ML033040382
ML033040382 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Dresden ![]() |
Issue date: | 10/30/2003 |
From: | Ring M NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB1 |
To: | Skolds J Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
References | |
EA-03-163 IR-03-007 | |
Download: ML033040382 (53) | |
See also: IR 05000237/2003007
Text
October 30, 2003
Mr. John L. Skolds, President
Exelon Nuclear
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2003007;
Dear Mr. Skolds:
On September 30, 2003, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. The enclosed integrated
inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on October 8, 2003,
with Mr. R. Hovey and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and to
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, there were two NRC-identified and two self-revealed
findings of very low significance. All four findings were determined to involve violations of NRC
requirements. However, because of their very low safety significance and because they have
been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as
Non-Cited Violations, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
Additionally, licensee identified violations which were determined to be of very low safety
significance are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report. If you contest the subject or severity of a
Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection
report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional
Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III, 801 Warrenville Road,
Lisle, IL 60532-4351; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the Dresden
Nuclear Power Station.
J. Skolds -2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA by Patrick L. Hiland Acting for/
Mark Ring, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000237/2003007; 05000249/2003007
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: Site Vice President - Dresden Nuclear Power Station
Dresden Nuclear Power Station Plant Manager
Regulatory Assurance Manager - Dresden
Chief Operating Officer
Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services
Senior Vice President - Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Vice President - Mid-West Operations Support
Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Director Licensing - Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Manager Licensing - Dresden and Quad Cities
Senior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Document Control Desk - Licensing
M. Aguilar, Assistant Attorney General
Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
State Liaison Officer
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\dres\Ml033040382.wpd
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy
OFFICE RIII N RIII N RIII RIII
NAME RLerch/trn HClayton PHiland for
MRing
DATE 10/30/03 10/30/03 10/30/03
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
J. Skolds -3-
ADAMS Distribution:
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GEG
DRC1
C. Ariano (hard copy)
DRPIII
DRSIII
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket Nos: 50-237; 50-249
Report No: 05000237/2003007; 05000249/2003007
Licensee: Exelon Generation Company
Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3
Location: 6500 North Dresden Road
Morris, IL 60450
Dates: July 1 through September 30, 2003
Inspectors: D. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector
P. Pelke, Resident Inspector
M. Mitchell, Reactor Engineer
M. Sheikh, Reactor Engineer
D. Chyu, Reactor Engineer
R. Alexander, Radiation Specialist
C. Phillips, Senior Operations Engineer
R. Winter, Reactor Inspector
R. Schulz, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Observer: Liliana Ramadan, NRC Intern
Approved by: Mark Ring, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
REPORT DETAILS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. REACTOR SAFETY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1R01 Adverse Weather (71111.01) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1R04 Equipment Alignments (71111.04) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Inadvertent Initiation of the Halon System in the Auxiliary Electric Equipment
Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1R06 Flood Protection (71111.06) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13) . . . . . 9
1R14 Personnel Performance Related to Non-routine Evolutions and Events
(71111.14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1R17 Permanent Plant Modification (71111.17) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing (71111.19) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1R23 Temporary Modification (71111.23) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. RADIATION SAFETY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems
(71122.01) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4OA4 Cross-Cutting Aspects of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4OA5 Other Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4OA6 Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4OA7 Licensee Identified Violation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000237/2003007, 05000249/2003007; 07/01/2003 - 09/30/2003, Dresden Nuclear Power
Station, Units 2 and 3; Fire Protection, Event Followup, Other Activities.
This report covers a 3-month period of baseline resident inspection, and announced baseline
inspections on licensed operator requalification and radiation safety. The inspection was
conducted by Region III inspectors and resident inspectors. Four Green findings, all involving
Non-Cited Violations (NCVs), were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by
their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609,
Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may
be Green or be a assigned severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program
for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Green. A self-revealed finding involving a Non-Cited Violation of Technical
Specification 5.4.1 was identified for the failure of an instrument maintenance supervisor
to follow the fire prevention procedure and obtain permission from the fire marshal prior
to an instrument technician performing hot work. This human performance deficiency
resulted in the automatic initiation of the halon system in the auxiliary electric equipment
room. Corrective actions by the licensee included establishing a continuous fire watch,
refilling all halon bottles, briefing of this event with all instrument maintenance
personnel, and coaching of individuals in accordance with station policy.
The finding was more than minor because it affects the initiating events cornerstone
objective to limit the likelihood of those events (fire) that upset plant stability and
challenge critical safety functions. The finding was determined to be of low safety
significance (Green) because the halon system was still operable to extinguish a fire in
its incipient stage. (Section 1R05)
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green. A finding of very low safety significance was identified by the inspectors
involving a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design
Control requirements. The licensee had not updated the controlling calculation to
assure that the motors would operate with undervoltage conditions after the high
pressure coolant injection (HPCI) gland seal leak off (GSLO) turbine gland steam
condenser exhauster and its hotwell drain pump motors were upgraded to safety-related
equipment. After the inspectors identified these inconsistencies, the licensee revised
the calculation, performed qualification testing, and generally fulfilled qualification that
the motors would operate under the postulated undervoltage conditions.
1 Enclosure
This finding was more than minor because the design process allowed upgrading the
motors to safety-related without assuring fulfillment of known design requirements that
affected the mitigating system cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, the
reliability, and the capability of HPCI to respond to initiating events to prevent
undesirable consequences. Continuous operation of the GSLO system was required to
support HPCI operation because of room temperature concerns. The finding was
determined to be of low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an
actual loss of the safety function. (Section 4OA5).
- Green. The inspectors identified a finding involving a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V, for the failure of mechanical maintenance personnel to
generate a condition report or inform a supervisor after identifying loose bolts on the
standby liquid control relief valve. This human performance deficiency resulted in the
licensee having to perform a historical operability evaluation on the condition of the
system. In addition to the historical operability evaluation, the mechanical maintenance
manager reinforced the requirement of initiating condition reports when deficiencies are
identified.
The finding was more than minor because it affected the mitigating system cornerstone
objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to
be of low safety significance (Green) because the system was determined to have been
operable with the loose bolts. (Section 4OA5)
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
- Green. A self-revealing finding involving a Non-Cited Violation of Technical
Specification 3.4.4 was identified for the licensees failure to ensure that Unit 3 was not
operated with reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage. As a result of this human
performance deficiency, the licensee was not in compliance with Technical
Specifications on two occasions for Unit 3 while operating with pressure boundary
leakage. Corrective actions by the licensee included using an enhanced fit-up process
to minimize the welding induced residual stresses and using proper tie-back support
alignment to minimize mechanically induced stress. Also, the licensee established an
exclusion zone and action level values to minimize reactor recirculation pump speed in
the area of the resonance frequency of the piping. In addition, the licensee will install a
piping configuration modification to improve the vibration response characteristics of
both A and B reactor recirculation loops high and low pressure sensing lines.
The finding was considered more than minor because the issue affected the barrier
integrity cornerstone. This finding was evaluated using Phase 1 of the significance
determination process (SDP) which screened Phase 2 because the finding affected the
reactor coolant system barrier. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very
low safety significance (Green) because additional equipment not credited in the
Probabilistic Risk Assessment was available to mitigate the leak and the contribution of
this type of event to the baseline core damage frequency was small. (Section 4OA3)
2 Enclosure
B. Licensee Identified Findings
Violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee, have
been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee
have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and
corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
3 Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 2 began the inspection period at full power. On July 20, 2003, operators reduced load to
630 MWe to perform rod pattern adjustments and reverse circulating water flow through the
condenser. The unit was returned to full power the same day. On August 10, 2003, operators
reduced load to 793 MWe to swap rods. The unit was returned to full power the same day. On
August 24, 2003, operators reduced load to 850 MWe to perform control valve testing, and the
unit was returned to full power the same day. On September 7, 2003, operators reduced load
to 660 MWe to perform rod pattern adjustments and perform testing on the isolation condenser
system. The unit was returned to full power the same day. On September 28, 2003, the
operators reduced load to 650 Mwe to perform work on the 2A reactor feed pump and the
2A condensate/condensate booster pump. Prior to completing this work the unit scrammed on
September 30, 2003, due to low reactor water level after the 2C reactor feed pump tripped due
to a ground fault.
Unit 3 began the inspection period at full power. On August 16, 2003, operators reduced the
load to 700 MWe to perform rod swaps, and the unit was returned to full power on
August 17, 2003. On September 27, 2003, operators reduced load to 416 MWe for
deep/shallow rod adjustments, and installation of a castle nut on 3B reactor feed pump casing.
The unit returned to full power on September 29, 2003.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity and
1R01 Adverse Weather (71111.01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an assessment of the licensees implementation of the
stations winter readiness process.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignments (71111.04)
.1 Partial Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected a redundant or backup system to an out-of-service or degraded
train, reviewed documents to determine correct system lineup, and verified critical
portions of the system configuration. Instrumentation valve configurations and
4 Enclosure
appropriate meter indications were also observed. The inspectors observed various
support system parameters to determine the operational status. Control room switch
positions for the systems were observed. Other conditions, such as adequacy of
housekeeping, the absence of ignition sources, and proper labeling were also
evaluated.
