IR 05000456/2023002
| ML23214A383 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/2023 |
| From: | Hironori Peterson NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB3 |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2023002 | |
| Download: ML23214A383 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
BRAIDWOOD STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000456/2023002 AND 05000457/2023002
Dear David Rhoades:
On June 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Braidwood Station. On July 11, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with G. Gugle, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Braidwood Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Braidwood Station.
August 3, 2023 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Hironori Peterson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000456 and 05000457 License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000456 and 05000457
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000456/2023002 and 05000457/2023002
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-002-0046
Licensee:
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC
Facility:
Braidwood Station
Location:
Braceville, IL
Inspection Dates:
April 01, 2023 to June 30, 2023
Inspectors:
R. Bowen, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
G. Edwards, Senior Enforcement Specialist
E. Fernandez, Senior Reactor Inspector
G. Hansen, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
D. Kimble, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Kutlesa, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
A. Shaikh, Senior Reactor Inspector
P. Smagacz, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Hironori Peterson, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Braidwood Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Follow Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing Analysis Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000457/2023002-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.08P The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50,
Appendix B, Criteria V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings", for the licensee's failure to follow the site-specific steam generator (SG) Eddy current testing (ECT) analysis procedure. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow procedure ER-MW-335-1003, Steam Generator Eddy Current Data Analysis Guidelines for Braidwood and Byron Stations Unit 2, when analyzing an indication that was identified in SG 2A tube during ECT performed in October 2021.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000456/2022-001-00 LER 2022-001-00 for Braidwood Station, Unit 1,
Liquid Penetrant Indications in Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle Seal Weld Repair due to Subsurface Weld Defects Opening Up from Thermal and Pressure Stresses during Operation 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period operating at full power. With the exception of minor planned reductions in power to support scheduled testing activities and load changes requested by the transmission system dispatcher, the unit remained operating at or near full power for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period operating at approximately 97.4 percent power and in power coast down for the planned end of the fuel cycle. On April 24, 2023, the unit was shut down for its 23rd refueling outage (A2R23). Following completion of refueling and other maintenance activities, the reactor was restarted and taken critical on May 12, 2023, and the main electrical generator was synchronized to the power grid on May 13, 2023. The unit reached full power operation on May 16, 2023, and continued operating at or near full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated selected system configurations during partial physical alignment verifications of the following systems/trains:
- (1) The spent fuel pool cooling system during the Unit 2 full core offload conducted as part of the A2R23 Refuel Outage during the week ending May 6, 2023.
- (2) The 2B Residual Heat Removal (RH) Train while protected for shutdown operations during the week ending May 13, 2023.
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated system configurations during a complete physical alignment verification of the 2A Safety Injection (SI) Train during Refuel Outage A2R23. The inspectors' activities were conducted during the weeks ending April 22 through May 20, 2023.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting physical inspections and performing reviews to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Zones 5.4-1 and 5.6-1; Switchgear Area 451' Elevation, Unit 1 Divisions 11 and 12 Miscellaneous Electric Equipment Rooms and Battery Rooms during the week ending April 29, 2023.
- (2) Fire Zone 1.3-2; 426' Elevation, Unit 2 Containment Upper Area during the weeks ending April 29 through May 13, 2023.
- (3) Fire Zone 1.1-2; 377' and 401' Elevations, Unit 2 Containment Inside Missile Shield during the weeks ending May 6 through May 13, 2023.
- (4) Fire Zone 1.2-2; 377' and 401' Elevations, Unit 2 Containment Annular Region during the weeks ending May 6 through May 13, 2023.
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the performance and training of the on-site fire brigade during observation of the following drill activities:
- (1) Observation of announced and unannounced fire drills with multiple crews on May 27, 2023.
===71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities:
PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities (IP Section 03.01)===
The inspectors verified that the following nondestructive examination and welding activities were performed appropriately:
- (1) Ultrasonic Examination
Welds 2AF-05-06, 07, 08, and 10, Aux FW Pipe to Elbow Welds
Welds 2-SI-34-12, 15,18, and 26, SI Suction Line from Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
Dye Penetrant Examination
Weld 2CS-03, Containment Spray Pump Room 2A Welded Pipe Saddle Visual Examination
Metrology (Dimensional Measurements) on Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Thermal Sleeves Volumetric or surface examination records and associated evaluations for relevant indications from the previous outage that the licensee analytically evaluated and accepted for continued service
Ultrasonic Exam Indication on 2RH-03-2B, RHR Mixing Tee-Pipe Weld Welding Activities
GTAW/SMAW Repair Weld on Weld 2 SI-34-26, SI Suction Line from RWST
Valve Replacement Welding on 2RC804 C and D RC Loop Equalization Line Manual Isolation Valve PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection
Activities (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified that the license conducted the following vessel upper head penetration inspections and addressed any identified defects appropriately:
- (1) Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of all 78 Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetrations
Bare Metal Visual (BMV) Examination of Reactor Vessel Upper Head Surface and Penetrations PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified the licensee is managing the boric acid corrosion control program through a review of the following evaluations:
- (1) AR 04522637, 2FC01 Outboard Pump Seal Leak
AR 04552114, Boron Found on Valve 2CV8119 During Survey
AR 04521341, Dry-wet Boric Acid at 2PT-RC012 non-EPN
AR 04506201, Packing Leakage on 2RC016B
AR 04520651, Worsening 2CV01PB Outboard Seal Leak PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities (Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified that the licensee is monitoring the steam generator tube integrity appropriately through a review of the following examinations:
- (1) Eddy Current Testing (ECT) of all operational steam generator (SG) tubes for Unit 2 SG A, B, C, and D
Secondary side visual examinations for Unit 2 SG A, B, C, and D
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated the following licensed operator activities in the control room:
- (1) Various activities involving on-watch operations crews. These activities included, but were not limited to:
Observation of selected portions of 1A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)testing and 4160 Vac electrical bus manipulations during the week ending April 22, 2023.
Observation of selected portions of Unit 2 main steam safety valve (MSSV)testing during the week ending April 22, 2023.
Observation of selected portions of the shutdown of Unit 2 for Refuel Outage A2R23 during the week ending April 29, 2023.
Observation of selected portions of the cooldown of Unit 2 for Refuel Outage A2R23 during the week ending April 29, 2023.
Observation of selected portions of the reactor coolant system (RCS) drain to reduced inventory in support of Refuel Outage A2R23 reactor vessel head lift during the week ending April 29, 2023.
Observation of selected portions of RCS heatup and Unit 2 startup from Refuel Outage A2R23 during the week ending May 13, 2023.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated the following licensed operator training activity:
- (1) A complex casualty evaluated scenario involving a crew of licensed operators was observed in facility's simulator on June 13, 2023.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Review and evaluation of the risk associated with receipt and insertion of rod cluster control assemblies into new fuel assemblies, as documented in Work Order (WO) 5198459-04 during the week ending April 22, 2023.
