IR 05000416/1990008

Insp Rept 50-416/90-08 on 900414-0518.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint Observation,Surveillance Observation,Surveillance Procedures & Records,Action on Previous Insp Findings & ROs

ML20043D897
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	06/01/1990
From:	Cantrell F, Christensen H, Mathis J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20043D884	List: IR 05000416/1990008 ML20043D887
References
50-416-90-08, 50-416-90-8, NUDOCS 9006110256
Download: ML20043D897 (10)

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Report No.:

50-416/90-08 l

i Licensee:' System Energy Resources, Inc..

l Jackson, MS 39205 i

r Docket No.: 50-416 License No.:

NPF-29 o

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Facility Name:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

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' Inspection Conducted:.' April 14 through May 18, 1990 Inspectors:

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H. O. Christensen, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

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athit, Resident Inspector Date Signed

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Approved by:

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W. 5. Aantrell, Chief Date Signed-React 6r Projects'Section IB-Division of Reactor Projects-

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SUMMARY.

Scope:

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!4 The resident inspectors conducted a routine inspection in the a'reas.o_f opera-m tional safety verification; maintenance observation; surveillance observation;

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. surveillance procedures and records; action on$ previous inspection findings;.

and reportable occurrences..The inspectors conducted backshift inspections on

' April 26, May 1. 16, 17 and'18, 1990 Results:

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<0ne. violation and two non-cited licensee identified violations (NCVs) were i

identified during this inspection period.- The cited' violation is for failure

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to maintain an inoperable group 3 containment isolation trip unit ~and/or trip system in a tripped condition, paragraph 3..

The first NCV was for failure to J

< perform an adequate post' maintenance retest on a division one dieseligenerator j'

air start solenoid valve.

The second NCV was for failure to perform'a gaseous I

effluent sample analysis within the required time, paragraph 6.. These viola-

l tions do not appear progransnatic in nature.

However,: they do -indicate ailack l

of attention to detail and the cited-violation indicates a lack of-communication

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l or a lack of defined job responsibility between the senior. operators on shift.

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In the inspection areas of maintenance observation, surveillance observation, and surveillance procedures and records, the licensee met the safety objectives

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of these areas.

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. G. Cesare, Director, Nuclear Licensing W. T. Cottle, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

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D. G. Cupstid. Manager, Plant Projects _

L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Supervisor

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J. P. Dimmette, Manager, Plant Maintenance i

• C, W. Elisaesser, Operations Superintendent S. M. Feith, Director,_ Quality Programs

• C R. Hutchinson, GGNS General Manager F. K. Mangan, Director,-Plant Projects and Support L. B. Moulder, Acting Manager, Plant Support

• J. V. Parrish, Manager, Plant Operations

• J. C. Roberts, Manager, Plant & System Engineering i

• S. F. Tanner, Manager. Quality Services F. W. Titus, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering F

M. J. Wright, Manager, Nuclear Training

• G. W. Vining, Manager, Plant Modification and Construction G. Zinke, Superintendent, Plant Li. censing Other Itcensee employees contacted included superintendents, supervisors, technicians, operators, security force members, and office personnel.

• Attended exit interview 2.

Plant Status q

The unit began and ended the inspection period in mode _ one, power

operations.

3.

Operational Safety (71707, 93702)

The inspectors were aware of the overall plant status, and of any~

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significant safety matters related to-plant operations.

Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members. of the plant-operating-staff.

The inspectors made frequent visits-to the control room.

Th~e observations included:

the verificatirn of instrument readings, setpoints and recordings; the review of operating system status and equipment tagging controls; the verification of annunciator alarms, limiting -

conditions for operation, and temporary alterations; and the review of i

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daily journals, data sheet entries, control room manning, and access controls On a weekly basis, selected engineered safety feature systems were

confirmed operable.

The inspectors verified that accessible val' e flow v

path alignment was correct, power supply ' breaker and fuse status was.

correct and instrumentation was operational. The inspectors verified the

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following systems operable:

LPCS, HPCS, CRD and emergency electric power systems.

The inspectors conducted plant tours weekly. Portions of the control building, turbire building, auxiliary building and outside areas were visited.

