ML20214Q977
| ML20214Q977 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1987 |
| From: | SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13303B847 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-54814, TAC-54815, NUDOCS 8706050285 | |
| Download: ML20214Q977 (427) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ ATmOEDFr RAI 31 i '5. it 10CFR50 Appendix R Coupliance Assessment Report For San Onofre Generating Station Units 2 and 3 Prepared by Southern California Edison Conpany 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Resemead, California 91770 May, 1987 8706050285 870531 PDR ADOCK 05000361-p PDR
SELE OF CotmiNPS FR9ft 1.0 INIIGOCTION 1 1-13 1.1 Background 1-1 1.2 Purpose 1-2 1.3 Definitions 1-4 1.4 Analysis Methodology Overview 1-11 2.0 REQUIREMENTS A!O ASSIMPTIONS 2 2-3 2.1 Requirements 2-1 2.2 Assunptions 2-1 3.0 CRI'IERIA A!O ME'1pmnrnGY 3 3-43 3.1 Identification of Safe Shutdown Systems, 3-2 Congonents and Cables 3.2 Common Power Supply Analysis 3-12 3.3 Connon Eclosure Analysis 3-17 3.4 Evaluation of Damage to Safe Shutdown Equipnent 3-20 Due to Fire Protection System Pipe Rupture and Fire Suppression Activities 3.5 Seismic Evaluation of the RCP Lube Oil 3-21 Collection System 3.6 Time and Manpower Study 3-24 3.7 Evaluation of 1-Hour Fire Barrier Configuration. 3-26 3.8 Connunication Systems Evaluation 3-29 3.9 Fire Area Boundary Evaluation 3-30 3.10 Appendix.R III.C/III.L coupliance Assessment 3-32 4.0 RESULTS 4 4-63 4.1 Identification of Safe Shutdown Systems, 4-1 Conponents and Cables 4.2 Connon Power Supply Analysis 4-28 4.3 Connon & closure Analysis 4-29 4.4 Evaluation of Damage to Safe Shutdown Equipnent 4-30 due to Fire Protection System Pipe Rupture and Fire Suppression Activities 4.5 Seismic Evaluation of the RCP Lube Oil 4-30 Collection System 4.6 Time and Manpower Study 4-32 4.7 - Evaluation of 1-Hour Fire Barrier Configuration 4-41 4.8- Communication Systems Evaluation 4-45 4.9 Fire Area Boundary Evaluation 4-45 4.10 Appendix R III.C/III.L Coupliance Assessment 4-46
5.0 REFERENCES
5-1 Appendix A Fire Area Drawings 44 Pages Appendix B Safe Shutdown Conponents List 28 Pages Appendix C Safe Shutdown Iogics 15 Pages Appendix D Appendix R Deviation Requests 191 Pages i
LIST OF FIGURES Ficures Title 1-0 10CFR50 Appendix R Coupliance Assessment Process 3-1 Identification of Safe Shutdown Systems and Conponents 3-2 Identification of Safe Shutdown Cables 3-3 Conmon Power Supply Analysis Breaker Coordination 3-4 Conmon Enclosure Analysis 3-5 Appendix R III.G/III.L Compliance Assessment ii
1.0 INIPODUCTION MD PURPOSE 1.1 Backaround By letter dated buly 27, 1982, Southern California Edison Company (SCE) comitted to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission (USNRC) to meet the technical requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Sections III.G, III.J and III.O for San Onofre Units 2 and 3 (SONGS 2 & 3). Documentation of the NRC's approval of the SONGS 2 & 3 Fire Protection Program is provided in NUREG-0712, Safety Evaluation Report for SONGS 2/3, and in supplements to that document. As a result of these license conditions, SCE conducted a systematic review of the total Fire Protection Program in preparation for an Updated FIR which was subnitted on March 19, 1984. As a result of this review, a ntmber of changes to the SONGS 2 & 3 Operating License Conditions and Technical Specifications were identified. We UFBA included a compliance assessment relative to the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Sections III.G, III.J, and III.0, as well as a comparison against the fire protection guidelines in Appendix A of Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1. We compliance assessment contained in the UFIR resulted in develognent of eight deviations to the Appendix R requireraents which were subnitted to the USNRC for review and approval concurrent with the UFIR on March 19, 1984. 1-1
1 Since 10CFR50.48(b) became effective, the USNRC Staff has issued ntunerous guidance h= ants addressing fire protection technical acceptance criteria. h latest guidance document, Generic
- Letter 86-10, was issued in April, 1986. In addition to promulgating additional acceptance criteria primarily to expedite developnent and USNRC review / approval of exenptions to the Appendix R rule, the ; guidance documents were made applicable as analysis criteria for plants licensed subsequent to January 1, 1979. As a result, SCE has re-evaluated the content and basis for the deviation requests filed with the NRC as part of the UFIR effort. '1his re-evaluation identified the need to conduct additional analyses to assess coupliance relative to the Appendix R fire protection guidance documents.
1.2 Purpose
- '1he purpose of this het is to suurnarize the results of the
. re-assessment of SONGS Units 2 and 3 relative to coupliance with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Sections III.G, III.J, III.L and III.O in light of numerous NRC guidance documents. h NRC guidance documents were utilized as guidance in determining the status of the SONGS compliance to the latest NRC interpretations of Appendix R. h re-assessment was deemed necessary since the NRC interpretations i appeared to have significantly changed or have been expanded since , issuance of the SONGS Safety Evaluation Report. 4 l l-2 i i
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ne re-assessment effort sumarized within this document supersedes in its entirety the Appendix R information presented in the UFEA. Wat is, the shutdown logic diagrams and system discussion of Appendix B of the UFEA, and the shutdown equipnent matrix and lists compliance statements of each fire area in section 7 of the UFHA, and the Appendix R Design Basis Table in Appendix D of the UFHA are intended to be replaced by the re-assessment results. % e re-assessment effort described in this document will provide the basis for a future revision to the UFBA. It is the intent of SCE that this document provide sufficient information to permit NRC review and approval of the Appendix R re-assessment effort. As for the original eight deviations to Appendix R subnitted with the UFHA in March 1984, SCE considers the deviations for " Safe Shutdown Instrumentation and Control Circuit Separation", " Associated Circuits" and "Ioss of Offsite Power Coincident with a Design Basis Fire" no longer applicable since these issues have now been addressed as part of the revised Appendix R analysis. W e deviation requests for " Alternative Shutdown Panel Instrumentation Requirements" and " Unsealed Penetrations in Heavy Concrete Walls" are considered no longer necessary based on design modifications to be implemented or engineering evaluation performed to resolve these deviations. %e deviation requests for " Fire Barrier Wrap for Cable Protection" and " Safe Shutdown Cable and Equipnent Separation Inside Containment" remain as originally subnitted as supplemented by the additional information provided as part of this subnittal. It should be noted that the deviation request concerning 1-3
"Bnergency Lighting Required for Cold Shutdown" should be clarified as
~ follows: (1) Eight hour emergency lights will be provided only for safe shutdown equipnent requiring operation within the first 8 hours post fire, and (2) anergency lighting provided for the control room will be diesel generator backed in lieu of eight hour battery packs. In addition, the re-assessment effort has identified the need for additional deviations. W ese deviations are provided in Appendix D to this document. 1.3 Definitions
%e following definitions are applicable to this analysis:
Alternative Shutdown capability - shutdown capability provided by utilization of equipnent and features not used for nonnal shutdown. Manual actions necessary to support operation of safe shutdown equipnent which are required to achieve and maintain either hot standby or cold shutdown will be considered under the provisions of emergency control station (s) per Section III.G.1 of Appendix R. Manual actions necessary to support operation of alternative shutdown equipnent which are required for hot standby will be considered under the provisions of alternative shutdown per Section III.G.3 of Appendix R. Alternative Shutdown Equianent - Equipnent utilized to provide an alternative shutdown capability. 1-4
Associated Circuit - Cables that are associated with equipment required for safe shutdown by orm of the following means:
- 1. A conson power supply; or
- 2. A circuit which if affected by a fire could result in spurious operation of equipnent which could adversely affect the safe shutdown capability; or
- 3. A <vennri enclosure (e.g., cable tray, panel, junction box) .
Associated Circuits of concern - Associated circuits defined above that have physical separation less than that required by Section III.G of Appendix R and one of the following:
- 1. A connon power source with the shutdown equipnent (normal or alternative) and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuits of concern by coordinated breakers, fuses, or similar devices; or
- 2. A swistion to circuits of equipnent whose spurious operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability; or
- 3. A common enclosure (e.g., raceway, panel, terminal box) with shutdown cables which, 1-5 I
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- a. Are not electrically protected by circuit breakers, fuses, or similar devices; or
- b. Will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure outside the fire area.
Boundary Conconents - System boundaries are based on the individual system functional characteristics necessary to achieve safe shutdown. Specific boundary couponents are provided in the safe shutdown conpanent list. GBLE - A microcomputer based system containing information on the 4 circuit and raceway schedule, safe shutdown components and cables, vias, etc. i
- Cold Shutdown - A condition where the reactor is subcritical, the i
boron concentration is within technical specification limits and RCS I average tengerature (T,y,) h less h or @ M 2d. l 1 l Cold Shutdown Bauinnent - Congonents which are required to operate to j i cooldown from hot standby conditions to cold shutdown, or to maintain cold shutdown conditions. Cold shutdown equignent which is also required to achieve hot standby is categorized as a hot standby couponent. i i ~ 1-6
i box) Comon Enclosure - An enclosure (e.g., raceway, panel junct on i f safe which contains both circuits required for the operat on ot shutdown components and circuits for non-safe shutdown comp Comon Power Supply - A power supply which feeds safe shut circuits. plaanostic Instrumentation _ - Instrumentation,tion beyond of the nonitoring instrumentation, needed to ensure the proper Eump actua t safe shutdown equipment and support equipnent (e.g., flow ra e Level indication for all tanks that may be discharge pressure). drained during shutdown or whose suction source may chan considered diagnostic instrumentation. uhme which manages fire hazards analysis ', Egg - A microcomputer da combustible loading, information. '1his information includes: suppression / detection systems, boundaries, etc. from other Fire Area _ - That portion of a building or plant separated d areas by three (3) hour rated fire barriers (walls, floors l or an ceilings) with any openings or penetrations protected with sl
- h barrier closures having a fire resistance rating equal to that of t e l
-s Fire area boundaries not having a 3-hour l unless previously approved. l t level rating, nor previous NRC-approval, which provide an equiv I l
)
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of protection, based on fire protection engineering evaluation, are ' also considered for analyses purposes. The fire area boundaries utilized were as defined in the UFIR. Fire Protection Features - Fire suppression and detection systems; manual fire fighting capability; fire rated walls, floors and ceilings; structural steel protection; cable tray and conduit wraps; and fire rated doors and danpers. Fire Zone - A portion of a fire area that is best analyzed separately as a zone within a fire area dur; to its unique combustible loading or _ fire characteristics. A fire zone is a subset of a fire area. Except where justified by fire protection engineering evaluation, fire zone boundaries are not considered (Appendix R) fire area boundaries for purposes of this analysis. Free of Fire Damace - The structure, system or couponent under consideration which is capable of performing its intended function during and after the postulated fire, as needed. Hioh T % nce Fault - A circuit fault condition resulting in an overcurrent level slightly below the couponent's circuit breaker trip setpoint. l-8
Hiah/Iow Pressure Interface Bauinnent - Equipnent which may be used to maintain the integrity of the hig Vlow pressure interface between the reactor coolant system and other plant systems. Failure of higVlow pressure interface couponents could result in a loss of coolant accident. Hot Standby - A condition where the reactor is subcritical, the boron concentration is within technical specification limits and the RCS average tenperature (Tave) is greater than or equal to 350 F . Hot Standby Bauinnent - Congonents which are required to operate to achieve or maintain hot standby conditions. Congonents (except hig Vlow pressure interface), which are normally in their safe shutdown position are addressed as spurious operation equipnent. Hot Shutdown - A condition where the reactor is subcritical, the boron concentration is within the technical specification limits and RCS average tenperature (T,y,) is less than 350 F, and greater than 2000F. Interruptina Device - A breaker, fuse or similar device installed in an electrical circuit to electrically isolate the circuit from
.overcurrents.
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l Normal Shutdown Cacability - Plant shutdown capability delineated in plant operating procedures which may be used in the event of a fire. Components utilized to enable the second point of control of-nornal shutdown equipnent is considered a part of the normal shutdown capabilities. Manual actions necessary to support operation of these couponents will be considered under the provisions of emergency control per section III.G.1 of Appendix R. Process Monitorina Instrumentation - Instrumentation utilized to monitor either normal or alternative safe shutdown capability. Safe Shutdown Component - Couponents which are classified as required for hot standby, cold shutdown, alternative shutdown, high/ low pressure. interface, or spurious operation equipnent. Safe Shutdown'Iocic Diaoram - A diagram that shows the interrelation of the components to achieve safe shutdown functional requirements.
'Ihe logic diagrams will identify the components which may be used to meet a given functional requirement.
Sourious Operation 'Ibe operation of equignent which could impair the capability to achieve safe shutdown. 1-10 l
Spurious Operation Fauitment - Equipoent whose normal position or operating status is consistent with that required for safe shutdown and whose spurious operation could adversely impact safe shutdown system operation. For purposes of identification, spurious operation equipment is treated as a safe shutdown component. Spurious Indication - n e operation of the plant process monitoring indication or diagnostic instrumentation for which the operator could be expected to take some action which may impair the capability to achieve safe shutdown. Train (Electrical) - Electrical train to which the component belongs.
'1he train dwignation will be related to electrical power train of the component.
1.4 Analysis Methodoloav overview he overall process used in the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Compliance Assessment is depicted in Figure 1.0. W e figure graphically outlines the sequence and the input / output relationships of the Appendix R Compliance Assessment. Each item or group of related items on the flowchart is referenced to a section of the report where the specific criteria and methodology are outlined. 1-11
. 'Ibe following tasks encompass the Appendix R Assessment:
o Identification of Safe Shutdown Systems, couponents, and Cables o Common Power Supply Analysis - o en=nnn Ehclosure Analysis o haluation of Damage to Safe Shutdown Equipnent due to Fire Protection System Pipe Rupture and Fire Suppression Activities o Seismic Evaluation of the RCP Lube Oil Collection System o Time and Manpower Study o Evaluation of 1-hour Fire Barrier Configuration o Connunication System Evaluation o Fire Area Boundary Evaluation i o Appendix R III.C/III.L Compliance Assessment 4 I 1-12
S e specific criteria and methodology for these tasks is provided in Section 3 of this document. Section 4 provides the results of these tasks. % e references are listed in Section 5. W e fire area drawings are contained in Appendix A. Appendix B contains the safe shutdown components list. %e safe shutdown logics are in Appendix C. W e Appendix R Deviation Requests are in Appendix D. k 1-13 4
= - , - , - - - - - ,
4 FIGURE 1.0 . 10CFR50 APPENDIX R COMPUANCE ASSESSMENT PROCESS ID SSD SYSTEMS 111 . 0 SEISMIC u wenON3.1 REPORT MCn0H3.5 ID E COMPONENTS CERABLANKET . REPORT y "" 3*l ~
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mencN3.7 GENERATE ID SSD SSD LOGICS CABLES CABLE AND RACEWAY ---> SCHEDULE RACEWAY / FIRE ~ AREA DATABASE PROGRAM q RACEWAY _ CABLE DRAWINGS
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DATABASE PROGRAM s 7 FA CABLE ) COMPONENT APPEND!X R llLG/!li.L COMPUANCE ASSESSMENT y
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. WANPOWER STUOY h Ill.G.3.h a y
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, COMMON ,
POWER SUPPLY lit.G/llt.L COMPUANCE ,
. ASSESSMENT m m 3.2 FINAL REPORT "
COMMON a OWWCAN
' NEEDS ENCLOSURE ' FIRE BOUNDARY n cn m 3.8 g ,3,3 EVALUATION S McVON3.9 oss womm4
2.0 RwumEMDTFS AIO ASSIMPTIONS his section outlines the 10CFR50, Appendix R requirements applicable to San Onofre Units 2 and 3, and the assumptions utilized in the Appendix R coupliance assessment analysis. 2.1 Recuirements Southern California Edison Company is conmitted to meeting the technical requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Sections III.G, III.J and III.O for San Onofre Units 2 and 3. 2.2 Assimotions h e following assumptions were applied to Appendix R analysis:
- 1. % e analysis considers both the availability and unavailability of offsite power concurrent with the fire.
- 2. An exposure fire involving either transient or in-situ combustibles is postulated to occur in only one plant fire area at a time.
- 3. Mechanical components are assumed to remain functional during and after the fire. % ese components include but 2-1
i 1 are not limited to: heat exchangers, hand operated and check valves, piping, and tanks.
- 4. For three-phase AC circuits, it is assumed that the probability of getting a hot short on all three phases in the proper sequence to cause spurious operation of a motor is considered sufficiently low as to not require evaluation, except for any cases involving hig Vlow pressure interface components.
- 5. For the high i @ nce fault analysis it is assumed that _
loads with cables in the fire area / zone under consideration will be drawing a current cqual to the full load current utilized in the appropriate SONGS 2 & 3 breaker setting calculation or in the Impell update to these calculations. 'Ihe loads assumed for equignent located outside the fire area of concern will be the ESFAS initiated IOCA load. For equipnent not ESFAS initiated, the normal operating load is assumed. '1his provides a conservative starting point for the analysis.
- 6. For ungrounded DC circuits two hot shorts of the proper polarity without grounding causing spurious operation is evaluated for Hig VLow pressure interfaces only.
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- 7. Spurious operation of safe shutdown equignent as a result of equipnent or cables located in a fire area is assumed to occur in combinations resulting in the most severe safe shutdown system impact.
- 8. At the time of the fire all trains of Safe Shutdown Systems are functional (i.e., none of the safe shutdown systems or components are undergoing maintenance or testing).
- 9. %e plant is operating at 100 percent power. his plant _
operating mode is the most limiting condition for evaluation of safe shutdown systems. Plant operating conditions during modes 5 and 6 are also considered to ensure proper evaluation of the shutdown cooling system. h is is done by ensuring that the component list and logic diagrams consider operation of these systems in modes 5 and 6.
- 10. No earthquake or other design basis accident is assumed to occur coincident with a fire.
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3.0 CRITERIA AE MEIBCDO[OGY
%e Appendix R Coupliance Assessment requires completion of the following tasks:
o Identification of Safe Shutdown Systems, Components and Cables o Comon INuer Supply Analysis o Comon Enclosure Analysis o Evaluation of Damage to Safe Shutdown Equipnent Due to Fire Protection System Pipe Rupture and Fire Suppression Activities o Seismic Evaluation of the RCP Lube Oil Collection System o Time and Manpower Study o Evaluation of 1-Hour Fire Barrier Configuration o Connunication System Evaluation o Fire Area Boundary Evaluation o Appendix R III.C/III.L Compliance Assessment h e specific criteria and methodology for each of these tasks are detailed in Sections 3.1 through 3.10. We results of these tasks are detailed in Sections 4.1.through 4.10. 3-1
3.1 Identification of Safe Shutdown Systems, Cmmnents and cables 3.1.1 Criteria
% e performance criteria for the identification of shutdown systems, components, and cables as specified in Appendix R are:
- 1. W e reactivity control function shall be capable of achieving
! and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity conditions.
- 2. % e reactor coolant makeup function shall be capable of maintaining the reactor coolant level to prevent the developnent of an unrecoverable condition.
- 3. We reactor heat removal function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal.
- 4. W e process monitoring function shall be capable of providing direct readings of the process variables necessary to perform and control the above functions.
- 5. n e supporting functions shall be capable of providing the process cooling, lubrication, etc., necessary to permit the operation of the equipnent used for safe shutdown functions.
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. ~ . . . . . . . . _ _ . . . . . . . . _ , _ . __ .. . . - . _ . . - . . . . . _.
4 3.1.2 Methodoloav
% e methodology for this task is organized into the following three sections:
o ' Identification of Systems o Identification of Components o Identification of Cables 21s methodology is depicted in Figures 3-1 and 3-2. 4 3.1.2.a Identification of Safe Shutdown Systems Given the performance criteria that the safe shutdown systems must achieve, the systems or portions of systems which fulfilled these criteria were determined. Wis was accomplished by reviewing the following documents: Operating Procedures Safe Shutdown Sequence Diagrams Updated Fire Hazard Analysis Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P& ids) One-Line Diagrams Elementary Drawings 3-3
3.1.2.b Identification of Safe Shutdown conoonents Having identified the required systems, the P& ids were reviewed to identify all couponents in these systems that are necessary to support safe shutdown. Wis review identified punps, valves, fans, dampers, heaters, coolers, tanks, air receivers, electrical panels and other couponents.
