IR 05000424/1992029
| ML20127E794 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1992 |
| From: | Barr K, Gooden A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127E788 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-92-29, 50-425-92-29, NUDOCS 9301200050 | |
| Download: ML20127E794 (14) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
p0 4 UNITED $TAf f t
. hg NUCLE An nLGULATOnY COMMisstON
.-
( n HIolON ll 101 M Aftli T T A $181t ET, N.W.
$
c3
} , [E Afl_ ANT A, OlonGI A 30323
%S...*/ DEc 24 U2 Report Nos.: 50-424/92 29 and 50-425/92-29 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 Docket Nos.: 50 424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81 facility Name: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP)
InspectionCondup}ed: November 30 - December 4, 1992 Inspector: bN f.c . M ,J.ff L g A. G60'defi~ Date <igned Accompanying Person el: B. Haagensen, Sonalysts Corporation-Approved by: N w 2 6 j pf A K. Barr; Chief
~ ~
Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted to assess the adequacy and operational readiness of the licensee's emergency preparedness program in the areas of emergency detection and classification, protective action decisionmaking, notification and communication, shift staffing and augmentation, training, dose calculation and assessment, and public informatio Results:
Within the areas reviewed, no violations or deviations were identified. The licensee appears to be committed to maintaining a state of readiness as evidenced by prompt actions taken in response to various weaknesses identified during exercises and drills, and actions to repair public notification sirens. The performance of two. operating crews during walk-throughs -(table top drills)
~ demonstrated the capability to properly classify events, notify offsite authorities in a timely manner, perform dose projections, and make protective action recommendations (PARS) for onsite and offsite areas. However, three areas ~.
of concern resulted from the walk-throughs:' Onsite and offsite PARS were not selected using. a consistent methodology (Paragraph 3); the emergency action levels for certain events. (steam generator tube rupture and loss of coolant .
9301200050 DR 921224 ADOCK 05000424 PDR
'
.
accident) are more conservative than federal guidanco in NUREG.0654 (Paragraph 2); and the default values used in the dose projection code contained conservative assumptions that resulted in the total committed thyroid dose to exceed the lower EPA protective action guides (PAGs) at the site boundary (Paragraph 7).
.
vy g t- g- g a s w -, - , g- -
+-wv e r yry ++ w .- -,y-y-w,e-v,,me- , m -- , w ve v --w ivv ,ywr er v, y, -,,a w- iev s. e s e - , + s w 4. 4mn,+= , . ..cr- tw . w e+ m bu v -+ ---e e trr
_ _ _ _
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees S. Allison, Unit Shift Supervisor
- J. Beasicy, Assistant General Manager, Operations J. Bowles, Unit Shift Supervisor B. Brown, Supervisor, Operations Training R. Brown, Plant Instructor, Nuclear J. Carswell, Foreman, Health Physics
- R. Dorman, Manager, Training and Emergency Preparedness K. Duquette, Health Physicist
- B. Gabbard, Nuclear Specialist 1 R. Gunn, Security Shift Supervisor W. Harper, Information Center Specialist
- K. Holmes, Manager, Health Physics and Chemistry N. Jenkin, Shift Clerk T. Jones, Shift Clerk
- Kitchens, Assistant General Manager, Plant Support
- Kochery, Superintendent, Health Physics
- R. LeGrand, Manager, Operations
- L. Mayo, Nuclear Specialist
- J. Roberts, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator L. Rouse, Plant Instructor, Nuclear
- Shipnan, General Manager P. Tucker, instructor, Training H. Williams, Shift Superintendent J. Williams, Shift Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included operators, engineers, technicians, security force members, and administrative personne Other Organizations J. Hardeman, Program Manager, Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection Division Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- P. Balmain, Resident inspector
- B. Bonser, Senior Resident inspector
- T. Decker, Chief, Radiological Effluents and Chemistry Section
- J. Starefos, Resident Inspector Intern
- R. Starkey, Resident inspector
- Attended exit interview
_
.
f
-
.