The ooservations included safety related tagout verifications, shift turnovers, sampling programs, housekeeping and general plant conditions.

Additionally, the inspectors observed the status of fire protection equipment, the control of activities in progress, the problem identification systems, and the readiness of the onsite emergency response facilities.

l The irspectors observed health physics management's involvement and

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awareness of significant plant activities, and observed plant radiation controls.

Periodically the inspectors verified the adequacy of physical security control.

Additionally, senior plant neanagement was observed

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making routine tours of the plant, i

The inspectors reviewed safety related tagouts, 900601 (Control Room A/C i

A); 900698 (TBCW C Ht Exchanger); and 900703 (SFGD SWGR & Battery Room j

Exhaust Fan B) to ensure that the tagouts were properly prepared, and

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performed.

Additionally, the inspectors verified that the tagged l

components were in the required position.

The inspectors reviewed the i

activities associated with the events listed below, i

On April 16, 1990, a group of approximately 25 local officials and I

citizens from Claiborne County arrived at the Grand Gulf north gate at 2:10 p.m. CST and blocked the entrance which had already been secured by the licensee.

The demonstration was in response to the State's restructuring of SERI tax payments made to Claiborne County, Mississippi.

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The restructuring would distribute taxes among the surrounding counties as a result of State Legislative action in 1986.

Anticipating such a demonstration the licensee advised Region 11 on April 13, 1990, that they were making contingency pians should the city of Port Gibson elect to discontinue off-site support to Grand Gulf in the i

event of an emerg e v.

The protesters left the site without incident at

4:06 p.m.

Media coverage was provided principally by Channels 3 and 12 from Jackson, Mississippi.

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On April 16, 1990, during a post work review of MWO-M90426, under which the division one diesel generator air start solenoid valve, IP75-F508A, was re) laced on January 17, 1990, the licensee noticed that the retest i

control form showed S01 04-1-01-P75-1 was performed instead of Surveillance Procedure 06-0P-1P75-M-0001, 00R 082-90 was etten to euluate this deficiency.

The performance of the S01 dM not adequately verify 1P75-F508A was operable.

Surveillance Procedure 06-0P-1P75-M-001 requires that two of the air start solenoid valves be isolated before attempting to start the engine.

The diesel starting and accelerating to rated speed within the Technical Specification time limit verifies that

the other air start solenoid valves are open with two of the air start

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i valves isolated.

In contrast 501 04-1-1P75-1 has the diesel generator started without isolating the air start solenoid valves.

This only verifies that at least 2 of the 4 air start solenoid valves opened but it does not verify that valve IP75-F508A in particular opened.

Valve

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IP75-F508A was successfully tested in accordance with Surveillance

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Procedure 06-0P-1P75-M-0001 on - February 7, 1989, during the regular

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quarterly performance test.

However, the failure to perform the required post maintenance test is a licensee identified violation and is not cited because criteria specified in section V.G.1 of NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied (NCV 90-08-01)

On April 28, 1990, the licensee reduced reactor power to 70% due to EHC

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filter plugging problems.

The initial indication of a problem occurred with a loss of seal steam.

This was traced to a clogged seal steam control valve filter.

Further investigation revealed that EHC filters N32D008B and D007A were also clogged.

After swapping to the standby filters, these filters became clogged.

The filter clogging problems

appear to be caused by an earlier fullers earth and fine filter replacement.

The earth filter material contaminated the EHC fluid system and clogged all the line strainers. Additionally, the licensee discovered

that replacement filter cartridges were redesigned and would not fit in the strainers.

The plant increased po;.er after all filters were cleaned.

The licensee is ;ontinuing to review these issues.

On May 4,1990, the licensee identified that an environmentally sealed Rosemount pressure transmitter,1E31N085B. RCIC steam supply channel B, had a plastic plug in the spare conduit.

The transmitter was declared inoperable and the plastic plug was replaced with a stainless steel plug.

After inspection and retest the transmitter was returned to service.

Additionally, the licensee conducted an inspection of all other division one and two transmitters to ensure they were properly environmentally sealed.

No other problems with plastic plugs were detected.

