IR 05000416/1989028
| ML20011D351 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 12/13/1989 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Christensen H, Mathis J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20011D350 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-89-28, NUDOCS 8912270018 | |
| Download: ML20011D351 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES
[.>m Moog*o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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REGION il
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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't-ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.:
50-416/89-28
Licensee:
-System Energy Resources. Inc.
Jackson. MS 39205
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Docket No.:
50-416 License No.: NPF-29 j
Facility Name:' Grand Gulf Fuclear Station
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Inspection Conducted: October 21 through November 17. 1989 Inspectors:
A /Y I2.-/2-eP7 H. O. Christensen. Senior Resident Inspector Dete Signed
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. L. Mat 11 s. Resident Inspector Date Signed Approved by:
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F. S. Cantrell. Section Chief Date Signed Division of Reactor projects
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SUMMARY
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Scope:
The resident inspectors conducted a routine inspection in the following areas:
operational safety verification, maintenance observation, surveillance observetion, cold weather preparations, action on previous inspection findings.
and reportabl6 occurrences.
The inspectors conducted backshift inspections on October 25 and Noveaber 10 and-16, 1989.
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Results:
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One licensee identified violation was identified difring this inspection period, p
The violation was for failure to perform post maintenance testing on several
preventive raaintenance task itms, paragraph 4.
During this inspection period..the unit scrammed due to a lightning strike. The
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licenses is installing a new lightning dissipation system which will be lf completed by the end of 19f0.
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Sr 8912270018 89127.3.
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PDR ADOCK 050004.16
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REPORT DETAILS i
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Persons Contacted I.icensee Employees J. G. Cesare. Director. Nuclear Licensing W. T. Cottle Vice President of Nuclear Operations
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M. L. Crawford. Manager. Nuclear Licensing D. G. Cupstid. Manager. Plant Modifications and Construction
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- L. F. Daughtery. Compliance Supervisor J. P. Dimmette. Manager. Plant Maintenance S. M. Feith. Director. Quality Programs
- C. R. Hutchinson. GGNS General Manager F. K. Mangan. Director. Plant Projects and Support R. H. McAnulty. Electrical Superintendent A. S. McCurdy. Technical Asst.. Plant Operations Manager
- L. B. Moulder. Operations Superintendent
- W. R. Patterson. Technical Asst.. General Manager
- J. C. Roberts. Manager. Plant & System Engineering G. Smith. Superintendent. Chemistry
- S. F. Tanner. Manager. Quality Services i
L. G. Temple. Superintendent. I&C T. G. Tinney. Superintendent. Mechanical F. W. Titus. Director. Nuclear Plant Engineering
- M. J. Wright Manager Plant Support
- J. W. Yelverton, Manager. Plant Operations
- G. Zinke. Superintendent. Plant Licensing Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
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The following NRC personnel toured the site on November 2.1989, and
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attended a licensee self evaluation presentation on November 3. 1989.
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i C. W. Hehl Deputy Director. Division of Reactor Projects. Region 11 (RII)
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L K. E. Perkins. Acting Director. Division of Reactor Safety. RII l
E. Adensam. Director. Project Directorate 11-2. Office of Nuclear Reactor l.
Regulation (NRR1 L. Kintner. Project Manager. Project Directorate 11-1. NRR F. Cantrell. Section Chief. Division of Reactor Projects. Ril 2.
Plant Status The plant operated in mode one, power operations, during this inspection period.
On November 7,1989, the unit scrammed due to a lightning strike and returned to power operation on November 9. 1E09, l
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Operational Safety (71707)
The inspectors were cognizant of the overall plant status, and of any
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significant safety matters related to plant operations. Daily discussions j
were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating i
staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room. Observe-
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tions included the verification of instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment
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controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect. daily journals i
and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access controls.
This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
On a weekly basis selected engineered safety feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable. The confirmation was made by verifying that accessible
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valve flow path alignment was correct. power supply breaker and fuse j
status was correct and instrumentation was operational.
The following systems were verified operable:
Emergency Electrical Power System. SSW System and LPCI
"A", "B" and "C".
General plant tours were conducted on a weekly basis. Portions of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside areas were visited.- The observations included safety related tagout verifica-tions. shift turnovers, sampling programs, housekeeping and general plant conditions the status of fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, problem identification systems, and containment isolation and the readiness of the onsitt emergency response facilities.
The inspectors observed health physics management involvement and awareness of significant plant activities, and observed plant radiation controls.
Periodically the inspectors verified the adequacy of physical security control.
The insoectors reviewed safety related tagouts 893851. SSW to CCW crosstie valve and 893852. SSW to fuel pool heat exchanger outlets to
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ensure that the tagouts were properly prepared, and performed.
Additionally, the inspectors verified that the tagged components were in the required position.