- (2) Review and evaluation of the risk associated with implementation of an unplanned risk informed completion time (RICT) for Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.7 associated with the failure of Unit 1 Instrument Bus Inverter 114, as documented in Issue Reports (IRs) 4672131 and 4673173 during the weeks ending April 29 through May 20, 2023.
- (3) Review and evaluation of the risk associated with an emergent maintenance activity on the 2B EDG, as documented in IR 4676013 and WO 5362733 during the week ending May 13, 2023.
- (4) Review and evaluation of the risk associated with plant startup activities under the provisions of TS 3.0.4.b with selected plant components out-of-service, as documented in Braidwood Risk Management Evaluation BW-MODE-035 during the week ending May 13, 2023.
- (5) Review and evaluation of the risk associated with emergent work to repair a hydraulic leak on the 2A Steam Generator Main Feedwater Stop Valve (2FW009A), as documented in IR 4678226 and WO 5365171 during the week ending May 20, 2023.
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Evaluation of the operability of the 1B Component Cooling Water (CC) Train following identification that the 1B RH Heat Exchanger (HX) thermal relief valve (1CC94228)had lifted and was stuck open, as documented in IR 4667428 during the weeks ending April 8 through April 22, 2023.
- (2) Evaluation of the operability of the DC Bus 212 Battery Charger following identification of anomalous voltage readings on the battery charger output, as documented in IR 4686690 during the week ending June 30, 2023.
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following permanent changes to the facility:
- (1) Review of permanent plant modification per Engineering Change (EC) 628212: Install MSIV Roof Slab Restrains on Braidwood Unit 2, during the weeks ending May 6 through May 20, 2023.
- (2) Review of permanent plant modification per EC 630851: Unit 2 OvationTM Auto Runback Upon Loss of Multiple Feedwater Pumps, during the weeks ending May 13 through May 20, 2023.
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed licensee activities and evaluated licensee performance associated with Unit 2 Refuel Outage A2R23 during the weeks ending April 29 through May 13, 2023.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the following post-maintenance and surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (12 Samples)
- (1) Functional and operational testing of the 2B EDG following various maintenance activities during Unit 2 Refuel Outage A2R23, as documented in WO 5348311-02 during the week ending April 22, 2023.
- (2) Functional and operational testing of Unit 1 Instrument Bus Inverter 114 following unplanned repairs, as documented in WO 5357898-08 during the weeks ending April 29 through May 6, 2023.
- (3) Functional and operational testing of the 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Train following planned maintenance activities during Unit 2 Refuel Outage A2R23, as documented in WO 5205404 during the week ending May 13, 2023.
- (4) Functional set pressure testing of MSSV 2MS015D following adjustment of the relief setpoint setting, as documented in WO 5240076-12 during the weeks ending April 22 through May 20, 2023.
- (5) Functional set pressure testing of MSSV 2MS013A following adjustment of the relief setpoint setting, as documented in WO 5240076-01 during weeks ending April 22 through May 20, 2023.
- (6) Core verification after refueling in A2R23, as documented in WO 5200757 during the weeks ending May 13 through May 20, 2023.
- (7) Functional testing of Unit 2 Instrument Bus Inverter 212 following planned and scheduled maintenance during Unit 2 Refuel Outage A2R23, as documented in WO 5292902 during the weeks ending May 6 through May 27, 2023.
- (8) Functional testing of Unit 2 Instrument Bus Inverter 214 following planned and scheduled maintenance during Unit 2 Refuel Outage A2R23, as documented in WO 5292901 during the weeks ending May 6 through May 27, 2023.
- (9) Unit 2 automatic rod drop timing testing following planned and scheduled reactor refueling during Unit 2 Refuel Outage A2R23, as documented in WO 5203298 during the weeks ending May 13 through June 3, 2023.
- (10) Low power and startup nuclear core physics testing following planned and scheduled reactor refueling during Unit 2 Refuel Outage A2R23, as documented in WOs 5203365 and 5206547 during the weeks ending May 13 through June 3, 2023.
- (11) VT-2 leakage testing specified by Section XI of the ASME [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code on Class 1, 2, and 3 systems and components following planned and scheduled reactor refueling during Unit 2 Refuel Outage A2R23, as documented in WOs 5212230 and 5213752 during the weeks ending May 13 through June 3, 2023.
- (12) Post-modification testing of the Unit 2 Main Electrical Generator Auto Voltage Regulator following installation under EC 624259 during Unit 2 Refuel Outage A2R23, as documented in WO 4877286 during the weeks ending May 13 through June 10, 2023.
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 2 RH system comprehensive pump and check valve stroke testing, as documented in WO 5214105 during the weeks ending May 6 through May 20, 2023.
- (2) Semiannual Technical Specification fast start testing of the 2B EDG, as documented in WOs 5361575 and 5352260 during the week ending May 20, 2023.
- (3) Technical Specification required testing of the 1A EDG to ensure that applicable automatic engine trips are appropriately bypassed during the emergency start sequence, as documented in WO 5185824 during the week ending May 27, 2023.
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) Periodic set pressure testing of MSSVs 2MS015A and 2MS013D, as documented in WOs 5240076-09 and 5240076-04 during the weeks ending April 22 through May 20, 2023.
- (2) Pre-outage full flow testing of the 2A Auxiliary Feedwater Train (2BwOSR 5.5.8.AF-4A: Unit Two Comprehensive Inservice Testing (IST)
Requirements for 2A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump), as documented in WO 5204031-01 during the weeks ending April 22 through June 3, 2023.
Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Local leak rate testing of Primary Containment Isolation Valve 2RE9159, as documented in WO 5224678 during the weeks ending April 29 through May 13, 2023.
Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) On-site full flow performance testing of the 0FX02PB (0B High Head FLEX Pump) by station personnel following rebuild of the positive displacement pump by an off-site vendor, as documented in WO 5011129 during the weeks ending January 14 through June 17, 2023.
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system:
Monthly alert notification system (siren) tests for the period from March 2021 to March 2023
Annual siren inspection and maintenance records for the period from March 2021 to March 2023
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the Emergency Preparedness Organization.
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program.
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee instructs workers on plant-related radiological hazards and the radiation protection requirements intended to protect workers from those hazards.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:
(1)workers utilizing the tool and equipment monitors and the whole body contamination monitors while exiting the radiologically controlled area during the Unit 2 refueling outage.
(2)radiation protection technicians performing work coverage for CRDM inspections.
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:
(1)various valve maintenance, repair and replacement activities in Unit 2 containment.
- (2) Unit 2 containment snubber work and inspections.
(3)reactor coolant pump motor replacement and maintenance activities.
(4)reactor head disassembly.
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:
- (1) Unit 2 refueling water storage tank SI line repairs.
- (2) Unit 2 steam generator platforms.
- (3) Unit 2 chemical and volume control system area.