During a walkdown on May 16, 1990, to inspect transmitters for proper environmental seals, the licensee discovered that' reactor water level transmitter B21-LT-N080B was not properly sealed. The heat shrink around i

the cable was loose.

The transmitter was declared inoperable..The

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trmmitter provides reactor vessel level inputs to a level 3 trip unit and a level 8 trip unit.

The level 3 trip unit B21N6808, provides an actuation input to RPS trip system B, channel B and also an input to a group 3 containment isolation trip system, channel B.

The shift t

superintendent was informed of the inoperable transmitter at 11:44 a.m.

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and the trip units were placed in trip condition at 12:20 p.m. in i

accordance with the action statements of TS 3.3.1, Reactor Protection

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System Instrumentation and TS 3.3.2, Isolation Actuation Instrumentation.

Tripping the level 3 trip unit inserted a reactor half scram and tripped

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the reactor level 3 input to the group 3 isolation channel B.

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superintendent realized that an approved TS change, which had not yet been

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incorporated in the control rooms TSs, would allow the trip unit for RPS

l instrumentation to be placed into a trip condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> versus

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one hour.

The TS change was expedited to the control room and the trip unit was removed from the trip condition at 1:50 p.m. and placed in cali-brate to clear the reactor half scram.

The superintendent believed that the group 3 isolation channel B remained in a trip condition because the group 3 trip system was already actuated by a reactor pressure high signal. He believed the group 3 isolation consisted of the shutdown cooling isolation valves. These valves, E12-F009 and F394, were already closed and the trip system logic was actuated.

However, an additional valve E12-F037B, RHR B to containment pool valve, is also a group 3 isolation valve which is isolated by a different isolation actuation logic.

Therefore the requirement of TS 3.3.2, action b, was not carried out. TS 3.3.2 action b, Isolation Actuation Instrumentation, states, with the number of operable channels less than required by the minimum operable channels-per trip)

system requirement for one trip system, place the inoperable channel (s and/or that trip system in the tripped condition within one hour.

The swing-shift superintendent reviewed the actions of the previous superintendent and determined that TS 3.3.2 was not being met for the group 3 isolation instrumentation.

At 4:33 p.m., the shift superintendent took the required TS action by placing the group 3 isolation channels in the tripped condition.

The failure to comply with TS 3.3.1, action b, is a

violation (90-08-03).

Discussion with the shift superintsndent indicated that other senior reactor operators (SRO) reviewed his actions and concurred.

This action may indicate a weakness in shift communications or the lack of defined responsibilities between the three on-shift SR0s, l

Within the past month the plant has experienced several non-safety plant I

service water (PSW), pipe leaking problems.

On April 16, 1990, a small leak was identified on the PSW return line from the drywell chillers. The leak was on an 8 inch pipe elbow located on a pipe weld.

A temporary i

patch was placed on the leak.

On May 3,1990, a pin hole leak downstream of throttle valve P44F513 was identified.

The leak was in the common discharge (PSW) header, a 14 inch pipe from the TBCW heat exchangers.

A temporary patch on this leak did not hold. Additionally, on May 13, 1990, another leak developed on this same pipe section. The licensee completed a temporary pipe sleeve weld repair on the effected section of the pipe.

Similar PSW pipe leak problems occurred in February 1989.

Two pin hole leaks developed on 8 inch piping to the plant chillers. These pipes were

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replaced during refueling outage 3.

The licensee believes the leaking

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problems ara caused by erosion / corrosion caused by high velocity flow downstream or throttle valves.

The licensee has surveyed six suspect areas and developed 20 additional ins)ection areas.

No minimum wall thickness problems were detected.

Acditionally, quality programs is developing a monitoring program of the areas surveyed. The licensee plans to replace the defective piping during refueling outage 4.

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Maintenance Observation (62703)

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Daring the report period, the inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below.

The observations included a review of the MW0s and other related documents for adequacy; adherence to

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procedure, proper tagouts, technical specifications, quality controls, and radiological controls; and the observation of work and/or retesting.

MWO DESCRIPTION WO 7214 Lube diesel driven fire pump B.

WO 7568 Change fuel filter and inspect diesel driven fire pump SP640003B, WO 8792 Check cathodic protection to D/G fuel oil storage tanks.

