IR 05000237/2020003
| ML20317A163 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 11/10/2020 |
| From: | Kenneth Riemer Reactor Projects Branch 1 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2020003 | |
| Download: ML20317A163 (19) | |
Text
November 10, 2020
SUBJECT:
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2020003 AND 05000249/2020003
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On September 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. On October 14, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. P. Karaba, Site Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000237 and 05000249 License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000237 and 05000249
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000237/2020003 and 05000249/2020003
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-003-0026
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3
Location:
Morris, IL
Inspection Dates:
July 01, 2020 to September 30, 2020
Inspectors:
G. Edwards, Health Physicist
R. Elliott, Resident Inspector
J. Havertape, Acting Sr. Resident Inspector
A. Nguyen, Senior Resident Inspector
C. Phillips, Project Engineer
M. Porfirio, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
J. Weigandt, Acting Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Enter a Condition Adverse to Quality into the Corrective Action Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000237,05000249/2020003-01 Open/Closed
[P.4] - Trending 71152 The inspectors identified a green finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, "Quality Assurance Program," for the licensee's failure to enter a condition adverse to quality into the corrective action program. Specifically, the inspectors identified that during a monthly surveillance test of the common emergency diesel generator (EDG) on May 26, 2020, operators recorded high out of specification diesel cooling jacket water temperatures, a condition adverse to quality, and did not make an entry into the corrective action program.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. The unit operated at or near full rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
Unit 3 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On August 1, 2020, the unit was down powered to 80 percent power for a control rod sequence exchange. The unit returned to full rated thermal power on August 2, 2020. On August 11, 2020, the unit was shut down for maintenance outage, D3M20, to perform repairs to the 3B Reactor Recirculation pump 2 seal.
The unit returned to near full power on August 16, 2020. On August 18, 2020, the unit was down powered to 75 percent power for a control rod pattern adjustment. The unit was returned to full rated thermal power that same day. On September 6, 2020, Unit 3 entered coast down in preparation for refueling outage D3R26. The unit ended the inspection period at approximately 88 percent of rated thermal power.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 3 'B' train of the shutdown cooling system on August 13, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 station blackout diesel on August 26, 2020
- (3) Unit 3 station blackout diesel on August 26, 2020
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 2 core spray system on July 29, 2020
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) FZ 8.2.6.A, Unit 2 switchgear area elevation 534 on July 10, 2020
- (2) FZ 1.1.2.2, Unit 2 reactor ground floor elevation 517' on July 16, 2020
- (3) FZ 8.2.5.A, Unit 2 switchgear area elevation 517' on September 2, 2020
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Unit 3 control room during the maintenance outage D3M20 shutdown on August 12, 2020, and startup on August 15, 2020
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated the performance and licensee evaluation of OBE 20-07A, Revision 0 on August 4, 2020
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated the performance and licensee evaluation of OBE OPEX-AM, Revision 5 on August 24, 2020
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 2 and Unit 3 high pressure core injection
- (2) Failure of the Unit 3 'D' emergency relief valve to open during testing on August 12, 2020
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 3, C-5 rod drive accumulator charging on July 10, 2020
- (2) Elevated risk associated with 2/3 fire pump maintenance outage on July 21, 2020
- (3) Unit 3 elevated risk due to X-area flow reversal on July 22, 2020
- (4) Protected paths for 2/3 diesel generator unavailability on August 25, 2020
- (5) Risk mitigating actions associated with TR-2 transmission line repairs on August 26, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Action Request (AR) 04358674, NRC questions - Unit 2 and Unit 3 HPCI [high pressure coolant injection] rooms
- (2) AR 4354939, Unit 2 anticipated transient without scram time delay relays K101A and K101B found out of tolerance during surveillance test