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems:
- (1) Unit 2 steam generator platforms during eddy current testing.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors reviewed and verified selected portions of the licensee's performance indicator submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2022 - March 31, 2023)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2022 - March 31, 2023)
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2022 - March 31, 2023)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2022 - March 31, 2023)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2022 - March 31, 2023)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2022 - March 31, 2023)
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022 EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022 EP03: Alert And Notification System (ANS) Reliability Sample (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022
===71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (1 Sample 1 Partial)
The inspectors conducted in-depth reviews of the licensees implementation of the corrective action program (CAP) related to the following issues:
(1)
(Partial)
Review and assessment of the station's corrective actions stemming from the startup of Braidwood Unit 1 from Refueling Outage A1R23 with the 1A Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closed, as documented in IR 4531005 during the weeks ending April 22 through June 17, 2023.
- (2) Review and assessment of the station's corrective actions stemming from long-term issues with the 0B High Head FLEX Pump (0FX02PB), as documented in IRs 4507623, 4508035, 4513349, 4548150, 4548287, and 4552101 during the weeks ending June 24 through June 30, 2023. Specific elements of the inspectors' review are documented in an observation in the Results Section of this report.
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)===
- (1) The inspectors conducted a semiannual review of the licensees CAP for potential adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety concern during the weeks ending June 24 through June 30, 2023. A specific trend related to performance issues and the obsolescence of the station's 125 Vdc safety-related battery chargers is documented in the Results Section of this report.
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors reviewed, evaluated, and closed the following licensee event report (LER):
- (1) Unit 1 LER 05000456/2022-001-00, Liquid Penetrant Indications in Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle Seal Weld Repair due to Subsurface Weld Defects Opening Up from Thermal and Pressure Stresses during Operation (ADAMS Accession No.
ML22334A008). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER, therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors reviewed the LER during the week ending May 6, 2023, and determined there were no associated findings or violations. Details of the inspectors review are documented in the Results Section of this report.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Follow Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing Analysis Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings", for the licensee's failure to follow the site-specific steam generator (SG) Eddy current testing (ECT) analysis procedure. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow procedure ER-MW-335-1003, Steam Generator Eddy Current Data Analysis Guidelines for Braidwood and Byron Stations Unit 2 when analyzing an indication that was identified in SG 2A tube during ECT performed in October 2021.
Description:
Eddy current testing is currently the primary nondestructive evaluation (NDE)method used for inservice inspection (ISI) of SG tubes during plant outages. Eddy current testing provides information about SG tube discontinuities. In general, depending on the technique being employed, the measured probe response can provide information about an indications location, origin (i.e., initiated from inner or outer surface of the tube), spatial extent, and relative orientation (axial, circumferential, or volumetric).
During the review of the ECT data obtained for Unit 2 SGs during the 2023 outage, the inspector also examined the ECT data from the previous outage. Specifically, the inspector requested the licensees SG resolution experts to retrieve the 2023 outage ECT data for flagged indications and areas of special interest, such as Anti Vibration Bar (AVB) wear signals and Tube Support Plate signals. Of particular interest was an axial indication detected in SG 2A, located in row 41 column 82, which was found to be 66% thru-wall in the free-span region of a tube. The inspector requested the licensee's analysts to superimpose the ECT signal from the last ECT performed in 2021 on the same SG tube at that specific location.
The comparison revealed a similar signal amplitude in 2021; however, there was insufficient data to interpret the indication's thru-wall dimension. Consequently, the inspector raised concerns regarding the previous "non flaw condition" classification of this indication signal in 2021.
Procedure ER-MW-335-1003, Section 4.19, titled Data Evaluation (Bobbin Coil), stated, this section defines special augmented data screening and analysis requirements for various classes of indications. Section 4.19.6 - 1 stated, REPORT new and previous free span differential indications in accordance with the applicable ETSS and flowchart. Procedure CDE-061-021, "Eddy Current Examination Technical Specification Sheet", contained the flowcharts for disposition of new and previous signals specific to Braidwood Unit 2 SG ECT. The flowchart in CDE-061-021, pertaining to Bobbin Coil free-span data, instructed the analyst to disposition the 2021 signal as a "Differential Free-Span Indication" (DFI) and employ different ECT probe techniques for further characterization. However, the signal was instead dispositioned as a "non-flaw condition," and no further ECT probe technique was used to determine the indication's thru-wall size. The licensee reviewed the previous data from 2021 and the procedures in place at that time and determined a potential missed call on the indication.
Since the 2023 indication was accurately identified and sized, and its size falls below the criteria for conducting an In Situ pressure test on the tube based on the EPRI Steam Generator In situ Pressure Test Guidelines, Revision 5, the licensee concluded that an In Situ pressure test is not necessary for this indication.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the inspectors question and concern into their corrective action program as a potential missed indication from 2021 and initiated actions to understand where the breakdown during analysis and independent review occurred resulting in this condition.
Corrective Action References: ARs 04675314 and 04674115
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to follow procedure ER-MW-335-1003, titled Steam Generator Eddy Current Data Analysis Guidelines for Braidwood and Byron Stations Unit 2, when analyzing an indication that was identified in one the SG tubes during ECT performed in the October 2021 Unit 2 refueling outage was determined to be a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the licensee's failure to follow the ECT analysis procedure when identifying the 2021 ECT signal as a potential indication allowed a degraded and uncharacterized SG tube to be put back to service for continued operation. This condition does not limit the likelihood of unacceptable RCS pressure boundary leakage or a SG tube rupture event.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors answered "No" to questions, "Does the finding involve a degraded steam generator tube condition where one tube cannot sustain three times the differential pressure across a tube during normal full power, steady state operation?" and "Do one or more SGs violate accident leakage performance criterion (i.e., involve degradation that would exceed the accident leakage performance criterion under design basis accident conditions)?"
Therefore, the finding was screened as having very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Based on interviews conducted with licensee and vendor staff, the inspector determined that there was a failure to implement adequate error reduction tools during the multiple stages of analysis and resolution after the acquisition of ECT data. This led to a human error that went unnoticed throughout the various review levels.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, states that, "Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished".
