IR 05000456/2022004
| ML23025A107 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/2023 |
| From: | Hironori Peterson NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB3 |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2022004 | |
| Download: ML23025A107 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
BRAIDWOOD STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000456/2022004 AND 05000457/2022004
Dear David Rhoades:
On December 31, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Braidwood Station. On January 18, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with J. Petty, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Hironori Peterson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000456 and 05000457 License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000456 and 05000457
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000456/2022004 and 05000457/2022004
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022-004-0044
Licensee:
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC
Facility:
Braidwood Station
Location:
Braceville, IL
Inspection Dates:
October 01, 2022 to December 31, 2022
Inspectors:
R. Bowen, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
A. Demeter, Project Engineer
G. Edwards, Health Physicist
E. Fernandez, Senior Reactor Inspector
D. Kimble, Senior Resident Inspector
P. Smagacz, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Hironori Peterson, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Braidwood Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report section Status URI 05000456/2022004-01 Startup from Braidwood Unit 1 Refueling Outage A1R23 with 1A Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)
Closed 71111.20 Open
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at approximately 80 percent power, with the unit at the end of the nuclear fuel cycle and in power coast down operations in preparation for a planned refuel outage. On October 3, 2022, the reactor was shut down for planned Refuel Outage A1R23.
Following refueling and other maintenance activities, the reactor was restarted and made critical on October 19, 2022. On October 20, 2022, the reactor was subsequently shut down again to facilitate maintenance activities on the 1A Main Steam Isolation Valve. (See Unresolved Item
===2022004-01 in the Inspection Results section of this report for additional details.) The reactor was restarted later that same day and the main electrical generator was synchronized to the power grid on October 21, 2022. The unit achieved full power operation on October 25, 2022, and remained operating at or near full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period operating at full power. With the exception of minor reductions in power to support scheduled testing activities and load changes requested by the transmission system dispatcher, the unit remained operating at or near full power for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP section 03.01)===
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures during the weeks ending November 19 through November 26, 2022.
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk significant systems from an impending severe winter storm during the week ending December 17, 2022.
External Flooding Sample (IP section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated selected flood protection barriers, mitigation plans, procedures, and equipment to verify that they were consistent with the licensees design requirements and risk analysis assumptions for coping with external flooding during the week ending December 24, 2022.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated selected system configurations during partial physical alignment verifications of the following systems/trains:
- (1) The 1A and 1B Residual Heat Removal (RH) Trains during unit 1 Refuel Outage A1R23 during the week ending October 8, 2022.
- (2) The 1A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) while protected as a risk-significant component to support the unit 1 shutdown cooling function during the Refuel Outage A1R23 during the week ending October 8, 2022.
- (3) The unit 1 spent fuel pool cooling system during Refuel Outage A1R23 during the week ending October 15, 2022.
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated system configurations during a complete physical alignment verification of the unit 1 Containment Spray (CS) system during Refuel Outage A1R23. This was the completion of the partial sample for the unit 1 CS system previously documented during the 3rd Quarter of 2022. The inspectors' activities were concluded during the week ending October 8, 2022.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting physical inspections and performing reviews to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Zone 18.3-1: unit 1 Main Steam and Auxiliary Feed Pipe Tunnel, during preparations for valve removal and replacement during the week ending October 8, 2022.
- (2) Fire Zones 1.1-1 and 1.2-1: unit 1 Containment, 377' Elevation - Inside and Outside Missile Barrier, during the week ending October 8, 2022.
- (3) Fire Zone 1.3-1: unit 1 Containment, 426' Elevation - Containment Upper Area, during the week ending October 8, 2022.
- (4) Fire Zone 1.2-1: unit 1 Containment, 401' Elevation - unit 1 Annular Area, during the week ending October 22, 2022.
- (5) Fire Zone 9.2-2: 2A EDG Room, 401' Elevation, during the week ending November 5, 2022.
- (6) Fire Zone 11.4-0: unit 1 Auxiliary Building, 383' Elevation, during welding on the Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) crosstie flush hardline, as documented in Work Order (WO)
===5230135 during the week ending November 28, 2022.
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP section 03.01)===
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections for the following areas of the station:
- (1) The unit 1 Turbine Building basement during the week ending November 5, 2022.
- (2) The Lake Screen House during the week ending November 26, 2022.
71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from 10/03/2022 to 10/14/2022:
03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.
Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of Elbow-to-Pipe Component ID 1-MS-06-30
Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of Elbow-to-Pipe Component ID 1-MS-06-31
Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of Elbow-to-Pipe Component ID 1-MS-06-32
Welding of Replacement Valve 1FW079B (W/O# 05179024-18)
Phased Array Ultrasonic Testing (PAUT) Pipe-to-Pipe weld Component ID 1FW079D 03.01.b - Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Examination Activities.
Visual Examinations (VE) of 79 penetrations on the Reactor Vessel Closure Head (RVCH)
Ultrasonic Testing (UT) of 78 penetrations on the RVCH
Liquid Penetrant (PT) examination of RVCH Penetration No. 69 03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities.
Evaluation 04517560-02/04492850-05 Boric Acid Leak on 1A Regen Hx CHG Outlet Isolation Valve, 1CV8321A 03.01.d - Pressurized-Water Reactor Steam Generator Tube Examination Activities.
Eddy Current (ET) testing of 6601 steam generator tubes in steam generator A
ET testing of 6593 steam generator tubes in steam generator B
ET testing of 6617 steam generator tubes in steam generator C ET testing of 6632 steam generator tubes in steam generator D
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam administered between August 19 and September 16, 2022. Eleven crews and fifty-nine individual operators were examined. Two operators who presently have an inactive license due to temporary medical conditions will be examined when they are medically fit and prior to reactivating their licenses.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated the following licensed operator activities in the control room:
- (1) Various activities involving on-watch operations crews. These activities included, but were not limited to:
Selected portions of the shutdown of unit 1 for Refuel Outage A1R23, during the week ending October 8, 2022.