%is task was performed by reviewing the flow paths for the systems and identifying systems boundaries. Components in the flow paths that require operation / repositioning to allow the system to function were identified. Components which could spuriously operate aM impair safe shutdown were also identified.
With respect to the spurious signal guidance provided by Generic Letter 86-10, the methodology utili::ed for the re-assessment effort was conservative, in nature. We generic letter provides guidelines for consideration of three cases of plant transients resulting from a fire in any plant area: (1) any one worst case spurious signal, (2) any one worst case spurious signal in conjunction with a loss of automatic functions, and (3) a failure of a high-low pressure interface. Components which could spuriously operate were identified and included in the shutdown analysis. W e cables of these components 3-4
.were identified and appropriately coded with their respective fire areas. For each fire area, the cables were analyzed for the potential 1-
- to result in spurious operation of the couponents. Whenever_the cable analysis d icates the potential for spurious operation, the spurious
_ operation was evaluated. %us, fire areas are evaluated for all t 4 potential spurious operations. Couponents comprising the higVlow pressure interfaces were reviewed in a similar manner.
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;. To address automatic safety feature functions, each automatic function-4 was identified, ard the cables / circuits related to each function were identified. For each fire area, the cables / circuits were eval'uted with respect to causing initiation of the safety feature function or l loss of the automatic function. % e potential failures were then considered in conjunction with other potential fire damages for the area. %us, the fire area assessments more than consider the guidance
- of the generic letters.
, %e next step was to identify the conponents for the protective functions not involving mechanical / fluid flow paths (i.e., process
- monitoring and essential power). For.the process monitoring l protective function, the guidance provided in IE Information Notice t.
- No. 84-09 was considered in the identification of the minimum set of instruments that are required to monitor plant process variables for I
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normal and alternative shutdown capability. For essential power, those power supplies that energized safe shutdown couponents were identified as safe shutdown components. Couponents required either for hot standby or cold shutdown were designated as such on the Safe Shutdown Congonent List. Spurious operation, high/ low pressure boundary and alternative shutdown couponents were also identified using the definitions provided in section 1.3. Safe shutdown components which are related to m.e electrical train of safe shutdown equipnent, but which may affect the ability to shutdown using the opposite train were identified as " train interaction" conponents, as these conponents required evaluation regardless of the train credited for shutdown in a given fire area. Engineered safety features (ESF) inputs, actuation logic and actuated safe shutdown (SSD) components were identified. his data was used to 4 identify fire areas in which a spurious ESFAS. signal may be generated by the fire, and the components actuated by this signal. Logic diagrams were generated to identify the interrelation of the components to achieve safe shutdown functional requirements. tese logic diagrams identify the components which may be used to meet a given functional requirement. l 3-6 l l
%e following infornation is included on the logic diagrams:
o Component's electrical train, o Valve normal, failure, and desired position o Alternative Shutdown Instrumentation 3.1.2.c Identification of Safe Shutdown Cables For each conponent en the safe shutdown couponent list, including potential spurious actuation components, the appropriate electrical elementary, cabling block, instrument loop, logic diagrans and vendor drawings were reviewed to determine all cables that were involved in the operation of the component. Wis identification process included all auxiliary contacts which could affect the operation of the safe shutdown component. n e following is a summary of the methodology:
- 1. For each safe shutdown component, applicable drawings were reviewed to determine the component's cables.
- 2. Each cable on the component's cabling block diagram was identified. Cables only for alarm, indication (this did not include SSD instrumentation) or couputer input are isolated from affecting safe shutdown components and therefore were not required for safe shutdown.
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- 3. For contacts that were actuated by devices not shown on the safe shutdown couponent's elementary diagram:
h e applicable reference drawing for each contact was identified and reviewed. From the reference drawing, the cable (s) associated with the contact (s) in the safe shutdown component's control scheme was identified. W e cable (s) was entered into the database under the safe -- shutdown component that it affected.
- 4. For each safe shutdown electrical / mechanical conponent, the cabling block diagram was reviewed on the elementary diagram to identify cables originating in remote panels. Wese were indicated in the cabling block diagram by the xLxxx designator.
- 5. We cabling block diagram was obtained for the remote panel determined above and the cables associated with that panel were identified.
- 6. W e cables were entered into the data base under the safe shutdown component that it affected.
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- 7. W e one-line distribution drawings were reviewed for the 120 VAC panels to identify the cable (s) powering the cabinet (s) .
- 8. % e power cable (s) were entered into the data base under the safe shutdown component that it affected.
- 9. From the Safe Shutdown Components Elementary Diagram, the component's power supply and component's control power supply were determined for entry into the data base with applicable drawing number.
- 10. From the list of safe shutdown power supplies the reference drawings were reviewed.
- 11. From the one-line diagrams for the electrical distribution centers (switchboards, load centers, motor control centers, distribution panels, etc.) on the Safe Shutdown Component List, those breakers associated with supplying power to the distribution center or with transferring power through it to another electrical distribution center were identified.
- 12. For each electrical distribution breaker, all referenced drawings including intermediate wiring diagrams and the component elementary drawing were reviewed to identify the 3-9 i
required power cables. W e breaker control and load power cables were entered into the CABLE data base.
- 13. One-line diagrams were reviewed to identify all breakers that
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power non-safe shutdown loads.
- 14. From the identified non-safe shutdown breakers, the elementary diagram for each breaker was reviewed.
- 15. W e power cables and those control cables that were not electrically isolated (by relays, contractors or transformers) from the breaker were entered in the CABLE data base.
- 16. W e one-line diagrams were reviewed for all 4160 VAC distribution system breakers that were not safe shutdown.
- 17. h e elementary diagram was reviewed for each breaker identified above.
- 18. h e power cables and those control cables that are not electrically isolated (by relays, contractors, or transformers) from the breaker were entered in the CABLE data base.
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- 19. For each safe shutdown instrument, the applicable P& ids were reviewed to identify the first cabinet in the instrument string.
- 20. Using the instrument index, the termination cabinet corresponding to the process cabinet identified above were determined.
- 21. From the drawing index, the cabling block diagram for the termination cabinet was obtained.
- 22. From the cabling block diagram the cables associated with the instrument under evaluation were identified.
- 23. 'Ihe cables were entered into the dabhame under the safe shutdown component that it'affected.
In conjunction with the identification of cables in the safe shutdown components scheme, r mote panels and power supplies were also I identified. A feedback mechanism was provided to ensure remote panels and power supplies identified during this process were also included on the safe shutdown component list. Once all power supplies were identified, all non-safe shutdown loads off those power supplies were identified as comon power supply 3-11
, ._- , , _ _ _ _ _ . . _ , ,_._--.y _ _ _ r - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
cables. 21s information served as input to the common power supply-associated circuit analysis.
'Ib determine the routing of the cables identified above, the information from the Raceway Tracking System (EE553) was sorted against the cables identified yielding cable versus raceway. Wis information was then conpared to the raceway versus fire area information contained in FPDS. Conduits and cable trays not assigned a fire area in FPDS were identified by a review of the raceway drawings and entered into the database. Conduits embedded in a fire area boundary were listed in both fire areas on either side of the boundary.
All of the above information was entered into the CABLE daFahnne. 3.2 C m Power Sucolv Analysis 3.2.1 Criteria In order to show that cables sharing a connon power supply with safe shutdown cables are not associated circuits of concern it is necessary to demonstrate that: 3-12
. __ _ _ _.-_ . __ . . ~ __. _ _
- 1. The branch circuit breaker or fuse will interrupt the branch circuit, clearing the fire induced fault and preventing the power source feeder breaker from tripping; or
- 2. h sum of fire induced high i=rahnee faults for all loads whose cables are in the fire area (short to ground or phase-to-phase), ESFAS initiated loads, and normal operating loads on the power supply, will not cumulatively exceed the setpoint of the feeder breaker causing it to trip; or
- 3. If it is found that the circuits do not meet the criteria of either 1 or 2, it is necessary to show that cables sharing a
, conson power supply meet the separation requirements of 10CFP50, Appendix R, Section III.G. t ! 3.2.2 Methodoloav h list of safe shutdown power supplies and their loads generated as part of the identification of safe shutdown power supplies (discussed ~ in Section 3.1 above) were used as the starting point for the enemnnes ! Power Supply Analysis. Figure 3-3 depicts the methodology for this study. h Common Power Supply Analysis was divided into two parts as 4 follows: 4 i o Breaker Coordination Study 4 o High Impedance Fault Analysis ] 3-13 i )
W e methodology for each part of the analysis is discussed below. 3.2.2.a Breaker Coordination Study t e purpose of this study is to determine if the fuses and breakers are adequately coordinated so that if the maximum short circuit current on a branch circuit occurs, the protective device for the branch circuit will interrupt the circuit and clear the fault, preventing the protective device for the feeder circuit from interrupting the circuit to the entire distribution point. A review of the existing breaker / fuse coordination calculations for safe shutdown power sources was performed to determine what portions of the electrical distribution system were not included in these calculations. W e existing SONGS 2 & 3 breaker coordination and breaker setpoint/ fuse sizing calculations were reviewed for application of proper criteria, calculation methods, assumptions and completeness. Particular emphasis was given to those breakers and fuses which protect non-safe shutdown circuits and the comon power source feeder breakers. Calculations were generated for breakers and fuses on comon power supplies which are not included in the current calculations if they could not be bounded by the characteristic curve of a higher rated protective device on the same bus. 3-14
As necessary, breaker coordination evaluations were performed to supplement existing documentation. 3.2.2.b Hich Tnrahnce Fault Analysis An analysis of the effect of high i_%nce faults on all comon power distribution points was conducted on a fire area basis. his analysis is depicted on Figure 3-5. For each fire area, all power cables fed from safe shutdown power supplies were identified. For each power supply with two or more cables in the fire area a high imrahnce fault analysis was performed. A high imra hnce fault current was then assigned to each cable in the fire area as follows: o Calculate the maximum possible fault current based on the breaker / fuse's long term (LT) setting. Use the LT setting as the maxin n fault current. Wis provides a conservative starting point for the analysis. o If no long term breaker setpoint is available, the short term (ST) or instantaneous (IT) setpoints will be used. 3-15 l
he total high inrahnce fault current was then calculated by suming the individual high impedance fault currents identified above. For cables outside the fire area which go to the power supply (s) of concern, ESFAS initiated and normal operating load currents were tabulated and considered. k he fire area dependent total feeder current to the power supply was then calculated by suming the high impedance fault current and the load current. Wis total feeder current was empared to the setting of the power supply feeder breaker. If the total calculated current was less than the long term setting of the feeder breaker for each feeder breaker then there is no high impuhnce comon power supply concern for this power supply. If the total calculated current was greater than or equal to the long term (LT) setting of the feeder breaker, the power source is a high inrahnce comon power supply concern and is assumed lost. During the Compliance assessment phase of this analysis (Section 3.10) the safe shutdown components fed from these power supplies were identified as lost in the fire area under evaluation. 21s procedure was repeated for all safe shutdown power supplies which have power cables in the fire area. S e procedure was started at the 3-16
lowest voltage level and considered each succeeding voltage level until all levels have been considered. 3.3 Comon thclosure Analysis i
!~
3.3.1 Criteria i In order to show that cables sharing connon enclosures will not inpair safe shutdown, the following must be determined: l
- - 1. If appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that any fire
; induced electrical faults will not cause unacceptable damage to i a safe shutdown circuit (at another location) which shares a
!- comon enclosure with that faulted circuit.
- 2. If appropriate measures have been taken to prevent propagation of the fire into the conw>n enclosure.
i - 3.3.2 Methodoloav In order to show that a cable sharing a comon enclosure with a safe shutdown cable will not cause an adverse effect on safe shutdown, it is necessary to demonstrate that d
- 3-17 i e -m v.,-----g- . ,en,, - -- -,,-,,,,,,-,,--,-,_m-n,,-c--wn
,--, -_-, ,_.-, , __~~.--n _ _ -n
- l. Fire induced shorts to ground or phase-to-phase shorts on the cable will not cause unacceptable damage to the circuit at another location (due to high currents in the conductor) . his is acconplished by showing that:
- a. We circuit is protected by a breaker, fuse or similar device which has been sized and the setpoint selected in accordance with the National Electric Code for the protection of the circuit in question; or
- b. We source of current for that circuit will not provide sufficient current to damage the circuit (i.e. less than the rated amperage of the conductor).
- 2. Fire rated seals or fire stops are provided for all raceways penetrating fire area boundaries.
Where circuit protection is inadequate an evaluation to the separation requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G will be perfortred. Figure 3.4 depicts the methodology for this analysis. 3.3.2.a An analysis was performed using the design bases of the electric power system and control power systems of SONGS 2 & 3, SONGS 2 & 3 design calculations / specifications, plant elementary and one-line drawings to l 3-18
demonstrate that power and control power circuits are %=tely protected for over-current. %e purpose of this analysis was to provide assurance that all power and control power circuits in the plant are protected so that fire i M M ground faults and shorts cannot cause unacceptable damage to the circuit at another location (due to high currents in the conductor) . Similarly, instrumentation and control circuits were analyzed using the design bases of the instrumentation and control systems of SONGS 2 & 3, Bechtel Power Corporation design calculations / specifications, and other design documents. Se purpose of this analysis was to provide assurance that all non-power circuits such as annunciator, alarm, couputer input and instrument loops in the plant are designed (separation / cable sizing) so that fire induced grourv3 faults and . shorts cannot cause propagation of the fire to another location due to an electrical fault. Circuits / cables were grouped by type, such as by voltage or current level, lE or non-lE, annunciator, alarm, conputer input and instrument, etc.
%ese evaluations also addressed potential fireinduced faults which 4 would result from higher voltage cables shorting to lower voltage cables. te existing SONGS 2 & 3 cable separation rating and installation specifications / requirements were reviewed for these conmon enclosure interactions.
3-19 l
l i-3.3.2.b Using the design bases of SONGS 2 & 3, the UFIR, station procedures, surveillance records, and plant design documents as necessary, cable penetrations in all fire area boundaries'were reviewed to verify that the penetrations are fire stopped or sealed to the rating of the barrier which it penetrates. Where sealing is iW_=te, an evaluation to the separation requirement of 10CFR50, Appendix R Section III.G will be performed. 3.4 Evaluation of P- 'e to Safe Shutdown Eauimt Due to Fire Protection System Pipe Ruoture and Fire Suporession Activitiel 3.4.1 Criteria Section III.G.3.b of 10CFR50, Appendix R, requires that alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or couponents in the area, room, or zone under consideration, shall be provided when: Redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown located in the same fire area may be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems. 3-20
3.4.2 Methodoloav 2e existing flooding calculations and inadvertent actuation analysis were analyzed to establish whether redundant trains of systems required for hot standby are subject to damage from fire suppression 1 activities or from rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems. Wis analysis included a review to verify completeness of the existing q inadvertent actuation analysis and a review of the existing flooding analyses to ensure that they bound a postulated fire protection pipe ruptu:e and manual fire fighting activities. Additional calculations were performed where required. 3.5 Seismic Evaluation of the RCP Lube Oil Collection System 3.5.1 Criteria We criteria used to evaluate the seismic design of the RCP lube oil system were:
- l. W e lube oil collection system is capable of withstanding a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) .
i 3-21
- 2. In the event that lube oil collection system is not capable of withstanding a SSE, evaluate the capability of lube oil system to withstand a SSE.
- 3. h seismic design requirements of Section 3.2 of the FSAR are satisfied.
3.5.2. Methodology h e basic methodology used in this task was to evaluate whether the existing lube oil collection system can withstand the effects of a safe shutdown earthquake and remain functional. Table 3.2-1 of the SONGS 2 & 3 FSAR designates the lube oil system as seismic Category II. S e seismic design and additional calculations were
- checked to review the capacity of the existing system due to SSE loads. S e capability of the collection system to perform its design
~ function deperds upon the definition of potential RCP oil leakage locations and the ability of the system to provide collection capability at each of those locations. % e steps taken in the evaluation included:
- 1. Obtaining the seismic design calculations of the oil system and collection system including oil piping and conponents.
3-22
- 2. Reviewing the seismic design calculations for the lube oil collection system for technical adequacy including:
o Assumptions o Loadings o Analytical Techniques o Load Combinations o Allowable Stresses o Conservatism
- 3. Performing structural evaluation of lube oil collection system by applying SSE loads defined in the FSAR.
- 4. Identifying available seismic design margins.
- 5. In the event that the lube oil collection system was determined not to be capable of withstanding an SSE, a similar review of the seismic design calculation and st.ructural evaluation would be performed for the lube oil system by:
o Determining system adequacy and compliance with Appendix R III.O seismic requirements. o Providing technical justification for existing installation in the event that applicable requirements are 3-23
not fully met. Successful outoome of the subtask may require a deviation request. Alternatively, recomendations for upgrading the RCP lube oil systen or the RCP lube oil collection system for conpliance would be provided, as necessary. 3.6 Time and Manoower Study 3.6.1 Criteria In order to take credit for manual actions to mitigate the effects of I a fire, it must be demonstrated that there is adequate time and sufficient manpower available to perform these actions. 3.6.2 h methodology used for the Time and Manpower Study is outlined below: 4
- 1. Operator actions required in 2 hours or less were identified in the manual action feasibility evaluation. h 2-hour time constraint was based on the present operator recall procedure which provides for additional manpower to be available within two hours.
- 2. Operator actions were established in order of priority with regard to plant system required time constraints.
.j . 3-24
- 3. Operator actions were further categorized by location and ease of operator transit between function locations.
- 4. S e time required to complete each specific operator action was based on input from operations personnel and walkdown of the physical location of the conponents.
- 5. S e operator routes were marked on drawings provided by SCE as design input.
I
- 6. W e operator transit time from one action to the next was determined by a timed walkdown of the expected route utilizing pathways, where existing eight-hour emergency lights were
- provided. S ose areas where eight-hour emergency lighting was not currently installed were &= anted and reu =4ations for new lighting were noted. W e walkdown was done at a slow pace to similate a limited light condition. (A review of emergency lighting requirements for actions required for 2 hours-to 8 hours was also performed).
- 7. Proposed connunication points were provided on the drawings and evaluated with operations personnel to identify any potential.
communication problems. 4 d 3-25 d
l
- 8. Once the plant walkdowns and cormonications evaluation were coupleted and the time input from operations personnel was received, the time lines were forna11ated. I i
- 9. Operator actions were then plotted on a time line to reflect the i time required to couplete each operator action and transit time between actions. If the completion of an operator action was a precondition to another operator action, then the time alotted for connonication between them was incorporated into the time line.
- 10. Any fire areas for which a fire necessitates the same set of manual actions were combined onto one time line.
3.7 Evaluation of 1-Hour Fire Barrier Confiauration 3.7.1 Criteria To address an NRC request that SCE demonstrate that Cerablanket could meet the requirements of a 1-hour' fire barrier, fire testing of the Cerablanket was conducted. '1his was completed by evaluating the Cerablanket test results for conpliance with NRC requirements and evaluating the SONGS 2 & 3 installation and inspection criteria for Cerablanket to ensure that tested assemblies were representative of in-plant installation. 3-26
. -_ -. - -. . - - . . _ . - -. -_ .-- , _ = _
In addition, the ability of existing raceway supports at SONGS 2
& 3 to withstand a design basis fire was also addressed.
'Ihe following NRC items of concern were addressed:
- 1. Support failure could result in significant damage and/or degradation of the protective fire barrier systen attached to the raceways which may expose the tray and its contents to fire.
- 2. Failure of supports could result in damage to the protective fire barrier of wrapped raceways located below the failed supports.
- 3. Support failure could also lead to penetration seal failure by inducing excessive tray and cable deflections at the penetration seals.
3.7.2 Methodoloav 3.7.2.a cerablanket In order to demonstrate that Cerablanket could meet the requirements of a 1-hour fire barrier, it is necessary to conduct the following tasks: 3-27
- 1. Cerablanket fire barriers provide a minimum 1-hour protection when subjected to the intense E119 time-temperature exposure.