Contrary to the above, in October 2021, the licensee failed to accomplish an activity affecting quality in accordance with a documented procedure. Specifically, Section 4.19.6 - 1 of procedure ER-MW-335-1003, Revision 10, stated, REPORT new and previous free span differential indications in accordance with the applicable ETSS and flowchart. Procedure CDE-061-021, "Eddy Current Examination Technical Specification Sheet (ETSS)", Revision 0, contained the flowcharts for disposition of new and previous signals specific to Unit 2 SG ECT. The applicable flowchart instructed the analyst to disposition an ECT signal obtained for Unit 2 SGs during the 2021 outage as a "Differential Free-Span Indication" (DFI) and employ different ECT probe techniques for further characterization. However, the signal was instead dispositioned as a "non-flaw condition," and no further ECT probe technique was used to determine the indication's thru-wall size.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: 0B High Head FLEX Pump (0FX02PB) Performance Issues 71152A The inspectors performed a detailed review of several issue reports (IRs) related to the subject performance problem. These included, but were not limited to:
- IR 4507623, B High Head FLEX Pump Did Not Meet Test Parameters;
- IR 4508035, 0B High Head FLEX Pump High Oil Temperature Trip;
- IR 4513349, 0FX02PB Could Not Achieve 0BwOS FX-12 Parameters as Needed;
- IR 4517970, 0FX02PC Failed 0BwOS FX-12 Requirements;
- IR 4522293, High Head FLEX Pump Compensatory Actions Adequacy;
- IR 4548150, 0FX02PB: Acceptance Criteria Not Met During Testing;
- IR 4548287, Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) Failure: 0B High Head FLEX Pump;
- IR 4552101, 0FX02PB 0B High Head FLEX Pump Failure;
- IR 4680217, High Head Pump Deficiency; and
- IR 4682187, Issues During Testing of 0B High Head FLEX Pump.
On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events. The order was effective immediately and directed the licensee to develop, implement, and maintain guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities in response to a beyond-design-basis external event. Later, the NRC incorporated these requirements into the Code of Federal Regulations under 10 CFR 50.155, Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events.
On December 7, 2016, the licensee informed the NRC that they had completed development and implementation of their mitigation strategies (Exelon Generation Company, LLC Letter No. RS-16-223 - ADAMS Accession Number ML16348A053). Like many utilities, the licensee chose to base the development and implementation of their mitigation strategies on Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 12-06, Revision 0, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX)
Implementation Guide (ADAMS Accession Number ML12242A378). The licensees strategies require the use of three different pumps, low head, medium head, and high head. The guidance in NEI 12-06 specifies that sites must maintain enough components to implement their strategies on all units (N) at the site, and have one additional (N + 1) component. To implement their strategies at Braidwood Station, the licensee requires one high head FLEX pump per unit, which means that a total of three high head FLEX pumps must be maintained at the site in order to satisfy the N + 1 requirements.
Additionally, the licensees mitigation plan based on the guidance stipulated in NEI 12-06 allows for the N + 1 high head FLEX pump to be out-of-service (to facilitate extended maintenance or repairs) for a period of up to 90 days.
During the summer of 2022, the licensee conducted full flow testing on all three high head FLEX pumps. The 0A High Head FLEX Pump (0FX02PA) passed this testing. The 0C High Head FLEX Pump (0FX02PC) did not meet the acceptance criteria as stated in the test procedure, but the licensee was able to evaluate the test results obtained and declare that the pump had sufficient capability to meet their FLEX strategy. On June 26, 2022, the 0B High Head FLEX Pump (0FX02PB) was tested and could not produce acceptable results. The licensee conducted troubleshooting on site with this component, including attempting different testing configurations, all without success. Ultimately, after several weeks the 0B High Head FLEX Pump was sent off-site to a vendor facility in the local area for testing and repair.
On January 12, 2023, the licensee attempted to test the 0B High Head FLEX Pump following its return from the vendors local facility. Once again, the acceptance criteria within the licensees full flow test procedure, 0BwOS FX-12, FLEX Pump Full Flow Test Surveillance, could not be met. With the pump vendor on-site providing assistance, troubleshooting was again performed by the licensee without success. Ultimately, the 0B High Head FLEX Pump was shipped off-site to the pump manufacturing facility in New Jersey for troubleshooting and repairs.
At the pump manufacturing facility in New Jersey, the 0B High Head FLEX Pump was overhauled and modified with the addition of a second hydraulic oil cooler. Following its return to the site, on June 2, 2023, the 0B High Head FLEX Pump was returned to an available status after successful completion of full flow performance testing. The 0B High Head FLEX Pump had been out-of-service for a total of 342 days, or 252 days beyond the 90 days permitted by the licensees NEI 12-06 based mitigation plan.
In reviewing this issue, the inspectors determined that the licensees inability to return the 0B High Head FLEX Pump to service within the 90 days allowed by their mitigation plan/strategy constituted a performance deficiency that was within their ability to foresee and which should have been prevented. Recognizing, however, that the licensee still maintained the ability to implement their mitigation plan/strategy even with the N + 1 high head FLEX pump out-of-service for the extended period of time, the inspectors determined that issue was of minor significance and not subject to formal actions per Section 2.3.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
With the return of the 0B High Head FLEX Pump to service, the inspectors examined the licensees corrective actions from the previous twelve months in an effort to determine whether or not all outstanding issues and questions had been addressed. Several observations by the inspectors were discussed station management, which included but were not limited to:
Periodic full flow testing for the stations high head FLEX pumps was originally contracted out to a 3rd party vendor, and then subsequently transferred to the stations Operations Department. The inspectors noted that a number of the issues with high head FLEX pump full flow testing seemed to align with the transfer of the testing regimen to the stations own personnel using station procedures, and that the possibility of this change having played a part in various subsequent high head FLEX pump performance issues had yet to be fully explored.
The need for the 0B High Head FLEX Pump to be equipped with a second hydraulic oil cooler in order for it to be returned to service raises some questions regarding the original design of the high head FLEX pumps and their suitability, as originally built, for their intended function. The inspectors noted during the course of their review that the licensee was intending to equip the remaining 0A and 0C High Head FLEX Pumps with additional hydraulic oil coolers as well as an enhancement.
If the high head FLEX pumps, as built and procured by the licensee, were appropriately suited for their function, then the possibility exists that the performance issues observed to date may have been the result of one or more degraded components on the pump(s). The inspectors noted that the licensees investigation efforts had yet to be completed in this area.
In the course of the inspectors review, no findings or violations of NRC requirements of more than minor safety significance were identified.
Observation: Safety-Related 125 Vdc Battery Chargers 71152S The inspectors performed a review of plant issues, particularly those entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) over the past several months. During their review, the inspectors noted that the licensee continues to experience performance issues involving the stations safety-related 125 Vdc battery chargers, all of which are original plant equipment. Specific CAP entries reviewed by the inspectors included, but were not limited to:
-
IR 4686690; Unexpected Alarm 2-22-E10, 125V DC Distribution Panel 212/214 Voltage Low.
-
IR 4527879; Unexpected Alarm 2-22-E10, 125V DC Distribution Panel 212/214 Voltage Low.
-
IR 4527763; Unexpected Alarm 2-22-E8, 125V DC Battery Charger 212 Trouble.
-
IR 4436885; Battery 112 Charger Unexpected System Response.
