IR 05000237/2023001

Integrated Inspection Report 05000237/2023001 and 05000249/2023001

ML23124A273
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	05/04/2023
From:	Robert Ruiz NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB1
To:	Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear
References
IR 2023001
Download: ML23124A273 (1)

Text

May 4, 2023

SUBJECT:

DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3-INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2023001 AND 05000249/2023001

Dear David Rhoades:

On March 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. On April 12, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with P. Boyle, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Signed by Ruiz, Robert on 05/04/23 Robert Ruiz, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000237 and 05000249 License Nos. DPR19 and DPR25

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000237 and 05000249 License Numbers: DPR-19 and DPR-25 Report Numbers: 05000237/2023001 and 05000249/2023001 Enterprise Identifier: I2023001-0058 Licensee: Constellation Energy Generation, LLC Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Location: Morris, IL Inspection Dates: January 01, 2023 to March 31, 2023 Inspectors: M. Porfirio, Illinois Emergency Management Agency C. St. Peters, Resident Inspector J. Steffes, Senior Resident Inspector Approved By: Robert Ruiz, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Implement Condensate System Startup Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green [H.11] - 71152A NCV 05000237,05000249/202300101 Challenge the Open/Closed Unknown A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1a occurred on November 18, 2022, when the licensee failed to implement plant procedure DOP 330002, "Condensate System Startup," revision 64. Specifically, the licensee's failure to properly implement step G.1.d of procedure DOP 330002 resulted in valve 33302-505, U3 condensate booster pump suction header isolation valve to condensate pump seals, not being fully opened. This resulted in seal degradation for the Unit 3 condensate pump 3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D and an emergent downpower.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On March 11, 2023, power was reduced to approximately 81 percent to perform rod sequence exchange. The unit returned to rated thermal power on March 12, 2023. On March 18, 2023, power was reduced to approximately 83 percent to perform rod sequence exchange. The unit returned to rated thermal power on March 19, 2023, and remained at or near full rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 3 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On February 6, 2023, power was reduced to approximately 33 percent to troubleshoot and add oil to the 3B reactor recirculation pump lower motor oil reservoir. The unit returned to rated thermal power on February 7, 2023.

On March 4, 2023, power was reduced to approximately 33 percent to install a remote oil addition modification for the 3B reactor recirculation pump lower motor oil reservoir leak and perform seal replacement for condensate/condensate booster pumps. The unit returned to rated thermal power on March 8, 2023. On March 11, 2023, power was reduced to approximately 83 percent to perform rod sequence exchange. The unit returned to rated thermal power on March 17, 2023. The unit returned to rated thermal power on March 18, 2022, and remained at or near full rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather associated with high winds and possible tornadic activity on March 31, 2023.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2 station blackout (SBO) diesel generator during the Unit 3 SBO maintenance window on January 13, 2023

(2) 2/3 'B' standby gas treatment on January 18, 2023

(3) Unit 2 standby diesel generator while the 2/3 standby diesel generator was unavailable for maintenance on January 30, 2023

(4) Unit 3 SBO diesel generator while the 2/3 standby diesel generator was unavailable for maintenance on February 1, 2023

(5) Unit 3 core spray (CS) 'A' on February 25, 2023

(6) Unit 2 'B' CS on March 1617, 2023

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Fire Zone (FZ) 9.0.B, Unit 3 diesel generator elev. 517', on February 15, 2023

(2) FZ 8.2.6E, Unit 3 reactor feedwater pump switchgear H2 seal elev. 538', and FZ 6.1, Unit 3 250V battery charger room elev. 538', on February 15, 2023

(3) FZ 1.1.2.3, Unit 2 reactor building general area 545', and FZ 11.2.2, Unit 2 southeast corner room elev. 476', on March 9, 2023

(4) FZ 1.1.2.2, Unit 2 reactor ground floor elev. 517', and FZ 9.0C Unit 2/3 swing diesel generator room elev. 517', on March 10, 2023

(5) FZ 11.2.3, Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection pump room elev. 476', on March 16, 2023

(6) FZ 11.2.1, Unit 2 southwest corner room elev. 476' on March 16, 2023

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on March 14, 2023.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Condensate and feedwater system

(2) Isolation condenser

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) 2/3 standby diesel generator emergent work on January 30-February 1, 2023

(2) Protected pathway on Unit 3 due to CS system logic functional test on March 16, 2023