Selected portions of the cooldown of unit 1 for Refuel Outage A1R23, during the week ending October 8, 2022.
Selected portions of the reactor coolant system (RCS) drain to reduced inventory in support of Refuel Outage A1R23 reactor vessel head lift, during the week ending October 8, 2022.
Selected portions of the RCS and unit 1 containment refuel cavity flood up for Refuel Outage A1R23, during the week ending October 8, 2022.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated the following licensed operator training activity:
- (1) A complex casualty evaluated scenario involving a crew of licensed operators was observed in facility's simulator on November 15, 2022.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure that selected structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended functions. The following SSCs and/or maintenance activities were reviewed:
- (1) A maintenance effectiveness review associated with the licensee's ongoing monitoring program for control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) thermal sleeves on unit 1 was conducted during the weeks ending October 15 through October 30, 2022.
- (2) A maintenance effectiveness review associated with the licensee's bolting practices for the 1(2)CV8321A&B, Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet Isolations Valves, as documented in Issue Report (IR) 4527583, was conducted during the weeks ending November 5 through December 24, 2022.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Evaluation of the plant risk associated with the changing of operating modes utilizing the provisions of Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.4.b while conducting unit 1 plant heatup for Refuel Outage A1R23, as documented in BW-MODE-033 during the week ending October 22, 2022.
- (2) Evaluation of the planned work associated with leak repairs to the 1RC8040C Hot Leg Loop Drain, as documented in WO 5141755 during the week ending October 22, 2022.
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Evaluation of the operability of unit 1 source range nuclear instruments following anomalous indications, as documented in IR 4527206 during the weeks ending October 8 through November 5, 2022.
- (2) Evaluation of the operability of various unit 1 emergency core cooling system valve relays following outage testing issues, as documented in IRs 4526618 and 4526631 during the weeks ending October 8 through November 12, 2022.
- (3) Evaluation of the operability of the 1B EDG following its trip on overspeed during Refuel Outage A1R23 governor testing, as documented in IR 4528007 during the weeks ending October 15 through November 5, 2022.
- (4) Evaluation of the operability of the 1B EDG following identification of potential fuel rack binding issues during Refuel Outage A1R23 testing, as documented in IR 4528116 during the weeks ending October 15 through November 5, 2022.
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the following permanent change to the facility:
- (1) Engineering Change (EC) 624258: Upgrade Existing Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) with Digital ABB Unitrol Model, during the weeks ending October 15 through October 29, 2022.
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP section 03.01) (12 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Functional and operational testing of the 1B EDG following electrical governor replacement during Refuel Outage A1R23, as documented in WOs 4986514 and
===5293773 during the weeks ending October 15 through 22, 2022.
- (2) Functional and operational testing of the unit 1 main electrical generator AVR following replacement during Refuel Outage A1R23, as documented in WO 4589156 and SP 22-001 during the week ending October 22, 2022.
- (3) Low power startup physics testing following reloading of the unit 1 reactor core for Operating Cycle No. 24, as documented in WOs 5148475 and 5149407 during the week ending October 22, 2022.
- (4) Functional and operational testing of the digital rod position indication (DRPI) system following reactor reassembly from Refuel Outage A1R23, as documented in WO 5146416 during the week ending October 22, 2022.
(5)unit 1 core alignment verification activities following reactor refueling, as documented in WOs 5162111 and 5144600 during the week ending October 22, 2022.
- (6) Functional and operational testing of the 1D Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV),1MS001D, following troubleshooting during Refuel Outage A1R23, as documented in IR 4530461 during the week ending October 22, 2022.
- (7) Functional and operational testing of the 1B AF Pump following outage maintenance, as documented in WOs 4986652 and 5180994 during the weeks ending October 22 through October 29, 2022.
- (8) Automatic rod drop time testing following unit 1 Refuel Outage A1R23 reactor reassembly, as documented in WO 5160060 during the week ending October 29, 2022.
- (9) Functional and operational testing for the 1A MSIV, 1MS001A, following repairs to the hydraulic system during Refuel Outage A1R23, as documented in WO 53002865 during the weeks ending October 22 through November 5, 2022.
- (10) Functional and operational testing of various electrical relays for the 2A EDG following performance of an extended 6-year EDG maintenance work window, as documented in WOs 4794002, 1599520, and 4794003 during the week ending November 5, 2022.
- (11) Functional and operational testing of the station's temporary fire pump, following its installation to support an extended maintenance and repair outage for the site's installed diesel-driven fire pump, as documented in Procedure FP-50 during the week ending November 12, 2022.
- (12) System leakage testing at normal operating primary pressure and temperature (NOP/NOT) following return of the unit 1 RCS to operation after reactor refueling, as documented in WOs 5162130 and 5162134 during the weeks ending November 12 through November 19, 2022.
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP section 03.01)===
- (1) The inspectors reviewed licensee activities and evaluated licensee performance associated with unit 1 Refuel Outage A1R23, during the weeks ending October 8 through October 22, 2022. An unresolved item (URI) associated with the station's performance during unit 1 restart at the end of the outage is documented in the Results section of this report.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP section 03.01) (3 Samples)
===5299750 during the week ending October 29, 2022.
- (2) Regularly scheduled monthly 1A EDG surveillance test performed after experiencing issues with the 1A EDG lube oil system in November 2022, as documented in WO 5316998 during the week ending December 31, 2022.
- (3) Observation and review of selected elements of the unit 1 and unit 2 Modes 1, 2, and 3 Shiftly and Daily Operating Surveillance by licensed operators in the main control room during the week ending December 31, 2022.
Inservice Testing (IP section 03.01)===
- (1) Inservice Testing for unit 1 Safety Injection Pumps and Safety Injection System Check Valves, as documented in WOs 5154224 and 5154249 during the week ending October 8, 2022.