- 2. Cerablanket fire barriers installed provide approximately 1-hour protection. In those (3 out of 9) instances where completed 1-hour protection was not demonstrated, these tested configurations installed to significantly relaxed criteria functioned properly for 50 minutes, 58 minutes and 59 minutes.
Cerablanket test cases meet a criteria of approximately one hour and are consistent with the Kaowool tests accepted by the NRC.
- 3. Circuit integrity was maintained throughout the test duration even though the NRC's conservative 325 F cold side temperature criteria was exceeded.
In addition, successful protection of the cables for one hour nust be as follows: o Cables maintained functional capability throughout the tested duration. o Cold side temperatures in excess of 325 F are justified by maintaining functional capability. 3-28
- ~\
i o Although there was limited cable insulation degradation, there was no evidence of ignition of cable insulation. 3.7.2.b Cable Tray Support Protection
% e methodology used in this task is as follows:
- 1. % e raceway supports at SONGS 2 & 3 must be shown to perform adequately in a real fire.
- 2. Compartment temperatures must be ensured to remain at levels low enough so as not to cause raceway support failure.
- 3. In the event the fire exposure in a compartment causes localized movement of raceways, it must be ensured that the penetration seals will not fail.
3.8 Cormonication Systems Evaluation 3.8.1 Criteria
%e performance criteria for the cormunications systems at SONGS 2 & 3 is as follows:
3-29
o SONGS 2 & 3 conmunications system is such that all manual actions will be carried out in an expeditious manner to assure a safe alternative shutdown. 3.8.2 Methodoloav h methodology used for this evaluation is as follows: o Identify communication points required for safe shutdown. o Review existing conmonication system and connitments. o If required, reconmend modifications. 3.9 Fire Area Boundary Evaluation h fire area boundaries of SONGS 2 & 3 have been evaluated to assess whether the boundaries provide adequate protection of redundant safe shutdown equipnent.
.3.9.1 Criteria h performance criteria for SONGS 2 & 3 is that all fire area boundaries separating redundant safe shutdown equipnent shall provide 3-30
i
%vte protection such that a single fire will not inpact the operability of the redundant safe shutdown equipnent.
3.9.2 Methodoloav
'Ihe following is the methodology used in the evaluation of the fire area boundaries:
l'. All fire area boundaries were identified based on the UFIR.
- 2. Each fire area boundary was compared to the fire area boundaries described in the original FIR which was approved via the SER.
Where the current condition of the barrier is consistent with ] that identified in the original FIR, then it was concluded that the barrier was previously approved on the basis of the fire hazards analysis contained in the FIR.
- 3. Where the current condition of a barrier is not consistent with that identified in the original FIR, then a rEHrvaluation of the acceptability of the current barrier was performed as provided for in Generic Letter 86-10. Examples of current conditions which are not considered consistent with the original FIR are a significant increase in combustible material in a fire area,
; unsealed openings not identified in the original FIR, and the l
3-31
- . .= - -. _ . .
presence of safe shutdown equipnent in fire areas in which safe shutdown equipnent was not identified in the original FIR.
- 4. For each boundary for which an ovaluation was performed, a fire protection engineer, assisted by a systems engineer as necessary, evaluated the acceptability of the barrier with respect to the fire hazards present and the function of the barrier 'to separate redundant safe shutdown equipnent.
- 5. For boundaries for which the engineering evaluation concluded that adequate protection is not provided for redundant safe shutdown equipnent, the need for sealing the barrier was identified and modifications initiated.
3.10 Appendix R III.G/III.L Compliance Assessment 3.10.1 Criterh 3.10.1.a Hot Standby (HSB) Components Outside Containment
- 1. One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions from either the control room or emergency control station (s) is free of fire damage (III.G.l.a) .
OR i 3-32 4
- 2. Separation of cables and equipnent and associated non-safe shutdown circuits of rat *nt trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Structural steel forming a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier (III.G.2.a).
- . OR
- 3. Separation of cables and equipnent and associated non-safe i shutdown circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area (III.G.2.b).
Note: Detection and suppression must be full area coverage. OR
- 4. Ehclosure of cable and equipnent and associated non-safe shutdown circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a one-hour rating (wrap must be barrier to barrier in the fire area). In addition, fire de*vetors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area (III.G.2.c).
Note: Detection and suppression must be full area coverage. OR 3-33 l
- 5. Alternative or dedicated shutdown capabiiity and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or components in the area, room, or zone under consideration shall be provided. In addition, fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system shall be installed in the area, room, or zone under t
consideration (III.G.3) . OR
- 6. If the above criteria are not met one of the following may be provided:
- a. Deviation request without plant and/or procedure modification OR
- b. Deviation request with plant ancVor procedure modification.
OR
- c. Engineering evaluation to demonstrate the adequacy of partial area suppression and/or detection, and/or the adequacy of fire barriers. '1his evaluation shall be performed by a registered Fire Protection Engineer.
OR
- d. Plant modification (achieve compliance).
3-34
3.10.1.b Cold Shutdown (CSD) Conoonents outside Containment Any one of the acceptance criteria from section 3.10.1.a. OR Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown (but not required for hot standby) from either the control room or emergency control station (s) can be repaired within 72 hours (III.G.l.b) . 3.10.1.c Inside Containment
- 1. Any one of the acceptance criteria from section 3.10.1.a or i 3.10.1.b as applicable to hot standby equipnent or cold shutdown equipnent.
OR
- 2. Separation of cables and equipnent and associated non-safe shutdown circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance i
of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards (III.G.2.d) . L OR 4 4
- 3. Installation of fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system in the fire area (III.G.2.e) .
I Note: Detection and suppression must be full crea coverage. 1 4 3-35
OR
- 4. Separation of cables and equipnent and associated non-safe shutdown circuits of redundant trains by a non-contustible radiant energy shield (III.G.2.f) .
3.10.2 Methodoloov For each fire area in the plant, as designated by the UMR, an evaluation was conducted to assess ccanpliance with Appendix R, Sections III.G/III.L. his compliance assessment is depicted in Figure 3-5 sheets 1 through 3. %e following is an outline of the assessment methodology performed on a fire area basis:
- 1. Cable / component sorts were reviewed for each fire area. An electrical train was postulated for shutdown. This was used as a starting point for the analysis.
- 2. Appropriate design input was reviewed to determine if existing 1-hour protection was provided for the train postulated for shutdown where redundant trains existed in the same fire area.
- 3. An assessment of the impact of train interaction (components of one train which could impact shutdown from the opposite train) components was performed.
3-36
- 4. A high impedance fault analysis was performed for power supplies with more than two power supply cables in the fire area of interest.
I
- 5. W e safe shutdown logic diagrams were used to identify the !
components which are assumed lost as a result of the fire. I h ese components were postulated as lost (or not necessary for safe shutdown) because they were either: Components of the train not credited for shutdown. Components powered from power supplies with unacceptable breaker coordination or high i = = lance fault analysis. Components with unacceptable comon enclosure analysis. Components with unprotected cables in the fire area. Components located within the fire area and determined not to be free of damage.
- 6. A minimum set of safe shutdown components was identified which would provide successful logic paths for the safe shutdown functional requirements.
3-37
.-w- -~ . . _ , . -4, - ,.- -_, -
- 7. Circuit analysis was performed to determine if some components
.could be resolved. Wis included further analysis of components not previously credited as a result of unacceptable high 4%nce or connon enclosure analyses. For each hot standby, cold shutdown, higVlow pressure interface, or spurious operation component, the potential for spurious operation of the component was analyzed as follows:
h e circuit analysis considered all the various types of failure modes for each type of cable being analyzed, (i.e. Power, Control / Indication, Instrumentation and whether the primary power source is AC or DC). We types of circuit failures were: POWER CONHOL OR FAILURE MCEE AC DC INDICATION INS'IRGENIATION I Wire to Wire Short: x x x x Open Circuit: x x x x Short to ground: x x x 3-38
POWER CONIBOL OR FAILURE MODE AC DC INDICATION INS'IRGENIRTION Hot short to a 125V DC cable: x x x Hot short to a 120V AC cable: x x Hot short to a 480V AC cable (high/ low pressure interface components only) x
- ne effect of the failure on the conponent (i.e. spurious energization, loss of control, etc.) was determined using the available electrical drawings. All effects were documented in the circuit analysis evaluation. Standard analyses were written to be used where circuits associated with different equipnent were identical.
- % e effect of failures postulated in instrumentation cables were traced to the indication and/or safe shutdown components affected.
3-39
h e 125V DC system is an ungrounded system (i.e. the l batteries are floating). W erefore, only hot shorts to cables powered from the same battery needed to be addressed. Hot shorts from cables powered from other batteries would not affect circuit operation, except for higVlow pressure interface components. Hot shorts assumed that only one wire within each of the two cables short together. Wire to wire shorts assumed that only two wires within a cable were involved. For higVlow pressure interfaces, hot shorts involving mitiple wires were assumed to occur (i.e. three phase AC circuits). h e analysis write-up contained a specific statement about each of the failure modes being considered. W e analysis indicated the potential for erroneous indication of component status lights. he analysis, when discussing the loss of rem te manual switche.3, identified the panel that the switch is mounted on by its component tag number and/or descriptive title. 3-40
The following types of circuits were analyzed as not I l affecting safe shutdown: l l l o Circuits affecting only annunciation ancVor computer inputs with electrical isolation (e.g. relay coil to contact). o Indicating circuits not required for operation of the safe shutdown component (e.g. anneter circuits). o Circuits affecting only automatic control with manual override available in the Control Room. o Circuits whose failure modes only resulted in component failing to safe shutdown position. Credit was not taken for this failure mode (e.g. circuit to normally energized solenoid valve required to be deenergized). o cables listed against a 4160V switchgear providing power to its safe shutdown loads could only result in the loss of the switchgear if the control cables for its supply breaker were also located in the fire area. 3-41
- 8. For cables /couponents remaining unresolved, options were reviewed to determine the feasible reconmendations to obtain a satisfactory safe shutdown method and flowpath.
(see Figure 3-5 sheets 2 and 3).
- 9. If alternative shutdown capability was evaluated as an option, an additional analysis was perfonned. Figure 3-5, sheet 2 of 3, depicts the decision process used to review an area for alternative shutdown requirements. The following items were also considered to determine if alternative shutdown capability could be achieved:
Can the proposed alternative shutdown capability achieve the performance goals specified in Paragraph III.L.l? Is process monitoring instrumentation available to perform and control the performance goals specified in Paragraph III.L.2? Is the proposed alternative shutdown capability physically independent of the fire area under consideration? 3-42
- Can the alternative shutdown capability be isolated from the fire area under consideration by utilizing fire isolation switches ancVor operator actions? If so, do the fire isolation switches meet the reqairements of Generic Letter 85-097
- Deviation request (s) may be sutmitted regarding the specific requirements of Sections III.G.3 and III.L of Appendix R where justifiable bases exist.
- Do procedures exist to implement the alternative shutdown capability? If not, recuun, arm 3ations will be made for operator actions as necessary.
- Bas adequate suppression and detection been provided in the areas of concern?
- 10. 'Ibe above compliance assessment was documented in calculations and reports.
l 3-43 l
FIGURE 3-1 IDENTIFICATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS IDENTIFY SAFE SHUTCOWN SYSTEWS U DETERWINE OPERATONAL BOUNDARES OF SAFE SHUlV0WN SYSTEMS U d IDENTIFY FLOW PATHS CN P er 10's AND ~ ONE - LINE DIAGRAMS . ' ~ If p if toENTWY SSD COWPONENTS IN FLOW PATHS TRA:N INTER CTjoN A ATI N LOGC COMPONENTS B = U IDENTIFY THE FOLLOWING i INFORMAfl0N FOR EAQ4 COWPONENT; l SYSTEW _ U "
- FIRC AREA CATEGCRY ELECTRICAL TRAIN DESCRIPTION t
'l ENTER COWPONENTS AND ASSOCATED WFORMATION INTO THE CABLE OATABASE
. CENERATE SAFE SHUTDOWN LOCC O!ACRAMS r (DIAGRAMS TO INCLUDE y ALL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS) SME SHUTDOWN , COMPONENTS 10ENTFIED - q 6.9 n eure 3-5 If A Figure 3-2 I
FIGURE 3-2 IDENTIFICATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN CABLES F1gure 3-1 9 REVIEW APPROPR: ATE DRAWINGS TO IDEN11FY , CAaLES RELATED TO THE SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONDTS If If If Il IDENTIFY NON-SAFE IDENTVY AU210ARY !DDEFY SAFE SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN LOADS IDEH11FY PROESS " CONTACTS WICH WAY POWE.R SUPPUES ON SAFE 5HUTDOWN PANELS AND CABl.ES AFFECT THE COMPONDT power SUPPUES F1gure 3-3 3 9 4 II D g ARE THESE COMPONDIT3 NO ON THE
$50 COMPONDTS 0 Figure 3-1 UST T
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FIGURE 3-3 COMMON POWER SUPPLY ANALYSIS BREAKER COORDINATION g ,... m e . PREFORM A BREAMER C00RDINA10N S1UDY FOR ALL SAFE SHUTDOWN power SUPPUES I' r5 FEEDER BREAXER YES PRCPERLY C00R0lNATED-
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NO
'l If PROPOSE WODITICAT10NS DOCUWENT TO ENSURE PROPER ACCEPTABLE COORDINATION RESULTS il F
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l l FIGURE 3-5 (CONTINUED) SHEET 3 OF 3 APPENDIX R lli.G/lli.L COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT O ACCEPTABLE E M ADEWATE E r I OPUtATOR ADEQUATE UCN11NC / TlWE 8.15 WANPOWER COMMUNICA10N BLC.1.s AV g CONSTRNNTS , g i ? I 1 NO NO NO l' c, o _M SUP E ON YEI DETE ON t3 ~ f ' ' N
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% APPENDDf R COMPUANCE OPPOSTE yEs m ON CA8d NP.UT ELECTRICAL r j SHEETS TRMN RECOWWEND OM DEMATON + ygg WODIFICATON L
5
4.0 RESULTS 4.1 Identification of Safe Shutdown Systems, r<wnnnents, and Cables 1 4.1.1.a Identification of Safe Shutdown Systems Which Fulfill the Safe Shutdown Functional Requirements 4 4 The specific safe shutdown functional requirements necessary to n satisfy the criteria listed in Section 3.1.1 are: o Reactivity Control o RCS Temperature Control o RCS Pressure Control o RCS Inventory Control o Lor 4g Tarm Decay Heat Removal o Auxiliary Support Systerrs: i Containment Temperature Control Control Room HVAC Class 1E Essential Power and Distribution Plant Parameter Monitoring Component Cooling Water Salt Water Cooling i 4-1
Dnergency Chilled Water SSD Caponent INAC Wese shutdown functional requirements are described below: Reactivity Control Initial reactivity control is accomplished by the control rods which are inserted when the reactor trip breaker portion of the reactor protection system is de-energized either automatically or manually in the control room. Long term reactivity control function is accomplished by achieving and maintaining sufficient RCS boration to ensure subcriticality of the reactor from the hot standby condition to cold shutdown.
% e Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) charging pumps inject borated water for reactivity control.
RCS Temperature Control Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature control is achieved through steam generator pressure and level control. We decay heat removal function of the RCS shall be capable of transferring 4-2
fission product decay heat from the reactor core at a rate such that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded. Decay heat removal in hot standby is accomplished by the use of auxiliary feedwater pumps supplying water.to the steam generators from the condensate storage tanks. The secondary side pressure in the steam generators is maintained by operation of the atmospheric dump valves (ADV's) or the main steam safety valves. RCS Pressure Control RCS pressure control is achieved through the use of lE-powered pressurizer backup heaters, charging pumps, and pressurizer auxiliary spray in conjunction with pressurizer pressure instrumentation. 01arging pumps or pressurizer heaters are utilized to increase pressure (where heaters are available, they will be credited). Auxiliary spray is utilized to decrease pressure if cooldown rate does not provide sufficient pressure control. Pressure control is maintained by isolating normal pressurizer spray, isolating or depressurizing the Safety Injection Tanks (during cooldown/depressurization) and de-energizing the non-lE pressurizer heaters as well as control of steam generator pressure. Although not specifically credited in the logic diagrams, charging pumps may be used to control RCS pressure. RCS makeup through the use of the charging pumps is an essential function and has been shown to be available for a fire in any fire area. 4-3 l
Rdi Inventory Control
% e RCS make-up control function is achieved by ensuring that sufficient make-up inventory is provided by the charging pumps drawing suction from the BAMU tanks and RHST which perform the function to compensate for RCS fluid losses. %ese losses occur as a result of identified and unidentified leakage from the RCS and contraction of the RCS during cooldown from hot standby to cold shutdown conditions.
Iona-Term Decay Heat Removal Long-tean decay heat removal is provided by the Shutdown Cooling System through the low-pressure safety injection (LPSI) pumps and the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. Containment Coolina
%e containment t aperature shall be maintained within allowable limits. %is is to ensure containment building equipnent and instrumentation operability. Containment temperature is controlled by the Containment Bnergency HVAC System.
4
2 Control Room HVAC
% e control room al.num p ire shall be maintained within allowable limits for habitability and equipnent operation. his will be m 11shed by the control room and control room cabinet area Bnergency HVAC Systems.
Spent Fuel Pool Coolina l %e Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (SFPC) System is not required to be operational to support the safe shutdown of SONGS 2 & 3. However, SCE previously committed to protect one train of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System from fire damage. An evaluation of systems'in the plant which are available to ensure cooling of the spent fuel pool has demonstrated that additional capability is available. Examples of this capability are the makeup to the spent fuel pool from the refueling water storage tank or the fire water system. Makeup to the pool would not be required during the first 12 hours followiig the worst case loss of the normal cooling capability. i'
% erefore, SCE considers that the protection of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System is not required since it has been shown that alternate means of cooling would remain available.
I 1 2 1 4-5 ] l
,~r ---- . , _ . . _ . , - . . , , _ _ . . _ , _ _ _ _ , - _ _ . _ . . . . . _ , . . .
Class lE Essential ~ Power Distribution Systen
%e class lE electrical distribution system shall be capable of providing electrical power to identified safe shutdown couponents. Portions of the Non-Class lE distribution' system which may impact the operation of the Class lE distribution system are identified to ensure the availability of the Class lE system.
Plant Parameter Monitorino
% e process monitoring function shall be capable of providing direct readings of those plant process variables necessary for the -
plant operators to perform and/or control the safe shutdown functions. %is instrumentation includes pressurizer pressure, pressurizer level, cold leg (Tc) temperature, hot leg (%) temperature, steam generator level and pressure, level indication for tanks where required and diagnostic instrumentation for shutdown systems. 4-6 1
- e-- ,. - - , , _ . . . . _ . , - . _ _ . . _ - _
i 2he alternative shutdown capability includes instrumentation for monitoring the neutron flux in the source range. Though not required to support the normal safe shutdown capability, neutron flux monitoring capability is available for all fire areas outside the containment. .For fires poEtulated inside the containment, a fire area not requiring alternative shutdown, neutron flux indication may not be available. Adequate shutdown margin is assured through the monitoring of the injected volume of borated water from the boric acid makeup tanks. Inadvertent dilution of the RCS as a result of the spurious actuation of equipnent is not likely since fires inside the containment have been analyzed to not impact the operability of components which have the capability of supplying unborated water to the RCS makeup path. Inadvertent dilution of the RG will be avoided for fires inside the containment by the isolation of unborated water sources and through the monitoring of unanticipated increases in pressurizer level and the proper volume of boric ?.cid injected. Component Coolina Water the Component Cooling Water (COf) System provides cooling water to the shutdown cooling heat exchanger, low pressure safety injection p2mps, conponent cooling water pumps, reactor coolant pump seals, emergency chiller and the containment emergency cooling units. 4-7 l
Salt Water Coolina
%e Salt Water Cooling (SWC) System provides cooling water to the Component Cooling Water System via the saltwater cooling pumps and the ultimate heat sink (sea water) supplying water to the cmponent cooling water heat exchangers.