.
i 2 i Emergency Detection and Classification (82201)
l l Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Sections IV.B and IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CfR Part 50, and Section D of the Vogtle Emergency Plan, this program area was inspected to determine whether the licensee used and understood '
a standard emergency action level (EAL) and classification schem The inspector reviewed the licensee's emergency classification system as
- found in the Vogtle Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs). The emergency classification system is based on the fission product barrier approach. Event classification is determined by the status of three barriers (reactor coolant system, fuel cladding, and
containment) considered as normal, breached, or challenged. The specific criteria are found in figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 to EPIP 91001-C, " Emergency Classification and implementing Instructions". Selected EAls were '
'
reviewed- for table-top exercises involving event classificatio In
'
addition, selected EAls were compared with guidance found in Appendix 1 of flVREG 0654. The inspector noted two examples where the Vogtle EAls would result in event classifications that are one level higher than the examples of initiating conditions in NUREG-0654. The two events involved '
a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR). The Vogtle barrier-based approach assumes that any LOCA that exceeds the capacity of two charging pumps will cause the fuel cladding barrier to be breached or challenged, even if the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) operates as designed if a LOCA occurs into containment, two of three fission product barriers are considered breached or challenge The aforementioned assumption is also applied in the event of a SGTR. As a result, any further degradation in contaiament is the breach of the third barrier and a General Emergency is declare During walk-through (table-top) evaluations with two operating crews, both groups were proficient and familiar with the EAL classification procedure and classified the events in accordance with the procedure. However, in both scenarios (LOCA and SGTR), the event classifications were overly conservative when compared to NUREG 0654 example Other specific examples where the Vogtle EAL scheme appears to be overly conservative when compared with NUREG-0654 initiating conditions in Appendix 1 include:
Description of Event Emergency Classification Vogtle_EAls NUREG-0654
..............................................................
SGTR with no additional Site Area Alert failures SG1R with stuck open Atmospheric Relief Valve and no fuel General Site Area damage (normal _ECCS)
LOCA outside of containment General Site Area and no fuel damage (normal ECCS)
The significance of overly conservative EAls were previously identified and discussed with the licensee during requal examinations for Control
-
,
i.--r----+e-+w+- +----*----,mer.,nm,-,---er-sv,em.--w-v.-% m---+m .___we=-m.e,w-
--
w w -#w-,, -m w.** **.~,-mr-i,..,einay--~v--~--w--t~*-ww g-~-w---ww w, y * r-e-=-'
_ --.- - - . -- . - .- . - _ - - - ~ . - - _ - - - . _ . -
. .
.
,
P
3 !
,
Room Operators (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-424/92-301) during June 199 Consequently, the inspector discussed this matter as an area of concern :
that warranted further licensee attention. The inspector was informed that changes to the Vogtle Emergency Plan incorporating the NUMARC EAL- ,
scheme would be submitted for NRC review and approval during the first ,
quarter of calendar year 1993, in response, the inspector indicated that '
the NUMARC EAL scheme would resolve the concern discussed above; however, ;
thepreviousopeniteminthisarea(Irl 50 424, 425/92-301 01) regarding overly conservative EALS would remain open for review during a subsequent inspectio The authority and responsibility for the classification of emergency events and the initiation of emergency actions were. described in EPIP 91001- Two Control Room crews (see Paragraph 6 for details regarding the interviews) ders etrated the capabi11ty to classify events, notify the offsite authoritd n ;mmmend protective actions, perform dose projections, and effective td G btun of Emergency Operating Procedure The inspector reviewed the licensees coordination of the annual EAL review with State and local officials. 1he 'icensee conducted a meeting--during July 1992 with representatives from the States (South Carolina and Georgia), counties (both Georgia and South Carolina), and Savannah River Site (SRS) to discuss proposed changes to the Vogtle emergency ;
classification system incorporating the NUMARC EALS. _According to -
documentation, each of the offsite authorities concurred with the proposed ,
NUMARC EAL scheme for Vogtl No violations or deviations were identifie . Protective Action Decision Making (82202)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) and (10),Section IV.0.3 of Appendix [ to 10 CFR Part 50, and Section J of the Emergency Plan, this area es reviewed to determine whether the licensee was maintaining a continuous capability to (1) assess emergency conditions, (2) make appropriate recommendations to offsite authorities to protect the public, and (3) take appropriate actions to protect onsite personnel in the event of an emergenc The inspector determined through review of the Emergency Plan. and EPIPs that autnority and responsibility for. accident assessment and protective actio". decisionmaking were clearly ' assigned and were available on a 24-hour basis. The specific actions and instructions were contained in '
FM P 91305-C, " Protective Action Guidelines".