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Reactor Coolant Drain Tank containment isolation valve stroke surveillance for 1RE9157, as documented in WO 4986536 during the week ending October 15, 2022.
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following submitted Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes:
Evaluation No. 21-72, Emergency Action Levels for Braidwood Station, January 20, 2022 This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.
Instructions to Workers (IP section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee instructs workers on plant-related radiological hazards and the radiation protection requirements intended to protect workers from those hazards.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:
- (1) Licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material leaving the Radiological Controlled Area.
- (2) Workers exiting the unit 1 containment access facility during the refueling outage.
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP section 03.04) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:
- (1) Reactor head removal and reinstallation of the upper internals and the flange inspection activities.
- (2) In-Core sump inspection activities.
- (3) Reactor cavity decontamination activities.
- (4) Reactor vessel head penetration 69 repair actives.
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP section 03.05) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:
- (1) Steam generator platforms during eddy current testing.
- (2) Sandbox covers in the reactor cavity.
- (3) Reactor vessel head penetrations area.
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP section 03.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP section 02.10)===
- (1) Unit 1 (September 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (September 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022)
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP section 02.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) September 1, 2021 through September 31, 2022 PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) September 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (section 03.03)
The inspectors conducted an in-depth review of the licensees implementation of the corrective action program (CAP) related to the following issue:
- (1) Review and assessment of the station's corrective actions following identification of a steam leak from the unit 1, train A, Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet Isolation Valve (1CV8321A), as documented in IR 4492850 during the week ending November 28, 2022. Specific elements of the inspectors' review are documented in an observation in the Results section of this report.
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors conducted a semiannual review of the licensees CAP for potential adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety concern during the weeks ending December 3 through December 24, 2022. A specific trend related to certain issues involving the timely completion of surveillance testing requirements is documented in the Results section of this report.
71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Reporting (IP section 03.05)
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the following licensee event notification (EN) made by the station to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center:
- (1) Review and assessment of the licensee's non-emergency report made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for unacceptable indications identified on unit 1 Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetration No. 69, as documented in NRC EN 56153 during the week ending October
INSPECTION RESULTS
Unresolved Item (Open)
Startup from Braidwood Unit 1 Refueling Outage A1R23 with 1A Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Closed URI 05000456/2022004-01 71111.20
Description:
On October 19, 2022, during unit 1 plant startup from Braidwood Refueling Outage A1R23, the licensee was experiencing technical difficulties with the 1A Steam Generator (SG) Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) hydraulic operating system. The unit 1 reactor was restarted and made critical at 1:10 p.m. (all times noted are Central Daylight Time - CDT), and low power reactor physics testing was commenced with reactor power stable in the intermediate range - below the point where reactor power would add heat to the reactor coolant system. As the dayshift outage activities wrapped up, the inspectors departed the station for the day with the understanding that the licensee fully intended to complete repairs on the 1A MSIV, perform the requisite testing on the valve, and then place it in its normally open at-power position before raising unit 1 power into the power range.
As difficulties with the 1A MSIV continued, the licensees schedule for completing the A1R23 Refuel Outage on unit 1 began to slip. Shortly after evening shift turnover on October 19, 2022, licensee personnel made a decision to raise unit 1 power with the 1A MSIV closed and the 1A MSIV Bypass Valve open. A target power of approximately 10 percent was selected in order to support scheduled testing for a newly installed main turbine electrical generator automatic voltage regulator. Unit 1 entered MODE 1 operation at 8:34 p.m.
During the evening of October 19, 2022, as control room operators attempted to raise unit 1 power to towards the target value of 10 percent, control of 1A SG level and pressure became more and more problematic. While unit 1 suffered no significant adverse effects, the 1A SG power-operated relief valve (PORV) did reach its actuation setpoint and lift several times. Recognizing that control of the plant was untenable in this configuration, licensee management made the decision to reduce power and stabilize unit 1. At 12:31 a.m. on October 10, 2022, unit 1 returned to operation in MODE 2, and the inspectors were informed of the event by licensee management later that morning following arrival at the site.
Ultimately, the licensee completed repairs to the 1A MSIV hydraulic systems on October 20, 2022. At 2:44 p.m. on that day, the licensee returned unit 1 to MODE 3 in order to open and test the 1A MSIV in accordance with established plant procedures.
On November 10, 2022, station management approved the charter for a formal corrective action program (CAP) causal evaluation to look into the event, with a specific focus on the decision-making process that was employed during the evening of October 19, 2022. The licensees decision to move forward with unit 1 operation at power with the 1A MSIV closed raises a number of questions. These include, but are not limited to:
How did the licensee justify accepting deviations from step F.4, MSIV Position for Startup, of station procedure 1BwGP 100-2, Plant Startup, as well as the prerequisites called out in section C of procedure BwOP MS-9, Opening the Main Steam Isolation Valves? What were the bases for these deviations?
The 1A MSIV provides steam flow through a 30.25-inch line and the 1A MSIV Bypass Valve only supports steam flow through a 4-inch line; how did licensee personnel justify placing the plant in this configuration with no formal or documented review by the stations Engineering Department?
Why were on-watch licensed operators in the unit 1 main control room not afforded the opportunity for additional training in the stations simulator prior to moving forward with operating the plant in such an unusual configuration?
Why did a focused test case that was run in the plant simulator by previously licensed personnel assigned to the stations Training Department fail to identify issues with the ability to control 1A SG steam pressure as power was increased, or the fact that the 1A SG PORV would reach its actuation setpoint and lift?
Planned Closure Actions: The issues surrounding the licensees decision to startup from Braidwood unit 1 Refueling Outage A1R23 with the 1A MSIV closed are considered unresolved pending the inspectors receipt and review of the licensees formal causal evaluation. At the end of the inspection period, the licensee planned to complete this evaluation early in the 1st Quarter of 2023.