The inspectors performed three partial walkdowns of the following systems:
- Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection;
- Unit 2B Core Spray; and
- Unit 2 Isolation Condenser.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors toured six plant areas important to safety to assess the material
condition, operating lineup, and operational effectiveness of the fire protection system
and features. The review included control of transient combustibles and ignition
sources, fire suppression systems, manual fire fighting equipment and capability,
passive fire protection features, including fire doors, and compensatory measures. The
following areas were walked down:
- Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 476'-6" East Low Pressure Coolant Injection
Corner Room (Fire Zone 11.2.2);
- Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 589' Standby Liquid Control Area (Fire
Zone 1.1.2.5.D);
- Unit 3 Reactor Building, Elevation 589' Isolation Condenser Area (Fire
Zone 1.1.1.5.A);
- Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 476'-6" High Pressure Coolant Injection Room
(Fire Zone 11.2.3);
- Unit 3 Reactor Building, Elevation 476'-6" High Pressure Coolant Injection Room
(Fire Zone 11.1.3); and
- Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 517'-0" (Fire Zone 1.1.2.2).
b. Findings
.1 Inadvertent Initiation of the Halon System in the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room
Introduction: A Green self-revealed finding involving a Non-Cited Violation of Technical
Specifications was identified for the failure of an instrument maintenance supervisor to
obtain permission from the fire marshal prior to performing hot work. This human
performance deficiency resulted in the automatic initiation of the halon system in the
Unit 2/3 auxiliary electric equipment room.
5 Enclosure
Description: On July 22, 2003, instrument maintenance personnel were performing
Work Order #573460-04 to remove a defective and obsolete seismic recorder located in
the floor of the Unit 2/3 auxiliary electric equipment room. After the recorder was
removed, the next step, instructional Step 2, was to assist the mechanical maintenance
personnel in removing the concrete expansion anchors. The instrument maintenance
supervisor misinterpreted instructional step 2 to mean that the instrument maintenance
personnel could perform the grinding to remove the anchors. Therefore, an instrument
technician proceeded with the grinding activity, and debris in the air from the grinding
caused the fire alarm system, XL-3, to alarm and automatic initiation of the halon
system. Administrative procedure OP-AA-201-004, Fire Prevention for Hot Work,
Revision 5, Step 5.1.1, requires the work supervisor to obtain permission from the fire
marshal to perform hot work operations by completing Section 1 of the Hot Work Permit,
Attachment 1. Section 1 identified the hot work to be performed, the extinguisher
location, the need to have a fire watch 1/2 hour after the hot work completed, any special
precautions to be implemented, and the fire marshals signature approving the
performance of the work. Since the instrument maintenance supervisor had not
obtained permission from the fire marshal to perform the hot work, the grinding by the
instrument technician was a violation of OP-AA-201-004.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the maintenance supervisors failure to follow
procedure OP-AA-201-004 was a performance deficiency warranting a significance
evaluation. The inspectors reviewed this finding against the guidance contained in
Appendix B, Issue Disposition Screening, of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612,
Power Reactor Inspection Reports. The inspectors determined that the finding was
more than minor because it affected the initiating events cornerstone objective to limit
the likelihood of those events (fire) that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety
functions. The finding also affected the cross-cutting area of Human Performance
because the maintenance supervisor failed to obtain permission from the fire marshal
prior to conducting the grinding activity.
In reviewing the finding using the Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination
Process, Phase 1, the inspectors determined that the finding did not contribute to the
likelihood of a loss of coolant accident, did not contribute to the likelihood of a reactor
trip and the likelihood of the unavailability of mitigation equipment or functions, and did
not increase the likelihood of a fire. The issue was determined to be of low safety
significance (Green) because the halon system was still operable to extinguish a fire in
its incipient stage.
Enforcement: Dresden Technical Specification 5.4.1 states that procedures shall be
established, implemented, and maintained covering the fire protection program.
Procedure Step 5.1.1 of OP-AA-201-004, Revision 5, requires the work supervisor to
obtain permission from the fire marshal to perform hot work by completing Section 1 of
the Hot Work Permit, Attachment 1.
Contrary to the above, on July 22, 2003, the instrument maintenance supervisor did not
obtain permission from the fire marshal prior to grinding in the auxiliary electric
equipment room. Corrective actions by the licensee included establishing a continuous
fire watch, refilling all halon bottles, briefing of this event with all instrument maintenance
personnel, and coaching of individuals in accordance with station policy. Because this
6 Enclosure
issue is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensees
corrective action program as Condition Report No. 168648, this violation is being treated
as an NCV, consistent with Section VI. A, of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
NCV 05000237/2003-007-01 and 05000249/2003-007-01.
1R06 Flood Protection (71111.06)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report flood analysis
documents and reviewed the licensees procedures for internal and external flooding.
The inspectors walked down the Unit 2 and 3 containment cooling service water system
pump vault rooms and low pressure coolant injection systems corner rooms to verify
drainage was unobstructed and to verify the integrity of flood barriers. In addition, the
inspectors reviewed licensee procedures for external flooding for ensuring proper safe
shutdown of the plant, and reviewed the licensees previously implemented corrective
actions for deficiencies associated with flood protection.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)
.1 Quarterly Review of Licenced Operator Qualifications
a. Inspection Scope
On September 29, 2003, the inspectors observed operating crew #6 during an out-of-
the-box requalification examination on the simulator. The inspectors evaluated crew
performance in the areas of:
- clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions;
- prioritization, interpretation and verification of alarms;
- procedure use;
- control board manipulations;
- supervisors command and control;
- management oversight; and
- group dynamics.
Crew performance in these areas was compared to licensee management expectations
and guidelines as presented in the following documents:
- OP-AA-101-111, Roles and Responsibilities of On-Shift Personnel, Revision 0;
- OP-AA-103-102, Watchstanding Practices, Revision 2;
- OP-AA-103-103, Operation of Plant Equipment, Revision 0;
- OP-AA-103-104, Reactivity Management Controls, Revision 2; and
- OP-AA-104-101, Communications, Revision 1.
7 Enclosure
The inspectors verified that the crew completed the critical tasks listed in the above
simulator guide. The inspectors also compared simulator configurations with actual
control board configurations. For any weaknesses identified, the inspectors observed
the licensee evaluators to verify that they also noted the issues and discussed them in
the critique at the end of the session.
The inspectors also reviewed selected issues documented in CRs, to determine if they
had been properly addressed in the licensees corrective actions program. The
documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Annual Operating Test Results
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the overall pass/fail results of Job Performance Measure (JPM)
operating tests and simulator operating tests (required to be given per
10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)) administered by the licensee from June 16 through July 25, 2003.
The overall results were compared with the significance determination process in
accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0609I, Operator Requalification Human
Performance Significance Determination Process (SDP).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees overall maintenance effectiveness for
risk-significant mitigating systems. The inspectors also reviewed whether the licensee
properly implemented the Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, for the systems.
Specifically, the inspectors determined whether:
- the system was scoped in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65;
- performance problems constituted maintenance rule functional failures;
- the system had been assigned the proper safety significance classification;
- the system was properly classified as (a)(1) or (a)(2); and
- the goals and corrective actions for the system were appropriate.
The above aspects were evaluated using the maintenance rule program. The
inspectors also verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking reliability and/or
unavailability for the systems.
8 Enclosure
The inspectors reviewed the following system:
- Unit 2 and 3 reactor protection system.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before
maintenance activities were conducted on structures, systems, and components and
verified how the licensee managed the risk. The inspectors evaluated whether the
licensee had taken the necessary steps to plan and control emergent work activities.
The inspectors completed evaluations of four maintenance activities:
- Unit 3A Recirculation Pump Deviation Meter Replacement in Panel 903-4;
- Unit 2 Containment Cooling Service Water Keep Fill Check Valve Replacement;
- Unit 2 Core Spray System Testing; and
- Unit 2/3 emergency diesel generator seismic qualification utility group
modification and the 2-0263-153A reactor wide range pressure A signal isolator
replacement.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance Related to Non-routine Evolutions and Events (71111.14)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to any potential impacts on plant
operations from the eastern power outage that occurred on August 14, 2003. The
inspectors reviewed control room indication traces from the date of the power outage
and interviewed licensed operators on any perturbations. In addition, the inspectors
verified that the licensee did not plan on performing any production risk activities and
that there were no surveillances that were approaching their respective critical due
dates. Also, the inspectors evaluated the licensees response to a Unit 2 scram on
September 30, 2003, which occurred on low reactor water level due to the tripping of the
2C reactor feed pump. The inspectors will review the licensee event report on this issue
during the next inspection report period.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
9 Enclosure
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following four operability evaluations:
- Unit 2 and Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Actuation Time Delay Impact from
Electromatic Relief Valve Setpoint Change (Operability Evaluation No.03-008);
- Unit 2 and 3 Steam Dryer, Revision 0 and 1 (Operability Evaluation No.03-009);
- More Industries SCI Signal Converter/Isolator (Operability Evaluation
No.03-005); and
- 3A Standby Liquid Control Relief Valve Bolting Torque Found Out of
Specification (CR# 162781).
The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the evaluations against the
Technical Specifications, UFSAR, and other design information; determined whether
compensatory measures, if needed, were taken; and determined whether the
evaluations were consistent with the requirements of LS-AA-105, Operability
Determination Process, Revision 1.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected issues that the licensee entered into its
corrective action program to verify that identified problems were being entered into the
program with the appropriate characterization and significance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R17 Permanent Plant Modification (71111.17)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed one permanent plant modification to verify the design
adequacy to ensure licensing bases and design bases were maintained, and to ensure
functionality of interfacing structures, systems, and components. The modification
reviewed was the following:
- Installation on new 138kV feed to Dresden Unit 2 138kV reserve auxiliary
transformer 22 (RAT22).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
10 Enclosure
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance test results to confirm that the tests were
adequate for the scope of the maintenance completed and that the test data met the
acceptance criteria. The inspectors also reviewed the tests to determine if the systems
were restored to the operational readiness status consistent with the design and
licensing basis documents.
