03/20/2006 BD-06-2-02 840 140 200 BDWW-1527 888 115 1.06 Agreement
83 03/20/2006 BD-06-2-03 370 120 200 BDWW-1528 462 101 1.25 Agreement
84 03/20/2006 BD-06-2-04 790 140 200 BDWW-1529 823 113 1.04 Agreement
85 03/20/2006 BD-06-2-05 < MDC 200 BDWW-1530 262 93 n/a Agreement
86 03/20/2006 BD-06-2-06 < MDC 380 BDWW-1531 < 380 n/a Agreement
87 03/20/2006 BD-06-2-07 < MDC 380 BDWW-1532 < 380 n/a Agreement
88 03/29/2006 BD-06-3-01 < MDC 200 GW-032906-JE-PWW-103 < 200 n/a Agreement
Page 4 of 8
Attachment 3
Tritium Sample Results
Braidwood Generating Station
NRC Licensee Ratio:
Collection
Date Sample ID MDC Sample ID
pCi/L +/- uncertainty pCi/L +/- uncertainty to NRC
89 04/03/2006 BD-06-3-02 < MDC 200 GW-40306-JL-PW-533 < 200 n/a Agreement
90 03/28/2006 BD-06-3-03 < MDC 200 GW-032806-JE-PWG-185 < 200 n/a Agreement
91 04/03/2006 BD-06-3-04 < MDC 200 GW-040306-JL-PWG-095 < 200 n/a Agreement
92 04/03/2006 BD-06-3-05 < MDC 200 GW-040306-JL-PWG-173 < 200 n/a Agreement
93 04/04/2006 BD-06-3-06 < MDC 200 GW-040406-JL-PWG-135 < 200 n/a Agreement
94 04/04/2006 BD-06-3-07 < MDC 200 GW-040406-MB-PWG-059 < 200 n/a Agreement
95 03/08/2006 BD-06-3-08 < MDC 200 GW-030806-JL-PW-5 < 200 n/a Agreement
96 03/28/2006 BD-06-3-09 < MDC 200 GW-032806-JL-PW-13 < 200 n/a Agreement
97 03/28/2006 BD-06-3-10 < MDC 200 GW-032806-JE-PWS-201 < 200 n/a Agreement
98 04/04/2006 BD-06-3-11 < MDC 200 GW-040406-JL-PW-415 < 200 n/a Agreement
99 04/03/2006 BD-06-3-12 < MDC 200 GW-040306-JL-PW-418 < 200 n/a Agreement
100 03/30/2006 BD-06-3-13 < MDC 200 GW-033006-JE-PW-450 < 200 n/a Agreement
101 03/28/2006 BD-06-3-14 < MDC 200 GW-032806-JE-PW-453 < 200 n/a Agreement
102 03/30/2006 BD-06-3-15 < MDC 200 GW-033006-MB-PW-433 < 200 n/a Agreement
103 03/30/2006 BD-06-3-16 < MDC 200 GW-033006-MB-PW-437 < 200 n/a Agreement
104 03/30/2006 BD-06-3-17 < MDC 200 GW-033006-MB-PW-447 < 200 n/a Agreement
105 03/30/2006 BD-06-3-18 < MDC 200 GW-033006-JE-PW-523 < 200 n/a Agreement
106 04/03/2006 BD-06-3-19 < MDC 200 GW-040306-MB-PW-476 < 200 n/a Agreement
107 04/03/2006 BD-06-3-20 < MDC 200 GW-040306-MB-PW-493 < 200 n/a Agreement
108 04/03/2006 BD-06-3-21 < MDC 200 GW-040306-MB-PW-512 < 200 n/a Agreement
109 04/03/2006 BD-06-3-22 < MDC 200 GW-040306-MB-PW-534 < 200 n/a Agreement
110 04/13/2006 BD-06-4-01 < MDC 200 BDSP-1 < MDC n/a Agreement
Page 5 of 8
Attachment 3
Tritium Sample Results
Braidwood Generating Station
NRC Licensee Ratio:
Collection
Date Sample ID MDC Sample ID
pCi/L +/- uncertainty pCi/L +/- uncertainty to NRC
111 04/13/2006 BD-06-4-02 < MDC 200 BDSP-2 < MDC n/a Agreement
112 04/13/2006 BD-06-4-03 < MDC 200 BDSP-3 < MDC n/a Agreement
113 04/13/2006 BD-06-4-04 < MDC 200 BDSP-4 < MDC n/a Agreement
114 04/13/2006 BD-06-4-05 < MDC 200 BDSP-5 < MDC n/a Agreement
115 04/13/2006 BD-06-4-06 < MDC 200 *BD-10 < MDC n/a Agreement
116 04/13/2006 BD-06-4-07 < MDC 200 *BD-22 < MDC n/a Agreement
117 04/13/2006 BD-06-4-08 < MDC 200 *BD-25 < MDC n/a Agreement
118 04/13/2006 BD-06-4-09 < MDC 200 *BD-34 < MDC n/a Agreement
119 04/13/2006 BD-06-4-10 < MDC 200 *BD-35 < MDC n/a Agreement
120 04/13/2006 BD-06-4-11 220 120 200 *BD-36 393 1.79 Agreement
BDSP-36 361 100 1.64 Agreement
121 04/13/2006 BD-06-4-12 < MDC 200 *BD-37 < MDC n/a Agreement