Dneraency Chilled Water he Dnergency Chilled Water (ECW) System provides cooling water for control room, boric acid makeup pump room, charging pump room, low pressure safety injection pump room, component cooling water pump room, switchgear room and electrical distribution room HVAC units. We E0f system supports equipnent in both Units 2 and 3. It has two redundant loops that are cooled by CCW and may be powered from either Unit 2 or 3. SSD Component HVAC Emergency BVAC fans are used in specific rooms of the plant to provide a controlled environment ensuring continued, proper operation of safe shutdown equignent. In addition to the cooling units identified in the Dnergency Chilled Water System above, 4-8
cooling units for the containment and fan units for the saltwater cooling puup rooms are utilized for shutdown. 4.1.1.b Identification of Safe Shutdown System Boundaries Having identified the functional requirements for safe shutdown, the systems necessary to fulfill these functions were identified, 4 their system boundaries were established and mode of operation 2 determined as described below. Detailed system interactions are depicted on the safe shutdown logic diagrams - Appendix C.
'Ibe logic diagrams have been developed to reflect the logic used for safe shutdown using equipnent identified in the Safe Shutdown Congonent List.
'Ihe Safe Shutdown Iogics have been arranged such that a fault affecting any one of the Safe Shutdown Components will address the impact of that component on the overall system requirements to support safe shutdown. Spurious operation components are included
- in the Safe Shutdown Component List and their effect on satisfying
- system success paths have been incorporated into the logic diagrams.
f l
- 4-9
.-..-.- .~.___ __.------. _.-.-__.._ _ ._ --- _ - _ . _ _ _ _ , _ _ - , _ _ _ ..,__,.,.c..mm---,_---
Where the spurious operation of a couponent could affect more than one success path on the logic diagram, an exclusive gg gate is provided such that the component nost be isolated or controlled to satisfy the logic diagram. Ebr all systems described, the system boundaries were drawn at miscellaneous instrument taps, tank overflow lines, closed vent and drain lines, steam traps, wye strainers, casing drains, closed manual valves and properly oriented check valves in addition to specific boundaries cited below. Reactor Coolant System
'Ihe Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is operated per approved procedures.
o No credit is taken for the forced circulation of the RCS. i-o No credit is taken for the use of the Pressurizer Spray Valves W-0100A & B during the transition from power operation to cold shutdown. Pressure is controlled by auxiliary spray, IE-powered pressurizer backup heaters, controlling the steam generator pressure, charging pumps and isolating or depressurizing the Safety Injection Tanks. 4-10
%e primary system bcr.indaries for the RCS are the reactor vessel, the two hot legs, four cold legs, the four Reactor Coolant Pump seals, the pressurizer and the tube side of the steam generators.
In addition, the system boundary extends to the RCS sartple line containment isolation valves. Boundaries for'the Reactor Coolant System also include the following: o A boundary drawn at the RCS letdown line containment isolation valves. At this boundary the RCS interfaces with the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) . o A boundary drawn at valves BV-9337 and HV-9377. At this boundary the RCS interfaces with the Shutdown Cooling System. nese valves are normally closed. Wey are opened only to establish a flow lath for shutdown cooling operations. o A boundary drawn at the safety injection tanks. c A boundary drawn at the reactor vessel vent valves and pressurizer vent valves. Wese valves are classified as spurious operation components not high/ low pressure 4-11 l
boundary conponents based on the FSAR design basis for the reactor coolant vent gas system (FSAR section 9.3.7.1.2.A.2). We design criteria ensures that with the vent valves open, the loss of reactor coolant is within the charging pump makeup capacity to the RCS thereby limiting the mass loss to below the definition of a IOCA in 10GR50, Appendix A. % erefore, the vent valves do not constitute a high/ low pressure boundary. Main Steam System
%e Main Steam System (MSS) is operated per approved procedures.
o Steam generator pressure and level indication are provided in the control room, at the Evacuation Shutdown (EVSD) Panel, ancVor at the Emergency Plant Parameters Monitoring (EPPM) Panel. o We steam generator atmospheric dump valves (ADV's) are manually operated to control steam generator pressure. W e main system boundaries are as follows:
- 1. . Valve HV-8421
- 2. Valve HV-8419 4-12
- 3. Valve HV-8204
- 4. Valve HV 8205
- 5. Valve HV-8203
- 6. Valve HV-8202
- 7. Valve HV-4053
- 8. Valve HV-4054
- 9. Valve HV-4057
- 10. Valve HV-4058 Boundaries for the Main Steam System also include the following:
o A boundary at the entrance to valves HV-8200 and HV-8201.
%ese valves supply steam to the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump (P-140) turbine, and are both normally open and fail open. % ese valves and the piping downstream are evaluated as part of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
o Main steam code safety valves. o Auxiliary feedwater (AEW) and main feedwater (MEW) isolation valves. W ey are considered part of the AEW and MEW systems. 4-13
Auxiliary Feedwater System Se Auxiliary Feedwater (AEW) System is operated per approved procedures. o he APW Systen is to be used to reduce the RG to the pressure (375 psia) and temperature (340 degree F) necessary for operation of the Shutdown Cooling System. his requires the AEW system to operate during hot standby to the initiation of shutdown cooling. 2 o he steam driven AEW pump, P-140, can be operated by ' manually controlling its steam supply valve, BV-4716 in the event the normal control panel for SV-4700 is disabled. o Credit is taken for manual action to_ realign valves
- connecting condensate storage tanks 'P-121 to tank T-120, so that tank > 120 can gravity feed to tank T-121.
i o' Credit is taken for manual action to realign valves to supply firewater to T-121, in the event both 'F-121 and j T-120 inventories are depleted. W e three demineralized
- j. condensate storage tanks have no technical specification '
1 minimum that can be credited, but their large storage capacity may be used if available. t , i 4-14 - a 'f
- - < - - - - , , - - ----n+ , , - . - - , - _ , , , ._,~-,,,,-,e - - , - _ - ,_r,n_-__-,--- -
- n. . , ,,- - - - . . , - - - , - - -
o Credit is taken for manual isolation of condenser make-up and sluice water pump lines. We primary system boundary for the AEW System is the entrance to the steam generators. Main steam valves HV-8200 and HV-8201 and piping downstream to the AEW turbine driven pumps are considered AEW. We following additional boundaries are associated with condensate storage tank water supply to the AEW pumps:
- 1. T-121 and T-120
- 2. 8"-092-W-212 (1414MUO92)
- 3. 8"-474-D-212 (1305MU474)
Feedwater System We Feedwater System (EWS) is operated per approved procedures.
! n ese procedures will be used to isolate the steam generators from the feedwater system.
t O 4-15 i
S e primary system boundaries are as follows:
- 1. W-4048
- 2. W-4052
! Boundaries for the Feedwater System also include the following: o A boundary drawn at the entrance to steam generators 2 88 and E89. % e steam generators are identified on the Main i Steam System. i l o %e hydraulic fluid return line boundary for valves W-4048 and W-4052 are drawn at the entrance to the hydraulic fluid reservoir and the valve's actuator piston. Se safe shutdown function of these valves is to close (i.e., drain the hydraulic fluid out of the valve actuator, causing the valve to fail closed). We reservoir and hydraulic pump , are not SSD components. Q1emical and Volume Control System
%e 01emical and Volume Control System (CVCS) is operated per approved procedures.
1 i' 4-16
o W e flow paths chosen for CVCS are those that result in cold leg RCS injection only. W e normal charging path is via the spring loaded check valve bypassing W-9202 and W-9203. o %e Boric Acid Make-up (BAMU) tanks, T-071 and M72 will be used for reactivity control (boron addition) . Additional inventory is necessary from the RHST to ensure sufficient volume to compensate for RCS contraction during cooldown. W e RWST, however, does not contain a sufficiently high boron concentration to preclude the need for the BAMU tanks. o Only one of the two letdown line valves identified as safe shutdown nust be closed to isolate RCS letdown. W e primary system boundaries are as follows:
- 1. RWSTs (T-005 and T-006)
- 2. BAMU tanks M71 and T-072
- 3. W-9201
- 4. TV-9267
- 5. W-9323 4-17
- 6. HV-9326
- 7. HV-9329
- 8. HV-9332 Boundaries for the Chemical and Volume Control System also includes the following:
o High-pressure safety injection (HPSI) pungs M17, P-018, and P-019, containment spray pumps P-012 and M13, and the suction piping to low-pressure safety injection (LPSI) punp P-015 and P-016. W e HPSI and containment spray pumps are spurious operation concerns that can drain the BWST. We LPSI punps are included in the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System. o LPSI to RCS loop isolation valves. Wese are included in the SDC system. l o %e Safety Injection Tanks (SIT) and their associated fill, vent, and isolation valves are included in the SDC system. Shutdown Coolina Systen t e Shutdown Cooling System will be operated per approved procedures. 4-18
- - _ _ . . -- - .. . - _ _ _ _ - --= .. ._
The main systen boundaries are as follows:
-1. Valve 16"-0023-C-173 (1204MUO23)
- 2. Valve 16"-0022-C-173 (1204M0022)
- 3. Valve HV-9368
- 4. Valve HV-9367
- 5. Valve HV-9340*
- 6. Valve HV-9350*
- 7. Valve HV-9360*
- 8. Valve HV-9370*
- 9. Valve HV-8162
)
- 10. Valve HV-8163
- 11. Valve HV-9345*
i
- 12. Valve HV-9355*
- 13. Valve ifV-9365*
- 14. Valve HV-9375*
l
- 15. Valve HV-9341*
- 16. Valve HV-9351*
- 17. Valve HV-9361*
- 18. Valve HV-9371*
1
- 19. Valve HV-9322
- 20. Valve HV-9325
- 21. Valve HV-9328 l
I d 'I 4-19 i _ . . . . _ . . _ . . , , _ _ . . _ . _ . _ . . . . ~ . _ _ . . . . _ _ . _ _ , - _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ , _ . - . _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . , _ _ _ . _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _
- 22. Valve BV-9331
- 23. Valve HV-9337
- 24. Valve HV-9377
- Safety injection tank valves have been identified as shutdown cooling system couponents for the purpose of this evaluation although these components are associated with the safety injection system.
Boundaries for the Shutdown Cooling System also include the following: o An arbitrary boundary drawn at valves HV-8162 and HV-8163.
% ese valves are normally open. However, they must be closed in order to establish shutdown cooling.
Cocoonent Coolina Water System
%e Conponent Cooling Water (COf) System is operated per approved procedures.
o % e non-critical loop supplies cooling water to the RCP
- 4-20
seals. 'Ihe non-critical loop isolation valves will fail-closed on loss of air, but can be opened by handwheels. o c&t cooling water to the reactor coolant puup seals may be interrupted for up to 30 minutes with the pumps operating (UFSAR, Revision 2 design criteria) and 24 hours ! with the punps off.
'na primary system boundaries are as follows:
- 1. 12"-100-D-221 (1203MU100)
- 2. 12"-002-D-221 (1203MU002)
- 3. Surge tanks M 03A and N 04B i 4. Individual couponent heat exchangers.
], l Salt Water Coolina System
'Ihe Salt Water Cooling (SWC) System is operated per approved procedures. .
1
'Ihe pungs are set within the intake structure, which allows direct punp suction from the intake forebay. A boundary is drawn at the 9
I h 4-21 i
end of the circulating water return piping into the ultimate heat sink. tis is the discharge point for the SWC System. Containment Bneraency Coolino System he Containment Emergency Cooling System (CBCS) is operated per approved procedures. o 'IWo emergency cooling units are required to operate during the shutdown sequence. o %e containment dome air circulators (A-071, A-072, A-073, and A-074) are not required for safe shutdown. We primary system boundaries for the containment Emergency Cooling System are the air intake points on the cooling units and the eight air discharge points in the lower portions of the containment. Component Cooling Water provides cooling to the cooler coils in the cooling units. Dneraency Chilled Water System he anergency Chilled Water System (EGS) is operated per approved procedures. 4-22
o %e anergency Water 01111ers E-335 and E-336, the Chilled Water Pumps P-160 and P-161 and the Chiller Oil Pumps P-444 and P-445 will be identified as safe shutdown cortponents; other components internal to the skid are not identified separately. We system boundary for the Emergency Chilled Water System is the pressure boundary for the cooling water flowing through the system. W e system is a closed loop system with the exception of a makeup water line from the nuclear service water system. A check valve, which prevents flow out of the Dnergency Chilled Water System, provides the system boundary on this line. Diesel Generator Systems
%e Diesel Generator (D/G) Systems are operated per approved procedures.
o % e diesel generator and all components mounted on the D/G skid are to be considered a single SSD component for the purpose of the analysis. D/G systems including cooling water, air start, and fuel transfer along with the D/G itself are closed loop systems and have no special boundary considerations. 4-23
HVAC Systems
%e Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems are operated per approved procedures.
he system boundary for each HVAC unit, for which credit is taken, is drawn at the end of air intake and exhaust ducting for each couponent. HVAC systems are required for the following rooms. SWC Pump P ll2A Room SWC Pump P-ll3B Room SWC Pump P-ll4B Room SWC Pump P-307A Room Train A Switchgear Room Train B Switchgear Room LPSI P-015 Room 005 LPSI P-016 Room 002 CVCS P-190 Room 106A CVCS P-191 Room 106B CVCS P-192 Room 106C 4-24
BAMU P-174 Room 105A BAMU P-175 Room 105B COf P-024 Room 8 Cof M 25 Boom 7 Cof H 26 Boom 6 Control Room Complex Bnercency HVAC System
'the Control Room Complex (CRC) HVAC System is operated per i
approved procedures.
'Ihe primary system boundaries are as follows:
- 1. Damper HV-9756
- 2. Danper HV-9717
- 3. Damper HV-9711 4
- 4. Danper HV-9779
- 5. Damper HV-9703 l
4.1.2 Identification of Safe Shutdown Components Using the P&ID's for the safe shutdown systems, all conponents within the boundaries defined above which were required to operate or i 4-25
,. \ maintain a given position were identified as safe shutdown components. For each safe shutdown conponent, the following data was identified:
- o. Conponent ID o Category
-o System o Description o Fire Area o Electrical Train o Drawing Reference h above information was entered into the conputer databace (CABLE) . h Safe Shutdown Component List is provided in Appendix B.
All ESFAS instrumentation whose spurious indication could result in spurious actuation of safe shutdown components was identified and logic required to initiate ESFAS actuation was determined. All components which are'related to one electrical train but may affect the ability to shutdown using the opposite train were identified. 'itese couponents include redundant train isolation valves and boundary valves located at interfaces of redundant process 5 trains. d* 4-26
2ese couponents were identified by entering a 5" in the " Train Interaction" colunn of the SSD Conponent List. Component electrical trains are defined by the train of the power distribution system supporting the component process train and are defined by the train '; ? of the active caponents in a process path (i.e. train of punp, fans, etc.). One system level safe shutdown logic diagram and six conponent level diagrams were developed for each unit. % ese logic diagrams as listed below are presented in Appendix C: Figure 1 Safe Shutdown System I4gic Figure 2 Inventory, Pressure and Reactivity Control Figure 3 Hot Standby Temperature Iogic Figure 4 Cold Shutdown Temperature Logic Figure 5 Auxiliary Support Systems Figure 6 Control Room and Containment INAC Imgic Figure 7 Electrical Power Iogic 4.1.3 Identification of Safe Shutdown cA les. Using the methodology presented in Section 3.1.2.c the safe shutdown cables were identified and entered into a database. 4-27
l l 4.2 Comon Power Sucolv Analysis 4.2.1 Breaker Coordination Study he SONGS Units 2 & 3 safe shutdown electrical distribution system will be properly coordinated and will ensure that a fault in a safe shutdown power supply feeder will be isolated by its own protective J device before the upstream isolation device actuates with the implementation of the breaker adjustments and fuse replacements reconnended in the study. 4.2.2 High I=whnce Fault Analysis A high i= w hnce fault analysis was performed on each power supply affected in a fire area. h e effect of high impedance faults were then factored into the Appendix R Compliance Assessment for each fire area. %e following fire areas required additional manual operator actions to strip faulted loads and then reclose the feeder breaker for the affected bus: 2-AR-24-100 3-AR-24-101 2-AR-24-102 3-SE-(-5)-135 2-SE-(-5)-135 3-SFe(-15)-136 2-SE-(-15)-136 3-CP-(-2)-142 4-28
2-CP-(-2)-142 3-CO-15-1 2-AC-9-16 3-PE-45-3 2-00-15-1 3-AC-50-60 2-AC-30-23 3-AR-9-92 2-AC-30-27 3-AR-9-96 2-AC-50-37 2-PE-45-3 2-AC-50-40 2-AR-9-88
'Ihe actions to clear high impedance faults have been factored into the Time and Manpower Study.
4.3 Co_ mon Enclosure Analysis As a result of the Conmon Enclosure Evaluation the following conclusions were drawn:
- 1. Appropriate design measures exist to ensure that any fire induced electrical faults will not cause unacceptable damage to a safe shutdown circuit (at another location) which shares a conmon enclosure with that faulted circuit.
- 2. Appropriate design measures exist to prevent propagation of the fire into a comon enclosure.
4-29
SONGS Units 2 & 3 design precluded the possibility that any circuits associated by connon enclosure would prevent safe shutdown after a fire. 4.4 Evaluation of Damage to SSD Equitznent due to Fire Protection System Pipe Rupture and Fire Suppression Activities. In analyzing the effects of pipe rupture and fire fighting activities no fire areas were identified for which safe shutdown was adversely affected. 4.5 Seismic Evaluation of the RCP Lube Oil Collection System As a result of this evaluation the following conclusions were drawn:
- 1. W e collection tanks and collection piping were designed to the appropriate design code, correct design loads, load corobinations and allowable stresses. %is conclusion is established by verifying that the design criteria used adequately addresses the functional requirements of the system and is in conformance with standard engineering practice for applications of this type.
- 2. %e implementation of design criteria in the existing design was verified to be correct for all aspects of the design. his 4-30
conclusion is established by verifying correct application of design codes, loads, load cabinations, material properties, allowable stresses, parameters and methods of analysis in the design calculation. Representative checks of numerical calculations for critical couponents and typical segments of piping provide further evidence that the existing design was performed correctly.
- 3. For the controlling SSE load combination, the collection tanks are stressed to 70% of allowable limits and the collection piping is stressed to between 20% and 55% of allowable limits.
Substantial design margin exists for these components.
- 4. Independent analysis calculations were performed for the collection pans. h e pans and supports are stressed below the allowable limits and adequate margin exists for these couponents.
- 5. Regulatory Guide 1.29 defines the structures, systens and compcnents required to withstand the effects of the SSE and remain functional. As stated in Appendix R, III.0, the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.29, position C.2 are applicable to the oil collection system, including all components and piping that comprise the system as demonstrated in this report. We 4-31
r T provisions of the Regulatory GL11de are met through the utilization of Seismic Category I design criteria in the design i of the oil collection system. Although the oil collection system is designated as seismic Category II, adverse seismic Category II over Seismic Category I interactions are avoided by utilizing Seismic Category I criteria in the system design. %erefore, compliance with the requirements to Appendix R III.O is demonstrated. 4.6 Time and Manpower Study 1 i Se 10CFR50 Appendix R Coupliance Evaluation identifies operator actions which are required to ensure that a safe shutdown can be achieved. Wese manual actions are identified on a fire area basis. W ey represent the worst case conbination of manual
. actions required as a result of an Appendix R fire.
h e Time and Manpower Study was conducted to ensure that the required ====1 actions are coupleted within the required time constraints with the manpower available. In addition, the Time and Manpower Study identifies the order in which manual actions are to be inplanented. tis order is selected to ensure that actions with the shortest time constraints are given the highest priority. Bis limits the extent of perturbations in system 4-32
parameters which may occur as a result of the fire, thereby ensuring thst a safe shutdown can be achieved. Se manual actions , which are given the highest priority are those associated with reactor trip, closure of main steam and main feedwater iso 3ation valves, protection of punps required to operate during shutdown, and tripping of the reactor coolant pungs. As a result of the Time and Manpower Study, the following conclusions were drawn:
- 1. In order to fornulate the time lines, the information in the manual action feasibility evaluation, was rrriews 't . the
" time critical" actions, those required to be t.2 ken Lz a7 hours or less, were identified. Given a start time of 20 minutes after indication of system atmormal operation, the operators can accouplish all of the actions assigned to them such that the system operational requirements are met within an acceptable period of time. S e time line analysis of operator actions required for safe shutdown indicate that sufficient manpower was available to safely shutdown both units in an Appendix R event.
4 4-33 W
,c ,- ,, , - - - < -
- 2. In addition to the actions specified above, camonication requirements were also addressed on the time lines. 'Ihese requirements were called out when one operator action was to be coordinated with another or when it was necessary for an l operator to report his action back to the central plant ;
control point. l l
- 3. For all of the manual actions identified on the time lines, the transit time between actions, the time to perform the actions and emergency lighting conditions were evaluated.