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 3 dPIS 31349-A, Unit 3 isolation condenser condensate return line high flow, found out of technical specification tolerance as documented in CR 4545127

(2) High pressure coolant injection turbine drain pot solenoid operated valve not in compliance as documented in CR 4549507 on January 2425, 2022

(3) Surface water tritium review as documented in CR 4554958 on March 23, 2023

(4) Unit 2/3 diesel fire pump battery terminal corrosion documented in CR 4563676 on March 2122, 2023

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system

operability and/or functionality: Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) DIS 025003, Electromagnetic relief valve/target rock valve pressure switches calibration, on Unit 3 after replacing switch 30203-3A, per Work Order (WO) 98106167

(2) DOS 660001, Diesel generator surveillance tests, following planned preventative maintenance on the Unit 2 emergency diesel generator, on March 1724, 2023

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) DOP 150015, Unit 2 LPCI [low pressure coolant injection] system quarterly flow rate test, on March 21, 2023

Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 2 standby liquid control system 'A' pump test for WO 5325917

(2) DOP 150010, Unit 2 LPCI system pump operability and quarterly test with torus available and inservice testing (IST) program, on March 21, 2023

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) Dresden pre-NRC exercise drill on February 22,

OTHER ACTIVITIES-BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01) ===

(1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

(2) Unit 3 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02)

(2 Samples)

(1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

(2) Unit 3 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

(2) Unit 3 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)

(1) Evaluation and corrective actions for the Unit 3 condensate/condensate booster pump seal degradation that resulted in emergent downpowers under CR

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Implement Condensate System Startup Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green [H.11] - 71152A NCV 05000237,05000249/202300101 Challenge the Open/Closed Unknown A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1a occurred on November 18, 2022, when the licensee failed to implement plant procedure DOP 330002, "Condensate System Startup," revision 64. Specifically, the licensee's failure to properly implement step G.1.d of procedure DOP 330002 resulted in valve 33302-505, U3 condensate booster pump suction header isolation valve to condensate pump seals, not being fully opened. This resulted in seal degradation for the Unit 3 condensate pump 3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D and an emergent downpower.

Description:

On November 19, 2022, Unit 3 was in power ascension to full power after the D3R27 refueling outage. During power ascension, discharge pressure on the 3B condensate pump was observed to be higher than the normal expected pressure band. The licensee initially diagnosed the increase in discharge pressure as a seal failure. Engineering staff walked down the 3B condensate pump and observed abnormal conditions, which included slight oscillation of the outer shaft seal while operating and a positive pump suction pressure. The site decided to secure the 3B condensate pump to inspect the outer seal. Vibration data was collected from the 3B condensate and condensate booster pump, with a step change identified in axial vibration on the outboard/thrust bearings of the condensate booster pump.

On November 20, 2022, the site held an engineering technical call during which, based on the information, no formal troubleshooting was performed.

On November 21, 2022, the inboard bearing and seal were replaced on the 3B condensate pump. The inspectors determined that no repairs on the 3B condensate booster pump were performed. At the time, the 3C condensate/condensate booster pumps were also running, and no changes were observed. After repairs were made to the 3B condensate pump seal, the pump was returned to service and Unit 3 proceeded in power ascension to full power.

On November 28, 2022, an unexpected alarm, 9036 G4, "Condensate Pump Discharge Pressure Low," was received in the main control room. Equipment operators were dispatched and reported that the 3B condensate pump was making a grinding noise and the inboard seal had movement when a strobe light was used. Thermography revealed that the inboard seal had lower temperatures than the other pumps. Turbine building closed cooling water (TBCCW) temperatures for the 3B condensate pump were found to be elevated, which indicated higher bearing temperatures. The 3B condensate/ condensate booster pump along with the 3C reactor feed pump were secured. The site performed a load drop from 100 percent MWe to around 85 percent MWe to replace the 3B condensate pump seals for a second time.

On November 30, 2022, at 5:35 a.m., elevated temperatures were identified on the 3A condensate pump inboard and outboard seals. Troubleshooting revealed that valve 33302-505, "U3 Condensate Booster Pump Suction Header Isolation Valve," to Condensate Pump Seals, was not full open. The site took actions to improve cooling to the running 3A, 3C, and 3D condensate pumps. At 6:30 a.m., Unit 3 commenced an emergent load drop of greater than 20 percent, and staffed their outage control center (OCC) at which point 3A, 3C, and 3D condensate pumps temperatures lowered and stabilized. At 2:41 p.m.

on November 30, 2022, Unit 3 commenced power ascension as a result of stabilized mechanical seal temperatures on the 3A, 3C, and 3D condensate pumps. On December 1, 2022, Unit 3 was returned to full power following the 3B condensate/condensate booster pump seal replacement.

