IR 05000361/1982018

IE Insp Rept 50-361/82-18 on 820413-16.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Plan Exercise & Associated Critiques

ML20054G703
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	06/03/1982
From:	Book H, Fish R, Kunhiro D, Kunkhiro D, Scown K, Wenslawski F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20054G697	List: IR 05000361/1982018 ML20054G696
References
50-361-82-18, NUDOCS 8206220223
Download: ML20054G703 (6)

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U. S. tiUCLEAR REGULSTORY C0!SilSSI0li y

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REGION V

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Report No. 50-361/82-18 Docket No. 50-361 License rio.

NPF-10 Safeguards Group Licensee: Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name: San Onofre Unit 2

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Inspection at: Camp Pendleton, California Inspection conducted: April 13-16, 1982 Inspectors:

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n R. F. Fi h Emer ency rep redness Analyst - Team Ifate' Signed

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. KdninjIr,~ lfegional State Liaison.0fficer Date Signed Y4 b.7 ["2-

K.p[wn,EmergpcyPrearednessCoordinator D6te/ Signed

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dd/fA Approved by:

F. A. Werislawski, Chief, Reactor Radiation Protection D'att Signed ffNW YhfV H. E. Book, Chief, Radiological Safety Branch

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Summar'.

Inspection on April 13-16, 1982 (Report No. 50-361/82-18)

Areas Inspected: Announced inspection of the eme rgency plan exercise and associated critiques. The inspection involved about 102 hours0.00118 days <br />0.0283 hours <br />1.686508e-4 weeks <br />3.8811e-5 months <br /> onsite by six (6) NRC inspectors and observers.

Results:

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

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• R. Dietch, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Operations

• K. Baskin, Manager, Nuclear Engineering, i fety and Licensing

• D. Pilmer, Acting Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Safety

• F. Massey, Acting Supervisor, Health Physics and Emergency Planning H. Ray, Station Manager

• W. Moody, Deputy Station Manager

• D. McCloskey, Supervisor of Emergency Pr e paredness

• W. Marsh, Health Physics Manager

• R. Grey, Health Physics Supervisor, Unit 2 G. Peckham, Dosimetry Supervisor

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• G. Allen, Nuclear Engineer D. Evans, Nuclear Engineer

• P. Dooley, Emergency Planning Coordinator

"S. Garry, Radiological Engineer

• d. Albers, Effluent Engineer M. Wharton, Supervising Engineer

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• D. Bonnette, Emergency Planner K. Hadley, Security Supervisor

• Denotes those present at exit interview.

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Emergency Exercise Plan

The Southern California Edison Company (SCE) Health Physics and Emergenc~y Planning Group was responsible for the development and control of the energency exercise plan. The exercise plan was developed in concert with the several participating offsite jurisdictions and with the.

assistance of a SCE consultant. The plan document included the objectives, the exercise ground rules, the exercise scenario (including initial plant conditions), cue cards, data sheets and graphs and exercise observer critique sheets. The plan document was controlled'by SCE and distribution was limited to persons having a specific need, onsite and offsite observers from SCE and participating local agencies and meubers of the Federal organizations (NRC and FEMA) evaluating the exercise. This emergency plan exercise was intended to satisfy the requirement for a joint exercise of all emergency plans contained in Section 13.3.4 (conclusions) of the Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0712, February 1981) for San Onofre Units 2 and 3.

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-2-The exercise scenario started with an event classified as an " alert" emergency and escalated through a " site" level to a " general" emergency condition.

The initiating event was a sudden increase in the unknown reactor coolant leakage rate. The scenario then developed into a loss of coolant accident with a release of activity inside containment and a short time (30 minutes) complete loss of emergency core cooling.

The release of activity to the environment was the result of a mini purge exhaust valve failing to completely close. The meteorological conditions were changed during the period of the release so that all the intended offsite jurisdictions could participate in the exercise.

3.

Observers The exercise was observed and evaluated by several organizations.

The licensee provided observers for all onsite areas where exercise activities took place. SCE also placed observers at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) located at the San Clemente City Hall complex.

Some of the SCE observers served the dual function of controller.

The function of the controller was to provide cue cards and data packages at the appropriate times and, if necessary, alter the course of the exercise or provide needed guidance. Controls were established to govern any changes to the course of the exercise. The participating offsite jurisdictions provided observers for their portions of the exercise.

Observers from the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IX were also present during the exercise. The FEMA team of observers were evaluating the portions of the exercise that involved local, state and federal agencies as well as the interface occurring at the EOF. The NRC observed activities in the Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (0SC),

Emergency Support Center (ESC) and the E0F. The NRC also observed the activities of teams dispatched from the OSC into the plant to take actions to evaluate or mitigate the conditions related to the exercise situation.