Licensee Actions: As noted above, a licensee formal causal evaluation into the circumstances surrounding this event was in progress at the end of the inspection period. No additional licensee actions are necessary at this time.
Corrective Action References:
IR 4531005: 1A Steam Generator PORV Lift
IR 4530477: OSP-A: 1A MSIV Failed to Open Observation: Development of Steam Leak on 1CV8321A, 1A Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet Isolation Valve, During the Operating Cycle 71152A The inspectors performed a detailed review of Issue Report (IR) 4492850, 1CV8321A Steam Leak. On April 13, 2022, during Operating Cycle 23 on unit 1, a steam leak was identified on the 1A Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet Isolation Valve, 1CV8321A. The exact origin of the steam plume could not be identified due to a buildup of boric acid deposits on the valve, but based on various visual clues, was believed by station personnel to be originating from the body-to-bonnet bolted mechanical joint on the valve. The steam leak resulted in increased unidentified leakage and derived air concentration readings within the unit 1 containment.
IR 4414126, 01-OSP-A A1R22 Mode 3 BACC W/D - 1CV8321A Body-Bonnet Leak, was previously written on April 5, 2021, identifying a minor, inactive boric acid leak on the body-to-bonnet connection of the same valve. In response to this IR, Work Order (WO)05142152, 01-OSP-A A1R22 Mode 3 BACC W/D - 1CV8321A Body-Bonnet Leak, was generated to clean and retorque the valves body-to-bonnet fasteners. When the valve was retorqued and no movement was observed, a gasket replacement was recommended. The replacement of the gasket was deferred, based on licensee engineering judgment, until A1R23.
As discussed in the stations Technical Specification (TS) Bases, the regenerative heat exchanger is a component within the reactor coolant system (RCS) and is therefore subject to RCS operational leakage limits in order to prevent compromises in safety, up to and including loss of coolant accidents. The inspectors chose this issue for an in-depth review of the licensees actions within their corrective action program (CAP) because of the inherent safety significance associated with the potential of increased leakage from 1CV8321A exceeding the RCS leakage limits specified in TS 3.4.13.
The inspectors examined the licensees corrective actions related to the identification of the boric acid leak on 1CV8321A in an effort to determine whether or not the deferment of the gasket replacement was consequential to the development of an active steam leak in the valve. Specific licensee actions targeting this event included the creation of a Technical Skills Alert for Mechanical Maintenance personnel and a request for additional training. While the inspectors did not identify any performance deficiencies with the licensees CAP actions that were taken, several specific observations related to this issue were worthy of note:
In IR 4414126, under the initial screening questions section, it is stated that the leak cannot be defined as minor leakage per ER-AP-331, Boric Acid Corrosion Control (BACC) Program. However, it is later noted within the same IR that the leak is considered a special case of minor BACC leakage.
In IR 4414126, the component materials are characterized as all being made from corrosion resistant stainless steel, so no further evaluation is required. A year later in IR 4492850 when the steam leak was discovered, it is again ascertained that the entire valve, including all components, are made of stainless steel. However, several weeks later in June, additional information is provided within the comments of IR 4492850 documenting the discovery that the yoke of the valve is made of carbon steel in contradiction to what was written in the body of the IR. Ultimately, the licensees technical staff concluded that this was acceptable since the yoke was painted to protect it from the effects of the boric acid.
The gasket and other materials that were removed and replaced during the disassembly of 1CV8321A during Refuel Outage A1R23 were not retained. This precluded additional examination as part of the licensees CAP that could have been performed in an effort to deduce the damage done to components, the cause of any damage, or provide insight into the cause of the loosened fasteners that were identified during the maintenance as documented in IR 4527583, OSP-A I.R. to document as found condition of 1CV8321A.
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that a conservative decision by the licensee to have disassembled the valve and preemptively replaced the gasket prior to the commencement of unit 1 Operating Cycle 23 could have prevented the increase in unidentified leakage that occurred during the cycle. This was, therefore, a missed opportunity by the licensees staff that may warrant additional study and/or review.
No findings or violations of NRC requirements of more than minor safety significance were identified by the inspectors in the course of this review.
Observation: Trend in the Timely Completion of Surveillance Tests/Procedures 71152S The inspectors performed a review of plant issues, particularly those entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) over the past several months. During their review, the inspectors noted an adverse trend involving the timely completion of surveillance tests/procedures. Specific CAP entries reviewed by the inspectors included, but were not limited to:
- IR 4469855; Surveillance Closed Out in PassPort with Work Not Performed
- IR 4504261; 1/2SX005 Exercise Frequency Correction
- IR 4522197; IST Non-Compliance 2RF027 Fail Safe Test
- IR 4522164; NOS ID: Fire Rated Assembly Visual Inspections were Missed While each of these individual issues had its own unique and distinct cause, in all cases the Stations Operations Department was forced to take emergent actions to rectify the errors involved. The inspectors did note that a common theme involving insufficient attention to detail and planning rigor was common to all of the occurrences. Braidwood Stations Technical Specification (TS), Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.3, lists the conditions and provisions applicable for addressing missed/tardy surveillance requirements, which includes an allowable delay period for the requirement to declare that the TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) hasnt been met. The Bases for TS SR 3.0.3 states, in part:
The basis for this delay period includes consideration of unit conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the surveillance, the safety significance of the delay in completing the required surveillance, and the recognition that the most probable result of any particular surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the requirements.
The TS SR 3.0.3 Bases further goes on to state:
Failure to comply with specified frequencies for SRs is expected to be an infrequent occurrence. Use of the delay period established by SR 3.0.3 is a flexibility which is not intended to be used repeatedly to extend surveillance intervals.