- (3) AR 4362710, 3D ERV [emergency relief valve] stroking issues
- (4) AR 4362001, 3B SDC HX outlet MOV 3-1001-4B difficult to operate
- (5) AR 4364280, Unit 3 emergency diesel generator not loaded due to voltmeter issues
- (6) AR 4365128, Elevated temperatures on the 2/3 EDG cooling water system
- (7) AR 4370960, Unit 3 standby liquid control clean demin water flow rate meter leak
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) DOP 4700-08, 3C instrument air system operation after relief valve replacement and receiver inspection, work order (WO) 4692725
- (2) DOP 0250-07, 3D ERV functional test after pilot replacement, WO 04885337
- (3) DMP 0202-01, Recirculation pump seal replacement and pump leak test, WO 05003002
- (4) DOS 6600-01, Diesel generator surveillance tests after trouble-shooting abnormal voltage indications on Unit 3 emergency diesel generator, WO 5063597
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated D3M20 forced outage for 3B reactor recirculation pump seal replacement activities from August 12, 2020 to August 16, 2020
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) DIS 1500-01, Division 2 quarterly TS reactor low pressure (350 PSIG) emergency core cooling system permissive calculation, WO 5026118
- (2) DIS 1300-02, Unit 2 isolation condenser steam/condensate line high flow calibration, WO 5043705
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Off-Year Exercise on September 23,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
- (1) Area Radiation Monitors (ARMs) on the refuel floor
- (2) ARMs in the auxiliary building
- (3) Portable ion chambers stored ready for use and/or during use in the refuel floor area
- (4) Portable friskers used at the exit to the RCA on the refuel floor area
- (5) ARMs located on the turbine floor
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (10 Samples 1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:
(1)
(Partial)
U2 and U3 Drywell High-Range Gamma Radiation Monitoring Systems (interim steps taken by the licensee to validate the periodic calibration/testing)
- (2) Eberline RO20, SN# 78124
- (3) Eberline RO20, SN #79222
- (4) Eberline RO20, SN #76449
- (5) Ludlum 177, SN# 16979
- (6) Ludlum 177, SN# 16956
- (7) Ludlum 177, SN# 19247
- (8) Ludlum 3, SN# 14341
- (9) Mirion AMP 100, SN# 20810
- (10) Thermo AMS-4, SN #17476
- (11) Canberra Argos, SN# 1011-285
Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Sample 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:
- (1) Unit 3 Service Water Radiation Monitor
- (2) Unit 2/3 Vent System Particulate, Iodine and Noble Gas (SPING) and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPING monitors
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in issue identification during operator rounds that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Enter a Condition Adverse to Quality into the Corrective Action Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000237,05000249/2020003-01 Open/Closed
[P.4] - Trending 71152 The inspectors identified a green finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, "Quality Assurance Program," for the licensee's failure to enter a condition adverse to quality into the corrective action program. Specifically, the inspectors identified that during a monthly surveillance test of the common emergency diesel generator (EDG) on May 26, 2020, operators recorded high out of specification diesel cooling jacket water temperatures, a condition adverse to quality, and did not make an entry into the corrective action program.
Description:
On May 26, 2020, the common EDG was started for routine monthly surveillance testing. As part of this testing, operator rounds were taken during the end of the one hour loaded portion of the run. The operators documented in WO 5036077 that TA 2/3-6641-12 and TA 2/3-6641-13, diesel generator jacket water temperature inlet and outlet, were 170 and 182 degrees [F] respectively. DOS 6600-01, Diesel Generator Surveillance Tests, Revision 144, required that TA 2/3-6641-12 and TA 2/3-6641-13 nominal range be 150 to 165 and 160 to 180 degrees [F] respectively.
On July 27, 2020, the common EDG was again run for the routine monthly surveillance testing. The operators documented in WO 5055405 that TA 2/3-6641-12 and TA 2/3-6641-13 were 171 and 183 degrees [F] respectively. Operators recorded this condition in the corrective action program as AR 4359125, 2/3 EDG cooling water inlet/outlet temperature high. On July 28, 2020, the station oversight committee reviewed the issue and implemented a procedure change request to increase the TA 2/3-6641-12 and TA 2/3-6641-13 nominal range to 150 to 180 and 160 to 190 degrees [F] respectively. The DG alarm and trip setpoints are 190 and 200 degrees [F] respectively. The diesel generator vendor estimated the maximum safe jacket water temperature to be 225 degrees [F].