The inspectors reviewed ten post-maintenance testing activities involving risk significant
equipment in the mitigating systems cornerstone:
- Replaced Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection room cooler fan bearings;
- Repair the Unit 2/3 fire damper between the auxiliary electric equipment room
and cable tunnel;
- Relanded lead for relay 2-1530-273 for low pressure coolant injection
logic-reactor recirculation pumps running;
- Replaced drywell vent valve 2-1601-23;
- Replaced lock washer on plunger assembly for head cooler isolation valve
2-0205-24;
- Replaced Unit 3 standby liquid control flow indicating controller FIC 3-1158;
- Replaced leaking 2A containment cooling service water pump discharge check
valve 2-1501-1A;
- Replaced Unit 2 core spray valves 2-1412-500 and 501;
- Replaced Unit 2 high voltage power supply for source range monitor 21; and
- Replaced 2D main steam line low pressure switch, 2-0261-30D.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed surveillance testing on risk-significant equipment and reviewed
test results. The inspectors assessed whether the selected plant equipment could
perform its intended safety function and satisfy the requirements contained in Technical
Specifications. Following the completion of each test, the inspectors determined that
the test equipment was removed and the equipment returned to a condition in which it
could perform its intended safety function.
The review included the following five surveillance testing activities:
- DIS 2300-08, Unit 2 Contaminated Condensate Storage Tank Level Switches
Functional Test and Unit 2 Torus Level Switches Functional Test, Revision 20;
- DIS 1500-13, Low Pressure Coolant Injection System Discharge Header Flow
Master Trip Unit Channel Functional Test, Revision 12;
11 Enclosure
- DOS 0500-25; Reactor Protection System, Channels A1, A2, B1 and B2
Automatic Scram Contactor Test, Revision 7;
- DIS 1700-21, Reactor Building Ventilation Channel A and Channel B Area
Radiation Monitor Channel Calibration Test, Revision 9; and
- DIS 1600-16, Drywell Hi Rad Monitor Functional Test, Revision 13.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Modification (71111.23)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors screened active temporary modifications on systems ranked high in risk
and assessed the effect of the temporary modifications on safety-related systems. The
inspectors also determined if the installations were consistent with system design. The
inspectors reviewed the following temporary modification:
- Temporary Modification No. 3444460, Adjust Deadband for High Pressure
Coolant Injection High Level Switches LS 3-0263-25A3 (B3).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed station personnel during the licensees 3rd quarter performance
indicator emergency preparedness drill on September 10, 2003, to determine the
effectiveness of drill participants and the adequacy of the licensees critique in properly
determining the emergency classification and identifying weaknesses and failures. The
scenario included an earthquake, fire in the Unit 2/3 cribhouse, and a loss of the Unit 2
reserve transformer and all emergency core cooling system bus AC power for greater
than 15 minutes.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
12 Enclosure
2. RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems (71122.01)
.1 Walkdowns of Liquid and Gaseous Effluent Monitoring and Control Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed walkdowns of selected components of the liquid and gaseous
effluent monitoring and processing systems, including point of discharge effluent and
process radiation monitors and the liquid radioactive waste Tank Farm, to verify that
the current system configuration was as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report (UFSAR) and was consistent with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM),
and to assess equipment material condition. The inspectors also walked down the
Radioactive waste (radwaste) system control panel in the radwaste control room and
discussed processing equipment reliability, use, and operating practices with radwaste
staff.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Radioactive Effluent Release Data, Dose Calculations, and ODCM Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the 2001 and 2002 Radioactive Effluent Release Reports, the
errata report for the 2000 effluent report, and selected radioactive effluent release data
for January 2002 through March 2003. The reports and data were reviewed to verify
that the radioactive effluent control program was implemented as described in the
ODCM, to verify that Technical Specification and ODCM dose limits were not exceeded,
and to ensure that any anomalies in the reports and effluent release data were
adequately understood by the licensee and were properly assessed and reported. The
inspectors reviewed the licensees current methodology for the calculation of offsite
dose, and selectively reviewed results of liquid and gaseous effluent sample analyses
for selected periods in 2002 through early 2003, to verify that the licensee calculated
dose from effluents consistent with the ODCM. In particular, the inspectors reviewed
effluent data and associated dose calculation reports for all the unmonitored/abnormal
releases (Dresden Abnormal Releases (DAR)) included in the 2001 and 2002 effluent
reports to assess the licensees ability to adequately determine the public dose impact
from those releases. The inspectors also reviewed revisions made to the ODCM in
calendar years 2001 and 2002, and the justifications for other than editorial changes to
the ODCM, to verify they did not adversely impact effluent controls and were evaluated
by the licensee and reported in accordance with requirements.
13 Enclosure
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Liquid and Gaseous Effluent Releases
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selectively reviewed batch liquid effluent release data and continuous
gaseous effluent release data (for the time period January 2002 through
February 2003), including results of station chemistry sample analyses and vendor
laboratory analysis results for difficult to measure nuclides, and the licensees release
procedures, practices and dose projections to members of the public. The review was
performed to verify that the licensee adequately applied analysis results and that dose
calculations conformed to ODCM methodology and Technical Specification
requirements. The inspectors also selectively reviewed grab sample radioisotopic
analysis results and licensee alarm set point calculations for liquid effluent batch
releases to verify that the data was properly used to complete calculations of offsite
dose consistent with ODCM methodology and the licensees procedures.
The inspectors accompanied a chemistry technician during a weekly change-out and
analysis of the particulate filter, iodine cartridge and noble gas sampling for the
Dresden 2/3 Chimney, to verify that sampling and handling practices, and analytical
techniques were technically sound and consistent with procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Liquid and Gaseous Effluent Monitor Calibration
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the current instrument calibration records for selected
point-of-discharge and process effluent radiation and flow rate monitors, to determine if
they had been calibrated consistent with industry standards and in accordance with
station procedures and the ODCM. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed channel
calibration records for the following effluent radiation detectors and flow monitors:
- Dresden 2/3 Chimney System Particulate, Iodine and Noble Gas (SPING);
- Dresden 2/3 General Electric (back up) Chimney Monitors;
- Dresden 2/3 Reactor Building Vent SPING;
- Dresden 1 Chimney SPING;
- Dresden 2/3 Radwaste River Effluent Monitor;
- Dresden 3 Service Water Monitor; and
- Dresden 2 and 3 Isolation Condenser Vent Area Radiation Monitors.
The inspectors also assessed monitor set point methodology and alarm set point values
for these monitors, to verify the technical viability of the calibration program and for
14 Enclosure
compliance with ODCM criteria. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed effluent and
process radiation monitoring availability and system health information for 2002 and
2003, and discussed monitor performance and reliability with system engineering staff.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Air Cleaning System Surveillance Tests
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the most recent results of the Ventilation Filter Testing
Program for the Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation
Systems to verify that test methodology, frequency and test results met Technical
Specification requirements. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed and discussed with the
system engineering staff the test results of in-place high efficiency particulate air
(HEPA) and charcoal absorber penetration tests, laboratory tests of charcoal absorber
methyl iodide penetration, in-place combined HEPA filter and charcoal absorber train
pressure drop tests.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.6 Analytical Instrumentation Quality Control and Inter-Laboratory Comparison Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed chemistry department quality control data for selected
instrumentation systems used to quantify effluent releases. Specifically, the inspectors
reviewed the most recent efficiency calibration records and lower limit of detection (LLD)
determinations for all spectroscopy systems used to analyze effluent samples. The
review was performed to determine if calibration and efficiency acceptance criteria and
ODCM specified LLDs were met and if the calibrations were conducted consistent with
industry standards.
The inspectors reviewed the results of selected quarterly 2002 and 2003 radiochemistry
inter-laboratory cross checks for both the licensee and its vendor analytical laboratory,
to determine if the cross check program was being implemented adequately and to
verify the quality of the radioactive effluent analyses performed by the licensee and its
contract laboratory.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
15 Enclosure
.7 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the results of a 2003 focus area self-assessment of the
radioactive effluent monitoring and control program and ODCM implementation, Nuclear
Oversight Department field observation reports completed in 2003, and condition reports
(CRs) generated during approximately the 18 month period preceding the inspection
that related to ODCM implementation and the liquid and gaseous effluent monitoring
and control program. The documents were reviewed to evaluate the licensees ability to
assess the radiological effluent monitoring and control program, to assess the scope
and adequacy of the licensees problem identification program and its ability to identify
repetitive problems or trends, contributing causes and extent of condition, and to
implement corrective actions intended to achieve lasting results.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)
.1 Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled the licensees submittals for performance indicators (PIs) and
periods listed below. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in
Revision 2 of Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
Performance Indicator Guideline to verify the accuracy of the PI data. The following
four PIs were reviewed:
Unit 2
- safety system function failures, July 2002 through June 2003, and
- high pressure coolant injection system, October 2002 through August 2003.
Unit 3
- safety system function failures, July 2002 through June 2003, and
- high pressure coolant injection system, October 2002 through August 2003.
The inspectors reviewed selected applicable conditions and data from logs, licensee
reports and CRs. The inspectors independently re-performed calculations where
applicable. The inspectors compared that information to the information required for
each performance indicator definition in the guideline to ensure that the licensee
reported the data accurately.