In the cases reviewed, since the licensee was able to rapidly perform the surveillances and testing required with the provisions of TS SR 3.0.3, the inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of NRC requirements of more than minor safety significance in the course of this review. However, increased efforts might be necessary to ensure that the licensees use of the provisions of TS SR 3.0.3 remains an infrequent occurrence, as noted in the TS SR 3.0.3 Bases. The licensee generated IR 4527990; Trend in Completion of Surveillances in Correct Timeframe, within the stations CAP to drive additional station reviews into this issue.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure.
On January 18, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to J. Petty, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
On October 14, 2022, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to G. Gugle, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On October 14, 2022, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to G. Gugle, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On November 28, 2022, the inspectors presented the emergency action level and emergency plan changes inspection results to M. Spillie and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
23772
U-2 CAF Tank 'B' Winter Readiness
09/21/2022
4532744
0B PWST Level Transmitter Heat Trace
10/27/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
4538315
1VV69AF Does Not Work
11/21/2022
Letter from Greg Gugle, Site Vice President to Marri-
Marchionda Palmer, Senior Vice President Midwest
Operations Exelon Nuclear, 2023 Winter Readiness
Certification
11/15/2022
Letter from Mr. Glen Kaegi to NRC; Mitigating Strategies
Flood Hazard Assessment (MSFHA) Submittal
06/30/2016
Miscellaneous
Letter from NRC to Mr. Bryan
Units 1 and 2 - Flood Hazard Mitigation Strategies
Assessment (CAC Nos. MF7898 and MF7899)
11/28/2016
0BwOA ENV-1
Adverse Weather Conditions Unit 0
24
0BwOS SFT-A2a
Unit Common Station Heat Area Heaters Freezing
Temperature Equipment Protection Surveillance
0BwOS XFT-A1
Unit Common Freezing Temperature Equipment Protection
Surveillance
0BwOS XFT-A2b
unit Common Station Heat Area Heaters Freezing
Temperature Equipment Protection Surveillance
0BwOS XFT-A3
Unit Common Cold Weather Surveillance
0BwOS XFT-A4
Unit Common Freezing Temperature Equipment Protection
Inside Surveillance
0BwOS XFT-A5
unit Common Freezing Temperature Equipment Protection
Out Building Surveillance
General Area Checks and Operator Field Rounds
OP-AA-108-107-
1001
Station Response to Grid Capacity Conditions
OP-AA-108-111-
1001
Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines
OP-BR-102-1001
Augmented Operator Field Rounds
Procedures
Seasonal Readiness
Procedures
BwOP CS-E1
Electrical Lineup - unit 1 Containment Spray System
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Electrical Lineup
BwOP CS-M1
Core Spray Operating Mechanical Lineup Unit 1
BwOP DG-E1
Electrical Lineup - Unit 1 1A Diesel Generator
BwOP DG-M1
Operating Mechanical Lineup Unit 1 1A D/G
BwOP FC-E1
Electrical Lineup - Unit 1 Lineup Operating
BwOP FC-M1
Operating Mechanical Lineup Unit 1
BwOP RH-E1
Electrical Lineup - Unit 1 Operating
BwOP RH-M1
Operating Mechanical Lineup Unit 1 1A RH Train
BwOP RH-M2
Operating Mechanical Lineup Unit 1 1B RH Train
Pre-Fire Plan No.
1; Fire Zone 1.1-1
Containment 377'-0" Elevation Unit 1 Annular Area
Pre-Fire Plan No.
133; Fire Zone
11.4-0 North
Auxiliary Building 383' Elevation Unit 1, Auxiliary Building
General Area - North
Pre-Fire Plan No.
203; Fire Zone
18.3-1
Unit 1, Main Steam and Auxiliary Feed Pipe Tunnel
Pre-Fire Plan No.
5; Fire Zone 1.2-1
Containment 377'-0" Elevation Unit 1 Annular Area
Pre-Fire Plan No.
6; Fire Zone 1.2-1
Containment 401'-0" Elevation Unit 1 Annular Area
Pre-Fire Plan No.
9; Fire Zone 1.3-1
Containment 426'-0" Elevation Unit 1 Containment Upper
Area
Fire Plans
Pre-Fire Plan No.
91; Fire Zone 9.2-
2, 9.3-2
DG 401' Elevation Diesel Generator Room 2A and Day Tank
Room
Procedures
Pre-Fire Plan Manual
Turbine Building Basement Floor Plan Area 6 Unit-1
Plumbing Turbine Building Basement Diagram Elevation
369-0 Areas 5 Thru 8
O
M-19
General Arrangement Lake Screen House Units 1 and 2
G
Drawings
M-906
Essential Service Water Lake Screen House
BwAP 1110-3
Plant Barrier Impairment Program
Procedures
CCAA-201
Plant Barrier Control Program
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Cable Condition Monitoring Program
Structures Monitoring
Corrective Action
Documents
05-OSP-X Scratch Rx Head O-Ring Surface near
Stud #46-47
04/09/2021
1A SG Tubesheet Anomaly in Tube R2C141 (A1R23)
10/06/2022
Rejectable Indications on CRDM Pen 69 Weld Buildup
10/07/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NDE Linear Indication Identified during LR Exam on Line
10/09/2022
54-PQ-603-003
Procedure Qualification for Automated Ultrasonic
Examination of RPV Closure Head Penetrations
03/03/2020
Engineering
Evaluations
A1R23 Degradation Assessment
385473
Remote Bare Metal Visual Examination of 79 RV Closure
Head Penetrations
10/09/2022
Liquid Penetrant Report for Penetration 69
10/07/2022