The 125 Vdc electrical power system for each unit consists of two independent and redundant safety-related DC electrical power subsystems (Division 11
- (21) and Division 12 (22)). Within the stations probabilistic risk analysis (PRA), they are near the top of the list of highly risk-significant key plant equipment. Each subsystem consists of one 125 Vdc battery, the associated battery charger for each battery, and all the associated control equipment and interconnecting cabling. During normal operation, 125 Vdc loads are powered from the battery chargers, with the batteries floating on the bus. If/when a loss of normal power to the battery charger occurs, electrical loads on the bus are picked up and powered uninterrupted from the respective station battery. While there is no connection between redundant 125 Vdc subsystems, such as batteries, battery chargers or distribution panels on a given unit, it is possible to interconnect the Unit 1 and Unit 2 125 Vdc subsystems of the same division. This permits a given 125 Vdc battery charger to be taken out of service for the purposes of maintenance and/or testing.
The stations four 125 Vdc safety-related battery chargers are considered to be obsolete. The original equipment manufacturer, Power Conversions Products in Crystal Lake, Illinois, was bought out by a foreign company in the early 2000s and no longer exists. While replacement parts for the stations 125 Vdc safety-related battery chargers still can be found, the status of the battery chargers as obsolete within the industry represents a challenge to the continued availability of spare parts. Recognizing this vulnerability, in May - June of 2021 the licensee developed a plan to replace the battery chargers with a newer/upgraded design.
The inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of NRC requirements in the course of this review. The inspectors did note, however, that the licensees present schedule for the upgrade of these key pieces of highly risk-significant plant equipment currently has the replacement activities for the stations 125 Vdc safety-related battery chargers out in the 2027 2028 timeframe.
Observation: LER 05000446/2022-001-00: Liquid Penetrant Indications in Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle Seal Weld Repair due to Subsurface Weld Defects Opening Up from Thermal and Pressure Stresses during Operation 71153 The inspectors performed a detailed review of the licensees causal evaluation associated with IR 4527538, OSP-A: Rejectable Indications on CRDM Pen 69 Weld Buildup.
On October 7, 2022, during a Liquid Penetrant examination on the embedded flaw seal weld repair of Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Penetration (Pen) 69, five 1/4-inch rounded indications were discovered that were determined to be unacceptable per the acceptance criteria in Section Ill of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Section III). Each unacceptable indication was identified during a scheduled ASME Section XI examination. An approved ASME Section XI Code repair method was applied consisting of blending the indications to remove or reduce the size to meet the applicable acceptance criteria in ASME Section Ill. Liquid penetrant examinations were then performed by the licensee to confirm that the ASME Section III acceptance criteria were met. The unacceptable indications did not penetrate through the embedded flaw seal weld or result in any through-wall reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage.
The licensees CAP evaluation subsequently attributed the cause of these indications to existing mechanical discontinuities and/or minor subsurface voids growing or opening to the weld surface due to thermal and/or pressure stresses during plant operation. The inspectors did not identify any issues with the licensees actions taken in response to this event. No findings or violations of NRC requirements were identified by the inspectors in the course of this review.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On July 11, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to G. Gugle, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On April 20, 2023, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness inspection results to A. Trespalacios, Director, Organizational and Regulatory Performance, and other members of the licensee staff.
On May 4, 2023, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to G. Gugle, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On May 15, 2023, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to J. Petty, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
M-136, Sheet 1
Diagram of Safety Injection Unit 2
BR
M-136, Sheet 2
Diagram of Safety Injection
M-136, Sheet 3
Diagram of Safety Injection
AY
M-136, Sheet 4
Diagram of Safety Injection
BH
M-136, Sheet 5
Diagram of Safety Injection
X
Drawings
M-136, Sheet 6
Diagram of Safety Injection
2BwOSR
5.5.8.RH-6
Residual Heat Removal System Comprehensive Pump Test
and Check Valve Stroke Test
2BwOSR
5.5.8.SI-11
Comprehensive Inservice Testing (IST) Requirements for Unit
Safety Injection Pumps and Safety Injection System Check
Valve Stroke Test
BwOP FC-E1
Electrical Lineup - Unit 1 Operating
BwOP FC-E2
Electrical Lineup - Unit 2 Operating
BwOP FC-M1
Operating Mechanical Lineup Unit 1
BwOP FC-M2
Operating Mechanical LIneup Unit 2
BwOP RH-E2
Electrical Lineup - Unit 2 Operating
BwOP RH-M4
Operating Mechanical Lineup Unit 2 2B Train
BwOP SI-E2
Electrical Lineup - Unit 2 Operating
Procedures
BwOP SI-M2
Operating Mechanical Lineup Unit 2
200408
IST-2SI8005/A-D/2SI8949B/D/2SI8922A/B - S Hot Leg Check
Valves
04/26/2023
204032
IST-2SI8819/A/B/C/D/2SI8926 - SI Cold Let Check Valve
04/26/2023
205408
IST-CO-2SI8818/A/B/C/D & CP-2SI8948/A/B/C/D - U2 RH
Cold Leg
0/27/2023
205408
IST-CO-2SI8818A/B/C/D & CP-2SI8948A/B/C/D - U2 RH Cold
Leg
04/27/2023
Work Orders
255220
IST-CO-2SI8841A/B & CO-2SI8949A/C - U2 RH Hot Leg
04/26/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
4685793
Fire Marshal Identified: 2nd Fire Drill Observations
06/20/2023
Fire Plans
Pre-Fire Plan No.
Fire Zone 1.3-2; Containment 426' -0" Elevation, Unit 2
Containment Upper Area
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Pre-Fire Plan No.
Fire Zone 1.1-2; Containment 377' -0" Elevation, Unit 2
Containment Missile Shield
Pre-Fire Plan No.
Fire Zone 1.1-2; Containment 401' -0" Elevation, Unit 2
Containment Missile Shield
Pre-Fire Plan No.
Fire Zone 5.4.1; Switchgear Are 451' Elevation, Unit 1 Division
Miscellaneous Electric Equipment Room and Batter Room
Pre-Fire Plan No.
Fire Zone 5.6-1; Switchgear Area 451' Elevation, Unit 1
Division 11 Miscellaneous Electric Equipment Room and
Batter Room
Pre-Fire Plan No.
Fire Zone 1.2-2; Containment 377' -0" Elevation, Unit 2
Annular Area
Pre-Fire Plan No.
Fire Zone 8.5-1; Turbine Building 426' Elevation, Unit 1
Turbine Building Mezzanine Floor - Northwest
Pre-Fire Plan No.
Fire Zone 8.5-1; Turbine Building 426' Elevation, Unit 1
Turbine Building Mezzanine Area - Northeast
Pre-Fire Plan No.