The inspectors have noted that senior plant managers make routine tours to the plant and the control room.
The inspectors reviewed the activities associated with the events listed below.
On November 7.1989, a severe electrical storm passed over Grand Gulf Nuclear Station at 5:43 p.m.
During the storm, the reactor eutomatically scrammed due to a high neutron flux signal on APRMs.
Additionally, a
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spike to the RCIC logic was received however RCIC did not start because
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the turbine trip throttle valve was closed in preparation for an I&C surveillance (06-IC-1E31-M-0023).
The APRM neutrin flux signal was not caused by an actual high neutron flux. but by a voltage surge due to the lightning strike.
Reactor level decreased to -18.4 inches and' was
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restored by the using the feedwater system.
Pressure was controlled using the main bypass control valves.
A channel check of APRM indications was performed prior to the plant restart to ensure that all APRMs would perform their intended function.
All APRMs functioned properly during the surveillance.
No abnormalities were observed.
The post trip analysis concluded that the cause of the instrumentation signal spikes was an induced voltage and/or ground potential spike caused by lightning activity at the site.
Similar events were reported in LER 88-12 and LER 89-10.
In LER 89-10 i
the licensee stated that they had reouisitioned a specialist in lightning protection to perform a plant survey and study of the existing plant lightning protection system.
As a result of the study, a new lightning protection system composed of lightning dissipation arrays was proposed.
Current progress indicates that implementation of the lightning protection system will be completed by December 31. 1989.
The inspectors witnessed the startup and noted criticality was achieved in a controlled manner.
Criticality was achieved on November 8.1989, at
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approximately 6:22 p.m. on step 73 with a reactor period of 189 seconds.
The generator was synchronized to the grid at approximately 4:17 a.m. on November 9, 1989.
No violations or deviations were identified, j-4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
During the report period, the inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below.
The observations included a review of the MW0s and other related documents for adecuacy; adherence to procedure, proper tagouts. technical specifications. Quality controls, and
radiological controls; observation of work and/or retesting; and specified L
retest requirements.
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[fWO DESCRIPTION IN5118 Calibrate loop 7A control room A/C.
M92850-SJAE 'B'
Intercondenser, clean / citric acid flush.
M95528 Service air compressor "B"
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M95743 Rework cooling water piping leakage for CRD pump A.
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ME5405 Inspect RCIC check valve E51F030.
During a review of maintenance data on Bettis air actuators. the licensee.
determined that soven actuators hed not received retesting after preventive maintenance was performed.
The preventive maintenance was to rebuild the actuators during the third refueling outage.
The licensee reviewed subsequent surveillance data and determined that only two of the thirteen valves still needed stroke time testing.
These two valves. M41F015 and M41F016. drywell air purge supply and exhaust, were successfully tested on October 31. 1989.
The licensee reviewed all of refueling outage three preventive maintenance tasks cards and the maintenance task cards for the last quarter.
No other deficiencies were found.
To prevent returning a component to operation without a required post maintenance retest. the licensee is attaching retest control forms to all task cards and will modify the task cards to identify retest requirements.
The failure to perform required post maintenance retest is a licensee identified violation and is not being cited because criteria specified in section V.G.1 of the NPC Enforcement Policy were satisfied (NCV 89-28-01).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillances listed below.
The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications and LCOs; verification of test instrument calibration; observation of all or part of the actual surveillances; removal and return to service of the system or component; and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.
06-CH-1017-A-0024. Offgas Post Treatment Gaseous Monitor B Calibration.
06-IC-1C71-M-2002. Turbine Stop Valve Trip Fluid Low Pressure (RPS)
Functional Test Channel D.
06-IC-1E31-M-0001. RCIC Main Steam Tunnel isolation Delsy Timer Functional Test and Calibration.
06-IC-1E31-M-0022. Drywell Air Cooler Condensate Flow Rate Monitoring Functional Test.
l 06-IC-1E31-N-1001. RWCU High Room and High Differential Room Temperature (RWCU isolation Functional Test).
l 06-IC-1E31-M-1016. RCIC Steam Supply Low Pressure.
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06-IC-1E32-M-1009. MSly Leakage Control System Dilution Flow Functional Test.
06-1C-SD17-A-1026. Accident Range Monitor AXM-1 Calibration. Containnent Ventilation.
06-0P-SP64-W-0001. Fire Pump Weekly Operability Test.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)
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The inspectors conducted a complete walkdown on the accessible portions of the high pressure core spray system.
The walkdown consisted of the following:
confirm that the system lineup procedure matches the plant drawing and the as-built configuration; identify equipment condition and items that might degrade plant performance; verify that valves in the flow path are in correct positions as required by procedure and that local and remote position indications are functional; verify the proper breaker position at local electrical boards and indications on control boards; and verify that instrument calibration dates are current.