Liquid Penetrant Report for Penetration 69
10/11/2022
Ultrasonic Examination of Elbow-to-Pipe Weld Component
ID 1MS-06-32
10/07/2022
Ultrasonic Examination of Elbow-to-Pipe Weld Component
ID 1MS-06-31
10/07/2022
NDE Reports
Ultrasonic Examination of Elbow-to-Pipe Weld Component
ID 1MS-06-30
10/07/2022
54-ISI-494-004
Multi-Frequency Eddy Current Array ID Probe Examination
of Vent Line and RVLIS Nozze Bores
03/22/2022
54-ISI-603-011
Automated Ultrasonic Examination of RPV Closure Head
Penetrations Containing Thermal Sleeves
2/24/2020
54-ISI-604-017
Automated Ultrasonic Examination of Open Tube RPV
Closure Head Penetrations
09/22/2021
Liquid Penetrant (Pt) Examination
Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds
Bare Metal Visual Examination for Nickel Alloy Materials
LMT-14-PAUT-
017
Non-Encoded Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination of
Ferritic and Austenitic Welds
Procedures
LMT-14-PAUT-
24
Encoded Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic
and Austenitic Welds
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
TQ-AA-150-F25
Braidwood Generating Station LORT Annual Exam Status
Report
10/01/2022
OP-AA-101-111-
1001
Operator Standards and Expectations
Operator Fundamentals
Watch-Standing Practices
OP-AA-103-102-
1001
Strategies for Successful Transient Mitigation
Operation of Plant Equipment
Communications
Operating Narrative Logs and Records
Reactivity Management
OP-BR-108-101-
1002
Operations Department Standards and Expectations
Systematic Approach to Training Process Description
Operator Training Programs
Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation
Examination Security and Administration
Simulator Management
TQ-BR-201-0113
Braidwood Training Department Simulator Examination
Security Actions
Procedures
TQ-BR-201-0113
Braidwood Training Department Simulator Examination
Security Actions
Radiation
Surveys
OP-AA-101-113-
1006
4.0 Crew Critique Guidelines
4482320
Boron Accumulation at 1CV8321A
03/03/2022
4517560
Walkdown of 1CV8321A Leakage
08/18/2022
27710
1CV8321A Gasket Issues
10/07/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
27895
A1R23 CRDM Thermal Sleeve Metrology Results
10/08/2022
Miscellaneous
2-9355156-000
Framatome Inc. Metrology Services Information Record:
Braidwood 1 CRDM Thermal Sleeve As-Found Dimensional
Report 2022 [PROPRIETARY]
10/07/2022
Procedures
Maintenance Rule Functions - Safety Significant
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Classification
Maintenance Rule Implementation per NEI 18-10
Maintenance Rule 18-10 - Scoping
Maintenance Rule 18-10 - Failure Definitions
Maintenance Rule 18-10 - Performance Monitoring and
Dispositioning Between (a)(1) and (a)(2)
637760
Alternate Detail for Installation of Valve Seal Cap on
1RC8040C
Drawings
M-35, Sheet 2
Diagram of Main Steam
Miscellaneous
BW-MODE-033
TS 3.0.4.b Evaluation - Mode Change with Technical
Specification Equipment Out of Service
- 3
ASME section XI Repair/Replacement Program
ER-AA-335-015-
2013
VT-2 Visual Examination in Accordance with ASME 2013
Risk Management
On-Line Risk Management
Integrated Risk Management
Procedures
On-Line Risk Management and Assessment
Self-Assessments OP-AA-108-117
Protected Equipment Program
5141755-07
1RC8040C - Leak Check During MODE 3 Ascending
10/18/2022
5141755-09
1RC8040C - Leak Test at NOP/NOT
10/18/2022
Work Orders
5141755-25
1RC8040C - Remove Valve Cap and Retorque Bonnet
10/17/2022
26618
OSP-A K603B and K630B Relays Failed During 1BwOSR
3.3.2.9-2
10/03/2022
26631
OSP-A Request Engineering Evaluation
10/03/2022
26943
Need Further Testing on Unit 1 N32 Noise
10/05/2022
27206
1-10-A6, SR S/D FLUX HIGH, Continuously Toggling
10/05/2022
27224
U1 Source Range Channel Deviation > 4%
10/06/2022
27232
OSP-ROL Discoveries During N31 Preamp Troubleshooting
10/06/2022
27637
U1 Source Range Channel Deviation > 6%
10/07/2022
28007
10/09/2022
28116
10/11/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
28479
10/11/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
28821
A1R23 LL - 1B DG Governor Replacement
10/12/2022
4532523
A1R23 4.0 Critique DG Sequence Testing
10/27/2022
Engineering Technical Evaluations
Risk Management Documentation
OP-AA-106-101-
1006
Operational Decision Making Process
Adverse Condition Monitoring and Contingency Planning
Procedures
Operability Determinations (CM-1)
4531726
AVR U-1 EC is Incomplete and Different from U-2 EC
10/24/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
4532595
1BwPR 1-19-B6 Needs to be Changed or Removed
10/27/2022
Engineering
Changes
24258
Upgrade Existing AVR with Digital ABB Unitrol Model
Procedures
SPP-22-001
Modification Testing, Commissioning and Power Ascension
Procedure for ABB Unitrol 6000 Automatic Voltage Regulator
(AVR) Replacement
Work Orders
4589156
Install EC 624258 Replacement MG Voltage Regulators U1
10/14/2022
4530461
OSP-A 1MS001D Failed to Close on B Train Manual
Actuation Test
10/19/2022
4531909
U-2 Switchyard Voltage Taken Outside of BwOP MP-27
Limits
10/25/2022
4534778
Oil Residue in 2A EDG Room Exhaust Duct
11/04/2022
4534778
Oil Residue in 2A EDG Room Exhaust Duct
11/04/2022
4534881
Intentionally Abbreviated Maintenance on 2JR-DG729