On August 24, 2020, the common DG was started for a 24-month endurance run. At 2:52 pm, the EDG was loaded to 2700 kW for a 2-hour 110 percent capacity test. At 3:04 pm, the main control room received an EDG trouble alarm and equipment operators noted jacket water outlet temperature to be 200 degrees [F]. At 3:25 pm, the EDG tripped on high cooling water temperature. The licensee documented this sequence of events in AR 4365128.
Troubleshooting determined heat exchanger fouling to be the cause of elevated jacket water temperatures and the eventual trip of the EDG. The fouling was cleared from the cooling water heat exchangers and the EDG was tested successfully on August 27, 2020. The licensee completed a causal evaluation and determined the cause of the fouling to be silt and clay.
Following the trip of the common EDG, the inspectors conducted a review of the issue.
During their review, the inspectors noted that on May 26th operators had circled the out of range temperature values for the jacket water cooler and made an annotation in the WO that the system engineer had been informed via email to evaluate the data. Additionally, the inspectors noted that no corresponding entry had been made into the corrective action program as required by PI-AA-125, Corrective Action Program, step 4.1.2. Step 4.1.2 states, If at any time a SCAQ, CAQ, or any question of either current or past operability arises, then initiate an IR in accordance with PI-AA-120. The inspectors questioned the licensee on why the issue wasn't documented into the CAP since it was out of specification data related to diesel generator operation that could potentially impact its ability to perform its safety function. The inspectors also identified that the issue in May would have provided valuable trend data for the licensee to evaluate the performance of the EDG and possible system degradation that was occurring. The inspectors determined that not entering the issue into the corrective action program was contrary to the licensee's CAP procedure and regulatory requirements and was a performance deficiency. The licensee captured the inspectors' concern in AR 4370364.
Corrective Actions: The licensee increased the common DG heat exchanger inspection/cleaning frequency from two years to annual, added instructions to all EDG surveillance procedures to clean the heat exchangers if a jacket water temperature of 180 [F]
is exceeded, and implemented a performance improvement action plan to improve issue identification and screening during operator rounds.
Corrective Action References: AR 4365128 and 4370364
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, Quality Assurance Program, requires, in part, that the applicant shall establish at the earliest practicable time, consistent with the schedule for accomplishing the activities, a Quality Assurance Program which complies with the requirements of this appendix. This program shall be documented by written policies, procedures, or instructions and shall be carried out throughout plant life in accordance with those policies, procedures, or instructions. The Quality Assurance Program was described in NO-AA-10, "Quality Assurance Topical Report," Revision 95, and discussed that the CAP was used to identify and correct conditions adverse to quality in Sections 16.2.1 and 16.2.2. The inspectors determined that the failure to perform activities in accordance with procedure PI-AA-125, Corrective Action Program, Revision 7, which was a Quality Assurance Program implementing procedure, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the inspectors identified that during WO 5036077 on May 26, 2020, operators recorded high out of specification diesel cooling jacket water temperatures, a condition adverse to quality, and did not make an entry into the corrective action program.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors reviewed the performance deficiency in accordance with the screening criteria contained in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, for inspection findings at power. The inspectors determined that a detailed risk evaluation was required because they answered 'Yes' to the relevant portion of Question 3, "Does the finding represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time?" The technical specification allowed outage time for one diesel generator is 14 days. The inspectors determined that the common EDG had run for approximately 30 minutes under 110 percent load at the time of the trip. Further, the inspectors noted that in AR 4365128 operators stated that jacket water temperature had reached 225 [F] following the trip of the common EDG on August 24, 2020, and that the EDG vendor had stated 225 [F] to be the maximum safe operating temperature. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the common EDG would have likely failed to run for its 24-hour mission time and that this condition likely existed since the EDG had last been run successfully on July 27, 2020.