16 Enclosure
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Radiological Effluent Technical Specification (RETS)/ODCM Radiological Effluent
Occurrence PI
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees assessment of its two public radiation safety
performance indicator for RETS/ODCM radiological effluent occurrences to determine
if the indicator was adequately assessed and reported consistent with industry
guidelines as provided by the applicable revision of Nuclear Energy Institute
Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed CRs generated during the 12 months preceding the
inspection to identify any potential occurrences such as unmonitored, uncontrolled or
improperly calculated effluent releases that may have impacted offsite dose. Also, the
inspectors evaluated the licensees methods for determining offsite dose and selectively
verified that liquid and gaseous effluent release data and associated offsite dose
calculations performed since this indicator was last reviewed in June 2002 were
accurate. Records of monthly PI data elements were reviewed for June 2002 through
March 2003 to verify that data was recorded and verified as required by the licensees
procedure.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector selected Condition Report (CR) No. 175749 for detailed review. The CR
was associated with the repeated surveillance failures of the containment cooling
service water (CCSW) system vault penetrations. The report was reviewed to ensure
that the full extent of the issues were identified, an appropriate evaluation was
performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The
inspectors evaluated the report against the requirements of the licensees corrective
action program as delineated in the corporate administrative procedure LS-AA-125,
Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure, Revisions 4 and 5, and 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B.
b. Findings
The inspector identified that a significant number of CRs had been written with regard to
CCSW vault penetration seal failures. The inspector performed a walkdown of flood
protection features associated with the Unit 2 and Unit 3 CCSW pump vaults. The
pump vaults contain safety related mitigating systems susceptible to flooding from
station internal equipment sources. There are four pumps in each units CCSW system
17 Enclosure
that are designed to provide cooling water to the containment cooling heat exchangers,
required for a safe shutdown following a design basis accident or transient.
Two of the four pumps associated with each unit are contained within a watertight vault.
The vaults are designed to ensure that a postulated rupture in the containment cooling
service water system will not result in a loss of all four pumps from subsequent flooding.
During the system walkdown, the inspector verified that there were no visible holes or
unsealed penetrations in floors and walls, and that watertight doors between flood areas
were maintained in good material condition. The inspector examined the licensees
penetration seal documentation for the purposes of determining if problems identified
were entered into their corrective action program and if the problems were properly
resolved. The nine penetrations were tested in accordance with Dresden Technical
Surveillance (DTS) 0030-01, CCSW Pump Vault Surveillance Testing. A significant
number of failures of Unit 2 and Unit 3 CCSW pump vault penetration seals had
occurred between 1975 and 1996. The licensees current corrective action process
began in 1996. The inspector examined licensees penetration surveillance records
from 1997 to 2003 specifically for penetration seal failures.
The Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), Section 3.7.0, required that an 18-month
surveillance be performed on the nine CCSW vault penetration seals with an
acceptance criterion that there was no visible leak detection solution (soap bubble
solution) on the pressure-free side of the penetration when subjected to 15 psig on the
pressurized-side of the penetration. Upon failure of any of the nine penetration seals,
the Control Room was notified and the CCSW pump vault was declared inoperable and
this in turn resulted in the B and C CCSW pumps, which are located inside the pump
vault, being declared inoperable per TRM action statement 3.7.o.C.1. Based on the
inoperability of the two CCSW Pumps, the respective operating unit entered a 7-day
action statement per Technical Specification 3.7.1 to restore at least one pump to
operable status. In addition, the unit entered an 8-hour action statement per the
TRM 3.6.a, for inoperability of the Drywell Spray subsystem.
The licensee has a history of numerous penetration failures that required maintenance
personnel to tighten the penetration belt link seals and bring the seals into conformance
with the acceptance criteria of the surveillance requirements. This tightening of failed
seals has repeatedly been required every 18 months on both units since
March 28, 1997. The result of the repetitive seal failures (based on each unit having 9
penetration seals tested) is detailed below.
Unit 3: 3/28/97- 6 failures; 1/29/99- 4 failures; 12/11/01- 3 failures; 6/06/02-
2 failures.
Unit 2: 3/06/98- 5 failures; 10/11/99- 6 failures; 4/12/01- 3 failures; 5/01/02-
4 failures.
In summary, there were eight tests involving 33 failed penetration seals over a period
exceeding 5 years; however, the licensee did not quantify the leakage rate during the
5-year period. By not quantifying the leakage rate the licensee could not establish or
assure the reliability of the penetration seals in order to prevent all four pumps from
being inoperable during the internal flooding event. The repetitive failure of the
18 Enclosure
penetration seals is indicative of an established acceptance criterion that cannot be
relied upon to maintain the seal integrity through the entire surveillance interval.
On July 30, 2002, the licensee shortened the surveillance test interval to every 3 months
instead of 18 months based on the continued failures. The results from the 3-month test
interval is detailed below.
Unit 2: 7/30/02- 1 failure; 10/29/02- 2 failures; 1/30/03- 3 failures; 4/30/03-
3 failures.
Unit 3: 9/04/02- 3 failures; 12/03/02- 1 failure; 3/05/03- 4 failures.
On June 27, 2003, the licensee determined that the existing acceptance criterion of
zero-leakage was over-conservative. The licensee subsequently changed the criterion
from no visible seal leakage, to less than or equal to a total leakage of 1.5 gpm for all
nine wall penetrations, the floor drain check valve, and the vault bulkhead door. The
appropriate acceptance criterion change was made to TRM Section TSR 3.7.0.2.
The leakage surveillance tests, after the criterion was changed to include a measurable
value, resulted in the following recorded data:
Unit 3: 6/27/03 - Total Leakage .3015 gpm, results well within acceptance
criterion of 1.5 gpm
Unit 2: 7/29/03 - Total Leakage .2312 gpm, results well within acceptance
criteria of 1.5 gpm
Unit 3: 9/03/03 - Total Leakage .4475 gpm, results well within acceptance
criteria of 1.5 gpm
The licensee plans to review, as part of its correction actions detailed in CR No. 175749,
all failed surveillances over the past 5 years to identify and correct any similar
occurrences.
4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153)
.1 (Closed) LERs 2002-003-00,Reactor Recirculation Loop A Sensing Line Socket Weld
Vibration Fatigue Failure, and
(Closed) LER 2002-006-00: Reactor Recirculation Loop A Sensing Line Socket Weld
Failure
Introduction: A Green self-revealed finding involving a Non-Cited Violation of Technical
Specifications was identified on October 8, 2002, and December 7, 2002, for the
licensees failure to ensure that Unit 3 was not operated with reactor coolant pressure
boundary leakage. As a result, the licensee was not in compliance with Technical
Specifications on two occasions for Unit 3 while operating with pressure boundary
leakage.
19 Enclosure
Description: On October 8, 2002, in preparation for shutting down Unit 3 for the start of
the 17th refueling outage, the licensee entered the drywell to inspect for leakage due to
an increasing trend in the reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage which had been
trending up since September 14, 2002. The licensee identified that the leakage was
from a 1 inch diameter piping socket weld on the A reactor recirculation loop low
pressure flow venturi differential pressure sensing line. Technical Specification 3.4.4,
Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage, requires that reactor coolant system
operational leakage shall be limited to no pressure boundary leakage. As a result of the
identified pressure boundary leakage, the licensee initiated the actions of Limiting
Conditions for Operations 3.4.4.C to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
The licensee performed a root cause investigation for the weld failure and determined
that high cycle fatigue due to an inadequate 1-1 axial leg socket weld application in a
system experiencing flow-induced vibration caused the failure of the weld. The weld
was an industry standard at the time of its installation in 1985. The licensee replaced
the sensing line elbows and piping with a pipe configuration without elbows. Also, as
part of the repair, the licensee performed the weld installation with a 2-1 axial leg socket
weld on the 3A and 3B reactor recirculation sensing lines. The licensees failure to
implement effective corrective actions from two previous high cycle fatigue weld failures
on similar configurations and to implement recommendations from the Electrical Power
Research Institute report TR-113890 to build up the weld to a 2-1 axial weld contributed
to this repeat weld failure.
Due to the return of elevated drywell leakage on November 8, 2002, the licensee
reduced power to perform a drywell inspection on December 7, 2002. The licensee
identified that a Unit 3 weld failure occurred on the reactor recirculation A loop low
pressure flow venturi differential pressure sensing line. The licensees completed root
cause investigation concluded that the weld failure was due to mechanically induced
residual pipe stress caused by the inadequate installation techniques performed on the
reactor recirculation sensing line repaired during the last refueling outage in
October 2002 (same weld as above), along with sensing line vibration caused by
resonance frequency with the pump speed.
To repair this failure, the licensee used an enhanced fit-up process to minimize the
welding induced residual stresses and used proper tie-back support alignment to
minimize mechanically induced stress. Also, the licensee established an exclusion zone
and action level values to minimize reactor recirculation pump speed in the area of the
resonance frequency of the piping. In addition, the licensee plans to install a piping
configuration modification to improve the vibration response characteristics of both A
and B reactor recirculation loops high and low pressure sensing lines.