11/04/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
4534916
Unexpected Annunciator 2-21-D6: 125 Vdc Bus 211 Ground
11/04/2022
Operability
Evaluations
1BwOSR
3.8.1.19-2
1B Diesel Generator Emergency Core Cooling System
Sequencer Surveillance
1BwOSR 0.1-
1,2,3
Unit One Modes 1, 2, and 3 Shiftly and Daily Operating
Surveillance
100
1BwOSR 3.1.7.1
Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) Operability Checkout
1BwOSR 3.3.2.8-
611B
Unit One Emergency Safety Features Actuation System
Instrumentation Slave Relay Surveillance (B Train Automatic
Safety Injection - K611)
Procedures
1BwOSR 3.7.2.1
Main Steam Isolation Valve Full Stroke Surveillance
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
1BwOSR 3.7.2.1
Main Steam Isolation Valve Full Stroke Surveillance
1BwOSR
3.8.1.10-2
1B Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection and Simulated
Safety Injection in Conjunction with Undervoltage During
Load Testing
1BwOSR 3.8.1.2-
1B Diesel Generator Operability Surveillance
1BwOSR
5.5.8.AF-3B
Group A IST Requirements for Unit One Diesel Driven
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
1BwOSR
5.5.8.AF-3B
Group A IST Requirements for Unit One Diesel Driven
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
BwHS 900-35
Diesel Generator Governor Set-Up Following Governor
Replacement
BwISR 3.1.4.3.a
Rod Drop Time (Automatic)
BwOP FP-50
Temp Installed Diesel Driven Fire Pump
BwOP MP-27
Monitoring of Generator Output Voltage for NERC
Compliance
BwVP 500-14
Core Alignment Verification
BwVS 500-6
Low Power Physics Test Program
BwVS TRM
3.1.h.1
Low Power Physics Data Interpretation
BwVS TRM
3.1.h.1
Core Reload Sequence and Verification
MA-BR-723-507
Diesel Generator Post Relay Replacement Circuit
Verification
Core Verification Guideline
Newton Core Gap Data Acquisition for Byron and Braidwood
SPP-22-001
Modification Testing, Commissioning and Power Ascension
Procedure for ABB Unitrol 6000 Automatic Voltage Regulator
(AVR) Replacement
Radiation
Surveys
Section XI Pressure Testing
Shipping Records
1599520-03
2A EDG: Functional Check 2CD1 and 2CD2 Relays Via
Simulated Cooldown
11/05/2022
Work Orders
4589156
Install EC 624258 Replacement MG Voltage Regulators U1
10/11/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
4794002-02
2A EDG: PMT - Normally Energized Agastat GP Series
Relays - 2PL07J
11/05/2022
4794003-03
2A EDG: Functional Check 2CD1 and 2CD2 Relays Via
Simulated Cooldown
11/05/2022
4986514-07
PMT - 1PL08J - Governor Devices 25GOV, 65DRU, 65MPU,
65PWR
10/15/2022
4986514-08
PMT - 1PL08J - 1B Emergency Diesel Generator Full Load
Reject Test 10/11/2022
4986514-09
PMT - 1PL08J - 1B Emergency Diesel Generator Sequence
Testing
10/15/2022
4986652
Change Grease in CPLG and Perform Inspection of CPLG
Internals
10/19/2022
4986652-02
CHG Grease in CPLG and Perform Insp of CPLG Internals
10/18/2022
4995189-01
1B Emergency Diesel Generator Sequencer Surveillance
10/15/2022
5144600-01
Core Alignment Verification, Unit 1
10/13/2022
5146416-01
Unit 1 Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) Operability
Checkout
01/17/2022
5148475
Low Power Physics Test Program with Dynamic Rod Worth
Measurement
10/21/2022
5149407
Reload Startup Physics Tests Following Refueling
11/07/2022
5160060
Automatic Rod Drop Time
10/04/2022
5162111-11
Newton Gap Measurements in A1R23
10/13/2022
5162130
VT-2 Exam unit 1 Class 2 & 3 Components - Outage MODE
Ascending
10/18/2022
5162134
VT-2 Exam unit 1 Class 1 Components - Outage MODE 3
Ascending
10/18/2022
5180994
LR-Perform 18 Mo Inspection in Support of 1BwBS
7.1.2.3.C-1
10/19/2022
5180994-02
LR-Perform 18 Month Inspection in Support of 1BwVS
7.1.2.3.C-1
10/18/2022
293773-01
IST - 1B Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Monthly
10/11/2022
5302865-02
PMT Main Steam Isolation Valves Partial Stroke
10/20/2022
28080
SECID - Fatigue Assessment / Work Hour Waiver
01/09/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
4530477
10/19/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
4531005
1A Steam Generator PORV Lift
10/20/2022
Station Outage Control Center Logs
10/19/2022 -
10/20/2022
Unit 1 Main Control Room Logs
10/19/2022 -
10/20/2022
Miscellaneous
A1R23 Shutdown
Safety Plan
A1R23 Shutdown Safety Plan
1BwGP 100-1
Plant Heatup
1BwGP 100-1T26
Flowchart Exception Sheet
1BwGP 100-2
Plant Startup
1BwGP 100-2T1
1BwGP 100-2 Flowchart
1BwGP 100-2T2
MODE 3 to 2 Checklist
1BwGP 100-3
Power Ascension 5% to 100%
1BwGP 100-4
Power Descension
1BwGP 100-5
Plant Shutdown and Cooldown
1BwGP 100-6
Refueling Outage
1BwOS TRM
2.5.b.1
unit One - Containment Loose Debris Inspection
BwAP 1300-6
Special Procedures, Test, or Experiments
BwAP 1450-1
Access to Containment
BwAP 340-1
Use of Procedures for Operating Department
BwOP MS-9
Opening the Main Steam Isolation Valves
Shutdown Risk Management
Procedure Use and Adherence
Pre-Job Briefings
Fatigue Management and Work Hour Rules
MA-AA-716-008-
1008
Reactor Services: Refuel Floor FME Plan
Unit Restart Review
OP-AA-108-108-
1001
Drywell/Containment Closeout
Evaluation of Special Tests or Evolution Evolutions
Procedures
Evaluation of Special Tests or Evolutions