A detailed risk evaluation was performed to assess the significance of the finding. The finding was assumed to result in a degraded condition in which the common EDG would fail to run. The condition was assumed to exist for an exposure period of one month. A region III senior reactor analyst (SRA) used a recently modified Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model, revision 8.59, to analyze the finding. The model modification was necessary to properly incorporate FLEX strategies. FLEX equipment failure rates were estimated by using failure rates for similar permanently installed equipment multiplied by a factor of 3. The change in core damage frequency for the exposure period was estimated to be less than 1E-7/year. As a result, risk contributions for external events and large early release frequency were not evaluated. The dominant core damage sequence involved a weather-related loss of offsite power, failure of the emergency diesel generators, failure of the high-pressure coolant injection system, and the failure to recover offsite or onsite power within the battery depletion time.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.4 - Trending: The organization periodically analyzes information from the corrective action program and other assessments in the aggregate to identify programmatic and common cause issues. Specifically, the diesel generator jacket water temperature on the common EDG was relatively stable for a year prior to the elevated temperatures that were experienced during the May 2020 surveillance test. At this point, jacket water temperatures increased in a stepwise fashion initially and increased steadily during each monthly surveillance run until the eventual trip of the common EDG on August 24, 2020. The significance of the jacket water temperature trend change was not recognized by the licensee and no actions were implemented to correct or stop the trend.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, Quality Assurance Program, requires, in part, that the applicant shall establish at the earliest practicable time, consistent with the schedule for accomplishing the activities, a Quality Assurance Program which complies with the requirements of this appendix. This program shall be documented by written policies, procedures, or instructions and shall be carried out throughout plant life in accordance with those policies, procedures, or instructions. The Corrective Action Procedure, PI-AA-125, which implemented part of the Quality Assurance Topical Report, Step 4.1.2 states, If at any time a SCAQ, CAQ, or any question of either current or past operability/reportability arises, then initiate an IR in accordance with PI-AA-120.
Contrary to the above, on May 26, 2020 the licensee failed to carry out activities in accordance with a procedure established to implement the Quality Assurance Program.
Specifically, the licensee failed to generate an IR in accordance with PI-AA-125 for a condition adverse to quality.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Potential Adverse Trend Related to Issue Identification and Screening during Operator Rounds 71152 The inspectors reviewed Exelon's corrective action program (CAP) for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue on September 21, 2020. The inspectors evaluated a sample of issues and events that occurred over the course of the second and third quarters of 2020 to determine whether issues were appropriately considered as emerging or adverse trends. The evaluation revealed a number of NRC and IEMA identified issues relating to equipment parameters found out of their specified operator rounds ranges:
- AR 4338023, IEMA U3 EDG walkdown items
- AR 4355291, NRC question on 3A CRD pump
- AR 4356740, IEMA walkdown items
- AR 4358676, WR needed to lower oil level in U2 HPCI booster pump
- AR 4370364, NRC question related to work order
All of the issues reviewed pertained to parameters covered on routine equipment operator rounds and were found by either NRC or IEMA during system walkdowns or document reviews to be outside the expected nominal range. The inspectors noted the number of NRC and IEMA-identified issues relating to operator rounds in the second and third quarters represented an increase in relation to previous quarters and was therefore a potentially adverse trend. The inspectors determined that the issues identified in AR 4338023, 4355291, 4356740, and 4358676, did not impact system operability or functionality and were, therefore, minor. However, upon an in-depth review the inspectors determined that the issue documented in AR 4370364 adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and was dispositioned separately in this report as a green finding and associated non-cited violation titled "Failure to Enter a Condition Adverse to Quality into the Corrective Action Program."