As part of the additional analysis being performed at SONGS 2 and 3, including the recent Appendix R guidance criteria, additional areas where operator actions are required have been identified. Examples of the additional operator actions include those actions required to mitigate the potential effects of spurious actuations. Access / egress pathways and specific action locations are being provided with 8 hour energency lighting fixtures. 'Ihe areas where additional lighting is required are identified in the results of the evaluation. Based on implementation of the above modifications, SONGS 2&3 will meet the requireraents of 10CFR50 Appendix R III.J. z: , U 4-34
- 4. Field walkdowns were conducted in order to compile a list of transit Hwa between operator actions. During the walkdowns, the location of the actions and the access and ,
egress routes'were examined to ensure % nte emergency
~
lighting was provided. Estimates of the time to couplete the action itself were provided by SONGS 2/3 Operations personnel and were based upon their knowledge of the valve type, size and configuration in the plant.
- 5. h time to complete the actions was corrpared to the system time constraint listed in the manual action feasibility evaluation. It was verified that all operator actions were coupleted at or before the specified time.
- 6. h time lines were evaluated to deterr::ine if any actions were being performed within the fire area prior to one hour.
If this condition was found to exist, alternate manual actions which could be performed outside of the fire area were specified. Where this was not possible, a justification as to why the action could be performed in the area in less , than one hour was formulated. These justifications are found in the manual action feasibility evaluation. Manual actions i required to be conducted in the fire area where the fire occurs are avoided whenever possible. 'Ihis is done to limit 4-35
the possible time delay for completing the action resulting from the fire fighting activities which nost occur prior to entry into the fire area. For cases where an action in the area of the fire is required prior to 1 hour, an evaluation has been conducted to ensure that the action can be completed subsequent to extinguishing the fire without exceeding the time constraints for the action. Actions in the fire area in less than one hour where an Appendix R fire scenario occurs include: Manual closure of the VCT Outlet Valves 2LV-0227B and 3LV-0227B in fire zone 2-AR-37-102A to isolate the VCT. Manual control of the SWC Heat Exchanger 002B Discharge Valves 2HV-6495 and 3HV-6495, in fire zones 2-TB-9-148F and 3-TB-9-148F, respectively, in order to provide saltwater cooling to the C0f system.
- 7. The time lines account for all actions taking place outside of the control room (fire area 2-AC-30-20) and actions internal to the centrol room which are preconditions for completing the actions in the field.
4-36
- 8. In addition, there are several manual actions which are atteM innediately in the control room for a fire in an area that affects the circuitry for the following priority actions:
tripping the reactor
- tripping the reactor coolant pumps tripping the charging pungs closing the MSIVs and MFIVs The actions discussed above were explicitly shown on the time line for Alternative Shutdown fire areas and were implicit in the actions specified for the areas where evacuation of the control room is not necessary. With the exception of tripping the reactor, if the circuitry or components which ensure that these priority actions may be coupleted from the control room are affected in the area of the fire, actions in the field will be coupleted as soon as possible to prevent spurious operation of the above components (e.g. trip DC power) to ensure the attempted control room actions are completed.
4-37
- 9. Operator actions required to be coupleted outside the fire area prior. to 1 hour were addressed. 'Ibe actions outside a fire area within 1/2 hour include:
stripping potential high i i *h-se faulted loads then ~ reclosing feeder breakers at various 120V,125V, 480V and 4160V power supplies. starting the diesel generator and closing the diesel generator breaker at the switchgears. deenergizing AEW and CVCS punps at the switchgear or loadcenter. isolating the fault in the eof chiller circuit then reclosing the switchgear feeder breaker at the switchgear rooms. setting-up the EPIM and monitoring it. deenergizing MEW and MSS valves at the LO71 panel in the control room. 4 4-38 y - - - . - - - - - . - - - - - , - ~ .
tripping switchyard breaker feeds to Train A and Train B switchgears from offsite power. tripping RCP load breakers. tripping feeds to pressurizer heaters at their respective load centers. deenergizing RCS isolation valves at LO71 panel in the control room. Other manual actions outside the fire area that are to be conpleted within one hour include recovering (XW, SWC, EN, and CVCS systems. All of the above manual actions were incorporated into a timeline to reflect the manpower required to couplete those actions within the specified time. Based on ccapletion of the above evaluations, it was determined that manual actions required for safe shutdown can be compl- .ad in the time required to limit the effects on plant parameters so as to ensure that a safe shutdown can be achieved for a fire in any fire area. 4-39 i 1
- 10. Se time constraints utilized in the Appendix R analysis for operator actions are based on analyzed events. %ese time constraints are as follows:
A 30-minute time constraint was established for operator actions required to isolate the RCS. his time constraint was based on the FSAR evaluations for a postulated pipe rupture in the letdown line where an operator action to isolate letdown was credited within 30 minutes. S e safe shutdown operator actions were bounded by this previously evaluated case. A 60-minute time constraint was established to restore charging. Loss of RCS inventory following a loss of letdown would be from the technical specification identified and unMentified leakage of 11 gpn. We loss of inventory until charging is restored at 60 minutes would be 660 gallons. W e loss of this inventory would not lead to an unrecoverable condition.
- A 30-minute time constraint was established for restoring and controlling auxiliary feedwater. Operator actions to restore and control auxiliary feedwater within 30 minutes d
- 4-40
were based on the FSAR evaluations of a steam line break where an operator action to restore feedwater was credited within 30 minutes. W e Appendix R safe shutdown operator actions were bounded by this previously evaluated case. 4.7 Evaluation of 1-Hour Fire Barrier Conficuration
- 1. An evaluation was completed of the SONGS 2 & 3 raceway fire barriers and raceway supports to demonstrate compliance to 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements. his evaluation addressed the justification of the Cerablanket fire wrap material currently installed at SONGS 2 & 3 and the adequacy of existing raceway support protection.
- 2. Qualification testing of Cerablanket demonstrated that the installed raceways at SONGS 2 & 3 are protected for approximately one hour without loss of circuit integrity. Wis conclusion is based on functionally testing circuits within wrapped raceways during exposure to an AS'IM E-119 fire exposure test. We 325 F criteria is also satisfied because the testing provides justification, as allowed in 86-10, for exceeding the specified tenperature rise. It is also concluded that since the results of the cerablanket test are in agreement 4-41 L
l
5 with the results of the 1978 Kaowool test with regard to actual cable failure Hmpa, that Cerablanket is also acceptable. 'No layers of Cerablanket covering the raceways with 3" of the intervening support protected provide approximately 1 hour fire protection for the cables.
- 3. 'the existing raceway support protection is adequate to ensure the functional integrity of the protected raceways and fire area boundary seals that they penetrate. The basis for this conclusion is the qualification testing performed, historical evidence, the existence of plant fire protection systens, the margin of safety in raceway support designs (as a result of seismic and other considerations) and penetration seal material behavior.
- 4. The Cerablanket fire tests performed in 1984 tested 17 configurations of conduit and cable tray wraps which were representative of wrapped raceways at SatG 2 and 3. These 17 configurations were subjected to a severe AS'D1 Fel19 exposure for 1 hour with no failure of the supports and no observed deterioration in the structural capacity of the support. As cited in the test report, the test sp ei = ui included raceway supports which were protected as they are in the plant configurations. '1he support loading in the plant is higher than 4-42
the loading on the test specimens. his can be compensated for based on the compartment tenperatures expected at SONGS 2 and 3. Several factors assure that SON @ 2 and 3 compartment temperatures will remain at levels low enough so as not to cause receway support failure. % ese factors have not been included in the develognent of the compartment temperature data presented in the Updated Fire Bazards Analysis (UFIR), but are realistic. Wese factors are: o Suppression and Detection Because SONGS 2 and 3 has wide spread use of both water spray systems and wet pipe sprinkler systems, a compartment fire will be extinguished or significantly cooled at very early stages of the fire, resulting in low temperatures and short fire durations. o Cnsite Fire Department
%e San Oncfre Fire Department consist of professionally trained full time personnel whose primary responsibility is fighting fires at San Onofre. W e Fire Department members are certified fire fighters and are on duty per 4-43
shift. h eir ability to respond quickly and initiate extinguishment of any fire will limit accessible conpartment temperatures. o Fire Develognent Characteristics f l l Temperatures provided in the UFIR assume all compartment l l combustibles are ignited sinultaneously. Fire developnent l considerations will significantly reduce these peak i compartment temperatures. % e primary conbustible in areas where raceways are wraIped is cable insulation. Full scale tests conducted by DUC/EPRI demonstrate a lateral spread rate of 6 to 7 feet per hour in horizontal tray stacks. R ese figures agree with observed flame spread rates in the cable trays during the Browns Ferry Fire. Wese very slow fire spread rates (based on Non-IEEE 383 cable) substantiate a very slow growing fire and associated slow temperature rise in the fire compartment. Additionally, SONGS 2 and 3 utilizes IEEE 383 cable which will make a fire less likely to start and much slower developing. 4-44
Because structural steel mechanical properties start to degrade significantly at temperatures only in excess of 1100 F, consideration of the factors cited above which drastically j reduce compartment temperatures, supports the fact that existing raceway support are adequate. 4.8 O==niications Systems Evaluation I h e design of the existing coumunication system was found to meet the I prior connitments. However, to be consistent with the guidance in Appendix R, including a loss of offsite power concurrent with a fire, modifications will be implemented which will enhance the existing conmunication capability to ensure that adequate comunication to support safe shutdown system operation will be available post fire. 4.9 Fire Area Boundary Evaluation h e results of the fire area boundary evaluation demonstrated that the SONGS Units 2 & 3 fire area boundaries provide adequate protection of redundant safe shutdown equipnent with the exception of boundaries in 9 fire areas. %ose fire areas for which an engineering evaluation of an area boundary was performed are identified in the attached Summary Table. %ose fire areas for which an engineering evaluation of an area boundary determined that sealing of the barrier is a required modification are also identified in the attached Sumary Table. 4-45
4.10 Appendix R III.G/III.L Compliance Assessment We results are sunmarized in the attached Sunmary Table listed by fire area number. We notes corresponding to the nunbered items on the Sunmary Table are located at the end of the table. 4.10.1 Proposed Modifications Based on the Appendix R III.G/III.L Compliance Assessment Evaluation, several modifications and repairs were proposed. %ese results are sunmarized as follews:
- 1. Fuse Modifications Fuses will be added to the control circuit.
- 2. Dnergency Lighting Eight hour emergency lighting will be provided for pathways utilized for manual actions at the components.
- 3. Local Instrument Indicator Modifications A local indicator will be added to various systens to either indicate the level, temperature or flow rate. Cold shutdown repair for SDC temperature and flow is required in conjunction with the modification.
4-46
- 4. Cable Wrap Modifications Raceways will be wrapped to provide either one-hour rated or three-hour rated protection for the cables.
- 5. Power Lockout Modifications Power lockout to various valves will be provided to prevent spurious operation.
- 6. Circuit and Switch Modifications Various cables will be rerouted or rewired in addition to adding isolation switches.
- 7. Connanication System he cormunications system will be enhanced to provide comunication for manual actions identified in the Appendix R Assessment.
- 8. Saltwater Cooling (SWC) Modifications
%ese modifications involve modifying control .ircuits and installing platforms for SWC valves.
- 9. Modification of ADVs his modification is required to facilitate manual operation of the Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs).
4-47
i
- 10. Miscellaneous modifications to support deviations (i.e.
removing tray covers, adding metal hatches).
- 11. Penetration Seal Modification
'Ihis modification is to provide penetration seals in the fire area boundaries.
- 12. Valve /Danper Operator Modification Modification to the operator for valves / dampers to alter i 1
their safe shutdwon failure position.
- 13. Modification to Sprinkler System j Modification to enhance the fire protection sprinklers systen.
4.10.2 Hig VLow Pressure Interface Valves
'Ihe valves identified as Category HLP in the component list (Appendix B) were evaluated for spurious operation which could result in failure of the hig Vlow pressure interface with the Reactor Coolant System.
j 'Ihese valves were analyzed as follows:
- 1. SDC Letdown Isolation Valves HV-9337 and HV-9377 provide a i
higVlow pressure interface between the RCS and the Shutdown Cooling System. Valves HV-9337 (Train A) and HV-9339 (Train B) J 4-48 _/ , _ . , - . _ _ __ _ . , _ , _ - . _ . , . _ _ - . . - . . . . , _ _ . - . _ . . . _ . _ , _ - . _ _ _ . _ _ , , . _ _ . . . . . - . _ . , _ , , _ _ , _ _ - - . - . , - . . , _ . _ _ _ , ~ , - ,
. . - - - - - .- -. - ~. .-.-. - . ._ _.
are in series while HV-9377 (Train C) and HV-9378 (Train D) are t in series. A modification is being inplemented power to lockout the AC breaker.at the Motor Control Center / inverter for the Train A and C valves to prevent inadvertent opening due to control circuit hot shorts.
'Itiree phase hot shorts were also evaluated for the valves. Se I
Train A and Train B valve power cables were evaluated for adequate separation. Se only fire area in which both power cables were routed was insida the containment. Scparation of 4 the power cables was analyzed in the containment deviation request. Se Train C and Train D power cables are routed only in Train C and D raceways, respectively. Sere are no other Train C or D 480V cables which could short to these power cables, therefore spurious operation would not occur for the Train C and D valve power cables. j
- 2. RCS Normal Letdown Valves HV-9205 and HV-9267 are normally open and are desired closed for a fige. % e Train B valve is motor operated while the Train A valve is an air operated solenoid i controlled valve which fails closed on loss of air or deenergization of DC power. Separation is maintained between the cables for those valves. For alternative shutdown, the DC power to the Train A Control Room circuits is stripped to ensure closure of the Train A valve.
4-49 A m-.- ,-- - . . ... . ..-,,m ,- _ -,--.,,,-m, m..m, --,---v.--,,,--.-,w-
APPEM)IX R III.G/III.L C3tPLIANCE JLN SQ9U@f 'DuLE ME'INOD(S)
- FIRE OF CIBCIIIT MANUM.
AREA C3(PLIANCE . DEVIATION - EVALIRTION MG)IFIOLTIONS ANM,YSIS SEPARATION ACTIONS REPAIRS. i { 2-CD-15-1 III.G.1, Y 12b,12c -
"* ,9 2 10a,10b. -
III.G.2.d 2-PE-(-18)-2 III.G.1 N 12a- - 3 2 10a,10b - 2-PE-45-3 III.G.2.b Y 12b, 12c lif 3,9 2 10b - 2-AC-9-5 III.G.3 N 12a, 12c 11b, 11d 3 2,7 10b - - 3-AC-9-6 III.G.3 N 12a,12c 11b, Ild 3 2,7 10b - 3-AC-9-7 III.G.3 N 12a,12c 11b, lle, 3 2,7,5 10b - 11d
, 2-AC-9-8 III.G.1 N 12a -
3 - - - l 2-AC-9-9 III.G.1 N - - 3,9 2 - - 2-AC-9-10 III.G.1 N 12a - - 2 - - 2-AC-9-11 III.G.1 N - - 3,9 2 - - 2-AC-9-12 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 10b - 2-AC-9-13 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 - - - 2-AC-9-14 III.G.3 N 12c 11b,11c 3 2,7,5 10b - 11d l 2-AC-9-15 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - Note: 'Ihe notes corresponding to the nunbered items on the Sununary Table are located at the end of the table, i i I 4-50 I i
. - _ . . ._ _., . _ _ . . .. __.m .. . - . . . m < ,,. ~ _ , .
APPDDIY R III.G/III.L QMPLIANCE As:>mrsr SQ9WEY 1 NEE METIKD(S) FIRE OF CIROTIT MAIERL ARIR Q NPLIANCE DEVIATION E. V AIIRTION IGIFICATICNS ANPLYSIS SEPARATION ACTIONS REPAIRS l 2-AC-9-16 III.G.l., N 12c 11a, Ili 3,9 2,5 10b -- III.G.2.c t 2-AC-9-17 III.G.1 N 12a. - 3 2. 10b - 2-AC-9-18 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - - 2-AC-9-19 III.G.1 N - - -
-1 - -
l 2/3-AC-30-20 III.G.3 Y 12a, 12c 11b, 11d 3 2,7 10a,10b - 1 I
- 3-AC-30-21 III.G.3 N 12c 11b, lle, 3 2,7,5 10b -
11d I 2-AC-30-22 III.G.1 N 12a 11a 3 2 10b - l 2-AC-30-23 III.G.1 N 12a lla 3,9 2 10b - 2-AC-30-24 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - 2-AC-30-26 III.G.3 N 12c 11d 3 7 10b - t l 2-AC-30-27 III.G.1 N 12a 11a 3,9 2 10b - l 2-AC-30-28 III.G.3 N 12c 11b, 11c, 3 2,7,5 10b - 11d 2-AC-50-29 III.G.1, Y 12b,12c 11b, lic, 3,9 2,5. 10b - III.G.2.b, lid,111 III.G.2.c 3-AC-50-30 III.G.1, N 12c 11c 3,9 2,5 10b - III.G.2.c 3-AC-50-31 III.G.1, N 12c 11c, 11h 3 2,5 10b - III.G.2.c 4-51 J'
APPDOTX R III.G/III.L GMPLIANCE Azuwirar St39ERY 1RB[E ME'1HD(S) FIRE OP CIRCUIT MANDRI, ARFA COGLIANCE DEVIATION EVAIARTION MCDIFICATIONS ANRLYSIS SEPARATION ACTIONS REPAIRS 3-AC-50-32 III.G.1, N 12c 11a, 11c, 3,9 2,5 10b - III.G.2.c 11h 3-AC-50-33 III.G.1, N 12c - 3,9 2,5 10b - III.G.2.c 3-AC-50-34 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 10b - 2-AC-50-35 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 10b - 2-AC-50-36 III.G.1, N 12c - 3,9 2,5 10b - III.G.2.c ! 2-AC-50-37 III.G.1, N' 12c 11a,11h, 3,9 2,5 10b - III.G.2.c 11c 2-AC-50-38 III.G.1, N 12c 11h 3 2,5 10b - III.G.2.c 2-AC-50-39 III.G.1, N 12c 11c 3 2,5 10b - III.G.2.c 2-AC-50-40 III.G.1 N - - 3,9 2 10b - 2-AC-50-41 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 - - 2-AC-50-42 III.G.1 N 12a - - 2 IOb - 2-AC-50-43 III.G.1 N - 11b, 11d 3 2 10b - 2-AC-50-44 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 IOb - 2-AC-50-45 III.G.1 N - - - 2 - - 2-AC-50-46 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 - - 2-AC-50-47 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 IOb - 4-52
APPDDIX R III.G/III.L GMPLIANCE Ahm&# St99%RY SBLE MEIE(S) FIRE OP CIRCUIT MANUM. AREA COGLIANCE DEVIATION EVAIIRTION EIFICATICNS ANM.YSIS SEPARATION ACTIONS REPAIRS 2-AC-50-48 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 - - 2-AC-50-49 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 - - 2-AC-50-50 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 - - 2-AC-50-51 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 - - 3-AC-50-52 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 - - 3-AC-50-53 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 - - 3-AC-50-54 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 - - 3-AC-50-55 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 - - 3-AC-50-56 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 10b - 3-AC-50-57 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 3-AC-50-58 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 - - 3-AC-50-59 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 10b - 3-AC-50-60 III.G.1 N - - 3,9 2 10b - 3-AC-50-61 III.G.1 N 12a - - 2 10b - 3-AC-50-62 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 - - 2-AC-70-63 III.G.1 N - Ila 3 2 10b - 2-AC-70-64 III.G.1 N 12a - - 2 10b - l l 3-AC-70-65 III.G.1 N 12a lla 3 2 10b .- 2-AC-70-66 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-Ac-70-67 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-AC-70-68 III.G.1 N -. - - 1 - - 4-53 s en
- m. -f
p -
., t - ,.,
.+ . $ g. ,
- v. y.
n
.s.