Analysis: The inspectors evaluated this finding using Phase 1 of the SDP which
screened this finding to a Phase 2 because the finding affected the RCS barrier. The
inspectors used the risk-informed inspection notebook for Dresden Nuclear Power
Station, Units 2 and 3, Revision 1, dated May 3, 2002, to complete the Phase 2
evaluation. In reviewing the Phase 2 assessment performed by the resident inspectors,
the senior reactor analyst (SRA) identified that the dominant sequence SLOCA - EC in
the Dresden SDP Worksheet was potentially risk significant. Further review by the SRA
identified that this sequence was an overly conservative sequence. The EC represents
20 Enclosure
vapor suppression of the containment and SLOCA represents a small break loss of
coolant accident. The worksheet only credited successful operation of 12 out of 12
vacuum breakers to perform the EC function; however, this was a passive action to
ensure the vacuum breakers were closed or remain closed. In reviewing the licensees
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA), the SRA noted that the licensee defines success of
vapor suppression as either 12 out of 12 vacuum breakers, containment spray or reactor
pressure vessel (RPV) blowdown. The SDP worksheets did not provide additional credit
for containment sprays or RPV blowdown. If additional credit was provided for
containment sprays (1 multi-train) in the EC function, the full point value for the
sequence would be 8 multi-train. This would result in the sequence being of very low
risk significance. Additionally, the licensees PRA identified the SLOCA contribution to
overall CDF of <1%, with a baseline CDF of 1.9E-08/reactor-year. This results in an
overall SLOCA contribution from all sources of small breaks as <2.0 E-08/reactor-year.
As a result of the vacuum breaker function of EC being a passive action, NRR has
removed this sequence from recently benchmarked plants, as it was not found to be a
dominant contributor to SLOCA. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very
low safety significance, Green. The inspectors determined that this finding also affected
the cross-cutting area of Human Performance because the licensee operated Unit 3 in
non-compliance of Technical Specifications on two occasions.
Enforcement: Technical Specification 3.4.4, Reactor Coolant System Operational
Leakage, requires that reactor coolant system operational leakage shall be limited to no
pressure boundary leakage in Modes 1, 2, and 3. The Limiting Condition for Operation
Action Statement requires that the plant be placed in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in
the following 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Although the exact time that the pressure boundary leakage
occurred could not be precisely determined, it is clear that the leakage existed for
greater than the 12 and 36 hour4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> time limits to place the plant in Mode 3 and 4,
respectively. Therefore, the licensee failed to operate Unit 3 in accordance with
Technical Specification 3.4.4 which resulted in operating the unit in Modes 1, 2 and 3,
with pressure boundary leakage from September 14 through October 8, 2002, and
November 8 through December 7, 2002. This failure is of very low safety significance
and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition reports
126277 and 134459. Therefore, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent
with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. NCV 050000249/2003-07-02.
.2 (Closed) LER 50-237;249/2003-001-00: Electromatic Relief Valve (ERV) Pressure
Switches Drift Greater Than Estimated. This issue was closed as a licensee identified
violation under Section 4OA7 of this inspection report.
4OA4 Cross-Cutting Aspects of Findings
.1 A finding described in Section 1R05 of this report had, as its primary cause, a human
performance deficiency, in that an instrument maintenance supervisor failed to obtain
permission from the fire marshal prior to a instrument technician performing grinding in
the auxiliary electric equipment room. As a result, the fire marshal did not approve the
hot work, a fire watch was not established, and an automatic initiation of the halon
system occurred.
21 Enclosure
.2 A finding described in Section 4OA3 of this report had, as its primary cause, a human
performance deficiency, in that the licensee operated Unit 3 on two occasions with
pressure boundary leakage. As a result, the licensee was not in compliance with
Technical Specifications 3.4.4.
.3 A finding described in Section 4OA5 of this report had, as its primary cause, a human
performance deficiency, in that maintenance personnel failed to generate a condition
report upon identifying loose bolts on the relief valve for the standby liquid control
system. As a result, the licensee had to prepare a historical operability evaluation to
determine if the system was operable.
.4 A finding described in Section 4OA5 of this report had, as its primary cause, a human
performance deficiency, in that the licensee staff, despite previous identification that
changing the motors to safety related would require a revised calculation supporting
motor operation at reduced voltage, failed to verify that the motors would operate with
the undervoltage conditions of the controlling calculation.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-237/249/2000-003-03(DRS): Failure to Re-analyze the
Operation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) gland seal leak off (GSLO)
System at Below the Minimum Required Operating Voltage When the System was
Upgraded to Safety-Related Status
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed an URI regarding the licensees failure to re-analyze the
operation of the HPCI GSLO turbine gland steam condenser exhauster and its hotwell
drain pump motors below the minimum required operating voltage of 90 percent of rated
voltage. The re-analysis was needed to ensure that minimal operating voltages were
available for these components since these components were upgraded to safety-
related status in 1997 and 1998 for Units 3 and 2, respectively.
The licensee reexamined the acceptability of the available voltage for the exhauster and
hotwell drain pump motors and documented the results in calculation DRE96-0189,
Voltage on Loads Fed from the Safety-Related 250 VDC Batteries, Revision 01. The
NRC reviewed the calculation. The NRC reviewed the results of licensee conducted
qualification tests of similar motors and agreed that the motors remained operable under
the postulated undervoltage conditions.
b. Findings
Introduction: The inspectors determined that the design control process failed to
translate design criteria into procedures creating a condition where the acceptability of
the HPCI GLSO turbine gland steam condenser exhauster and its hotwell drain pump
motors had not been verified by a valid calculation or qualification test when the motors
were upgraded to safety-related status. This issue was considered to be of very low
safety significance and was dispositioned as an NCV.
22 Enclosure
Description: When the inspectors reviewed the existing calculation at the time that the
motors were upgraded to safety-related status, the inspectors noted several
inconsistencies. The conclusion section of this calculation stated that the HPCI turbine
gland steam condenser exhaust and its hotwell drain pump motors would experience
less than 90 percent of their rated voltage during one or more periods. Therefore,
successful operation of the equipment could not be assured. The calculation also
documented that the subject equipment was classified as non safety-related and would
not be required for HPCI operation. Furthermore, the conclusion section stated that if
these motors were upgraded to safety-related in the future, additional investigation
would be required to demonstrate successful operation at available voltages. The
inspectors identified that although the motors had been re-classified as safety-related,
and needed for HPCI operation, the licensee had not performed requisite analysis to
ensure equipment operability. After the inspectors identified these inconsistencies, the
licensee revised the calculation, performed qualification testing and generally, fulfilled
qualification that the motors would operate under the postulated undervoltage
conditions.
Analysis: Using Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issue Disposition Screening, the
inspectors determined this finding was more than minor because the design process
allowed upgrading the motors to safety-related without assuring fulfillment of known
design requirements that affected the mitigating system cornerstone objective of
ensuring the availability, and the reliability and capability of HPCI to respond to initiating
events to prevent undesirable consequences. Continuous operation of the GSLO
system was required to support HPCI operation because of room temperature concerns.
The inspectors used Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process,
Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power
Situations, regarding mitigating systems and determined that the finding did not
represent an actual loss of the safety function. Therefore, the finding screened as
Green, a finding of very low safety significance. This finding was assigned to the
mitigating systems cornerstone for both units.
Enforcement: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires,
in part, that measures be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements
and design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and
instructions.
Contrary to the above, as of February 9, 2000, the design requirement to assure that the
HPCI GLSO turbine gland steam condenser exhauster and its hotwell drain pump
motors would operate at less than 90 percent of their rated voltage during one or more
periods was not correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures or
instructions for the subject motors. Specifically the controlling calculation had not been
updated to assure that the motors would operate with the undervoltage conditions when
the motors were upgraded to safety-related. Because the licensee entered the condition
into their corrective action system as Corrective Action Process PIF D2000-00801,
Calculation DRE96-0189 Does Not Reflect SR Upgrade of HPCI GSLO & GDEF, this
violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the
NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 050000237/2003-007-03 and
NCV 050000249/2003-007-03.
23 Enclosure
.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-237;249/2002-006-03: Halon and CO2 Fixed Suppression
System Functionality Issues. This issue was reviewed by the Office of Nuclear
Regulation (NRR) and the Office of General Counsel (OGC). The NRC staffs
acceptance of the CO 2 system was based on the licensees commitment to satisfy the
requirements of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 12-1973, Carbon Dioxide
Extinguishing Systems. The NRC staffs acceptance of the Halon System was based
on the licensees commitment to satisfy the requirements of NFPA 12A-1973,
Halogenated Fire Extinguishing Agent Systems - Halon 1301." The licensees design
basis for the auxiliary equipment and electric room CO2 system was 50 percent
concentration with soak time of 10 minutes. The design basis for the Halon system was
5 percent with soak time of 10 minutes. The review conducted by NRR and OGC
determined that the design concentration and soak time for both systems were
acceptable.
Although the licensee committed to design and install a CO2 system which met the
requirements of NFPA 12-1973, the licensee specifically took exception to the NFPA 12
requirements for testing and stated that installation acceptance tests were not
specifically performed. Licensee records stated that shop testing was completed for the
systems. In the NRCs Safety Evaluation Report which accepted the system as
adequate based on the commitment to NFPA 12-1973, no concerns were identified with
the exception to testing. None of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48, General Design
Criteria 3, and the criteria of Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 specifically required a full
discharge test to be conducted to prove operability. Additionally, the 1973 edition of the
standard for both systems did not explicitly require a full discharge test. Therefore, no
full discharge test was required. The NRC concluded that the licensing basis for
gaseous suppression systems at Dresden has been met. This item is closed.
.3 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-237/03-006-04: Loose Bolts on the Unit 3 A Standby
Liquid Control System Relief Valve
Introduction: The inspectors identified a finding involving a Non-Cited Violation of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for the failure of mechanical maintenance
personnel to generate a condition report after identifying loose bolts on the standby
liquid control relief valve. This human performance deficiency resulted in the licensee
having to perform a historical operability evaluation on the condition of the system.