The inspectors raised the concern of a potentially adverse trend associated with issue identification and screening during operator rounds with the licensee. The licensee was receptive to the inspectors' feedback and responded that there was a plan to improve performance during operator rounds with an emphasis on entering issues into the corrective action program. Specific actions in the licensee's plan included one-on-one discussions between equipment operators and operations management on expectations, paired observations during operator rounds, and removal of unnecessary items from equipment operator rounds packages.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 14, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. P. Karaba, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 4, 2020, the inspectors presented the Radiation Protection inspection results to Mr. P. Boyle, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Drawings
M-363
Diagram of Shutdown Reactor Cooling Piping
BG
Procedures
DOP 1400-E1
Unit 2 Core Spray System Electrical Checklist
DOP 1400-M1
Unit 2 Core Spray System
DOP 6620-16
SBO D/G 2(3) Preparation for Standby Readiness
Corrective Action
Documents
1417050
Fire Panel 2202-56A in Trouble
09/23/2012
4095329
Relay K6 De-Energized in Panel 2202-56A
2/18/2018
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
4357245
NRC Question Regarding Cables Along FP Piping on RB
517'
07/16/2020
Fire Plans
105 U2RB-5
105 U2RB-5Unit 2 RX Ground Floor Elev. 517' FZ 1.1.2.2
146 U2TB-49A
Unit 2 CREVS
149 U2TB-51
Unit 2 Switchgear Area Elev. 534
Miscellaneous
TRM 3.7.1
Fire Hose Stations
Procedures
Station Housekeeping/Material Condition Program
Work Orders
1589710
Fire Panel 2202-56A In Trouble - Bad Tamper Switch
05/15/2018
4772846
Relay K6 De-Energized in Panel 2202-56A
04/14/2018
Drawings
2E-3462, sheet
Electromatic Relief Valve 203-3D Control
AG
Engineering
Evaluations
Function 30-3
Maintenance Rule System Basis Document for Main Steam
Function 30-3, Prevent Over Pressure of the Reactor Vessel
During Transients
09/03/2020
Miscellaneous
Relays - Control /
Timing
Preventative Maintenance Template
Procedures
DEOP 0400-2
Emergency Depressurization
Equipment Classification
Corrective Action
Documents
4355950
Fire Pumps Auto-Started from Unexpected Pre-Action
07/10/2020
4356022
Unexpected Alarm 901-2 C-8 Central File Fire w/Halon
Discharge
07/10/2020
Procedures
DFPP 4123-15
Returning 2-3 Diesel Fire Pump to Standby Following Start
Corrective Action
4359125
2/3 EDG Cooling Water Inlet/Outlet Temperature High
07/27/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
4362001
3B SDC HX Outlet MOV 3-1001-4B Difficult to Operate
08/09/2020
4364280
Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator Not Loaded due to
Voltmeter Issues
08/20/2020
4370960
U3 SBLC Clean Demin Water Flow Rate Meter Leak
09/21/2020
4392001
3B SDC HX Outlet MOV 3-1001-4B Difficult to Operate
08/09/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
4368224
NRC Question on DOS 6600-01
09/09/2020
Drawings
Relaying and Metering Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 34-1 and
33-1
W
Relay, Metering and Excitation Diagram Standby Diesel
Generator 3
Y
20306
Vickers Schematic Diagram Voltage Regulator Model
M-364
Diagram of Standby Liquid Control Piping
Engineering
Evaluations
4362710
3D ERV Stroking Issues - Complex Troubleshooting
Package
Miscellaneous
EPRI 1011111
EMD Mag Amp Voltage Regulators for Emergency Diesel
Generators
11/01/2004
MI 4520
EMD Maintenance Instruction; Voltage Regulator - Magnetic
Amplifier Type
08/01/1961
MI 4523
EMD Maintenance Instruction; Magnetic Amplifier Controlled