The licensee performed a corrective action program evaluation (CAPE) and implemented an adverse condition monitoring plan (ACMP). The ACMP established parameters to monitor 3A, 3C, and 3D condensate pumps until seal replacement could occur. Inspector review of the CAPE identified the cause of the event was the operator failed to fully open the cooling water supply valve, 33302-505, as directed by procedure, DOP 330002. Inspectors noted that the CAPE also identified that no peer check was performed in the field. Additionally, a CAPE contributing cause was that the OCC did not set the vision for challenging assumptions and use the management model to document technical justifications during the first seal failure.

This resulted in delayed seal overheat determination and ultimately seal failure. This contributing cause occurred during the initial identification of the 3B condensate pump seal degradation. During the licensee's review of the event, it was identified that the technical call on November 20, 2022, did not have operations or maintenance on the call. It was also found that an incorrect assumption of refuting no flow as the cause occurred, while degraded cooling flow, ultimately the cause of the seal degradation, was not assessed. The CAPE identified that manual valve 33302-505 was also found to be missing its handwheel early in the outage, D3R27, but no condition report was written. The missing handwheel led to the operator incorrectly identifying the valve position. The site also performed an extent of condition which involved operator performance. The site determined other procedures and surveillances performed by the operator showed no adverse conditions as a result of performance.

Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced the inboard and outboard seals on the 3B condensate pump on two separate occasions. The inboard and outboard seals were replaced at a later date for the 3A, 3C, and 3D condensate pumps. A standing order was established to implement clear standards on use of peer check, stop work criteria, and pre-job briefing standards.

Corrective Action References: CR 4539818, Unexpected Load Drop

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to open valve 33302-505 as directed by step G.1.d in procedure DOP 330002 was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, failure to open valve 33302-505 as directed resulted in seal degradation on the 3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D condensate pumps and subsequent emergent downpower.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because they answered No to the questions in Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions."

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically, the licensee staff did not stop when they went to manipulate a manual valve without a handwheel. This resulted in the operator incorrectly determining the valve position and failing to open the valve 33302-505 as directed by step G.1.d in procedure DOP 330002.

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical Specification Section 5.4.1.a. requires, in part, written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 4 addresses Procedure for Startup, Operation, and Shutdown of Safety-Related BWR Systems and Section 4.n, addresses Condensate System (hotwell to feedwater pumps, including demineralizers and resin regeneration).

The licensee established procedure DOP 330002, Condensate System Startup, Rev. 64, to address placing the condensate system into operation and start the first and subsequent condensate/condensate booster pumps. DOP 330002, Condensate System Startup, Rev. 64, step G.1.d. requires operators to "open 2(3)-3302505, U2(3) condensate booster pump suction header isolation valve to condensate pump seals."

Contrary to the above, on November 18, 2022, the licensee failed to implement step G.1.d. of procedure DOP 330002, Condensate System Startup, Rev. 64. Specifically, the operator in the field did not open valve 33302-505 after incorrectly determining the valve position. This resulted in seal degradation of the Unit 3 A, B, C, and D condensate pumps and a subsequent emergent downpower.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On April 12, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to P. Boyle, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.01 Corrective Action CR 4666587 NRC Identified Issues 3/31/2023

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Procedures DOA 001002 Tornado Warning/Severe Winds 27

OPAA108111- Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines 24

1001

71111.04 Corrective Action 4551943 NRC Concern Unit 3 Station Blackout Area 2/1/2023

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings M358 Diagram of Core Spray Piping CN