>
Walk-through evaluations involving protective action decision ~ making were conducted with two ; operating crews- (see Paragraph 6 for details).
Although personnel appeared -to be cognizant of appropriate onsit protective -actions and aware of the range of protective . action recommendations (PARS) appropriate to the general public, onsite . and offsite PARS were not selected using :a consistent methodology. The inspector noted the following:
<
..-..,---*c-,% , [m - , , ,, . . . ,.-_,,,,,g.,,-,,,%-m
_ , , , g ,.4 cm ,.w.,-...mp ,..vn. % , , , , - . . ,m. w.v.,,,,.,,.n,mma
, .
,
. In response to a scenario involving a SGTR, one crew based the PARS (evacuate 5-miles radius and 10-miles downwind) entirely on dose projections without consideration for plant condition The remaining crew when presented a similar accident with slightly modified details, made the identical PARS based on plant conditions rather than dose projections. The projected doses indicated 7 Rem (thyroid) at the site boundary, but only 20 millirem in the 5 miles downwind zone Therefore, the zones that were between 5 and 10 miles were not expected to receive doses in excess of protective action guides (PAGs) for evacuation (greater than 5 Rem thyroid or greater than 1 Rem whole body). Consequently, evacuation of these zones on the basis of dose projection information was not necessar EPIP 91305-C contained confusing guidance and direction regarding the selection of minimum, default PARS following the General Emergency declaratio . One of two crews evacuated non-essential personnel to the alternate evacuation center at Plant Wilson. Based on forecasted conditions (wind shift from the North at 000 degrees to the West at 270 degrees), the choice was inconsistent with procedural guidanc EPIP 91305-C specified evacuation to the Vogtle Recreation Area Relocation cente ,
,
The licensee agreed to take actions to resolve concerns that were noted during the walk-throughs as follows: (1) as an interim measure until the next training cycle, a lessons learned letter will be is:ued to emergency response personnel detailing walk-through problems and appropriate actions; and (2) the procedure implementing PARS (EPIP 91305 C) will be revised to clearly state the minimum, default PARS following the General Emergency declaration and the inclusion of an action level for fission product inventory. The inspector informed the licensee that actions taken to ensure appropriate and consistent PARS would be tracked as an inspector followup item (If!).
If1 50-424, 425/92 29-01: Revise EPIP 91305-C and provide training to ensure consistency in the development of PAR Additional details regarding the walk-throughs are provided in Paragraph .
No violations or deviations were identified.
- Notifications and Communications (82203) ,
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and (6), and Section IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, this area was inspected to determine whether the licensee was maintaining a capability for notifying and communicating with plant personnel, offsite support agencies and authorities, and the population within the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ). '
_ _ . _
-
_ _ . _ . . _ _ . , _ _. . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
'
. .
!
i
The inspector reviewed the licensees notification procedure EPIP 91002 0,
" Emergency Notifications". The referenced procedure contained the ;
emergency notification message form, and specified when to notify onsite and/or offsite emergency response personnel. The referenced procedure required that offsite notifications be made promptly after event declaration. The emergency notification message form used for initial and '
followup notifications to State and local authorities met the guidance in NUREG-0654, Sections II.E.3 and II. In addition, for NRC notifications, the licensee utilizes NRC form 361 issued under NRC ;
Information Notice 89 89 (Event Notification Worksheets). Documentation t was provided to show that the licensee was updating the on-call emergency response roster on a quarterly basis. The licensees communications !'
procedure instructs communications personnel to employ equipment referred to as the "faxXchange" in parallel with the voice circuits (ENN, backup i
'
ENN, etc.)- for simultaneous transmission of the completed notification form via facsimil Walk throughs with two operating crews (see Paragraph 6) verified that personnel understood the requirements, including time limits, for notifying State / local authorities and the NRC. The scenario postulated- ,
during the walk throughs required the communicators to utilize backup communications equipment for notifying the State and/or local authoritie No problems were noted. Personnel demonstrated excellent familiarity with procedures for backup notification The inspector observed an operability test of the following communications equipment: (1) Emergency Notification Network (ENN) from the Control Room, (2) Emergency Notification System (ENS) from the Technical Support Center (TSC), and (3) the SRS radio tested from the TSC. No problems were noted .