Description: As a result of the inspectors review of licensee-identified measuring and
test equipment concerns, the inspector reviewed work order 00420336-07. The work
order directed the replacement of the Unit 3 A standby liquid control relief valve which
used torque wrench #0013622580. Prior to starting the work on October 12, 2002, the
maintenance mechanics documented that the A relief valve bolts were found finger
tight instead of at their required torque value. Subsequently, the inspector identified that
a condition report had not been written for the nonconforming condition nor was an
operability evaluation performed on the system. Administrative Procedure, LS-AA-125,
Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure, Revision 4, requires that Exelon Nuclear
personnel and contractors at Exelon Nuclear locations shall originate a condition report
or inform a supervisor when an undesirable condition is recognized. The mechanical
maintenance personnels failure to generate a condition report upon finding the loose
bolts on the standby liquid control system is a violation.
24 Enclosure
After identified by the inspector, both the maintenance and engineering department
personnel wrote condition reports and determined a historical operability evaluation was
warranted. The maintenance condition report assumed the finger tight bolts were on the
discharge flange and not the inlet; however, the condition report written by engineering
personnel was to evaluate the system operability for both the inlet and discharge
flanges. In addition to the historical operability evaluation, the mechanical maintenance
manager reinforced the requirement of initiating condition reports when deficiencies are
identified. The inspectors reviewed the licensees historical operability evaluation and
concluded that the system remained operable because quarterly surveillance testing
flow requirements were met and no leakage was identified from the inlet side of the
relief valve. With respect to the outlet flange, the standby liquid control pressure at the
relief valve during an anticipated transient without scram was evaluated to reach
1469 psig. The relief valve was tested in November 2002 and indicated a correct lift
pressure of 1500 psig. Therefore, if the system had been required to operate, the relief
valve would not have lifted and the outlet flange bolts would not have been pressurized.
Analysis: The finding was more than minor because it affected the mitigating system
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that
respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors
review of this finding using the significance determination process, Phase 1, determined
that the finding screened out as Green because the finding was not a design deficiency,
was not an actual loss of safety function, was not a loss of safety function beyond the
allowed outage time of technical specifications, was not a loss of safety function of one
or more non-technical specification trains of risk significant equipment, and was not
complicated by any external events. This finding was determined to be of low safety
significance because the system was determined to have been operable with the loose
bolts. The inspectors determined that this error also affected the cross-cutting area of
Human Performance because the maintenance personnel failed to generate a condition
report for the as-found deficient condition.
Enforcement: Appendix B, Criterion V, 10 CFR 50, requires that activities affecting
quality shall be accomplished in accordance with procedures. Administrative Procedure,
LS-AA-125, Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure, Revision 4, requires that
Exelon Nuclear personnel and contractors at Exelon Nuclear locations shall originate a
condition report or inform a supervisor when an undesirable condition is recognized.
Contrary to the above, on October 12, 2002, maintenance mechanics working on the A
standby liquid control system relief valve did not generate a condition report nor inform a
supervisor upon the discovery of the loose bolts on the relief valve as required by
LS-AA-125. This is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. Because this
violation is of very low safety significance and has been entered in to the licensees
corrective action program as condition reports 162781and 162835, this violation is being
treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A, of the NRC Enforcement Policy:
NCV 05000249/2003-007-04.
25 Enclosure
4OA6 Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Hovey and other members of
the licensees staff on October 9, 2003. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any
materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No
proprietary information was identified.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
- Licensee-identified Non-Cited Violation with Mr. D. Bost, on September 8, 2003,
via telephone. A letter containing the enforcement action was issued on
October 8, 2003.
- Interim exit was conducted with Mr. J. Hansen on September 16, 2003, via
telephone, for the Green finding on an Unresolved Item concerning Design
Control of support pumps that were upgraded to safety related for the
HPCI system.
- Interim exit was conducted for Licensed Operator Requalification 71111.11B with
Mr. B. Surges on August 4, 2003, via telephone.
- Public Radiation Safety effluent monitoring and control program inspection with
Mr. D. Bost on July 11, 2003.
4OA7 Licensee Identified Violation
The following violation of very low significance was identified by the licensee and is a
violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC
Enforcement Manual, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as NCVs.
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
.1 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality
shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type
appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these
instructions, procedures, or drawings.
10 CFR 50.9 requires, in part, that information required by the Commissions
regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be
complete and accurate in all material respects.
Commonwealth Edison Nuclear Station Welding Procedure NSWP-W-01, ASME
Welding, Revision 5, dated June 12, 1998, required, in part, that Quality Verification
perform pre fit-up and fit up inspections.
Exelon Nuclear Procedure NO-AA-300-001, Inspection Planning and Execution of
Quality Inspection Activities, Revision 0, dated September 10, 2001, applied to
independent inspection for safety related, ASME code, and augmented quality work at
Exelon nuclear stations. Section 5 of the procedure required, in part, that inspections be
26 Enclosure
documented using approved instructions, procedures, process sheets, travelers, or
checklists and applicable drawings.
As described in AR 00127520 and 00128073, on October 15, 2002, a contract Quality
Verification (QV) inspector failed to perform pre fit-up and fit-up inspections associated
with four welds on the flow sensing line of the Unit 3A recirculation loop. Additionally,
the QV inspector documented on the ASME Weld Record that the inspections had been
completed. This information is material to the NRC because it demonstrates
compliance with the Commissions regulations and procedures of the Dresden Nuclear
Power Station.
The NRC Office of Investigation (OI) investigated the matter and concluded that the
individual deliberately falsified quality control records. Since the incident was
determined to be a deliberate violation of NRC requirements, the violation was subject to
the traditional enforcement process instead of the NRCs significance determination
process. The violation was categorized in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement
Policy at Severity Level IV. On October 8, 2003, after considering the circumstances of
the case and after consulting with the Director, Office of Enforcement, a Non-Cited
Violation was issued to the licensee (ADAMS Accession No. ML032820115), consistent
with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
.2 (Closed) LER 50-237/249/2003-001-00: Electromatic Relief Valve (ERV) Pressure
Switches Drift Greater than Estimated
On May 19, 2003, while performing DIS 0250-03, Revision 37, Electromatic Relief
Valve/Target Rock Valve Pressure Switches Calibration, on Unit 3, instrument
maintenance department personnel found that the pressure switch setpoint (with head
correction) for ERV 3-203-3B (as-found at 1112.6 psig) exceeded the Technical
Specification (TS) allowable value of #1110.5 psig, and the analytical limit of 1112 psig.
Additionally, the pressure switch setpoint for ERV 3-203-3D (as-found at 1134.5 psig)
exceeded the TS allowable value of #1133.5 psig. The licensee readjusted each
pressure switch to within procedural tolerances and declared each switch operable prior
to proceeding to the next switch.
On May 21, 2003, while performing DIS 0250-03, Revision 37, on Unit 2, instrument
maintenance department personnel found that the pressure switch setpoint (with head
correction) for ERV 2-203-3B (as-found at 1113.6 psig) exceeded the TS allowable
value of #1110.5 psig, and the AL of 1112 psig. Additionally the pressure switch
setpoint for ERV 2-203-3C (as-found at 1112.9 psig) exceeded the TS allowable value
of #1110.5 psig and the analytical limit of 1112 psig. The licensee readjusted each
pressure switch to within procedural tolerances and declared each switch operable prior
to proceeding to the next switch.
TS 3.3.6.3 requires that the relief valve instrumentation for each function in
Table 3.3.6.3-1 shall be operable with an allowable value of #1133.5 psig for relief
valves and #1110.5 psig for the low set relief valves. Contrary to the above, on
May 19, 2003, ERV 3-203-3B and ERV 3-203-3D as-found pressure switch setpoints
exceeded the TS allowable values, and on May 21, 2003, ERV 2-203-3B and
ERV 2-203-3C as-found pressure switch setpoints exceeded the TS allowable values.
27 Enclosure
The licensee conducted a root cause evaluation and determined that the root cause of
this event were ineffective implementation of previous corrective actions (lower the field
setpoints) from three 1996 LERs and calculation errors (underestimation of the expected
setpoint drift). A missed opportunity was identified in that a previous root cause
evaluation for a similar event in 2002 (LER 50-237/2002-005) did not identify all of the
root causes.