Procedures DOP 1400E1 Unit 2 Core Spray System Electrical Checklist 4

DOP 1400M1 Unit 2 Core Spray System 24

DOP 1400M1/E1 Unit 3 Core Spray System 21

DOP 6600M1 Unit 2 Standby Diesel Generator 30

DOP 6620E1 Unit 2 Station Blackout Electrical Checklist 03

DOP 6620M1 Unit 2 Station Blackout Mechanical Checklist 10

DOP 6620M2 Unit 3 Station Blackout Mechanical Checklist 5

DOP 7500M1/E1 Unit 2/3 Standby Gas Treatment 06

71111.05 Fire Plans 102 U2RB2 Unit 2 Southwest Corner Room Elev. 476' 4

103 U2RB3 Unit 2 Southeast Corner Room Elev. 476' 4

104 U2RB4 Unit 2 HPCI Pump Room Elev. 476' 06

105 U2RB5 Unit 2 Reactor Ground Floor Elev. 517' 6

108 U2RB7 Unit 2 Reactor Building General Area 545' 5

2 U3TB73 Fire Zone 9.0.B Unit 3 Diesel Generator Elev. 517' 07

166 U3TB77 Fire Zone 8.2.6E Unit 3 RFP Switchgear H2 Seal Elev. 538' 06

169 U3TB80 Fire Zone 6.1 Unit 3 Battery Charger Room Elev. 538' 06

184 2/3 EDG Unit 2/3 Swing Diesel Generator Room Elev. 517' 7

Miscellaneous EC 633230 8610 Evaluation Supporting Removal of Fire Hose from 0

Hose Stations

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Fire Drill Scenario 3A TBCCW Cooling Water Pump (33801A) Fire 3/14/2023

No. 2213

Procedures OPAA201008 Pre-Fire Plan Manual 5

71111.12 Miscellaneous Isolation Condenser System Health Report 03/15/2023

Feedwater/Condensate System Health Report 03/15/2023

Work Orders 5219595 Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Steam and Condensate Line HI 4/7/2022

Flow Calibration

247430 Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Steam and Condensate Line HI 7/29/2022

Flow Calibration

280863 Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Steam and Condensate Line HI 10/4/2022

Flow Calibration

299174 Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Steam and Condensate Line HI 12/28/2022

Flow Calibration

71111.13 Corrective Action 4551179 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator Output Breaker Trip 1/30/2023

Documents

Procedures MAAA716004 Conduct of Troubleshooting 20

OPAA106101 Significant Event Reporting 25

OPAA106101- Event Response Guidelines 32

1001

OPAA108117 Protected Equipment List 03/16/2023

WCAA2000 Emergent Issue Response 13

71111.15 Corrective Action 4513772 Isolation Condenser Condensate Line High Flow DPIS 07/29/2022

Documents 31349-A found OOT

4545127 dPIS 31349-A Found Out of Tech Spec Tolerance 12/28/2022

Drawings 12E3506 Schematic Diagram Primary Containment Isolation System AF

Isolation Condenser Control Logic

Procedures DIS 130007 Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Steam/Condensate Line High 30

Flow Calibration

71111.24 Corrective Action 4561990 30203-3A PS Controller OOT 03/14/2023

Documents

Procedures DIS 025003 Electromagnetic Relief Valve/ Target Rock Valve Pressure 56

Switches Calibration

MADR- Diesel Generator Post Maintenance Testing Run 19

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

MM566001

Work Orders 5142252 OP PMT U2 EDG (Maintenance Run + DOS 660001) 03/16/2023

244617 OP PMT Air Start Regulator on D2 EDG DOS 660001 03/16/2023

5318364 D2 QTR TS LPCI System Flow Test Surveillance 03/21/2023

20673 D2 QTR TS LPCI System Pump Run and IST Surveillance 03/21/2023

53337201 OP D2 1M TS Unit Diesel Generator Operability 03/16/2023

98106167 IM Repair ERV/Target Rock Pressure Controller (DIS 03/15/2023

25003)

71114.06 Miscellaneous Dresden Pre NRC Exercise Drill 02/22/2023

71151 Miscellaneous NRC Performance Indicator Data: Initiating Events - 01/01/2022 -

Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours 12/31/2022

NRC Performance Indicator Data: Initiating Events - 01/01/2022 -

Unit/Reactor Shutdown Occurrences 12/31/2022

71152A Corrective Action 4538093 Condensate and Feedwater Dissolved Oxygen Above Action 11/19/2022

Documents Level

4538124 3B Condensate Pump Inboard Bearing 11/19/2022

4539461 3B Condensate Pump Seal Degraded 11/28/2022

4539818 Unexpected Load Drop 11/30/2022

Drawings M348 Diagram of Condensate Piping EDSF

Procedures DOP 330001 Condensate System Fill and Vent 22

DOP 330002 Condensate System Startup 64

OPAA108111 Adverse Condition Monitoring and Contingency Plan 17

2