The licensee's management control program for the Alert Notification System was reviewe According to documentation and discussions with a member of the licensees staff, the system consists of 48 sirens (46 ,
located within Burke County _ Georgia, one located onsite, and one siren 3 located in South Carolina), and tone alert radios that were provided to residences within the EPZ. According to licensee- documentation,- siren .
test. results for calendar year 1991 reliability was 98.5 percent.- Siren .
test documentation was reviewed covering the period March 1991 to October t 1992. The records showed that periodic test and maintenance was performed in accordance with procedural requirements in Procedure No. VEGP 25722-C, Appendix 3 of the Emergency P1an,~and guidance in NUREG 0654. According to test documentation, the licensee was prompt in taking actions to repair, replace, or restore sirens to an operable condition in the event of a failur The inspector reviewed the licensees notification system for activating the emergency response organization (ERO) during off-hours. _ The ~
notification system involves plant ' security personnel activating a computer based automatic telephone dialing -and. recording system for contacting a list of individuals assigned to the ERO. - This automated system is referred to as the " Dialogic Recall System". The inspector
- - . . - - - - . - - . - . - .- -- . _ - - - - - . - . - . 2
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
discussed with a member of the licensees staf f the periodic testing of the referenced system including backup provisions in the event the automated system was inoperable. According to the licensee contact, in the event the system became inoperable, the pro.edure for manual call-out would be implemented. The inspector conducted an interview with a member of the plant security staf f as verification that personnel were f amiliar with their role (including backup methodology) in activating members of the ERO during off-hours. According to documentation, system operability checks were perf ormed on a monthly basis and recall drills demonstrating the capability for notification to augmentation staff was performed quarterl Quarterly drills also served as a mechanism for updating notification roster in the event of outdated phone and/or pager numbers. Selected records covering the referenced test / drills were reviewed for the period -
September 1991 to September 199 During the interview with security personnel, the inspector noted the monitoring equipment for the l10AA weather tone alert radio syste In the event the transmitter for the tone alert radio system became inoperable, the monitoring equipment would be in an alarmed state. When questioned regarding security's response to the alarm, the interviewee discussed actions in accordance with Procedure No. 90117-C, " Security Monitoring of Weather Alert System".
Emergency communications equipment in the emergency response facilities (ERfs) were consistent with the descriptions in the Emergency Plan. The inspector reviewed periodic test documentation for selected communications equipment covering the period August 1991 through August 199 No problems were note Communications equipment were tested at the frequency required by EPIP 91204-C, " Emergency Response Communications",
in addition, documentation of the weekly activations (tests, severe weather,etc.) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) tone alert radios was reviewed covering the period October 28, 1992 to November 25, 199 No violations or deviations were identified. Shift Staffing and Augmentation (82205)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(2), Sections IV.A and IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and Sections B and H of the Emergency Plan, this area was reviewed to determine whether shif t staffing for emergencies was adequate both in numbers and in functional capability, and whether administrative and physical means were available and maintained to augment the emergency organization in a timely manne Shift staffing levels and functional capabilities were reviewed and determined to be consistent with the guidance in lable B-1 of NUREG 065 The licensee maintains an emergency response notification roster which was updated quarterly. The licensees notification procedure for activating members of the ERO af ter normal working hours was via an autodialer system known as " Dialogic". Notification was initiated by security personnel when requested by the Emergency Directo The licensees backup methodology made use of manual phone calls by security personnel. The inspector discussed staff augmentation times with a licensee
i
'
representative and reviewed documentation for an augmentation drill conducted during November 1992. With one exception, the referenced drill resulted in a successful demonstration of facility activation times. Tha exception involved the Operations Support Center (OSC) which required 74 minute According to Section H of the Plan, the OSC will be '
operational within about an hour of the initial notification. According to the licensee contact, a self-critique of the drill results disclosed that the required staffing was available but the OSC Manager was delayed -
in declaring the facility as operational. The licensee contact indicated that the drill results were discussed with tFe participants and an augmentation drill will be conducted during the calendar year 1993 to demonstrate facility activation time The inspector indicated that the results from the 1993 augmentation drill will be reviewed for consistency with Section H of the Emergency Pla The inspector reviewed the ?lcensce's program for ensuring the i availability of response personnel for timely augmentation of facilitie On a quarterly basia, the licensee conducts notification drills during of f-hours in which ERO personnel are notified and must call to report their avai_ lability and estimated time of arrival to the plant (no actual reporting to the facilities).