The safety significance of this event was minimal because the design functions for the
relief valves would not have been compromised and reactor pressure would have
remained within the safety analyses while taking into account the actual as-found
setpoint values.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
28 Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
D. Bost, Plant Manager
H. Bush, Acting Radiation Protection Manager
R. Conklin, Radiation Protection Supervisor
G. Dorsey, Chemistry Manager
R. Gadbois, Shift Operations Superintendent
V. Gengler, Dresden Site Security Director
J. Griffin, Regulatory Assurance - NRC Coordinator
J. Hansen, Regulatory Assurance Manager
J. Henry, Operations Director
R. Hovey, Site Vice President
C. Kolotka, Acting Chemistry Manager
T. Loch, Supervisor, Design Engineering
D. Nestle, Health Physicist/Acting ODCM Coordinator
M. Overstreet, Radiation Protection Supervisor
R. Quick, Security Manager
R. Rybak, Acting Regulatory Assurance Manager
F. Sadnick, Project Manager, Wackenhut Corporate
A. Shahkarami, Engineering Director
J. Sipek, Nuclear Oversight Director
N. Spooner, Site Maintenance Rule Coordinator
B. Surges, Operations Requalification Training Supervisor
B. Svaleson, Maintenance Director
S. Taylor, Radiation Protection Director
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
M. Ring, Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 1
R. Schulz, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
R. Zuffa, Resident Inspector Section Head, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
1 Attachment
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000237/2003007-01 NCV Failure to Meet Technical Specification 5.4.1, Fire
05000249/2003007-01 Protection Program Implementation for Hot Work Activities05000249/2003007-02 NCV Failure to Operate Unit 3 without Pressure Boundary
Leakage as Required by Technical Specification 3.4.4
05000237/2003007-03 NCV Failure to Re-analyze to Assure Operation of the HPCI
05000249/2003007-03 Gland Seal Leak Off (GSLO) System at Undervoltage
Conditions When the System Was Upgraded to Safety-
Related Status05000249/2003007-04 NCV Failure of Mechanical Maintenance Personnel to Generate
a Condition Report after Identifying Loose Bolts on the
Standby Liquid Control Relief Valve
Closed
05000237/2003007-01 NCV Failure to Meet Technical Specification 5.4.1, Fire
05000249/2003007-01 Protection Program Implementation for Hot Work Activities05000249/2003007-02 NCV Failure to Operate Unit 3 without Pressure Boundary
Leakage as Required by Technical Specification 3.4.4
05000237/2003007-03 NCV Failure to Re-analyze to Assure Operation of the HPCI
05000249/2003007-03 Gland Seal Leak Off (GSLO) System at Undervoltage
Conditions When the System Was Upgraded to Safety-
Related Status05000249/2003007-04 NCV Failure of Mechanical Maintenance Personnel to Generate
a Condition Report of Inform a Supervisor after Identifying
Loose Bolts on the Standby Liquid Control Relief Valve
50-237/2000-003-03 URI Failure to Re-analyze the Operation of the HPCI Gland
50-249/2000-003-03 Seal Leak off (GSLO) System at Below the Minimum
Required Operating Voltages When the System Was
Upgraded to Safety-Related Status
50-237/2002-006-03 URI Halon and CO2 Fixed Suppression System Functionality
50-249/2002-006-03 Issues
50-237/03-006-04 URI Loose Bolts on the Unit 3 A Standby Liquid Control
System Relief Valve
2 Attachment
50-237/2003-001-00 LER Electromatic Relief Valve (ERV) Pressure Switches Drift
50-249/2003-001-00 Greater Than Estimated
50-249/2002-003-00 LER Reactor Recirculation Loop A Sensing Line Socket Weld
Vibration Fatigue Failure
50-249/2002-006-00 LER Reactor Recirculation Loop A Sensing Line Socket Weld
Failure
Discussed
None.
3 Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
ALARA As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable
AR Action Request
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CAP Corrective Action Program
CCSW Containment Cooling Service Water
CDF Core Damage Frequency
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR Condition Report
DC Direct Current
DIS Dresden Instrument Surveillance
DOS Dresden Operating Surveillance
DOT Department of Transportation
DRP Division of Reactor Projects
DRS Division of Reactor Safety
EC Engineering Change
ERV Electromatic Relief Valve
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
GSLO Gland Seal Leak Off
HPCI High Pressure Core Injection
IEMA Illinois Emergency Management Agency
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
kV kiloVolts
LHRA Locked High Radiation Area
MWe megawatts electrical
MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve
NCV Non-Cited Violation
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
NSWP Nuclear Station Welding Procedure
OA Other Activities
OE Operability Evaluation
OGC NRC Office of General Counsel
OI NRC Office of Investigations
PI Performance Indicator
PRA Probabilistic Risk Analysis
QV Quality Verification
RP Radiation Protection
SDP Significance Determination Process
SR Safety-Related
SRA Senior Reactor Analyst
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report
4 Attachment
URI Unresolved Item
VHRA Very High Radiation Area
WO Work Order
5 Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does
not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety but rather that
selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or
any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
CR 176588; Nuclear oversight identifies winter readiness ineffective corrective action;
September 19, 2003
OP-AA-108-109, Seasonal Readiness, Revision 1
DOS 0010-19, Preparation for Cold Weather for Unit 1 and Out Buildings, Revision 15
DOS 0010-22, U2 Preparations for Cold Weather, Revision 11
DOS 0010-25, U3 Preparations for Cold Weather, Revision 11
CR 172915; Winter readiness preparations; dated August 25, 2003
CR 125536; Nuclear oversight identifies winter readiness deficiencies; dated
October 2, 2002
CR 138104; Winter readiness preventative maintenance appears to be scheduled late in
the season; dated January 4, 2003
CR 169966; Improper winter readiness for reactor building chillers; dated
August 1, 2003
CR 143193; Winter readiness; dated February 6, 2003
Winter Readiness Critique for 2003
1R04 Equipment Alignment
CR 173762; Oil on basement wall, 2/3A isolation condition make up sump inoperable;
August 29, 2003
CR 165636; Unit 2 250Vdc battery foam spacers; dated June 30, 2003
Drawing M-51, Diagram of H.P. Coolant Injection Piping
Unit 2 DOP 2300-M1/E1, Unit 2 HPCI System
DOP 1400-M1,Unit 2 Core Spray System, Revision 20
6 Attachment
DOP 1400-E1,Core Spray Electrical, Revision 03
DOP 1300-M1/E1, Isolation Condenser System, Revision 13
1R05 Fire Protection
CR 176243; Safe shutdown emergency light #201 battery needs to be replaced; dated
September 17, 2003
CR 174991; Safe shutdown light 311A inoperable; September 9, 2003
CR 174422; Leaking pipe; September 5, 2003
CR 174152; Penetration F-49-10 as found with 4" ceramic blanket; September 3, 2003
CR 173975; Incorrect penetration fire barrier shown on drawing; August 27, 2003
CR 173929; Penetration F-79-16 found with 6" ceramic fire blanket; August 28, 2003
CR 171458; Penetration F-71-01(B) found with 2" of ceramic fire blanket;
August 13, 2003
CR 172929; Turbine building fire main has through-wall leak; August 25, 2003
CR 168655; System actuation precludes continuous auxiliary electrical equipment room
fire watch; dated July 23, 2003
CR 168852; Safe shutdown light found unacceptable condition; dated July 24, 2003
CR 169149; Safe shutdown light #362 fast charge light on continuously; dated
July 25, 2003
CR 169169; Safe shutdown light #360 has fast charge light on and low electrolyte; dated
July 26, 2003
CR 166358; Operations shift less than minimum manning for fire brigade; dated
July 5, 2003
Dresden Fire Protection Report Volume 1, Updated Fire Hazards Analysis
Fire Pre-Plan U2RB-3, Revision 5
Fire Pre-Plan U2RB-11, Revision 5
Fire Pre-Plan U3RB-31, Revision 5
Fire Pre-Plan U2RB-4, Revision 5
Fire Pre-Plan U3RB-22, Revision 5
7 Attachment
Fire Pre-Plan U2RB-5, Revision 5
1R06 Flood Protection
CR 176191; Containment cooling service water vault watertight door predefine has
incorrect frequency; September 17, 2003
UFSAR 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, Revision 4
Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) 3.7, Plant Systems, Revision 0
Drawing Number FL-1, Flood Barriers Basement Floor, May 26, 1995
Drawing Number FL-11, Section FL-11 Flood Barrier Turbine Building, May 26, 1995
Drawing Number FL-12, Section FL-12 Flood Barriers Turbine Building, May 26, 1995
FASA No. 142203-03, Focused Area Self-Assessment - Flooding, March 3, 2003
CR 175998; NRC identifies issues with sub doors to Torus basement; dated
September 16, 2003
CR 149463; Containment coolant service water vault drain line check valve is not tested;
dated March 14, 2003
CR 149463; Focus area self-assessment flooding; dated March 17, 2003
CR 158435; Extended power uprate impact on sizing of emergency flood pump not
evaluated; dated May 12, 2003
WO 99270171; D2 18M TS Containment coolant service water vault drain valve test;
March 18, 2003
WO 348236; D3 18M TS Containment coolant service water vault drain valve test;
March 25, 2003
DOS 4400-01, Containment Cooling Service Water Vault Floor Drain, Revision 7
DOA 0010-04, Floods, Revision 15
DOS 4400-01, Containment Cooling Service Water Vault Floor Drain, Revision 7
1R11 Operator Requalification
CR 172209; Operator license renewal letter not received by the NRC; dated
August 18, 2003
CR 172128; Crew evaluation paperwork lost; dated August 11, 2003
8 Attachment
CR 170322; Licensed Operator Requalification Training CRC meeting evaluation
receives low rating on scorecard; dated August 5, 2003
CR 167198; Non-compliance with TQ-AA-106-0305, Licensed Operator Requalification