Fire Zone 1.2-2; Containment 401' -0" Elevation, Unit 2
Annular Area
Miscellaneous
Fire Drill Scenario
20.23.05.23
Hot Work Fire
2/21/2022
BwAP 1100-16
Fire/Hazardous Materials Spill and/or Injury Response
BwAP 1100-3
Fire Chief (Designated Field Supervisor) Implementing
Procedure
BwAP 1100-4
Fire Brigade Implementing Procedure
BwAP 1110-1
Fire Protection Program System Requirements
BwAP 1110-3
Plant Barrier Impairment Program
BwAR 0-37-A4
Unit One Area Fire
BwOP FP-100
Fire Response Guidelines
BwOP PBI-1
Plant Barrier Impairment Program Pre-Evaluated Barrier
Matrix
Plant Barrier Control Program
High Risk Fire Area Identification
ER-BR-600-1069
Site List of High Risk Fire Areas - Braidwood Unit 1 and Unit 2
Fire Drill Performance
Procedures
Fire Prevention for Hot Work
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Fire Brigade Qualification
Pre-Fire Plan Manual
Control of Transient Combustible Material
OP-AA-201-012-
1001
Operations On-Line Fire Risk Management
OP-BR-201-012-
1001
Braidwood On-Line Fire Risk Management
Packing Leakage on 2RC016B
07/29/2022
Worsening 2CV01PB Outboard Seal Leak
11/01/2022
Dry-Wet Boric Acid at 2PT-RC012 non-EPN Drain Valves
10/20/2022
2FC01P Outboard Pump Seal Leak
10/26/2022
Boron Found on Valve 2CV8119 During Survey
2/07/2023
A2R23 CRDM Thermal Sleeves Metrology Results
04/27/2023
Indication Discovered in Weld 2SI-34-26 During ISI
04/29/2023
A2R23 Eddy Current Examination Indication in SG 2A
04/30/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
A2R23 ISI Relevant Condition Identified on 2CV06009C Pipe
Support
05/01/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Investigate Prior Eddy Current Indications from A2R22 (2021)
05/03/2023
180-9363870-000
Braidwood Unit A2R23 RVCH Penetrations Examination
Report
05/02/2023
23-RT--001
Radiographic Examination Report for Radiography on Weld
05/02/2023
Ultrasonic Examination on Elbow-Pipe Weld 2SI-34-26
05/12/2014
074/075
Ultrasonic Examination on 2RH-03-2B RHR Mixing Tee-Pipe
10/24/2021
Liquid Penetrant Examination on Containment Spray Pump
Room 2A 180 Degree Welded Pipe Saddle 2-CS-03-SW01
04/28/2023
A2R23-UT--029
Ultrasonic Examination on Safety Injection Line Weld
04/29/2023
NDE Reports
043/044/045
Ultrasonic Examination on Safety Injection Line Welds
2SI-34-12/15/18
04/30/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
046/07/08/09
Ultrasonic Examination on Aux Feedwater Welds
2AF-05/06/07/08/10
04/28/2023
Ultrasonic Examination on Safety Injection Line Weld
05/03/2023
Bare Metal Visual (BMV) Examination of Reactor Closure
Head Top Head and Penetrations
04/30/2023
54-ISI-603-011
Automated Ultrasonic Examination of RPV Closure Head
Penetrations Containing Thermal Sleeves
2/24/2020
54-ISI-604-017
Automated Ultrasonic Examination of Open Tube RPV
Closure Head Penetrations
09/22/2021
CDE-001-021
Examination Technique Specification Sheet
Liquid Penetrant Examination
Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Pipe Welds
Evaluation of Eddy Current Data for Steam Generator Tubing
ER-MW-335-1003
Steam Generator Eddy Current Data Analysis Guidelines for
Braidwood and Byron Unit 2
MRS-2.4.2 GEN-
Eddy Current Inspection of Pre-Service and In-Service Heat
Exchanger Tubing
Procedures
WPS 8.8 - GTSM
Welding Procedure Specification Record for GTAW and
Work Orders
05105558
Replace Valve 2RC804C/D RC Loop Equalization Line
Manual Isolation Valve
10/22/2021
Miscellaneous
BR2C23-06.0
Braidwood 2 Cycle 23 Coastdown Reactivity Plan
03/20/2023
1BwGP 100-8
Generic Reactor Control Guidance
2BwGP 100-8
Generic Reactor Control Guidance
4.0 Crew Critique Guidelines
OP-AA-101-111-
1001
Operations Standards and Expectations
Operator Fundamentals
Watch-Standing Practices
OP-AA-103-102-
1001
Strategies for Successful Transient Mitigation
Operation of Plant Equipment
Procedures
Communications
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Operating Narrative Logs and Records
Reactivity Management
Systematic Approach to Training Process Description
Operator Training Programs
Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation
Examination Security and Administration
Simulator Management
TQ-BR-201-0113
Braidwood Training Department Simulator Examination
Security Actions
4672131
Alarm 1-4-D5, Bus 114 Inverter (1IP08E) Trouble SER No.
264
04/22/2023
4673147
+130 Vdc Ground DC Bus 112 During Inverter 114 Testing
04/26/2023
4673173
Instrument Inverter 114 Failure After Maintenance
04/26/2023
4673457
1SI-IP092 Inverter 114 Output Frequency Meter Suspect
04/272/2023
4673812
Fire PRA Overconservative Modeling
04/28/2023
4676013
OSP - Cylinder 1L Temperature Abnormal
05/06/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
4678226
2FW009A 6 Drops per Minute Hydraulic Leak
05/15/2023
20E-1-4030IP04,
Sheet 1
Schematic Diagram - 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 114
(1IP08E), Part 1
B
Drawings
20E-1-4030IP04,
Sheet 2
Schematic Diagram - 10 KVA Inverter for Instrument Bus 114
(1IP08E), Part 2
A
Final RICT Record for Failure of Instrument Bus Inverter 114
(1IP08E)
04/30/2023
Miscellaneous
BW-MODE-035
TS 3.0.4.b Evaluation - Mode Change with Technical
Specification Equipment Out of Service
0-2
BwMP 3100-082
Diesel Generator 6-Year Inspection
Risk Management
PARAGON Model Capability
On-Line Risk Management
Risk Management Support of RICT
Calculation of RMAT and RICT for Risk Informed Completion
Time Program
Procedures
ER-BW-600-2001
Braidwood RICT System Guidelines
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Conduct of Troubleshooting
Receipt Inspection of Nuclear Fuel and Associated Fuel
Related Components
PWR Special Nuclear Material and Core Component Move
Sheet Development
Integrated Risk Management
Protected Equipment Program
Risk Informed Completion Time
Outage Risk Management
3-4
Administrative Controls During Fuel Handling Activities for
Byron and Braidwood
New Fuel Receipt and Inspection for Byron, Braidwood, and
Ginna
Operation of the New Fuel Elevator for Byron and Braidwood
Fuel Movement in the Spent Fuel Pol for Byron and Braidwood
OU-OU-AP-4001
PWR Fuel and Core Component Handling Practices
On-Line Risk Management and Assessment
5198459-04
Unit 2 New Fuel Download into The Spent Fuel Pool
2/07/2023
5357898-01
Replace the X5 Synch Card and the X201 Card on 1IP08E
04/23/2023
5362733-01
FNM - 2DG01KB - Replace 1L Fuel Injector Pump
05/09/2023
Work Orders
5365171-01
FNI - 2PS-FW162 - Replace Pressure Switch
05/16/2023
4667428
1CC9422B Relief Valve Lifting
04/04/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
4686690
Unexpected Alarm 2-22-E10, 125V DC Distribution Panel
2/214 Voltage Low
06/25/2023
Procedures
Risk Management Documentation
28216
Install Unit 2 MSIV Roof Slab Restraints
0-1
Engineering
Changes
630851
Unit 2 Ovation' Auto Runback Upon Loss of Multiple
Feedwater Pumps
4983252-03
Install EC 628216: 2A MSIV Roof Slab Restraints
05/08/2023
4983252-04
Install EC 628216: 2D MSIV Roof Slab Restraints
05/08/2023
4983252-05
Install EC 628216: 2B MSIV Roof Slab Restraints