122 04/13/2006 BD-06-4-13 < MDC 200 *BD-38 < MDC n/a Agreement
BDSP-38 208 78 n/a Agreement
123 04/20/2006 BD-06-4-14 < MDC 200 *BD-13 < MDC n/a Agreement
124 04/13/2006 BD-06-5-01 < MDC 190 GW-041306-MB-PWG-190 < 190 n/a Agreement
125 04/18/2006 BD-06-5-02 < MDC 190 GW-041806-MB-PW-604 < 190 n/a Agreement
126 04/20/2006 BD-06-5-03 < MDC 190 GW-042006-MB-PWS-202 < 190 n/a Agreement
127 03/29/2006 BD-06-5-04 < MDC 190 GW-032906-JE-PWG-055 279 94 n/a Agreement
128 05/10/2006 BD-06-6-01 < MDC 190 JL-011 < 190 n/a Agreement
129 05/10/2006 BD-06-6-02 < MDC 190 MS-020 < 190 n/a Agreement
130 05/11/2006 BD-06-6-03 430 120 190 JL-031 441 1.03 Agreement
Page 6 of 8
Attachment 3
Tritium Sample Results
Braidwood Generating Station
NRC Licensee Ratio:
Collection
Date Sample ID MDC Sample ID
pCi/L +/- uncertainty pCi/L +/- uncertainty to NRC
131 05/11/2006 BD-06-6-04 < MDC 190 MS-042 < 190 n/a Agreement
132 05/15/2006 BD-06-6-05 < MDC 190 MB-050 204 n/a Agreement
133 04/05/2006 BD-06-6-06 < MDC 190 PW-441 < 190 n/a Agreement
134 04/13/2006 BD-06-6-07 < MDC 190 PW-465 < 190 n/a Agreement
135 04/18/2006 BD-06-6-08 < MDC 190 PW-448 < 190 n/a Agreement
136 05/05/2006 BD-06-6-09 < MDC 190 PWG-048 < 190 n/a Agreement
137 05/16/2006 BD-06-6-10 < MDC 190 PWG-074 < 190 n/a Agreement
138 05/16/2006 BD-06-6-11 < MDC 190 PWN-110 < 190 n/a Agreement
139 05/19/2006 BD-06-6-12 < MDC 190 PWS-203 < 190 n/a Agreement
140 05/19/2006 BD-06-6-13 < MDC 190 SW-8 < 190 n/a Agreement
141 06/14/2006 BD-06-7-01 2560 180 180 GW-061406-JL 2368 145 0.93 Agreement
142 06/11/2006 BD-06-7-02 < MDC 180 VB10-061106 < 180 n/a Agreement
143 04/11/2006 BD-06-7-03 330 120 180 PW-481 337 110 1.02 Agreement
144 04/27/2006 BD-06-7-04 < MDC 180 PWN-104 < 180 n/a Agreement
145 05/01/2006 BD-06-7-05 < MDC 190 PWN-105 190 104 n/a Agreement
146 06/15/2006 BD-06-7-06 2560 180 180 GW-061506-JL 2111 138 0.82 Agreement
147 06/15/2006 BD-06-7-07 2680 180 180 NRC Independent 2111 138 0.79 Agreement
sample of GW-061506-JL
148 04/25/2006 BD-06-7-08 < MDC 180 PWG-062 < 180 n/a Agreement
149 04/07/2006 BD-06-7-09 < MDC 180 PWG-067 < 180 n/a Agreement
150 04/27/2006 BD-06-7-10 < MDC 190 PWG-089 < 190 n/a Agreement
151 04/11/2006 BD-06-7-11 < MDC 180 PWG-093 < 180 n/a Agreement
Page 7 of 8
Attachment 3
Tritium Sample Results
Braidwood Generating Station
NRC Licensee Ratio:
Collection
Date Sample ID MDC Sample ID
pCi/L +/- uncertainty pCi/L +/- uncertainty to NRC
152 06/08/2006 BD-06-7-12 < MDC 180 PWG-100 < 180 n/a Agreement
153 06/08/2006 BD-06-7-13 < MDC 180 PWG-111 < 180 n/a Agreement
154 05/01/2006 BD-06-7-14 < MDC 180 PWG-143 < 180 n/a Agreement
155 04/11/2006 BD-06-7-15 < MDC 190 PWG-176 < 190 n/a Agreement
156 06/08/2006 BD-06-7-16 < MDC 180 PWG-178 < 180 n/a Agreement
157 04/27/2006 BD-06-7-17 < MDC 190 PWG-202 < 190 n/a Agreement
158 04/12/2006 BD-06-7-18 < MDC 190 PWG-600 < 190 n/a Agreement
159 05/01/2006 BD-06-7-19 < MDC 190 PW-461 < 190 n/a Agreement
160 05/01/2006 BD-06-7-20 < MDC 190 PW-472 < 190 n/a Agreement
161 06/08/2006 BD-06-7-21 < MDC 190 PW-528 < 190 n/a Agreement
162 06/08/2006 BD-06-7-22 < MDC 190 PW-613 < 190 n/a Agreement
MDC - Minimum Detectable Concentration
- REMP Sample Locations
NRC sample uncertainties are based on two sigma counting statistics.
Page 8 of 8