Training exam administration job aid; dated July 11, 2003
CR 167285; Near miss on crew aligned during annual dynamic evaluation; dated
July 11, 2003
CR 168349; Operations Team 5 crew clock resets due to annual exam failures; dated
July 21, 2003
CR 169450; Conflicting information identified in Licensed Operator Requalification
Training job performance measure for standby gas treatment system; dated
July 29, 2003
CR 169501; Operation Team 4 crew clock resets due to annual exam failures; dated
July 29, 2003
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
CR 166038; CR 161288 determined a maintenance rule functional failure; dated
July 2, 2003
CR 165838; Unit 3 fuel reliability indicator (FRI) exceed 300; dated July 1, 2003
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
CR 167854; Unit 2 containment cooling service water system standby pressure low;
dated July 16, 2003
CR 167588; Containment cooling service water abnormal noise; dated July 15, 2003
CR 168648; Halon injection during work in auxiliary electric; dated July 22, 2003
CR 168826; Area for improvement for operation fire brigade response to the Auxiliary
electrical equipment room; dated July 23, 2003
W.O. 00594058-01; Troubleshooting Recirculation Pump 3A Speed Oscillations
EC 343813; Provide Engineering Acceptance of the Installation of a Temporary
Deviation Meter for Recirculation Pump 3A
Procedure CC-AA-112; Temporary Configuration Changes, Revision 5
1R15 Operability Evaluations
CR 171812; Dryer Operability Determination; dated August 8, 2003
9 Attachment
CR 166927; Monthly PMs changed to quarterly on execution day; dated July 9, 2003
CR 168363; Unit 2 and Unit 3 steam dryer potential design nonconformance; dated
July 21, 2003
CR 165823; Isolation condenser actuation time delay impact from electromatic relief
setpoint change; dated July 1, 2003
UFSAR Section 5.4.6; Isolation Condenser
Technical Specification 3.3.5.2; Isolation Condenser System Instrumentation
Technical Specification 3.5.3; Isolation Condenser System
Calculation NED-I-EIC-0093; Electromatic Relief Valve/Target Rock Valve Pressure
Switch Error Analysis; dated 5/30/03
1R17 Permanent Plant Modification
EC Number EC340723; Installation on New 138kV Feed to Dresden Unit 2 138kV
Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 22 (RAT22); Revision 01
LS-AA-104-1001; 50.59 Review Coversheet Form; Revision 1
LS-AA-104-1001; 50.59 Evaluation Form; Revision 2
Affected Documents List for EC340723; dated August 16, 2003
Drawing 12E-913; Schematic Diagram of 345kV Switchyard Annunciator; Revision K
Drawing 12E-3954 thru 3957; Wiring Diagram of 345kV Switchyard Control Panel;
Revision S
Drawing 12E-6652J; Schematic Diagram TR86 Control & Indication; Revision K
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
W.O. 00590605; DIS 0250-02, Revision 18; Main Steam Line Low Pressure Isolation
Switch Calibration (Reactor Mode Switch in Run Position)
W.O. 00459355; Replaced PS 2-2361-30D
W. O. 00481977; Instrument Maintenance Replace HV P/S for SRM 21; June 20, 2003
DIS 0700-10; Data Sheet 1, SRM Channel 21 Rod Block Calibration; dated
September 24, 2003
DOS 1400-07, Revision 15, Emergency Core Cooling System Venting
10 Attachment
W.O. 374465-03; Core spray valve replacement, 2-1412-500 and 501
CR 171338; Wrong solenoid ordered for 2-1601-23; dated August 13, 2003
W.O. 00584370; DOS 1600-03, Unit 2 Quarterly Valve Timing, Revision 29
W.O. 00545980; Replace leaking 2A containment cooling service water pump discharge
check valve 2-1501-1A
W.O. 00483398-01; Metering Valve Leaking Air
DIS 1100-06, Revision 4, Preventative Maintenance and Functional Check of Standby
Liquid Control Flow Indicating Controller FIC 2(3)-1158"
W.O. 00613958; Replace Leaking 2A Containment Cooling Service Water Pump
Discharge Check Valve 2-1501-1A
DOS 1500-02, Revision 48, Containment Cooling Service Water Pump Test and
Inservice Test (IST)
W.O. 00594620; High Pressure Coolant Injection Room Cooler Vibrating and Making
Excessive Noise - Replace Cooler Fan Bearings, dated July 11, 2003
CR 167124; High pressure coolant injection room cooler fan high vibrations; dated
July 10, 2003
Procedure DMP 5700-04; Low pressure coolant injection and high pressure coolant
injection Room Cooler Maintenance; Revision 9
W.O. 00599404; Repair electro thermal link for damper 2/3-9472-011
DEP 2100-06,Crimping and Termination of Low Voltage Small Insulated Lugs and
Connectors, Revision 4
DFPS 4175-09,Fire Damper Visual Inspection, Revision 10
DOS 1600-03,Unit 2 Quarterly Valve Timing, Revision 29
DOS 40-7,Verification of Remote Position Indicator for Valve Included In Inservice
Testing (IST) Program
DOS 1600-28, Air Operated Valve Fail Safe and Accumulator Integrity Test, Revision 9
1R22 Surveillance Test
CR 176605; Unit 3 emergency diesel generator cooling water supply found out of
tolerance; September 19, 2003
Technical Specifications 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation
11 Attachment
Technical Specifications 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation
CR 175541; Unit 2 isolation condenser heat capacity test data results; dated
September 12, 2003
CR 174806; main steam line high flow DPIS 3-0261-2P; AF value exceeded TS value;
dated September 9, 2003
CR 174805; main steam line high flow DPIS 3-0261-2M found high greater than TS limit;
dated September 8, 2003
CR 173669; As found data not transferred to as left data block; dated July 14, 2003
CR 173405; 2-1530-273 did not respond in accordance with DIS 1500-35; dated
August 27, 2003
CR 173159; 2/3 Post Accident Radiation Monitor Detectors Not Fully Inserted; dated
August 26, 2003
CR 170488; Out of tolerance during DIS 1600-03; Torus to reactor building differential
pressure calibration; dated August 6, 2003
CR 170366; 3-263-62 Reactor vessel core differential pressure transmitter; dated
August 5, 2003
CR 170036; Out of tolerance during DIS 1300-02; dated August 1, 2003
CR 169994; Potential to not meet Technical Specification Surveillance; dated
July 31, 2003
CR 167158; DIS 2400-01; dated July 10, 2003
CR 167918; 2B post-loss of cooling accident H2/O2 - 02 cell found out of tolerance; dated
July 17, 2003
CR 168218; Hydraulic control unit 38-59 pressure switch found out of tolerance during
DIS 300-02; dated July 18, 2003
CR 168400; Found 2-8540-5 & 2-8540-6 our of tolerance, no technical specification
violation; dated July 21, 2003
CR 169099; Unit 2 high radiation sampling system heating, ventilation and air conditioning
surveillance failed; dated July 25, 2003
CR 169217; Dirty contacts on scram resetting relay; dated July 27, 2003
CR 169413; Hydraulic control unit pressure switches - adverse trend on out of tolerance;
dated July 23, 2003
12 Attachment
CR 168493; 3-0263-52B found out of tolerance; dated July 22, 2003
CR 166127; DPIS 2-1350-A and 2-1350-B found out of tolerance; dated July 3, 2003
WO 00580443; D2 Quarterly Tech Spec Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitor
Call and Functional; August 21, 2003
Work Request 99-111852 Revision 1; D2 18M/RFL Tech Spec Drywell Hi Rad Monitor
Functional Calibration; November 3, 2001
Work Request 99-212795 Revision 1; D2 24/RFL Tech Spec Drywell Hi Rad Monitor
Functional Calibration; October 23, 2002
Improved Technical Specification Table 3.3.6.1-1; Primary Containment Isolation
Instrumentation
WO00610330DIS 0263-07, Unit 2 ATWS RPT/ARI and ECCS Level Transmitters
Channel Calibration Test and EQ Maintenance Inspection, Revision 12
71152 Problem and Identification Resolution
CR 176311; Tools, parts and clear plastic bags found on the reactor building crane;
September 18, 2003
CR 176034; Issue unresolved for one year, lack of effective screening; dated
August 27, 2003
CR 1751745; Quarterly review of reactor building containment cooling water ACE
assigned Grade 3; dated September 15, 2003
CR 173178; High pressure coolant injection system Unit 2 motor gear unit - timeliness of
corrective actions; August 26, 2003
CR 172485; 2003 INPO evaluation AFI - - SE.1-2; August 11, 2003
CR 172351; Nuclear oversight review of chemistry focus area self-assessment (FASA);
dated July 2, 2003
CR 169094; Torus level increase; dated July 25, 2003
CR 169181; Containment requiring more frequent venting; dated July 23, 2003
CR 168824; Service water radiation monitor low flow alarm; dated July 23, 2003
CR 169845; Scaffold built without work order; dated July 31, 2003
13 Attachment
71153 Event Follow-up
CR 178699; Unit 2 unplanned automatic and manual scrams exceeded goal;
September 30, 2003
CR 178577; PPC point T076 did not detect a reactor scram signal; September 30, 2003
CR 178507; Reactor fuel pump trip caused reactor scram; September 30, 2003
CR 167124; High pressure coolant injection room cooler fan high vibrations; July 10, 2003
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
CR 118156; Safety system functional failure regulatory assurance performance indicator
exceeds threshold; dated August 5, 2002
4OA5 Other Activities
PIF D2000-00801; Calculation DRE96-0189 Does Not Reflect SR Upgrade of HPCI GSLO
& GDEF; February 9, 2000
Calculation DRE96-0189; Voltages on Loads Fed from the Safety-Related 250 VDC
Batteries; Revision 1
Calculation DRE97-0161; Justification for Continued Operation Of HPCI Gland Seal
Exhauster Subsystem Components; Revision 02
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
AR 00128073; Identified adverse trend with QV inspections; dated October 19, 2002
AR 00127520; Human performance issue with QV inspection; dated October 15, 2002
AR 00134726; Socket weld fitting dimensions not per design; dated December 9, 2002
NSWP-W-01; ASME Welding; Revision 5
NO-AA-300-001; Inspection Planning and Execution of Quality Inspection Activities;
Revision 0
CR 159815; Out of tolerance; dated May 21, 2003
CR 159816; Out of tolerance, dated May 21, 2003
CR 159552; DIS 0250-03 Emergency relief valve/target rock pressure switches out of
tolerance; dated May 19, 2003
14 Attachment