Voltage Regulator
03/01/1970
Work Orders
28114
D2/3 2 Y PM Standby Diesel Generator Inspection
07/18/2017
4664268-15
D2/3 2 Y PM Standby Diesel Generator Inspection
03/25/2019
5036077
D2/3 1M TS Unit Diesel Generator Operability
05/20/2020
5044726
D2/3 1M TS Unit Diesel Generator Operability
06/20/2020
5055405
D2/3 1M TS Unit Diesel Generator Operability
07/25/2020
Procedures
DOP 4700-08
3C Instrument Air System Operation
DOS 6600-01
Diesel Generator Surveillance Tests
144
Work Orders
4692725
D3 3Y COM 3C IA REC IDNS INSP/LFT CK RV (ILL
- U0232183)
08/06/2020
4885337
D3 RFL PM Electromatic Relief - D - Replace Pilot
10/26/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
4885337
Functional Test D ERV per DOS 0250-07
08/14/2020
5003002
MM Replace 3B RR Seal and OP Post Maintenance Test of
3B RR Pump Following Seal Replacement
08/07/2020
5063597
D3 1M TS (IST) Unit Diesel Generator Operability
08/17/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
4362352
Unit 3 IRM 18 Does Not Pass Range 6-7 Overlap Check
08/12/2020
4362710
3D ERV Stroking Issues
08/12/2020
4362717
CRD L-13 Green Double Dashes on Full Core Display
08/12/2020
4363390
Unit 3 RWCU Auxiliary Pump Trip during Reactor Startup -
D3M20
08/15/2020
4363512
IRM 18 Went Downscale When Ranging from 6 to 7
08/16/2020
4363514
Control Rod N9 - RPIS Issue Caused Rod Drift Alarm -
D3M20
08/16/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
4362731
NRC Identified Potential Issue Rigging for Recirculation Seal
08/12/2020
4363331
NRC - 3B Drywell Cooler Access Hatch Latch - D3M20
08/15/2020
Engineering
Evaluations
D3M20
Shutdown Safety Management Plan
08/10/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
04357223
Found PS 2-0263-52A Circuit 1 and Circuit 2 Reset O.O.T
07/16/2020
4351938
Unit 2 DEHC Fluctuations in Throttle Mode
06/23/2020
4355936
Unit 2 DEHC Fluctuations in Throttle Mode
07/10/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
4358189
Hose Used for Calibrations During DIS 1500-01 Questioned
07/22/2020
Engineering
Changes
447233
Evaluate the Effect of Hose Length on IMD Calibrations for
ECCS Pressure Switches
07/23/2020
Procedures
DIS 1300-02
Unit 2 Isolation Condenser Steam/Condensate Line High
Flow Calibration
DIS 1500-01
Unit 2 Reactor Low Pressure (350 PSIG) ECCS Permissive
Work Orders
05036080-01
Quarterly TS CS Pump Test
07/31/2020
05065409-05
Core Spray Flow Indicator Needs Calibration
07/31/2020
26118
D2 Quarter TS Reactor Low Pressure (350 PSIG) ECCS
Permissive Calculation
07/16/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
5043705
D2 Quarter TS ISO Cond Steam AND Cond Line HI Flow
08/20/2020
Calibration
Records
DMC-3000 Calibration Summary Report
06/26/2020
Calibration of the Accuscan II WBC System at Exelon
Dresden Generating Station
07/13/2020
Calibration of the Fastscan WBC System at Exelon Dresden
Generating Station
07/15/2020
Drywell High Radiation Monitor RIS 2(3)-2419A Channel
Calibration
10/29/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
280769
2/3 Refueling Floor CAM Long Term Out of Service
07/25/2018
297049
Liquid Scintillation Calibration Procedure Lack Guidance
11/12/2019
04301949
903-3 C-9 2/3 Reactor Building Vent Stack Monitor Flow Low
2/06/2019
Miscellaneous
General Atomics High-Range Gamma Radiation Monitoring
System
Self-Assessments AR 04322022 02
RP SRPT for NRC SA IP 71124.05 - Instrumentation
08/04/2020
Work Orders
0196847401
Unit 3 Drywell High Range Gamma Radiation Monitoring
System Calibration
10/30/2018
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
4361303
Follow-Up Discussions with the NRC (re. Oil Level Readings)
08/05/2020