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Reactivity Management - Fuel Handling, Storage, and
Refueling
Outage Risk Management
Shutdown Safety Management Program
Shutdown Safety Plan Independent Review
Work Orders
4986536
Replace Valve Diaphragm
10/11/2022
28542
LLRT Failed, Results Out of Spec
10/11/2022
4539225
Low Lube Oil and Turbo Oil Pressure during 1A Diesel
Generator Run
11/27/2022
4539226
Frothy-like Substance in 1A Diesel Generator Jacket Water
Standpipe
11/27/2022
4539982
1A Diesel Generator Low Lube Oil and Turbo Oil Pressure
after Adjustment
11/30/2022
4540521
1DG01MA, 1DG02MA and 1DG03MA as Found Conditions
2/20/2022
4540606
1ZT-DG714A Cable Detached
2/03/2022
4540613
1A Diesel Generator Failed to Trip
2/03/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
4545327
1A Diesel Generator Lower Lube Oil Cooler Leaking Oil
2/29/2022
1BwOSR
3.6.3.5.RE-1
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Containment Isolation Valve
Stroke Surveillance
1BwOSR 3.8.1.2-
1A Diesel Generator Operability Surveillance
1BwOSR
5.5.8.SI-11
Comprehensive Inservice Testing (IST) Requirements for
unit 1 Safety Injection Pumps and Safety Injection System
Check Valve Stroke Test
1BwOST 0.1-1, 2,
Unit 1 Modes 1, 2, and 3 Shiftly and Daily Operating
Surveillance
101
2BwOSR 0.1-
1,2,3
unit 2 Modes 1, 2, and 3 Shiftly and Daily Operating
Surveillance
104
BwOP DG-1
Diesel Generator Alignment to Standby Condition
BwOP DG-11
Diesel Generator Startup and Operation
BwOP DG-12
Diesel Generator Shutdown
Procedures
Administrative Requirements for Inservice Testing
Work Orders
5154224
IST - 1SI8905A-D8949B/D/8922A/B Safety Injection Hot Leg
10/05/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
5154249
IST - 1SI8819A/B/C/D/1SI8926 - Safety Injection Cold Leg
10/05/2022
261230
1A Diesel Generator Operability Semi-Annual Surveillance
10/24/2022
299750
IST - 1A EDG Operability Monthly Surveillance
10/24/2022
5316998
IST - 1A EDG Operability Monthly Surveillance
2/28/2022
Miscellaneous
Q 21-72
Emergency Action Levels for Braidwood Station
01/20/2022
ADDENDUM 3
Emergency Action Levels for Braidwood Station
Procedures
ADDENDUM 3
Emergency Action Levels for Braidwood Station
RP-AA-302 Conduct an Alpha Program Evaluation After
Outage
11/02/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
Unit 1 Radiation Protection Refueling Outage Report
Process
09/15/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC ID: Deficiency in Alpha Program Implementation
10/13/2022
Miscellaneous
Alpha Area Level Assessment
05/27/2021
NISP-RP-002
Radiation and Contamination Surveys
Determination of Alpha Levels and Monitoring
Procedures
Contamination Control Best Practice Application
21-095108
Reactor Head Stand
04/07/2021
21-095806
RF Sump
04/16/2021
Radiation
Surveys
21-095850
Unit 1 Cavity (Head, Chest and Knee Height) Survey
04/17/2021
BW-01-22-00614
Remove/Reinstall Reactor Head Upper Internals
BW-01-22-00615
Reactor Cavity Work
BW-01-22-00618
Transfer Canal Blind Flange and LLRT
BW-01-22-00623
Reactor Cavity Decon Work
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
BW-01-22-00641
Setup/Demob, PT Pen 69 and All Associated Activities
71151
Miscellaneous
Monthly Data Elements for NRC Radiological Effluent
Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM)
09/01/2021 -
09/30/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample
(09/01/2021 - 09/30/2022)
Monthly Data Elements for NRC Reactor Coolant System
(RCS) Specific Activity (09/01/2021 - 09/30/2022)
09/01/2021 -
09/30/2022
Monthly Data Elements for NRC Occupational Exposure
Control Effectiveness Sample (09/01/2021 - 09/30/2022)
09/01/2021 -
09/30/2022
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Barrier Integrity - RCS
Identified Leakage
10/01/2021 -
09/30/2022
Collecting and Reporting of NRC Performance Indicator Data
Procedures
Monthly Data Elements for NRC Reactor Coolant System
(RCS) Leakage
4414126
01-OSP-A A1R22 Mode 3 BACC W/D - 1CV8321A
Body-Bonnet Leak
04/05/2021
4415586
O06-OSP-R Scope Expansion on 1CV8321A
04/10/2021
4492850
1CV8321 1A Steam Leak
04/13/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
27583
OSP-A I.R. to Document as Found Condition of 1CV8321A
10/07/2022
BwMP 3305-007
Disassembly/Reassembly of Velan Motor Operated Globe
and Globe Stop Check Valves
Boric Acid Corrosion Control (BACC) Program
Tool Pouch/Minor Maintenance
Guidance for Check Valve General Visual Inspection
Procedures
Root Cause Analysis Manual
Work Orders
5142152
01-OSP-A A1R22 Mode 3 BACC W/D - 1CV8321A Body-
Bonnet Leak
04/10/2021
4469855
Surveillance Closed Out in PassPort with Work Not
Performed
01/04/2022
4504261
1/2SX005 Exercise Frequency Correction
06/07/2022
22164
NOS ID: Fire Rated Assembly Visual Inspections Were
Missed
09/13/2022
22197
IST Non-Compliance 2RF027 Fail Safe Test
09/13/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
27990
Trend in Completion of Surveillances in Correct Timeframe
10/09/2022
Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR)
Procedures
Issue Identification and Screening Process
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action Program Evaluation Manual
Effectiveness Review Manual
2