WO 9698 Rework / troubleshoot N007 loop for drywell

1. 1 seismic switch.

WO 9842 Replace coil on breaker 52-113111, water i

treatment building power roof vent.

WO 10109 Clean ESF electrical switchgear room i

cooler IT460002A.

WO 10114 Lubricate D/W vacuum breaker E61F001B valve stem.

WO 10238 Clean PSW side of drywell chiller B001A.

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WO 10481 Install a temporary patch over pin hole leak on TBCW Heat exchanger outlet temperature valve.

No violations or deviations were identified.

The results of the inspection in this area indicate that the maintenance program was

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effective with respect to meeting safety objectives.

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SurveillanceObservation(61726)

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The inssectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillances lhted

' elow.

The observation included a review of the procedures for

technical adequacy, confonnance to technical specifications and LCOs; verification of test instrument calibration; observation of all or part of

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the actual surveillances; removal and return to service of the system'or

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component; and review of the data for acceptability based upon the i

acceptance criteria.

04-1-03-021-1, Monthly Area Radiation Monitors functional Test.

06-10-B21-M-1001, Safety Relief Valve High Pressure Trip.

06-IC-1C71-M-2003,. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure (RPS/E0C RPT)

I functional Test.

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06-IC-1D17-A-1001, FHA Vent Exhaust Rad Monitor Channel A Test.

06-EL-1821-M-0001, ADS Timer Functional Test.

06-EL-E30-M-0001-1 Suppression Pool Make-up Tune Delay Calibration.

06-RE-1C51-0-0001, LPRM Calibration, Channel D.

No violations or deviations were identified.

The results of the inspection in this area indicate that the surveillance program was effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives.

6.

Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)

The event reports listed below were reviewed to detennine _if the information provided met the NRC reporting requirements.

The determination included adequacy of event description, the corrective action taken or planned, the existence of potential generic problems and-3 the relative safety significance of each event. The inspectors used the NRC enforcement guidance to determine if the event. met the criteria for licensee identified violations.

(Closed) LER 90-004, Surveillance procedure does not fully implement

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Technical Specifications requirements.

On April 6,1990, the licensee discovered that the surveillance procedure for verifying air pressure in the containment airlock seal flasks did not fully implement the requirements tf Technical Specification 4.6.1.3.d.2.

This issue was documented in @C inspection report 90-06.

The licensee corrected the procedure and the surveillance test passed.

This item is closed.

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(Closed) LER 90-005, Single failure during testing could cause breach of i

control room envelope.

This event was documented in NRC inspection report l

90-06, paragraph 8.

This item will be administrative 1y closed and corrective action will be tracked under unresolved item 90-06-05.

l On May 1 and 3, 1990, the licensee nade 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(v) reports on the loss of the emergency notification system.

Following repairs the system was returned to service.

On May 3,

1990, the licensee identified that surveillance 06-CH-1017-W-0017, Gaseous Release Points Iodine Particulate and Tritium,

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was not successfully completed.

It was discovered that the radwaste l

building ventilation filter was analyzed twice, once as the radwaste i

building ventilation filter and once as the turbine building ventilation

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filter.

Because of this mix-up the actual turbine building ventilation filter was not analyzed within the required 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> time period.

The turbine building filter was later analyzed and the records corrected. The failure to perform the turbine building ventilation filter analysis is' a

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violation of TS 4.11.2.1.2.

However, due to the timely discovery,

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reanalysis, and indepth review of the event, this-licensee _ identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Section V.G.1 oftheNRCEnforcementPolicyweresatisfied-(NCV 90-08-02).

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Surveillance Procedures and Records (61700)

The inspectors reviewed selected surveillance procedures of safety related systems and components to ascertain compliance with required Technical Specifications.

The review consisted of verification that the procedures included prerequisites and preparations for test; acceptance criteria; and instructions to ensure systems or components were restored to operation following testing.

The procedures reviewed included various frequency which included refueling, yearly, semiannually, quarterly, monthly, weekly and daily.

Additionally, eighteen completed surveillance tests were reviewed.