No violations or deviations were identifie ! Knowledge and Performance af Duties (82206)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) and Section IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and Section 0 of the Emergency Plan, this area was
'
inspected to determine whether ERO personnel were properly trained and understood their response roles , ,
The inspector reviewed the description (in the Emergency Plan) of the training program, training procedures, and selected lesson plans, and interviewed members of the instructional staff. The inspector reviewed-selected lesson plans for Emergency Director training, field monitoring and dose projection, and training for security personnel involved with activation and notification of the ERO. Based on these reviews and interviews with training personnel, the inspector determined that the licensee maintained a formal training progra Emergency response training records were' reviewed for selected individual Records for 20 randomly selected individuals assigned to the ERO (Emergency Directors, Dose Assessment Managers, ENN Communicators, etc.) were reviewed to verify that individuals received training in accordance with the Plan and procedures during 1992. No problems were note The licensee maintains a computerized tracking system for emergency response training which provides periodic updates regarding the status of personnel trainin According to a member of the -licensee's staff, on a weekly basis a computerized printout is generated and reviewed to ensure that personnel training is current and up-to-dat .
To assess the effectiveness of the emergency response training program,
,
-- ,--->-,,_,m- ,..,,,,,-.-,..,,..,,.._,,-,,,__,..,.l-.. , . , , , ,--.,,,,...._..m.., - . , _ _ _ . . , , , ~ _ , , , . , _ . _ , . . , ,,_., , ,,_,, ,,,,,.- , _
- _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ___
_ ..__ ,
-
l
.
j
.
8 !
the inspector conducted table-top drills with two operating crews (Unit !
Shift Supervisor, Shift Superintendent, Shift Clerk, Health Physics l foreman / Supervisor, and management designated Emergency Director).
Specific areas of evaluation included event classification, notification, i dose projection, and PARS. The postulated accident sequences involved a :
,
steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) and loss of r.colant accident (LOCA).
, The results of the walk-through were as follows:
- Onsite and offsite PARS were not selected using a consistent methodology between the shifts (Paragraph 3).
- The Health Physics Foreman used a non-controlled document as an aid to formulate PARS. A copy of the dose assessment lesson plan was 3 , used for back calculation of release rate using field monitoring results; and the selection of evacuation zones were made using a training document rather than EPIP 91305 * In one instance, lack of interface and discussion between the Health '
'
Physics foreman and Shift Superintendent regarding PARS resulted in an inappropriate decision regarding which evacuation center non-essential personnel should be directed to (Paragraph 3).
resulted in classifications one level higher than the NUREG 0654 examples of initiating conditions (Paragraph 2).
The overall findings from the table-top drills indicated that personnel were familiar with their roles and responsibilitie The personnel performing dose projection demonstrated a competent knowledge of the automated dose projection program including the effective use _of field monitoring data to refine source term dat The Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to classify events in accordance with procedures, notify the offsite authorities (State / local and NRC) within l
the required time regime, and recommend protective actions to protect-i onsite personnel and the general public within the EP Regarding offsite agencies training, the inspector reviewed documentation
, which disclosed that the licensee had provided EAL training to the l State / local governmental officials (Georgia and South Carolina), and radiation medical emergency training was- provided- to medical _- support hospitals and the Burke Coun_ty Emergency Management Agency. _During June
_
and September 1992, -training was provided to members of the local fire i departmen No violations or deviations were identifie . Dose Calculation and Assessment (82207)
Pursuant to 10 - CFR 50.47(b)(9), this - area was inspected to determine whether the licensee maintained adequate methods for assessing 'th consequences of an actual- or potential radiological releas ,
?