.x. ; ,, m .,, ;
- n ;
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~,. , ...,,
,, AkHl$TX R III.G/IIIjf GMo!,YAN3 AcN '
<e. S m y ggg. ~g 2.
c , MEIH00(S) FIRE OP - AREA CIRCUIT MMUP1 , ;, QMPLIANCE DPNIATION - EVAIIRTION M3)IFICATIONS AIALYSIS SEPARATION AQTI0tS sdTAIRS
, 2-AC-70-69 III.G.1 N -- - -
1 - -
, _ _ Q.; 2-AC-85-70 III.G.1 N .- 12a -
3 2 - -
.- 2-AC-85-71 III.G.1 N 12a -
3 2' ' - - 2-AC-85-72 III.G.1 N 12a '. - ' a . 1 - - - 2-AR-9-73 III.G.1 N 12a -
- t 1 - - -
2-AR-9-74 III.G.1 N 12a -
~
-1 -
~
3-AR-9-75 III.G.1- N - 1 - ' J _ 2-AR-9-76 - III.G.1/ Y 12a, 12b, 11a 3,9 2 10a,10b - III.G.2.a 12c
.p 2-AR-9-77 III.G.I. N - - -
1 - - AR-9-78 III.G.1, Y 12a,12b, 2* 11g 3,9 ' 2 10b - III.G.2.a 12c 2-Mt-9-80 III.G.1 N 12a 1 - - 2-AR-9-81 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - 2-AR-9-82 III.G.1 N 12a - 2 10b - 2-AR-9-83 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 - - , 2-AR-9-84 III.G.1,J Y 12a, 12b,- 11g 3,9 1 2 10b - III.G.2.a 12c 2-AR-9-86 III.G.1 N - 1 - - 2-AR-9-87 III.G.1 N 12a i 3 2 10b - 2-AR-9-88 III.G.1 N 12a - 3,9 2- 10b - 2-AR-9-89 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 10b - 4-54
- l, o
i. APPDOIX R III.G/III.L CMPLIANCE A:mmeru:nr SIMERY 1RELE MEITED(S) FIRE OF CIRCUIT MANUM. AREA EMPLIANCE DEVIATI N EVAIIRTICH MCDIFICATIONS ANM.YSIS SEPARATION ACTIGtS REPAIRS 2-AR-9-90 III.G.1 N - - -
'l - -
3-AR-9-91 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 10b - 3-AR-9-92 III.G.1 N 12a - 3,9 2 10b - 3-AR-9-93 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 10b - 2-AR-24-94 III.G.1, Y 12a, 12b, 11a 3,9 2 10b - III.G.2.a 12c 3-AR-24-95 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 - - 3-AR-24-96 III.G.1 N 12a - 3,9 2 10a,10b - 2-AR-24-98 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 10a,10b - 2-AR-24-99 III.G.1 N - - 3 .2 10b - 2-AR-24-100 III.G.1 N 12a - 3,9 2 10b - 3-AR-24-101 III.G.1 N 12a - 3,9 2 10b - 2-AR-24-102 III.G.1 N 12a lla 3,9 2 , 10a,10b - 3-AR-37-104 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-AR-37-105 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-AR-37-107 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - 2-AR-37-108 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 3-AR-37-109 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - 3-AR-37-110 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-AR-50-111 III.G.1 N 12a lla 3 2 10b - 2-AR-63-116 III.G.1 N 12a lla 3 2 10b - 4-55
_. ._m . . . . .. . - . -
-,y _. . _ . _ . _
, , ._.. ~ . , ,
c APPEM)IX R III.G/III.L CGtPLIANCE A_escanyr SG9tARY MNE ME'm0D(S) FIRE OF CIRCUIT - MAMAL ARFA OGtPLIANCE DEVIATION EVAIIRTION MCDIFIOLTIONS ANUNSIS SEPARATION ACTIONS REPAIRS 3-AR-63-117 III.G.1 N' - - 3 2 10b - 3-AR-63-118 III.G.1, N 12c 11a, 11f 3 2,5 10b - III.G.2.c 2-AR-63-119 III.G.1, N 12c 11a, lif 3,9 2,5 10b - III.G.2.c 2-AR-63-120 III.G.1 N -- - 3 2 10b l - 2-AR-63-121 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - -
- 2- & l7-122 III.G.1 .N 12a - - 2,5 - -
2-ni-17-123 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 - - 2- & l5-124 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-MI-15-125 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-FH-30-126 III.G.1 N 12a - - 2 10a - i ! 2- N 30-127 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2- & 30-128 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-ni-30-129 III.G.1 N 12a - 1 - - 2- & 45-130 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-FH-45-131 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-sm-45-132 III.G.1 N - - - 2 - - l 2-ni-53-134 III.G.1 N 12a - - 2 - - 2-SFe (-5)-135 III.G.1, Y 12a, 12b, 11g 3,9 2,5 10a,10b -
- III.G.2.b, 12c III.G.2.c 4-56
UM APPDDIX R III.G/III.L UNPLIANCE ASSES 94D7f ELNt?JrY 'JAIVE MEITED(S) FIRE OF CIRCUIT MANUAL AREA 00iPLIA!KZ DEVIATIQ1 EVAIIRTION EDIFICATIQE A?RLYSIS SEPARATIQ3 ACTIQ E REPAIRS 2-SFe (-15)-136 III.G.1, N 12a,12c Ilb,11c 3,9 2,5 10b III.G.2.c 2-SFe (-15)-137 III.G.1, N 12a 11b, lig 3,9 2 10a,10b 8 l III.G.2.a 2-SFe (-15)-138 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 10b - 2-SFe (-15)-139 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 10a,10b - 2-SFe8-140 III.G.1 N 12a 11g 3,9 2 10a,10b - 2-SFe8-141 III.G.1 N 12a - 3,9 2 10b - 2-CD-(-2)-142 III.G.1, Y 12a, 12b, 11b, 11c 3,9 2,5 10b - III.G.2.b, ,12c III.G.2.c 2-SPe30-143 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-SFe30-144 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - 2-SFe25-145 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 10a,10b - 2-SB-50-146 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - 2/3-TD-(-9)-148 s II .3.1. , Y 12a, 12b, lle, 11g 3,9 2,5 10a,10b - I.I G.2.b, 12c III.G.2.c 2-TD-7-149 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - 2 'm-7-150 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-TD-30-153 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 - - 2/3-TD-72-154 III.G.I. N 12a - - 1 - - 4-57 t______ l M a
s.
.l APPDDIX R III.G/III.L (DtPLIANCE AMMetENr SIMfARY 2005 METYKD(S)
FIRE OF ARFA CIRCDIT MMUL (DtPLIANCE DEVIATION EVAIDATION MG)IFICATIONS ANhLYSIS SEPARATION ACTIONS REPAIRS s 2-DG-30-155 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 10b - 2-DG-30-156 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-DG-30-157 III.G.1' N 12a - - 2 - - 2-DG-30-158 III.G.1 N - - 3 2- 10b - 2-DG-20-159 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 10b - 2-DG-20-160 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 10b - 2-3-(-2)-161 III.G.1, Y 12a,12b, 11b 3,9 2,5 10a,10b - III.G.2.b, 12c III.G.2.c 2-N-30-162 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - 2-H-30-163 III.G.1 N 12a lib 3 -
'10a,10b -
2- N-30-164 III.G.1 N 12a 11b 3 - 10a,10b - 2-E-30-165 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - 2-N-30-166 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 10b - 2-CD-15-167 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-00-15-168 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-AC-(-5)-169 III.G.1 N 12a -
- 3 - - -
2-SE-(-12)-170 III.G.1 N 12a - - 2 10b - 2-SE-30-171 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-SFe70-172 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 2-f11-30-174 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - 2-AC-70-175 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - 4-58 i
APPD DIX R III.G/III.L 03tPLIANCE A M5m 4ENF SIAftARY 'IRNE MEITED(S) FIRE OF CIRCUIT MhNuhl. ARIA COEPLIANCE DEVIATION EVALUATION MCDIFIGTIONS ANhLYSIS ' SEPARATION ACTICNS REPAIRS 2-SE-(-2)-176 ' III.G.1 N 12a .- 3 - - 3-00-15-1 III.G.1, Y 12b, 12c - 3,9 2 :10a,10b - III.G.2.d
- 3-PE-(-18)-2 III.G.1 N 12a -
3 2 10a,10b - 3-PFc45-3 III.G.2.b Y 12b,12c 11f 3,9 2 10b - 3-MI-17-122 III.G.1 N 12a - - 2,5 - - 3- & l7-123 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 - - ' 3-Fil-15-124 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - ! 3- & l5-125 III.G.1 N- - - - 1 - - 3-FH-30-126 III.G.1 N 12a - - 2 10a - 3- N 30-127 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 3-FH-30-128 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - 4 3-ni-30-129 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - 3-Fil-45-130 III.G.1 N - - - 1 ' - - 3-n!-45-131 III.G.1 N - - 1 1 - - 3- & 45-132 III.G.1 N - - - 2 - - 3-MI-63-134 III.G.1 N 12a - - 2 - - 3-SE-(-5)-135 III.G.1, Y 12a, 12b, 11g 3,9 2,5 10a,10b - III.G.2.b, 12c III.G.2.c j 3-SD-(-15)-136 III.G.1, N 12a,12c 11b, IIc 3,9' 2,5 10b - ! III.G.2.c 4-59
_ _ . . . _ . _ - , _ _ _ _ . -. . m_ . . . . . ., .
. .q.e e APPDOIX R III.G/III.L EMPLIANCE A"MHDFC R4 MARY 1AILE i MPITED(S)
FIRE OF i- AREA CIRCUIT MANLRL CMPLIANCE DEVIATICN EVAIIRTION MCEIFICATIONS ANALYSIS SEPARATION ACTIONS REPAIRS 3-SE-(-15)-137 III.G.1, N 12a 119,11b 3,9 III.G.2.a 2 10a,10b 8 3-SE-(-15)-138 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 - - 1 3-SE-(-15)-139 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 10a,10b - i 3-SE-8-140 III.G.1 N 12a lig ' 3,9 2 10a,10b - 3-SE-8-34] III.G.1 N 12a - 3,9 .2 10b - 3-CP-(-2)-142 III.G.1, Y' 12b,12c 11b, 11c 3,9 2,5 10b - III.G.2.b, III.G.2.c 3-SB-25-145 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 10a,10b '- 3-SE-50-146 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - '
- 3- 5 7-149 III.G.1 N 12a - -
1 - - 3 'IB-7-150 III.G 1 N - - - 1 - - 3 'IB-30-153 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 2 - - 3-DG-30-155 III.G.1 N .- - 3 -2 10b - 3-DG-30-156 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 3-DG-30-157 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 3-DG-30-158 III.G.1 N -
.- 3 2 10b -
3-DG-20-159 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 10b .- 3-DG-20-160 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 10b - 4-60
l
' APPE2OIX R III.G/III.L (IMPLIANCE AN Sl3MUN MILE MEIMD(S)
FIRE OF CIRCUIT MMERL AREA CCNPLIANCE DEVTTTION EVALIRTION MCDIFICATIONS ANMYSIS SEPARATION ACTIONS REPAIRS 3-N-(-2)-161 III.G.1, Y 12a, 12b, 11b . 3,9 2,5 10a, IOb - III.G.2.b, 12c
- III.G.2.c 3-N-30-163 III.G.1 N 12a lib 3 - 10a,10b -
l 3-N-30-164 III.G.1 N - 11b 3 - 10a,10b - 1 3-E-30-165 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - ) l 3-3-30-166 III.G.1 N - - 3 2 10b - 3-00-15-167 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 4 3-00-15-168 III.G.1 N - - - 1 - - 3-SE-(-12)-170 III.G.1 N 12a - - 2 IOb - 3-SEH30-173 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - ! 3-fB-30-174 III.G.1 N 12a - - 1 - - 3-SFe-(-2)-176 III.G.1 N 12a - 3 - - -
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4-61 4 T
APPDOIX R III.C/III.L (XMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT SMARY MEE NOTES
%e following notes apply to the sununary table:
- 1. No redundant Safe Shutdown equipnent/ cables in fire area.
- 2. Redundant circuits /equignent resolved by redundant couponents outside F.A.
- 3. Redundant circuits resolved by circuit analysis.
- 4. Redundant circuit protected by 3 hour wrap.
- 5. Redundant circuit protected by existing 1 hour wrap and suppression and detection.
- 6. Redundant circuit /equipnent protected by 20 ft. separation and suppression / detection.
- 7. Redundant circuit /equipnent resolved by alternate shutdown.
- 8. Redundant circuit /equipnent resolved by repairs.
- 9. Redundant circuit /equipnent resolved by CPS analysis.
10 a. Radundant circuit /equipnent resolved by manual actions inside fire area.
- b. Redundant circuit /equipnent resolved by manual actions outside fire area.
- 11. Redundant circuit /equipnent resolved by modifications for each F.A.
- a. Fuse Modifications
- b. Local Instrument Indicator Modifications
- c. Cable Wrap Modifications
- d. Circuit and Switches Modifications
- e. Saltwater Cooling (SWC) Modifications
- f. Miscellaneous modifications to support deviations (i.e. removing tray covers, adding metal hatches).
- g. Penetration Seals
- h. Valve /Danper Operator Modification
- 1. Modification to Sprinkler System
- 12. Evaluation Required
- a. Fire Area Boundary
- b. Separation
- c. Suppression / Detection 4-62
APPDOIX R III.C/III.L CMPLIANCE ASSESSENT Stnomar mBLE Note: '1he follwing modifications will be credited for all fire areas: Emergency Lighting 4 - Power lockout of SDC valves, auxiliary _ spray valves and C N valves SDC fl w indication BAMU tank level indication C m surge tank level indication f - CCW valves power lockout Platform for SWC valves
- Breaker Coordination modifications Cocaunication System Handwheel exteasion on AW valves
- '1he follwing manual actions will be credited for all fire areas:
- Manual valves for shutdown cooling system Manual valves for auxiliary spray Manual valves for condensate storage tanks Manual valves for spent fuel pool cooling t -
Monitoring of local indication for: 2 Congonent Cooling Water Surge Tank Level
- Boric Acid Make-up Tank Level
- Shutdown Cooling System Flw e
4-63
5.0 PEFEREN ES 5.1 Facility Operating Licenses NPF-10 and NPF-15, for SONGS 2 and 3 respectively. 5.2 Updated Fire Hazard Analysis, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3, Revision 2. 5.3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2/3, Revision 2. 5.4 Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for SONGS 2/3, Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362, NUREG-0712, dated February 1981. 5.5 Safety Evaluation Report (SSER #4) for SONGS 2/3, Docket Nos. 50-361 amd 50-362, NUREG-0712 Suppiement No. 4, dated January 22, 1982. 5.6 Safety Evaluation Report (SSER 45) for SONGS 2/3 Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362, NUREG-0712 Supplement No. 5, dated February, 1982. 5-1
I APPENDIX A FIRE AREA DRAWINGS 2
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APPENDIX B SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS LIST