All tests had been performed within the time frequencies required by the TS or IST program; appropriate action had been taken for any item failing acceptance criteria; and test were performed by qualified individuals.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701,92702)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 88-08-03 Define a program for handling MIC problems for SSW small bore dead leg piping.

Quality Assurance

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Procedure (QAP) 9.90 was developed to establish the administrative methods

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and responsibilities for identifying and reducing unacceptable or adverse

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MIC effects on standby service water systems, in addition QAP 9.90 establishes the methodology for examination, scheduling, results tracking and initiation of corrective action.

The inspector reviewed the implemen-tation of the MIC program.

The program is identifying MIC problem areas and the corrective action is adequate.

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l (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 89-19-03, Diesel generator air sample program.

The licensee committed to develop an instrument air quality standard, an air quality test program and implement an inspection and maintenance program for component filters and regulators.

The following procedures were developed 08-5-03-10, Chemistry Sampling Program, and 08-S-03-21, Sampling Instrument Air, Emergency Diesel Starting Air and ADS Air System.

The inspector reviewed the procedures for acceptance criteria.

These procedures from the instrument air (P53) provide the guidelines for taking samples

, emergency diesel starting air, ADS air and other safety related compressed air systems.

(Closed) Violation 89-30-01 Excessive reactor cooldown rates and failure to perform required engineering evaluation.

The inspector reviewed the

. licensee corrective action for the above violation.

The following corrective action was taken by the licensee.

Integrated Operating Instructions 03-1-01-4, Scram Recovery. 03-1-01-3, Plant Shutdown and 03-1-01-1 Cold Shutdown to Generator Carrying Minimum Load data sheets were revised to require an evaluation of the temperature differential at i

every 60. minutes segment to identify any out-of-limit heatup/cooldown

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rates.

Procedure 01-S-06-26 Post Trip Analysis was revised to require a l

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8 check of the acceptability of the cooldown/heatup rates.

The corrective action taken by the licensee is accertable for closeout of this item.

(Closed) Violation 90-03-01, Failure to follow procedures which resulted in the contamination in the makeup water system.

The licensee admitted the violation in response dated April 30, 1990.

Procedures 501 04-01-P21-1, Makeup Water Treatment System, and S01 04-1-01-G41-1, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System were revised to provide guidance to prevent cross contaminating the makeup water system.

Caution signs were placed on all valves that have the patential of cross-connecting contaminated systems with non-contaminated systems.

Additionally, an engineering evaluation request was issued to evaluate a design change to modify the makeup water system to prevent cross contamination. This item is closed.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 90-03-03, Review the licensee corrective action to ensure that QA exempt personnel complete annual training.

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QAPs were revised to include training for exempt personnel. Additionally, I

the exempt personnel have received training.

This item is closed.

9.

Exit Interview (30703)

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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 18, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

The licensee did not

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identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by

the inspectors during this inspection.

The licensee had no comment an the

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following inspection findings:

Item Number Description and Reference

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V10 90-08-03 Violation - The failure to comply with Technical Specification 3.3.1 action b, l

paragraph 3.

NCV 90-08-01 Non-cited violation for failure to perform

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the required post maintenance retest, paragraph 3.

NCV.90-08-02 Non-cited violation for failure to perform-l the turbine building ventilation filter i

analysis within TS time frame, paragraph 6.

10. Acronyms and Initialisms

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Control Rod Drive CRD

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DG Diesel Generator

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ECCS -

Emergency Core Cooling System EHC Electro Hydraulic Control

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ESF Engineering Safety Feature l

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HPCS -

High Pressure Core Spray Instrumentation and Control 1&C

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IFl Inspector followup Item

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Limiting Condition for Operation LCO

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LER Licensee Event Report

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Licensee Identified Violation LIV

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LPCS -

Low Pressure Core Spray

MNCR -

Material Nonconformance Report

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MWO Maintenance Work Order

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Nuclear Plant Engineering NPE

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC

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PSW Plant Service Water

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QDR Quality Deficiency Report

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Residual Heat Removal RHR

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RPS Reactor Protection System i

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SERI -

System Energy Resource Incorporation

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S01 System Operating Instruction

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SSW Standby Service Water

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TBCW -

Turbine Building Cooling Water TS Technical Specification

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