..
W,ww, eve-ym-a-wmntv--+w er -^- M wysv-- -^*yev ----yiwr---y tr -N gr yyrur qwwet=umri'y e- >'rt=----*-"t-NT'"W$mw-au-WW-+TW u---g 'n--+r* *D- '+'"m-e'+-r-TP--m4irwv1'vW' t"r-CN
- --
.
EPIP 91304-0, " Estimating Offsite Dose", describes the licensees
- metnodology for estimating offsite doses. In addition, the referenced <
procedure provides guidance on calculating infant thyroid dose based on
'
I field data. The licensees methodology for dose assessment is an automated )
method known as " Vibrant". Vibrant is a " user friendly" program which :
queries the user to provide various inputs to initiate dose calculations '
(e.g. release rat _e, monitored path, filtered, etc.). According to EPIP 91304-C, the Health Physics foreman is the designated on shift dose analyst and is therefore assigned responsibility for dose projections prior to activaticn of the Emergency Operations f acility (EOF). When the E0F becomes activated, responsibility is transferred to the E0f Dose Assessment Manage Walk-throughs were conducted with two individuals assigned this responsibility as part of the operating crew table-top drill discussed above. Both interviewees demonstrated familiarity and competence with the operation of the ERf computer (for obtaining meteorological data, process monitors reading, etc.) and operation of the Vibrant program. Although .
Vibrant program queries are not set up for requesting feedback from field '
team data, personnel demonstrated the capability to manually incorporate field monitoring data into dose projections for making adjustments to PAR During the walk-throughs, the inspector noted that one of two interviewees consistently used the accident default values for the postulated accidents (SGTR and LOCA) rather than requesting additional data from the operations staff or other available resources (e.g. process monitors, grab samples, etc.). For example, in each accident scenario
, requesting release duration, the interviewee used the computer code default value of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (although it was established that the plant would be shut down within approximately 2 to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> in response to the LOCA). Consequently, the resulting dose projections were substantially higher than results obtained by other dose projection personnel using a release duration of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The use of several conservative default assumptions for a SGTR- resulted in the decision to recommend the evacuation of a 5-mile radius and 10-mile downwind zones of the EPZ. The :
inspector expressed concern regarding the use of default values when plant
,
conditions (e.g. status of safeties) and monitoring (e.g. stack monitor)
- data are available. A member of the licensee's staff indicated that
-
personnel failed to convert the release rate from 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. In addition, other dose projection methods are being considered as a replacement for Vibrant code (specifically NRC computer code " RASCAL"). '
The licensee representative informed the inspector that the following corrective actions would be taken in response to the noted concern: (1) a lessons learned letter would be forwarded to dose projection personnel regarding_ computer code default values for various accidents, and (2).
provide additional training to Health _ Physics foreman on __ converting _
duration of release from the default value. The inspector informed the licensee that actions taken in response to the default computer codes would be tracked as an If Ifl 50-424, 425/92-29-02: Verify actions taken in response to the Vibrant computer code default values.
l i
m., G .. . v _
, m.m ,._,r-e-..,---,,- . - _ - , . . , ,.,,~._,,_,,..__,,4-_-.,_._,..._.r- . , , , , , . , . _ _ . . , . . _ - _ _ . _ . _ . . _ _
- _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ - _
l .
.
The inspector was provided documentation to show that the licensee's last dose comparative study involving Vogtle's dose projection code, States (Georgia and South Carolina) and f1RC was performed in calendar year 198 As a result, the inspector contacted the State of Georgia representative assigned dose projection responsibility. According to the State contact, the results from Vibrant are in close agreement with the State dose projection result No problems had been noted in this are No violations or deviations were identifie . Public Information Program (82209)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7),Section IV.D.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and Section G of the Emergency Plan, this area was inspected to determine whether basic emergency planning information was disseminated to the public in the 10-mile EPZ on an annual basis, lhe licensee had developed an emergency response information brochure for use by members of the public residing in the 10-mile EPZ. The brochuro took the form of a calendar which was updated and distributed annuall The inspector reviewed the 1993 calendar and verified that it included the information specified by NUREG 0654, Section ll.G. In addition to the calendar, the licensee's public information literature included a publication known as the "Vogtle Neighbor", mailed semiannually to residents within the 10-mile EPZ. A licensee contact indicated that the calendars were distributed based on a listing of the electrical meter According to a member of the licensee's staff, on an annual basis each residence within the 10-mile EPZ is canvassed by Burke County / licensee personnel for identifying special needs population (e.g. handicap, no transport ation, etc.).