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SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPUNkNT LIST SUNTED BY SYSTEM Page 1 FIRE TRAIN SY3 TEM COMPUNENT CATEGOHY DESCRIPTION TRAIN AREA / ZONE 18) HEF DRAWING INTERACTION 121V 2/30033 HOB 129 VAC PANEL A 2-48 Je166 N 2/30035 HSB 129 VAC PANEL B 2-3b 39166 N 20629 H9B DG 129 VAC PANEL A 2-158 JS166 N 20023 HSB Du 129 VAC PANEL 9 2-155 34166 N 20039 HSB 129 VAC PANEL A 2-49 JG166 N 20041 HSB 128 VAC PANEL B 2-35 36166 N 20062 HSB VITAL 120VAC BACHUP B 2-J5 J0142 E-1 N 20063 HSB VITAL 129VAC BACHUP A 2-48 39137 E-1 N. 20071 ALT 120VAC DIST PANEL A 2-29 JS181 R19 N 21071 ALT 488-120V TNANSF A 2-14BA 3W19G R13 N 2XB411 ALT PNL EL411 NBT AX 2-JA 31619' N 2Y006 CSD 2HV-9377 INVENTEN C 2-46 30175 F-4 N 2YGO7 CSD 2HV-9378 INVERTER- D 2-45 Je176 F-4 N 2YO98 HSB VITAL 1ke VAC ALT POWEM SUPPLY B 2-35 38142 D-1 N 2Y009 HUB VITAL 12e VAC ALT POWER SUPPLY A 2-49 38137 E-1 N 2Y01 HSB 129 VAC VITAL BUS CHANNEt. A A 2-47 34172 B-6 N 2Y919 ALT INVERTER UPS A 2-1484 JG162 R2S N 2YO2 HSB 12@ VAC VITAL BUS CHANNkL 9 .B 2-44 39172 B-b N 2Ye3 HSB 126 VAC VITAL BUS CHANNEL C C 2-46 38172 B-5 N 2YO4 HSB 120 VAC VITAL 90W CHANNEL D D 2-4b 30172 B-4 N 30920 HSB DG 129 VAC PANEL A J-1b8 J2166 N 3u023 HS'8 DW 129 VAC PANEL B 3-15b 32166 N 30039 H9B 129 VAC PANEL A 3-68 J2166 N 30041 HSB 120 VAC PANEt. B 3-34 32166 N ( 30062 HSB VITAL 120 VAC POWER SUPPLY BACHUP B 3-34 J2142 E-1 N 3Q063 HSB VITAL 120 VAC POWEN SUPPLY BACHUP A 3-68 32137 E-1 N 30071 ALT 12 EVAC DIST PANEL A 2-29 J2181 N 3T071 ALT 488/129V THANSI- A 3-148A 32199 N 3XS411 ALT PANEL 3L411 NBT AX 3-3A~ 33619 N 3Y066 CSD 3HV-9377 INVERTEN C 3-57 32175 F-4 N 3Y997 CSD 3HV-9378 (NVERTER D 3-58 32176 F-4 N 3YO98 HSB 128 VAC LINE RESULATON 9 3r34 J2142 D-1 N-3YSO9 HSB 129 VAC LINE REGULATUR A 3-60 J2137 E-1 N 3YO! HSB 129 VAC VITAL BUS CHANNEL A A 3-56 32172 B-6 N 3Ye19 ALT UPS INVERTER A 3-148A J2162 R16 N
- 3:= 3YO2 HSB 125 VAC VITAL BUS CHANNEL B B 3-59 32172 B-5 N
- rn 3Y83 HSB 125 VAC VITAL BUS CHANNEL C. C 3-57 J2172 B-5 N
- 3Y94 HSB 129 VAC VilAL BUS CHANNEL D D 3-58 32172 B-4 N 20001 HSB BATTEHY CHARGER FOR BUS D1 A 2-47 JG173 F-6 N
!l $ 125V 2Be02 HSB BATTENY CHARGER FON BUS D2 B 2-44 30174 F-6 N l.M
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2D1 HSB 125 VOC DISTR SW80 A 2-47 39173 H-6 Y O F l t
1 . SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SUR1ED BY SYSTEM Page 2 FIRE TNAIN CY3 TEM COMPONENT CATEGOHY' DESCRIPTION TRAIN AREA / ZONE (S) HEF DRAWING INTERACTION i 125V 2D1P1 HSB 125 VDC ESF PANEL A 2-47 J0173 C-5 N i 2D2 HSB 12h VDC DISTH SWBD B 2-44 30174 H-6 Y J 2D2P1 HSB 125 VDC ESF PANEL B 2-44 J01"/4 C-5 N 2D3 HSB 12h VDC DISTH SWBD C 2-46 39175 H-b Y 2D3P1 HSB 125 VOC ESF PANEL C 2-46 JS175 C-5 N 2D4 HSB 12b VDC DISTN SWBD D 2-4b 39176 H-b Y 2D4P1 HSB 125 VDC ESF PANEL D 2-45 J0176 C-5 N 39001 Hb8 BATTERY CHAROER FOH BUS D1 A 3-56 32173 F-6 N JB002 HSB BATTERY CHARGER FOR BtJS D2 B 3-59 32174 F-6 N t 39003 HSB BATTERY CHAN6kR FOH BUS D3 C 3-5t 32175 F-b N 4 3B004 HSB BATTERY CHARGER FOR Bus D4 D 3-58 32176 F-6 N 3B007 HSB 12h VDC BATTkHY FOH BUS D1 A 3-55 32173 F-6 N JB408 HSB 125 VDC BATTERY F0Fs PUS D2 9 3-52 32174 F-6 N 38009 HSB 125 VDC BATTkHY FOH BuC D3 C 3-54 32175 F-6 N 3B819 HSB 125 VDC BATTERY FOR B818 D4 D 3-53 32176 F-6 N 3D1 HSB 12b VDC DISTN SWBD A 3-56 32173 H-6 N 3D1P1 HSB 125 VDC ESF PANEL- A 3-56 32173 C-5 N 3D2 HSH 12h VDC DISTN SWBD D 3-59 32174 H-6 N 3D2P1 HSB 125 VDC ESF PANEL 9 3-59 J2174 C-5 N 303 HSB 12b VDC DISTR SWBD C 3-57 J2175 H-b N 3D3P1 HSI) 125 VDC ESF PANEL C 3-57 J2175 C-5 N 3D4 Hb8 125 VDC D)STN SWBD D 3-58 32176 H-b N 3D4P1 HSB 125 VDC ESF PANEL D 3-38 J2176 C-5 N 221MV 2XR1 HSB RESERVE AUX THANSFUNMER X 2-YARD 30181 R14 Y C 2XH2 HSB RESERVE AUX THANSFORNER X 2-YAND J0191 R14 Y 2XR3 SUE RESENVE AUX TNANSFORMER X 2-YAND 30191 R14 Y 2XUt HSB UNIT AUX rRANSFORMER X 2-YAHD JS191 R14 N 3XR1 HSB RESEHVE AUX T RANSF OHMER X 3-YAND 30181 R14 Y 3XH2 HSB RESERVE AUX TRANSFURMER X 3-YAHD J0181 R14 ~ Y 3XR3 SUE RESkHVh AUX THANSFUNMER X 3-YARD- 30101 R14 Y 3XUt HSB UNIT AUX TRANSFOHMER X 3-YAHD 39191 R14 N t POS17 HSB GHID FEEDeH POSITION X 3vYAND 39191 R1A N POS4 HSB GRID FEEDER POSITION X 2-YARD J0181 R14 N 4169V 2/3D006 HSB E-33b UNIT 2/3 MB1 B 3-34 30199 E-5 N 2/3D997 HSB E-336 UNIT 2/3 MBT A 3-60 J0197 E-5 N , '> 2A04 HSB 4160 VAC ESF SWITCHGkAR A 2-49 30197 G-4. N
', m 2A96 HSB 4160 VAC ESF SWITCHGEAR 9 2-J5 JS199 G-4 N
- 1 2D005 HSB 2P-925 BUS A/B MBT AB 2-135A 3019'/ E-7 Y
'.b .3A04 HSB 4169 VAC ESF SWITCHGEAR A 3-69 J2197 G-4 N i .' y 3A06 HSB 4169 VAC ESF SWITCHGkAR B 3-34 32199 G-4 N j .3D005 HSB JP-925 BUS A/B MBT AB 3-135A 32197 E-3
- Y "W 4MV 2/39u HSB 489 VAC EUF MCC A 2-49 30154 G-5 N 2/3B8 HSD 400 VAC ESF NCC B 2-J5 Je156 G-5 N 2/3DB9415 HSB E-418 UNIT 2/3 MB1 A 2-49 39118 E-1 - N 2/JDB6615 HuS E-419 UNIT 2/3 MBT B R-JS J0129 E-2 N 2B04 HSB 489 VAC EliF LUAD CENTEN A 2-49 30118 G-7 N 2B46 HSB 480 VAC ESF LOAD CENTER B; 2-J5 Jette,G-7' N e
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! SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPUNENT LIST SURTED BY SYSTEM Page 3 FIRh THAIN SYSTEM COMPONENT CATEGOHY DESCRIPTION TRAIN art A/ ZONE tSt HEF DRAWING INTERACTION '4@0V &BD HSB 480 VAC ESF MCC A 2-158 J0136 H-5 N 2DE HSB 480 VAC EUF MCC A 2-40 30137 H-b N 2BH HSB 480 VAC ESF MCC B 2-155 J0141 G-5 N 2BJ HSB 480 VAC E1F MCC B 2-3b 30142 H-b N 2 BHA HSD 480 VAC ESF MCC A 2-40 J0132 H-5 N 2BRB Hb8 480 VAC EbF MCC B 2-35 30134 H-5 N 20Y HSB 480 VAC ESF MCC A 2-40 30136 H-5 .N 2BZ HSB 480 VAC Et:F MCC B 2-35 30164 H-b N 2DB0410 HSB 2P-191 BUS A/B MBT AB 2-88 J0118 E-6 Y 27110 ALT Rt:GULAT ING TRANSFONMt:R A 2-1484 30190 R12 N 2T411 ALT UNIT 2 EPPM SUPPLY THANSFORMER A 2-JA J0162 G-2 N 3804 HSB 480 VAC ESF LUAD CENTEM A 3-60 32118 G-7 N 3B06 HSB 480 VHC ESF LOAD CENTER B 3-34 32120 G-7 N 3BD HSB 480 VAC EUF MCC A 3-158 32136 H N 3BE HSB 480 VAC ESF MCC A 3-60 32137 H-5 N 3BH HSD 480 VAC E8F MCC B 3-15d 32141 G-5 N 3BJ HSB 480 VAC ESF MCC B 3-34 J2142 H-5 N 3 BRA HSB 480 VAC ESF MCC A 3-60 32155-1 H-5 N 3BHB HSB 480 VAC ESF MCC B 3-34 32155-2 H-5 N 3DY HSB 480 VAC EUF MCC A 3-60 32162 H-b N 3BZ HSD 400 VAC ESF MCC B 3-34 32164 H-5 N 30B0410 HSB 39-191 BUS A/B MB1 AB 3-92 32118 E-6 Y 3T110 ALT REGULATING IRANSFORMER A 3-148A J2190 R10 N 3T411 ALT UNIT 3 EPPM SUPPLY THANSFONMEN A 3-3A 33162 N AFW 2-4"-634-D-087 HSB AFW PUMPS 504 & 141 X-CONNECT -
2-161A 40160A E-3 N 2-4"-635-D-087 HSB A>W PUMPS 504 4 141 X-CONNECT - 2-161A 40160A D-3 N 2-8"-092-W-212 HSB CST r-120 TO COND MAKEUP SUP ISOL - 2-163 401::10D D-6 N 2-8"-474-D-212 HSB FINE.W1H HDN SUPPLY TO T-121 ISOL - 2-164 40150D H-5 N 2-8"-476-D-212 H!iB DRA!N VALVE T-120 TO T-121 - 2-164 40150D E-6 N 2HV-4705 HSB AFW PUMP P-the TO S/W E088 DISCH. A 2-166 40160A E-3 Y 2HV-4706 HSB AFW PUMP P-140 TO S/G E089 DISCH B 2-161A 40160A D-3 Y 2HV-4712 HSB AFW PUMP P-504 DISCH ISOL VALVE B 2-166 40160A G-3 N 2HV-4713 HSB AFW PUMP P-141 DISCH ISOL VLV A 2-161A 40160A B-3 N 2HV-4714 HSB E088-AFW STOP VALVE B 2-161B =0160A F-1 N yo 2HV-4715 HSB AFW TO S/G E089 STOP VALVE BYPASS B 2-161B 40160A D-2 N ] 2HV-4716 HSB AFW PUMP P-140 STEAM TUNB SUP VLV C 2-161A 40160B E-3 Y m 2HV-4730 HSB AFW TO S/G E088 ISOLATION VALVE A 2-1619 40160A F-2 N @ 2HV-4731 HSB E089 AFW S10p VALVE A 2-161B 40160A D-1 N
- -* 2HV-4762 HSB HV-4712 BYPASS B 2-161A 40160A F-3 N 2HV-4763 HSB HV-4713 BYPASS A 2-161A 40160A C-2 N cm 2HV-8200 HSB E089 81EAM SUPPLY VLV TO P-140 9 2-145A 40141C E-3 N 2HV-8201 HSB E088 STtEAM SUPPLY VLV TO P-140 A- 2-14SA 40141D E-3 N 2HY-4714-2 HSB SUL VLV FUN E/H CONTR FON HV-4714 8 2-161B 40160C D-6 N 2HY-4731-1 HSB SQL VLV FOR E/H CONTR FOR HV-4731 A 2-161B 40160C G-6 N 2HY-8200 HSB SULENUID PILOT FUN HV-8200 9 2-145A 40141C E-3 N 2HY-8201 HSB SOLENOfD PILOT FOR HV-8201 A 2-143A 40141D E-3 N M "-001-R-212 SOE CST T-120 ISOL VLy -
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'2-163 40149A E-7 N 2-8"-063-R-221 SOE , CST T-120 ISOL VLV 2-163 401500 C-2 N
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SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SOHTED BY SYSTEM Page 4 FIRE TRAIN SYSTEM COMPONENT CATEGONY DESCRIPTION TRAIN AREA / ZONE (S1 HEF DRAWING- INTERACTION AFW 2K-007 HSB AFW P-140 STEAM TUHBINE C 2-161A 40160B G-2 Y Et.1-3 kO 4-1 HSB CST T-121 LEVEL INDICATION A 2-20A 40150D F-5 N ELI-3204-2 HSB CST T-121 LEVEL INDICATION B 2-20A 40150D G-5 N 29-140 HSB AUX 1LIANY FEkDWATEH PUMP C 2-161A 40160A E-6 Y
.,,'2P-141 HSB AUXILI AHY FEEDWATER PUMP A 2-161A 40160A B-6 Y b.(,? 4 HSB AUXILIANY FEEDWATEN PUMP B 2-161A 40160A G-6 Y 2P-815 HSD E088 AFW ISOL HV-4714 HYD PUMP B 2-161B 40160C B-3 N 2p-816 HSB E089 APW ISUL HV-4*/31 HYD PUMP A 2-161B 40160C E-3 N 2PSL-4714-2 HSB HV-4714 HYDHAULIC PUMP PREfiS SWITCH B 2-161B 40160 D-5 N 2pSL-4731-1 HSB HV-4731 HYDRAULIC PUMP PMESS SWITCH A 2-161B 40160 G-5 N 2SV-4700 HSB AFW TUHBINE THH0TTLE VALVE C 2-161A 40160B F-2 Y 2T-120 HSB CONDENSA1E STRU TANK (500K GAL) -
2-165 401500 C-6 N 2 T-U "
- HSB CONOENSArE STHG TANK (150K GAL) -
2-164 401500 F-6 N 21-284 HbB HYDNAULIC FLUID RESEHVOIH - 2-161B 40160C B-5 N 2T-285 HSB HYDHAULIC FLUID RESERVOIR - 2-161B 40160C E-5 N 2W-750 HSB HV-4714 GAS CHAHOLD ACCuMULA10H - 2-1619 40160 D-3 N 2W-751 HSL
- Eni-DJ1 GAS CHARGED ACCUMULATUR -
2-161B 40160 N 3-4"-634-D-Ou7 HSD APW PUMPS 504 & 141 X-CONNECT - 3-1614 40160A803 E-3 N 3-4"-635-D-087 HSB AFW PUM99 be4 & 141 X-CONNECT - 3-161A 40160AS03 D-3 N 3-8"-0's2-W-212 SOE CST T-120 TO COND MAKEUP SuP ISUL - 3-163 401500603 D-6 N 3-8"-474-D-212 HSB FIHE HEADER SUPPLY TO T-121 ISOL - 3-164 401500S03 H-5 N 3-8"-476-D-212 HSB DNAIN LINE FHUM T-120 TO T-121 - 3-164 4W1500S03 E-6 N 3HV-4705 HSB AFW Pump P-140 TO S/G E088 DISCH A 3-166 40160AS03 E-3 Y 3HV-4706 HSB APW PUMP P-140 TO S/u Ee89 DISCH B 3-161A 40160AS03 D-3 Y 3HV-4712 HSB AFW PUMP P-540 DISCH ISOL VALVE B 3-166 40160AS03 G-3 N 3HV-4713 HSD AFW PUMP P-141 DISCH Ibut VALVE A 3-161A 40160AS03 B-3 N 3HV-4714 HSB E068 AFW STHP VALVE B 3-161B 40160ASO3 F-1 N 3HV-4715 HSB APW TO S/U EW89 810P VALVE BYPASS B 3-1618 40160 Abs 3 D-2 N 3HV-4716 HSB AFW P-140 STEAM TUHB SUPPLY VLV C 3-161A 40160BS03 E-3 Y 3HV-4730 HSD APW TO S/u E088 S10P VALVE DYPASS A 3-161B 40160 abo 3 F-2 N 3HV-4731 HSB E039 AFW STUP VALVE A 3-161B 40160ASO3 D-1 N 3HV-4762 HSB HV-4712 BYPASS B 3-161A 40160AS03 F-3 N 3HV-4763 HSB HV-4713 BYPASS A 3-161A 40160AS03 C-3 N 3HV-8200 HSB E089 STEAM SUPPLY VLV TO P-140 B 3-145A 40141CSO3 N 3HV-8201 HSB EO88 STEAM SUPPLY VLV TO P-the A 3-1454 40141DbO3 N 3HY-4714-2 HSB SQL VLV FOR E/H CONTR FOR HV-4714 B 3-161B 40160DS03 D-6 N
> 3HY-4731-1 HsB SUL VLV FUM E/H CUN1R FUH HV-4/31 A 3-161B 40160CS03 G-6 N T 3HY-8200 HSB PILOT SOLENOID FOR HV-8200 B 3-14bA 40141CSO3 E-3 N M%E 3HY-8201 HSB PILOT SULENUID FDH HV-82e1 A 3-14SA 40141DbO3 E-3 N 3K-007 HSB AFW P-140 STEAM YUHBINE C 3-161A 40160BS03 G-2 . Y O ><
3LI-3204-1 HSD LEVEL IND fur TANK T-121 A 2-20A 401500603 F-5 N 3LI-3204-2 HSB LEVEL IND FOR TANK T-121 B 2-20A 401500S03 G-5 N 02 39-140 HSB AUXILIAHY FLEDWATER pump C 3-161A 4e160AS03 E-6 . Y JP-141 HSB AUX ILI AHY FEEDWATER PUMP A 3-161A 40160A803 B-6 Y 39-504 HSB AUXILIARY FELDWATEH PUMP B 3-161A 40160AS03 G-6 Y 3P-815 HSB Est!8 AFW ISOL HV-4714 HYD PUMP B 3-161B 40160CS03 B-3 N 3-6"-001-R-212 50E CST T-120 ISOL VLV - 3-163 40149A, E-7 N 3-6"-002-R-212 SOE CST T-120 150L VLV - 3-163 40149A E-7 N 3-8"-063- R-221. SOE CST T-120 ISOL VLV - 3-163 40150D C-2 N
e 1 6 g SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPUNENT LIST SURTED BY SYSTEM Page 5 FIRh TRAIN CYSTEM COMPONENT CATEGORY DESCRIPTION TRAIN ARdA/ ZONE (S) HEF DRAWING- INTERACTION AFW 3P-816 HSB E089 AFW ISOL HV-47J1 HYD PUMP A 3-161B 40160CS03 E-3 N 3PSL-4714-2 HSB HV-4714 HYDHAULIC PUMP PHESS SWITCH B 3-1618 4e160S03 D-5 N 3PSL-4731-1 HSB HV-4731 HYDRAULIC PUMP PREUS SWITCH A 3-161B 40160S03 G-5 N 3SV-4700 HSB APW TUHBINE THHOTTLE VALVL C 3-1614 401608903 F-2 Y
, 3T-120 HSD CONDENSATE STHG TANK (500K GAL) -
3-165 401 BOD 803 C-6 N 3T-121 HSD CONDENSATE STHG TANK (150K GAL) - 3-164 40150Dw03 F-6 N 3T-284 HSB HYDRAULIC FLUID RESERVOIR - 3-161B 40160CSO3 B-5 N 3T-285 HSB HYDHAULIC FLUID lhBENVOIR - 3-1619 40160CS03 E-5 N 3W-750 SB HV-47J1 UAS CHARGdD ACCUMULATUR - 3-161B 40160SO3 D-3 N 3W-751 HSB HV-4731 GAS CHAHutD ACCUMULAfOR - 3-161B 40160803 G-3 N CCW 2E-001A HSB CCW HEAT EXCHANGdR A - 2-1354 40127C B-5 N 2h-002B HSB CCW HEAT EXCHANGkN B - 2-13bA 40127C F-5 N 2HCV-6537 SUE PUMP 024 MIN FLOW VALVE X 2-135D 40127A F-2 Y 2HCV-6b38 SUE PUMP Odd MIN FLOW VALVE X 2-135C 40127A E-2 Y 2HCV-65J9 SOE PUMP 026 MIN FLUW VALVE X 2-135B 40127A B-2 Y EHV-6211 Suk NUN-CHIT LUUp UHB CNTM1 IbuL VLV B 2-2U 40127F G-3 Y 2HV-6212 HUD NON-CHIT LOOP ISOL VLV A 2-135A 40127D E-7 Y 2HV-6213 HSB NON-CHIT LOUP IbOL VLV B 2-13bA 40127D D-7 Y 2HV-6216 SOE NON-CRIT ORB CNTMT ISOL VLV B 2-2C 40127F C-5 Y 2HV-6218 HSB NUN-CHIT RETUHN NhADER B IBUL A 2-13bC 40127A F-8 Y 2HV-6219 HS B- NON-CRIT HETUHN HEADER A ISOL B 2-13bB 40127A D-8 Y 2HV-6220 SUE PUMP P-Okb MINI-FLOW LINE TU LOUP A X 2-13bC Aw127A F-1 Y 2HV-6221 SOE PUMP P-025 NINI-FLOW LINE TO LOOP B X 2-135B 40127A C-1 Y q 2HV-6222A SUE Pump P-025 SUuTION ISUL FROM LUUP A X 2-135D 40127A F-7 Y 2HV-6222B SUE PUMP P-025 SUCTION ISOL FROM LOOP A X 2-135C 40127A E-7 Y 2HV-6223 SUE NON-CHIT LOUP IHB CNTMT ISUL VLV A 2-1C 40127F G-4 Y 2HV-6224A SUE PUMP P-025 SUCTION ISOL FROM LOOP B X 2-135C 40127A D-7 Y 2HV-6224B SUE PUMP P-025 SUCTION ISUL FROM LUUp BX 2-1358 4012/A C-7 Y 2HV-6225 SOE CCW SURGE TANK A ISOL VLV X 2-141 40127B E-4 Y 2HV-6226A SUh Ccw PUMP P-025 TO LOUP A X 2-135A 4e127A G-3 Y 2HV-6226B SUE CCW PUMP P-025 TO LOOP A X 2-135A 40127A E-3 Y 2HV-6227 SUE CCW PUMP P-025 LOUP A ShAL COULINu X 2-135u 4e127A E-3 Y 2HV-6228A SUE CCW PUMP P-025 TO LOOP B X 2-135A 40127A D-3 Y 2HV-6228B SOE CCW PUMP P-025 TO LOUP B X 2-135A 40127A C-3 Y 2HV-6229 SUE CCW PUMP P-025 LOOP B SEAL COOLING X 2-135B 40127A C-3 Y