The inspectors walked down the system using system operating instruction 04-1-01-E22-1. HPCS System. and piping and instrument diagram (P&ID)
M-1086. HPCS.
The following discrepancies were noted during the walkdown of high pressure core spray system.
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On the electrical lineup checksheet in 501 04-1-01-E22-1 the component description for component E31 SV-F503 reads F005 Leak Off Isolation, however the label in the field reads 1H22 P178 Power i
Supply.
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Attachment II. Remote Operated Valve Lineup Checksheet, for valve E31-SV-F503 indicates there is a valve position indication on panel P178, however there is only a handswitch open/close position.
These discrepancies will be addressed under the licensees relabeling program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Cold Weather Preparations (71714)
l During this inspection-period the residents verified implementation of the licensee's cold weather preparation program for orotective measures for i
i extreme cold weather.
The inspectors reviewed Equipment Performance Instruction 04-1-03-A30-1. Revision 2.
Cold Weather Preparation to
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verify that actions outlined were taken prior to cold weather conditions.
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The inspectors verified that selected breakers listed in Data Sheet 11 to procedure 04-1-03-A30-1 were in the required position.
The breakers energized space heaters and heat tracing equipment.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Reportable Occurrences (90712, 92700)
The event reports listed below were reviewed to determine if the inforna-tion provided met the NRC reporting requirements.
The determination included adequacy of event description and corrective actions taken or planned, existerce of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional. inplant reviews and discussions with plant personnel as appropriate were conducted for the reports indicated by an asterisk. The event reports were reviewed using the guidance of the general policy and procedure for NRC enforcement actions, regarding licensee identified violations.
(Closed) LER 89-14. RWCU Isolation during surveillance due to personnel error.
This event occurred on September 29. 1989, and was documented in
NRC inspection report 89-23.
This LER is administrative 1y closed and the corrective actions will be tracked under violation 89-23-01.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701,92702)
of existing (Closed) Unresolved Item. 88-11-01. Review the adequac:7 drywell/ containment differential pressure instrumentation for meeting the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2 which requires monitoring drywell pressure on a narrow range of 12 psia to 3 psig for a type D variable.
A type D variable is used to indicate operation of individual safety systems and other systems important to safety.
The safety system associated with the need to monitor drywell pressure over a narrow range is the combustible gas control system which includes the drywell purge and vacuum relief subsystems.
GGNS has existing narrow range differential pressure transmitters and computer points which L
measures and provides indication of drywell-to-containment pressure over a range of +2 psid to -2 psid. System operation and valve opening pressures l
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l for the CGCS are based on setpoints which are within +1 psid to -1 psid.
Therefore, the licensee concludes a drywell pressure instrumentation range i
of 42 psid to -2 psid is sufficient to conitor CGCS operation.
I Furthermore, the licensee plans to add descriptions of the instrumentation to the FSAR (Section 7.5) via NPE-FSAR 88/53.
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i 10. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope end findings were summarized on November 17, 1989,
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with those persons indicateo in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee did not
identify es proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee had no comment on the following inspection findings:
Item Number Description and Reference NCV 89-28-01 Failure To Perform Post Maintenance Testing On Preventive Maintenance Task Paragraph 4.
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11. Acronyms and initialisms ADHRS-Alternate Decay Heat Removal System
Automatic Depressurization System ADS
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APRM -
Average Power Range Monitor ATWS -
Anticipated Transient Without Scram Boiling Water Reactor BWR
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CGCS -
Combustible Gas Control System CRD Control Rod Drive
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Design Change Package DCP
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Diesel Generator DG
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ECCS -
Emergency Core Cooling System Er.gineering Safety Feature ESF
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FCV Flow Control Valve
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FSAR -
Final Safety Analysis Report
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GGNS -
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station HPCS -
High Pressure Core Spray System HPU Hydraulic Power linit
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Instrumentation and Control 150
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Inspector Followup Item IFI
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Limiting Condition for Operation l
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Lightning Eliminators and Consultants LEC
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Licensee Event Report lER
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LLRT -
Local Leak Rate Test toCI -
Low Pressure Core Injection LPCS -
Low Pressure Core Spray HNCR -
Material Nonconformance Report l
MSIV -
Main Steam Isolation Valve Maintenance Work Order MWO
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Nuclear Plant Engineering NPE
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC
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Pressure Differential Switch PDS
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P&ID -
Piping and Instrument Diagram PSW Plant Service Water
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Quality Deficiency Report QDR
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RCIC -
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RHR Residual Heat Removal
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RWCtl -
Reactor Water Cleanup kadiation Work Permit RWP
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SBLC -
Standby Liquid Control SERI -
System Energy Resource Incorporation System Operating Instruction 501
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Standby Service Water SSW
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Temporary Change Notice TCN
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TS Technical SDecification
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