The inspector discussed with a member of the licensee's staff the notification program for the transient populatio The inspector was informed that signs were posted at various locations (recreational areas, boat launching pads, hunting clubs, commercial establishments, etc.)
within the 10-mile EPZ. In addition, information was posted on telephones within the EPZ. The inspector spot checked several locations within the EPZ and noted with two exceptions, brochuras and/or signs were as described in licensee procedures. The exceptions involved two businesses within the 10-mile EPZ which did not have public information brochures available during the inspection but both locations acknowledged that brochures had been made availabic during the yea The inspector discussed with the licensee representative for consideration as an improvement item, that periodic followup calls be made to locations regarding the availability of brochure The licensee's maintenance and distribution of NOAA tone alert radios were also reviewed (Paragraph 4). According to the licer.see contact more than 900 radios were issued within the EP A distribution matrix is maintained showing the location of radios by miles, zones, and sectors f rom the plant. Based on the reviews and interview with responsible personnel, the inspector determined that this program was effectively
l
. _ . . . .
-
.
,
implemented and maintaine No violations or deviations were identifie . Action on Previous inspection findings (92701) (Closed) Violation 50-424, 425/91-04-01: Failure to maintain the EOF ventilation system in accordance with Section H of the Emergency Pla All previously committed actions regarding maintenance work orders (MWO) were complete The inspector requested and observed an operability check of the EOF HVAC. The system appeared to function in accordance with the design for maintaining a positive pressur (Closed) Ifl 50-424, 425/91-23-02: Failure of ERf personnel responsible for dose assessment to effectively utilize field team data in making PAR The inspector verified that actions were taken in accordance with licensee commitments to train personnel responsible for offsite dose assessmen According to documentation, training on the use of field team data was provided to 35 members of the licensees staff during December 1991. In addition, personnel performing dose projections during walk-throughs demonstrated a competent knowledge of the Vibrant dose projection computer code and were able to effectively incorporate field monitoring data into the dose projection process to refine PAR (0 pen) Exercise Weakness 50-424/92-10-01: Licensee failed to make accurate and timely notifications to State and local agencies concerning emergency classification status, release conditions, et The inspector reviewed documentation to show that the licensee had completed actions in accordance with the commitments made to NRC subsequent to the exercise. However, the inspector informed the licensee that the item would remain open for further review during the annual exercise for performance assessment, (0 pen)IFI 50-424,425/92-301-01: EAL classification logic scheme is overly conservativ A member of the licensee's staff discussed proposed EAL changes which would incorporate the NUMARC EAl However, at the time of the inspection, proposed changes had not received approval by plant management for submittal to NRC. This item remains opened pending EAL changes or implementation of NUMARC EAl . Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on December 4,1992 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas
___- _ --
.
.
,
inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed belo The inspector also expressed concern regarding the event classification system at Vogtle resulting in emergency classifications that were one level higher than the 14UREG-0654 classification (Paragraph 2). In response to the inspector's concern regarding the conservative EAls, the Plant General Manager indicated that EAL changes incorporating the liVMARC EAL scheme would be submitted to 11RC for review during early 1993. There were no dissenting comments f rom the licensee. Proprietary information is not contained in this repor item llumber Description / Reference 50-424, 425/92-29-01 Ifl - Revise EPlP 91305-C and provide --
training to ensure consistency in the development of PARS (Paragraph 3).
50-424, 425/92-29-02 Ifl - Provide training and lessons learned documentation regarding the Vibrant computer code def ault values (Paragraph 7).
litensee management was informed that four open items from previous inspections were reviewed and two items are considered closed (Paragraph 9).
_
i-u . J