05/08/2023
4983252-06
Install EC 628216: 2C MSIV Roof Slab Restraints
05/08/2023
Work Orders
5012832-04
Install EC 630851: Unit 2 Ovation' Auto Runback Upon Loss
04/12/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
of Multiple Feedwater Pumps
5012832-05
Install EC 630851: Unit 2 Ovation' Auto Runback Upon Loss
of Multiple Feedwater Pumps - Modification Acceptance Test
05/05/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
4675931
Fuel Assembly Unable to Properly Seat
05/05/2023
Miscellaneous
A2R23 Shutdown Safety Plan
- 2
2BwGP 100-1
Plant Heatup
2BwGP 100-2
Plant Startup
2BwGP 100-3
Power Ascension 5% to 100%
2BwGP 100-4
Power Descension
2BwGP 100-5
Plant Shutdown and Cooldown
2BwGP 100-6
Refueling Outage
2BwOS TRM
2.5.b.1
Unit Two Containment Loose Debris Inspection
BwAP 1450-1
Access to Containment
Shutdown Risk Management
Pre-Job Briefings
Fatigue Management and Work Hour Rules
MA-AA-716-008-
1008
Reactor Services: Refuel Floor FME Plan
Unit Restart Review
OP-AA-108-108-
1001
Drywell/Containment Closeout
Evaluation of Special Tests or Evolutions
Reactivity Management - Fuel Handling, Storage, and
Refueling
Shutdown Safety Management Program
Procedures
Shutdown Safety Plan Independent Review
4563135
Fuel Oil Leak 2B DG
03/18/2023
4671070
Low Fuel Oil Pressure on Start of 2B D/G
04/18/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
4676928
OSP - 2B Emergency Diesel Generator 1L Fuel Injection
Pump Leaking While Diesel Generator Running
05/10/2023
Procedures
0BwOS FX-12
FLEX Pump Full Flow Test Surveillance
0-2
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
1BwOSR
3.8.1.13-1
1A Diesel Generator Bypass of Automatic Trips Surveillance
2BwOSR 3.6.1.1-
Primary Containment Type C Local Leakage Rate Testing of
Reactor Building Drains and Vents System
2BwOSR 3.7.5.7-
Unit Two Train B Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Path Operability
Non-Routine Surveillance (Following Cold Shutdown)
2BwOSR
3.8.1.11-2
2B Diesel Generator Loss of ESF Bus Voltage with No SI
Signal
2BwOSR 3.8.1.2-
Unit Two 2B Diesel Generator Operability Surveillance
2BwOSR
5.5.8.AF-4A
Unit 2 Comprehensive Inservice Testing (IST) Requirements
for 2A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
2BwOSR
5.5.8.RH-6
Residual Heat Removal System Comprehensive Pump and
Check Valve Stroke Test
BwAR 1-4-D5
Buss 114 Inverter Trouble
BwISR 3.1.4.3.1
Rod Drop Time (Automatic)
BwMP 3305-003
Main Steam Safety Valve Testing Using Setpoint Verification
Device
BwOP DG-1
Diesel Generator Alignment to Standby Condition
BwOP DG-11
Diesel Generator Startup and Operation
BwOP DG-12
Diesel Generator Shutdown
BwOP IP-1
Instrument Bus Inverter Startup
BwOP IP-2
Transferring an Instrument Bus from the Inverter to the
Constant Voltage Transformer
BwVS 500-6
Low Power Physics Test Program
BwVS TRM
3.1.h.1
Core Reload Sequence and Verification
Section XI Pressure Testing
ER-AA-335-015-
2013
VT-2 Visual Examination in Accordance with ASME 2013
Edition
Molded Case Circuit Breaker Testing
Inspection/Certification of Portable Pressure Test Equipment
OP-BR-FX-1003
High Head FLEX Pump Operating Guideline
1-2
SPP-19-002
Modification Testing, Commissioning, and Power Ascension
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedure for ABB Unitrol 6000 Automatic Voltage Regulator
(AVR) Replacement
4877286-75
Modification Test for EC 624259: Replacement Main
Generator Voltage Regulators - Unit 2
06/08/2023
5011129
0FX02PB Performance Test
06/10/2023
5011129
0FX02PB Performance Test
06/10/2023
5185824
1A Emergency Diesel Generator Bypass of Automatic Trips
Surveillance
05/24/2023
200757
Physical Reactor Inventory Prior to Installing Reactor Head
Upon
05/04/2023
203365
Low Power Physics Test Program with Dynamic Rod Worth
Measurement
05/12/2023
204031-01
IST - Unit 2 Full Flow Test and Equipment Response Time of
04/21/2023
206547
Reload Startup Physics Testing Following Refueling
05/25/2023
212230
VT-2 Exam - Unit 2 Class 2 & 3 Components - Outage MODE
Ascending
05/18/2023
213752
VT-2 Exam - Unit 2 Class 1 Components - Outage MODE 3
Ascending
05/18/2023
214105
IST Comprehensive & Response Time Test of 2A RH Pump
05/04/2023
24678
IST-LT-U2 LLRT RE 9159A/B P65 RCDT to Gas Analyzer
04/27/2023
240076-01
2MS013A: Testing of Main Steam Safety Valve
04/19/2023
240076-04
2MS013D: Testing of Main Steam Safety Valve
04/19/2023
240076-09
2MS015A: Testing of Main Steam Safety Valve
04/19/2023
240076-12
2MS015D: Testing of Main Steam Safety Valve
04/19/2023
292901-01
2IP08E Replace Components and Test Inverter
05/01/2023
292901-05
2IP08E Perform Loaded Capacity Test
05/04/2023
292902-01
2IP06E Replace Components and Test Inverter
05/02/2023
292902-05
2IP06E Perform Loaded Capacity Test
05/03/2023
5348311
Fuel Oil Leak 2B DG
04/18/2023
5350647
LR-IST-2B D/G Operability Monthly
04/18/2023
5352260
OP 2DG01KB Operability Semiannual Surveillance
05/17/2023
Work Orders
5357898-08
EM: 1IP08E Instrument Inverter 114 Performance Monitoring
04/30/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
5361575
LR-OP IST - 2B Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly
05/18/2023
5361975
FNE 2B DG Field Flash Relay 90FF T/S
05/09/2023
EP-Siren - Failure (BW06,BD18)
07/06/2021
Grundy County 911 Siren Controller Error
08/03/2021
Siren BD04 Indicated an issue during morning poll
09/08/2021
EP-Siren Failure BW14
11/04/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
Siren BW29 Indicated an issue during polling
07/05/2022
Off-Site Emergency Plan Alert and Notification System
Addendum (ANS) for the
Braidwood Nuclear Power Station
08/01/2009
Alert Notification System Maintenance Records
03/01/2023 -
03/31/2023
Alert Notification Testing Records
03/01/2021 -
03/31/2023
Miscellaneous
KLD TR - 985
Braidwood Generating Station Alert and Notification System
(ANS) Design Report Revision Submittal
09/19/2018
21 Braidwood EP HP Drill Learning
06/03/2021
21 EP Focus Area Drills Critique and Learnings
08/25/2021
Accountability / Evacuation Drill Critique
09/16/2021
Annual EP Medical Drill Hospital Participation
2/14/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
EP Plume Phase and Environ Monitoring
2/06/2022
Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation Drill
Reports (Quarterly call-in drill results)
03/01/2021 -
03/31/2023
Braidwood August 29, 2022 ERO Drive-In Drill
09/29/2022
Braidwood Station ERO Roster
03/17/2023
Miscellaneous
ERO Training and Qualification Records (Sample - 15
personnel)
04/12/2023
BwAP 320-1
Shift Staffing
Addendum 1
Braidwood On-Shift Staffing Technical Basis
Procedures
ERO Training and Qualification
NOS ID: EP-Document observations in Training Suite
05/21/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
EP - Mazon (Braidwood Alternative ERF) Quarterly Inventory
05/21/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
EP EMnet Phones Out of Service
07/22/2021
URI Dose Assessment Program Conflicts with PWR E Plan
08/06/2021
ERO Database files degraded impacting Fleet Everbridge
System.