On April 14, 1982 SCE held a briefing for all of their observers and controllers. Controlled copies of the exercise plan document were distributed at that time. The meeting provided an opportunity for discussion of the schedule of activities, the role of the controllers, personnel identification system and telephone numbers for controller communications.

Reference was also made to the evaluation sheets-that were to be completed by the observers and controllers. On April 14 SCE also chaired a meeting of the observers from the participating offsite jurisdictions. This meeting was similar to the one for the SCE observers including the distribution of copies of the exercise plan document.

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Exercise

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The exercise was initiated at about 8:00 a.m. on April 15 and continued until about 1:00 p.m.

The exercise involved the following locations-described in the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station ~(SONGS) Units 2 and 3 Emergency Plan: Control Room, Technical Support Center, OperaRions Support Center, Emergency Support Center,' E0F and an assembly area.

Offsite areas, including the E0F, that were observed by the FEMA team will be described in a report issued by that agency. The exercise included sending teams into the plant'to simulate repair activities and the analysis of coolant, containment sump and containment atmosphere samples. Radiation monitoring activities around the site as well as in plant were also conducted as part of the exercise.

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Critique Shortly after the termination of the exercise, SCE held a preliminary critique to review in general terms the results and findings of selected participants and observers. Two items were identified as needing further discussion and possible corrective action (s). This exercise showed that there was a need to rethink the use of the interagency telephone system (ITS) and the teletype system for transmitting information from the TSC/ ESC to the various offsite locations including the Offsite Dose Assessment Center (0DAC) in the E0F.

It was reported that FEMA observers had expressed some concern about operations of the ODAC and the liaison function in the E0F.

It was concluded that additional information concerning this second item was necessary before any action could be considered.

The written reports (critique sheets) submitted by all SCE observers /

controllers will represent the primary effort to evaluate (critique) the exercise. These reports, which are to be examined by the Health Physics and Emergency Planning Group (HPEP) will be used to establish the listing of items needing corrective actions. The HPEP group is also responsible for assuring that all necessary corrective actions have been implemented.

6.

Exercise Summary On Friday afternoon, April 16, a summary of the execcise results was presented at the San Juan Capistrano City Hall. Representatives of the following organizations summarized the exercise findings from their standpoint: FEMA Region IX, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, City of San Juan Capistrano, City of San Clemente, Orange County, San Diego County and California Parks and Beaches. This summary session was not a closed presentation; however, it was followed by a FEMA Region IX presentation on the exercise findings provided specifically for members of the public and media.

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7.

Exit Interview On April 16, 1982, following completion of the inspection, an exit interview was held to discuss the NRC findings. SCE personnel attending

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this meeting have been identified in paragraph 1.

In addition the following SCE personnel were also present:

T. Garvin, Lead QA Engineer; G. Noel, Technical Training Administrator; C. Seward, Fire _ Protection Administrator. Messers. R. Fish and J. Carlson represented the NRC during the exit interview. The licensee was informed there were no-items of noncompliance or deviations identified during the inspection.

The following NRC observations, none of which were considered significant, were discussed during this meeting, The licensee identified problems concerning the use of the' interagency a.

telephone system and the teletype system to transmit information from the TSC/ ESC to the various offsite locations needs to be resolved.

It should also be noted that the FEMA observers identified this as a matter needing corrective action. The licensee stated that they would seek a resolution of this item through discussions with the several offsite jurisdictions.

b.

It appeared that the CR did not receive information regarding the results of the activities of the repair teams dispatched from the OSC. The TSC did receive such information. The importance of the CR being kept informed of all activities relating to the operation of the facility was emphasized. The licensee agreed that the CR should be kept informed of all such activities and indicated necessary action would be taken to assure such was the case.

Two items needing some attention were noted during observations c.

of the dose assessment activities in the TSC.

Because more than one dose calculation is made, there is a need to provide the related parameter (s) to the decision making personnel. Also, management of the dose projection documentation could be improved.

The second item concerned the radiological status boards not being fully utilized. The importance of completing the health physics computer project was discussed, d.

The observations of the repair teams dispatched from the OSC disclosed that additional preparation would be beneficial. There should be a briefing on job assignment, a review of the route to be taken, a discussion of the expected levels of radiation and permitted exposure, identification of the person in charge and the equipment. Other items may also need to be covered.

With respect to the routes, the licensee stated that they had evaluated the various areas of the facility and had predetermined the routes to be taken based primarily on the potential for levels of radiation and possible exposures received by the individuals.

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With respect to the ESC there appears to be a question concerning the authority for permitting personnel in the ESC to receive exposures in excess of the regalatory limits. The ESC operates under Nuclear Engineering and Operations Department issued procedures rather than site issued procedures.

None of the ESC procedures address the subject of authorizing emergency exposures.

Therefore the site procedure for emergency exposures seems to control such action for the ESC also. The licensee acknowledged this situation and indicated the ESC procedures would be modified to include authority for permitting emergency exposures.

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