2/06/2023
Emergency Program Off-site Support Organization Letters of
Agreement (LOAs)
03/01/2021 -
03/31/2023
Braidwood Emergency Preparedness Program Drill and
Exercise Reports
03/01/2021 -
03/31/2023
21/2022 Braidwood Emergency Planning Public Information
Bulletin
08/25/2022
21 EVAL -
Emergency
Preparedness
21 Emergency Preparedness Off-site Agency Interface
Annual Review
03/08-
2/2021
23 EVAL -
Emergency
Preparedness
23 Off-Site Agency Interface Annual Review
2/01/2023 -
03/20/2023
NOSA-BRW-22-
Braidwood Station Emergency Preparedness Audit Report
04/13/2022
Miscellaneous
NOSA-NCS-22-
22 Emergency Preparedness Off-site Agency Interface
Annual Review
03/21-
25/2022
Addendum 2
Evacuation Time Estimates for Braidwood Generating Station
Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone
54(T) Audit Performance Indicators Guide
Procedures
Nuclear Oversight Audit Process Description
Dose Rates at U2 Cnmt PRT/RCDT were Elevated
04/26/2023
SG Worker Positive Whole Body Count
04/27/2023
Accumulated Dose Alarm
05/01/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Increasing Dose Rates "C" S/G Secondary
05/01/2023
NISP-RP-002
Radiation and Contamination Surveys
NISP-RP-005
Access Controls for High Radiation Areas
NISP-RP-009
Radiography
Procedures
NISP-RP-010
Radiological Job Coverage
23-192700
401' Pressurizer Spray Line and Associated General Areas
04/25/2023
Radiation Surveys
23-192939
Elevation 401' Inside Missile Barrier
04/28/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
23-193088
Alpha/Delta Steam Generator Platform Elevation 390'
04/29/2023
BW-02-23-00505
CNMT Building Outage Scaffold
BW-02-23-00510
CNMT Building Outage Valve Work with Added Controls
BW-02-23-00616
All RCP Motor Maintenance
BW-02-23-00645
"D" RCP Motor Replacement
BW-02-23-00701
S/G Bowl Drain
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
BW-02-23-00705
S/G Install/Remove Nozzle Covers
Radiation Surveys 2023-192808
Bravo/Charlie Steam Generator Platform Elevation 390'
04/26/2023
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
BW-02-23-00705,
Task 2
S/G Eddy Current Testing and Tube Repair
Drill / Exercise Performance (DEP) Performance Indicator
Data
01/01/2022 -
2/31/2022
Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Participation
Performance Indicator Data
01/01/2022 -
2/31/2022
Miscellaneous
Alert Notification System (ANS) Reliability Performance
Indicator Data
01/01/2022 -
2/31/2022
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Mitigating Systems
Safety System Functional Failures
04/01/2022 -
03/31/2023
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Mitigating Systems
Mitigating System Performance Index for Emergency AC
Power
04/01/2022 -
03/31/2023
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Mitigating Systems
Mitigating Systems Performance Index for High Pressure
Injection
04/01/2022 -
03/31/2023
Collecting and Reporting of NRC Performance Indicator Data
Monthly Data Elements for NRC Safety System Functional
Failures
71151
Procedures
LS_AA-2200
Mitigating System Performance Index Data Acquisition and
Reporting
4507623
B High Head FLEX Pump Did Not Meet Test Parameters
06/26/2022
4508035
0B High Head FLEX Pump High Oil Temperature Trip
06/28/2022
4513349
0FX02PB Could Not Achieve 0BwOSFX-12 Parameters as
Needed
07/27/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
4517970
0FX02PC Failed 0BwOS FX-12 Requirements
08/21/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
22293
High Head FLEX Pump Compensatory Actions Adequacy
09/14/2022
4548150
0FX02PB: Acceptance Criteria Not Met During Testing
01/12/2023
4548287
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) Failure: 0B High Head FLEX
Pump
01/13/2023
4552101
0FX02PB 0B High Head FLEX Pump Failure
2/02/2023
4680217
High Head Pump Deficiency
05/25/2023
4682187
Issues During Testing of 0B High Head FLEX Pump
06/02/2023
Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR)
Issue Identification and Screening Process
Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure
Root Cause Analysis Manual
Corrective Action Program Evaluation Manual
Procedures
Effectiveness Review Manual
277356
Unexpected Alarm 1-21-E8, 125 Vdc Battery Charger 111
Trouble
09/06/2019
4436885
Battery 112 Charger Unexpected System Response
07/25/2021
27763
Unexpected Alarm 2-22-E8, 125 Vdc Battery Charger 212
Trouble
10/07/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
27879
Unexpected Alarm 2-22-E10, 125V DC Distribution Panel
2/214 Voltage Low
10/08/2022
Miscellaneous
BRW-19-0132
Units 1/2 ESF 125 Vdc Battery Charger Replacement
(PHC/PRC)
06/01/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
27538
OSP-A Rejectable Indications on CRDM Pen 69 Weld Buildup
10/07/2022