- %o 2HV-6236 Sud NON-CHll LUUP IHB CNTMT ISUL VLV A 2-1C 40127E C-6 Y 2HV-629dA HSB LErDOWN HM CCW HET ISOL X 2-2C 40127E C-3 Y '
I$ 2HV-62938 HSB LETDOWN HX CCW IBUL X 2-2U 4012'/D F-4 Y
- S x
2HV-6366 2HV-6367 SOE HSB CNrMT EMdR COOLER 401 - SUPPLY CNTMT EMER COULEH 4e1 - RETUHN A A 2-2C 2-2U 40172B 401729 C-7 D-7 N N ,m 2HV-6368 SUE CNTMT EMSR COOLER 400 - SUPPLY B 2-2C 401729 E-7 *N 2HV-6369 H88 CNTM1 EMER COULEH 4ee - HtTUNN B 2-2U A0172B F-7 N 2HV-6370 SUE CNTMT ENER COOLER 399 - SUPPLY A 2-2C 40172B D-2 N 2HV-6371 HSB CNTM1 EMER COULEH 399 - HETUNN A 2-2U 40172H C-2 N 2HV-6372 SUE CNTMT EM4R COOLER 402 - SUPPLY B 2-2C 40172B F-2 N 2HV-63~/3 Hb8 CN1MT EMER COULEH 4e2 - whTUNN B 2-2C 401728 E-2 N 2HV-6500 CSD SDC H, EAT EXCH B HETURN ISOL B 2-1J6 40127E,F-4 N O _.s
8 . g I SWE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIs1 SuRTED BY SYSTEM Page '6 FIRE THAIN CYSTEM COMPONENT CATEGOHY DESCRIPTION TRAIN ARtEA/ Z ONE (S) HEF DRAWING INTERACTION CCW 2HV-6501 CSD SDC HEAT EXCH A HETURN ISOL A 2-136 40127E C-4 N ENV-6be5 Suti CCW SURuh TANK B IbOL VLV X 2-149A 4W127B B-4 Y 2HV-6522A H9B LEfDOWN HX CCW HET ISOL X 2-94 48127E F-3 Y 2HV-65229 HSB LETDOWN HX CCW IWub X 2-94 40127 F-7 Y
, 2HV-6551 SOE PUMP P-925 MINI-FLOW LINE TO LOOP A X 2-13dC 48127A E-1 Y 2HV-6552 SOE PUMP P-025 MINI-FLOW LINE TO LOOP B X- 2-13bB 40127A D-1 Y 2HY-6212 HSB WOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-6212 A 2-135A 40127D E-6 Y 2HY-6213 HSB SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-6213 9 2-135A 48127D D-6 Y 2HY-6218 HSB SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-6218 A 2-135C 40127A F-8 Y 2HY-6219 HSB SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-6219 B 2-1359 48127A D-8 Y 2HY-6293A HSB WOLENOID PILUT FOR HV-629JA X 2-2C 40127ESO3 C-3 Y 2HY-62938 HSB SULENUID PILOT FON HV-621s3B X 2-2C 40127D F-4 Y 2HY-6500 CSD BOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-6500 B 2-136 40127E F-5 N 2HY-6581 CSD SULENOID PILOT FOH HV-6be1 A 2-136 40127E C-5 N 2HY-6522A HSB WOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-6522A X 2-94 40127E F-3 Y 2HY-Eb22B HSB SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-65229 X 2-94 40127 F-7 Y 2HY-6537 BOE SOLENUID PILOT FOR HCV-6537 X 2-135D 48127A F-2 Y_
2HY-6b38 SOh SULENOID PILOT FON HCV-6538 X 2-135C 48127A E-2 Y 2HY-6539 SUE 80LENdfD PILOT FOR HCV-65J9 X 2-135B 40127A A-2 Y 29-024 HSB CCW PUMP A 2-13bD 48127A G-5 N 2P-025 HSB CCW PUMP AB 2-135C 48127A D-5 N 2P-026 HSB CCW PUMP B 2-1359 48127A B-5 N 2T-883A HSB CCW LOOP A SUHOE FANK A 2-141 481279 N 21-844B HSB ' CCW LOOP B SUHGk TANK B 2-1404 40127B N JE-estA HBB CCW HEAT EXCHANGtiR A - 3-1354 4612/C903 9-5 N 34-002B HSB CCW HEAT EXCHANGh8 8 - 3-135A 40127CSO3 F-5 N 3HCV-6537 SOE PUMP O24 MIN FLOW VALVE X 3-135D 40121ASO3 F Y 3HCV-6538 SOE PUMP 925 MIN FLOW VALVE X 3-136C 40127Abe3 E-2 Y 3HCV-6539 SOE PUMP 926 MIN FLOW VALVE X 3-1359 40127ASO3 B-2 Y 3HV-6211 SOti NON-CH11 LOOP ORB CNTMT ISOL VLV B 3-2C 40127FS03 G-3 Y 3HV-6212 ^ H1B NON-CHIT LOOP iSOL VLV A. 3-1354 48127DSO3 E-7 Y 3HV-6213 HSB NON-CHIT LOOP ISOL VLV B 3r135A 49127DSO3 D Y 3HV-6216 SOE NON-CHIT LOOP OHB CNTMT ISOL VLV B 3-2C 48127FS93 C-5 Y 3HV-6218 HSB NON-CHIT RETURN HEADER S ISOL A 3-135C 49127AS$3 F-8 Y
,p 3HV-6219 HSB NON-CRIT HETUHN HEADER A ISOL B 3-135B 49127ASO3 D-8 Y o 3HV-6220 SOE P-02b MINI-FLOW LINE TO LOUP A X 3-135C 48127AS$3 F-1 Y ,M 3HV-6221 SUE P-825 MINI-FLOW LINE TO LOOP B X 3-135B 48127ASO3 C-1 Y
. 2 3HV-6222A SOti PUMP P-025 SUCTION FROM CHIT LOOP AX 3-13bD 49127ASO3 F-7 Y S 3HV-62228 80E PUMP P-625 SUCTION FROM CHIT LOOP A X 3-135C 40127ASO3 E-7 Y 3HV-6223 SOti NON-CHIT LOOP IRB CNTMT ISOL VLV A 3-1C 48127FS03 G-4 Y-
- cu 3HV-6224A SOE PUMP P-925 SUCTION FROM CRIT LOOP B X 3-1J5C 40127Ase3 D-7
- Y,
- 3HV-62249 SOE PUMP P-025 SUCTION FNOM CHIT LOOP.B X 3-135B 48127AS$3 C-7 Y 3HV-6225 SOE CCW SURGE TANK A Itt0L VLV X 3-141 46172B863 E-4 Y 3HV-6226A SOE CCW PUMP P-025 TO LOOP A X 3-13bA 48127AS03 G-3 . Y 3HV-62269 SOE CCW PUMP P-025 TO LOOP A X. 3-135A 40127ASO3 E-3 Y 3HV-6227 SOE . CCW PUMP P-025 LOOP A SEAL COOLINO X 3-135C 48127ASO3 E-3 Y 3HV-6228A SOE CCW PUMP P-925 TO LOOP B X 3-135A 48127A803 D-3 Y O
I
8 . I SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SORTED BY SYSTEM Page. 7 FIHE TRAIN CY3 TEM COMPONENT CATEGOHY DESCRIPTION TRAIN. AREA /2ONE(S) HCF DRAWING INTERACTION CCW , 3HV-62289 SUE CCW PUMP P-025 TO LUOP B X 3-135A 40127AS03 C-3 Y 3HV-6229 SOE CCW PUMP P-02b LOOP B SEAL COOLING X 3-1359 40127AS03 C-3 Y 3HV-6236 SOE NON-CRIT LOOP IRB CNTMT ISOL VLV A- 3-1C 40127F603 C-6 Y 3HV-6293A HSB LhTDOWN HX CCW RET ISOL X 3-2C 40127803 C-3 Y 3HV-62939 HSB LEIDOWN HX CCW ISOL X 3-2C 48127DS03 F-4 Y 3HV-6366 SOh CNTMT EMERG COULEa 401 - SUPPLY. A 3-2C 40172BS03 C-7 N 3HV-6367 HSB CNTMT EMERG COOLER 401 - RETURN A 3-2C 401729S03 D-7 N 3HV-6368 SOE CNTMT EMERO COULEH 400 - SUPPLY B 3-2C 40172BS03 E-7 N
- 3HV-6369 HSB CNTMT EMEHG COOLER 400 - RETURN B. 3-2C 40172B803 F-7 N 3HV-6370 SOE CNTMT EMERG COOLEN 399 - SUPPLY A 3-2C 40172BS03 D-2 N 3HV-6371 HSB CNTMT EMEHG CuOLER 399 - RETURN A 3-2C 40172BS03 C-2 N 3HV-6372 SOh CNTMT EMERG COULEN 402 - SUPPLY B 3-2C 40172DS03 F-2 N 3HV-6373 HSB CNTMT EMRES COOLER 402 - RETURN B 3-2C 40172BS03 E-2 N 3HV-6500 CSD SDC HEAT EXCH B RETURN ISOL B 3-136 40127E603 F-4 N 3HV-6301 CSD SDC HEAT EXCH A RETURN ISOL A 3-1J6 40127E803 C-4 N 3HV-6505 SOE CCW SURGE TANK B ISOL VLV X 3-1404 40172BS03 B-4 Y 3HV-6522A HSB LETDOWN HX CCW HET ISOL X 2-94 40127B803 F-3 Y 3HV-66228 HSB LETDOWN HX CCW ISOL X 2-94 40127CS03 F-7 Y
? 3HV-6551 SOE P-025 MINI FLOW LINE TO LOOP A X 3-135C 40127AS03 E-1 Y 3HV-6552 SOE P-025 MINI-FLOW LINE TO LOOP B X 3-13bD 40127AS03 D-1 Y 3HY-6212 HSB SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-6212 A 3-135A 40127D803 E-6 Y 3HY-6213 HSB SOLENOID PILOT FON HV-6213 B 3-1354 40127DSO3 0-6 Y 3HY-6218 HUB SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-6218 A 3-130C 40127AS03 F-8 Y 3HY-6219 HSB SOLENOID PILOT FOH HV-6219 B 3-13bB 40127AS03 D-8 Y % 3HY-6293A HUB SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-62934 X 3-2C 40127903 C-3 Y 3HY-62938 HSB SULENUID PILOT FON HV-62939 X 3-2C 40127DS03 F-4 Y 3HY-6500 CSD SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-6500 B 3-1J6 40127E903 F-5 N 3HY-6501 CSD SOLENUID PILOT FOR HV-6501 A 3-136 40127E803 C-5 N 3HY-6522A HSB SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-6522A X 2-94 40127BS03 F-3 Y 3HY-65229 HSB SULENUID PILOT FOR HV-Eb22B X 2-94 40127CS03 F-7 Y 3HY-6337 SOE SOLEN 0!D PILOT FOR HCV-6537 X 3-133D 40127A903 F-2 Y 3HY-6538 SOE SULENUID PILOT FOH HCV-6538 X 3,135C 40127AS03 E-2 Y 3HY-6539 SUE SOLENOID PILOT FOR HCV-6539 X 3-13dB 48127AS03 A-2 Y 3P-024 HSB CCW PUMP A 3-13bD 40127AS03'G-5 N JP-025 HSB CCW PUMP AB 3-133C 40127ASO3 D-5 N
- 32 39-026 HSB CCW PUMP B 3-135B 40127AS03 B-5 N
$ 3T-9034 HSB CCW LOOP A BURGE TANK -
3-141 40127B N
- IQ
. c) CVCS 3T-004B 2-2"-005-C-334 HSB HSB CCW LOOP B SUNGE TANK -
CVGB (O SAFETY INJECT LINE ISOL VLV - 3-1404 2-2D 40127B 40112C C-8 N N y 2-2"-065-C-334 HSB CHARGING PUMPS DISCH TO HPSI HEADhH - 2-87 40124B G-1 N 2-2"-084-C-334 HSB LOOP CHAHGING THROTTLE VALVE - 2-2D 40123A D-2 *N
*W 2-2"-130-C-334 HSB ALT AUX SPHAY Ibul -
2-2D 40123A B-2 N 2FV-0210-Y SOE BAMU FLOW CONTHOL VALVE X 2-84A 48123B C-2 Y BAMU POMP TO VCT ISOLATION 2FV-92b3 SOE A 2-111A 4012b8 G-2 Y 2FY-0210AY SUE SOLENOID PILUT FOR FV-0210-Y X 2-84A 401239 C-3 Y 2FY-9253 SOE SOLENUID VALVE FON FV-9233 4 2-111A 4012b8 F-3 Y 2HV-9200 SOE CVCS NORMAL FLOW CONTHOL VLV A 2-2D 40123A D-3 Y
. l .
g e SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SOHTED BY SYSTEM Page 8 FIRE TRAIN EY3 TEM COMPONENT CATEGORY DESCRIPTION TRAIN AHEA/ ZONE (S) HEF DRAWING INTERACTION 4 CVC3 2HV-9201 SOE PAR AUX SPHAY ISOL VALVE A 2-1C 44123A E-3 Y 2HV-9205 HLP NUMMAL LhTDOWN ISO (OHB) A 2-2D 40123A G-3 N 2HV-9216 SOE CONTHOLLED BLEEDO:'F HELIEF ISOL X 2-1B 40124A E-3 Y 2HV-9217 SOti CONTHOLLED BLEEDOFF SiOP VLV (1HB) B 2-1C 40124A G-3 Y 2HV-9218 SOE CONTHOLLED BLEEDUFF STUP VLV (ORB) A 2-2D 49124A F-4 Y-2HV-9231 HSB BAMU PUMP P-175 RECIRC ISOL A 2-98 4012bA D-8 N . 2HV-9235 HSB ' 9 AMU T-9/2 GRAVITY FEED TO CHHG B 2-98 40125A B-5 N 2HV-9236 HSB BAMU PUMP P-174 RECIRC ISOL A 2-98 40125A D-1 N 2HV-9248 HSB BAMU T-071 GNAVITY FEED TO CHHG B 2-98 40125A B-4 N 2HV-9247 HSB DISCH VLV TO CHARG PUMPS A 2-84A 401259 E-5 N 2HV-9257 SUE BAMU PUMP RECIRC. TO VCT X 2-84A 46123B E-2 Y 2HV-9323 HSB COLD leu 14 IStiL VLV B 2-2D 40112C D-4 Y 2HV-9324 SOE HPSI PUMP DISCHARGE ISOLATIUN A 2-2D 40112C D-5 Y 2HV-9326 HSB COLD leu 1B ISOL VLV B 2-2D 40112C C-4 Y ' 2HV-9327 SOE HPSI PUMP DISCHARGE ISOLATION A 2-2D 40112C B-5 Y 2HV-9329 HSB COLD LEB 2A ISttL VLV B 2-2C 40112C B-4 Y 2HV-9330 SOE HPSI PUMP DISCHARGE ISOLATION A 2-2D 49112C A-5 Y ' 2HV-9332 HSB COLD leu 2B ISt*L VLV B 2-2C 40112C F-4 Y l 2HV-9333 SOE HPSI PUMP DISCHARGE ISOLATION A 2-2D 49112C F-5 Y 2HV-9420 SOE HuSI PUMP DISCHAHliti ISOLA 110N A 2-2D 40112C G-3 Y 2HV-9434 SOE HPSI PUMP DISCHARGE ISOLATION B 2-2D 48112C E-3 Y 2HY-9200 SOE SQL VALVE FOR HV-9200 A 2-2D 401234 E-3 Y 2HY-9205 HLP SOL VALVE FOR VALVE HV-9205 A 2-2D 49123A G-3 N 2HY-9218 HSB SOLENOID PILOT FOH HV-9218 A 2-2D 40124A F-4 Y ~ 2HY-9231 HSB BAMU PUMP P-175 RECIRC LINE ISOL A 2-98 4012SA D-8 N 2HY-9236 HSB BAMU PUMP P-174 Rt: CIRC LINE ISOL A 2-98 AsiatA D-1 N 2HY-9257 SOE HOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-9237 X 2-84A 49125B E-2 Y 2LV-0227B HSB VOL CONTR TANK OUTLET vhtVE. B 2-102A 40124A B-5 Y 2LV-0227C HSB RWST OUTLET VALVE B 2-/6 40124B B-7 Y 29-012 SUE CONTAI'NMEN1 SpHAY PUMP A 2-137C 40114A C-4 Y 2P-013 SUE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP B 2-13/A 48114A G-4 Y j 29-017 SOE HPSI PUMP #1 A 2-137C 40112A G-4 Y 2P-018 SOE HSPI PUMP #3 AB 2-137B 40112A E-4 Y 29-019 SUE HPSI PUMP #2 B 2-137A 40112A C-4 Y 2P-174 HSB BAMU PUMP A 2-84A 40125B D-6 N
- g 2P-175 HSB BAMU PUMP A 2-848 4012SB B-6 N u 2P-190 HSB CHARGING PUMP #1 A 2-87 48124B G-3 Y '
$$ 2P-191 HSB CHARGING PUMP #2 AB 2-88 40124B D-3 Y L C3 2P-192 HSB CHAHGING PUMP #3 B 2-89 441249 C-5 Y Q 21-005 HSB RWST 005 - 2-163 401229 C-3 N '" 2T-906 HSB RWST 006 - 2-166 48122B C-3 *N 2T-071 HSB BAMU TANK B - 2-98 40125A D-3 N ET-072 HSB BAMU TANK A - 2-98 49123A D-6 N i 2T-077 HSB VOLUME CONTROL TANK - 2-107 40124A D-6 N 2TV-9267 HLp NORMAL LETDOWN ISO VALVE (IHB) . B 2-1C 40123A F-3 N 3-2"-005-C-334 HSB CVCS TO SAFETY INJECT LINE ISOL VLV - 3-2D 40112C803 C-8 N 3-2"-065-C-3J4 HSB CHARGING PUMPS DISCH TO HPSI HEADER - 3-93 49124BSO3 G-1 N t s
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, ^1 . g i [ . SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SOR1ED BY SYSTEM Page 9-FIRE THAIN CYSTEM COMPONENT CATEGOHY DESCRIPTIUN TRAIN AREA / ZONE (S) HEF DRAWING INTERACTION t 5
- CVC3 3-2"-084-C-334 HSB LUUP CHARGING THROTTLE VALVE -
3-2D 44123ASO3 D-2 N 3-2"-130-C-334 ALT AUX SPRAY ISOL HSB - 3-2D 40123AS03 8-2 N 1 3FV-0219-Y SOE BAMU FLOW CUNTHUL VALVE X 3-78A 46125BSO3 C-3 Y 4 3FV-9253 SOE BAMU PUMP TO VCT ISOLA 110N A 2-111A 4012b8S03 G-2 Y . 3FY-9210AY SUE SOLENO!D PILUT FOR FV-9218-Y X 3-78A 49125B803 C-3 .Y { 3FY-92b3 SOE SOLENOID VALVE FOH FV-9253 A 2-111A 4012bBS03 F-3 Y t 3HV-9200 SOE CVCS NORMAL FLOW CONTHOL VLV A 3-2D 46123A993 D-3 Y 3HV-9201 SOE PZH AUX SPHAY ISOL VALVE A 3-1C 40123AS03 E-3 Y + 3HV-9205 HLP NORMAL LErDOWN ISO (OHB) A 3-2D 44123A803 G-3 N I 3HV-9216 SOE CONTROLLED BLEEDOeF RELIW ISOL X 3-1B 401R4AS$3 E-3 Y 3HV-9217 SUE CONTHOLLED BLEEDUFF STUP VLV (IRB) B 3-1C 40124AS03 G-3 Y 4 3HV-9218 BOE CONTROLLED BLEEDOFF STOP VLV (OHB) A 3-2D 40124AS$3 F-4 Y 3HV-9231 HSB BAMU PUMP P-175 RECIRC ISOL A 3-96 44125ASe3 D-8 N , 3HV-9235 HSB BAMU T-072 GRAVITY FEED TO CHNG B 3-96 4el25AS03 B-5 N 3HV-92J6 HSB BAMU PUMP P-174 RECIRC ISOL A 3-96 40125A603 D-1 N 3HV-9240 HSB BAMU T-071 GRAVITY FEED TO CHHG B 3-96 4012 BAS 03 B-4 N 3HV-9247 HSB DISCH VLV TO CHARG PUMPS A 3-78A 49125B903 E-3 N i 3HV-9257 Strd BAMU PUMP RECIRC TO VCT X 3-78A 4012bBS03 E-2 Y 3HV-9323 HilB COLD LEG 1A ISOL VLV B 3-2D 40112CS03 D-4 Y ! 3HV-9324 SOE HPSI PUMP DISCHANGE ISOLAT ION A 3-2D 40112CSO3 D-5 Y - 3HV-9326 HtJB COLD LEG 1B ISOL VLV B 3-2D 48112CSO3 C-4 Y 3HV-9327 SOE HPSI PUMP DISCHANGE ISOLA 110N A 3-2D 40112C803 B-5 Y - 3HV-9329 HSB COLD LES 2A ISOL VLV B 3-2C 48112CSe3 B-4 Y 3HV-9330
- SOE HMSI PUMP DISCHARGE ISOLA 110N A 3-2D 40112CS03 A-5 -Y 3HV-9332 HSB COLD LEG EB ISOL VLV B 3-2C 49112C803 F-4 Y i 3HV-9333 SOE HPSI PUMP DISCHANGE ISOLA 1 ION A 3-2D 40112CSO3 F-5 Y -
3HV-9428 SUE HPSI PUMP DISCHARUE ISOLATION A 3-2D 48112CSO3 G-3 Y 3HV-9434 SOE HPSI PUMP DISCHANGE ISOLATION B 3-2D 40112C803 E-3 Y 3HY-9206 SUE 80L VALVE FOR HV-920e A 3-20 40123A893 E-3 Y 3HY-920b HLP SOLENUID PILO 1 FOH HV-9205 A 3-2D 401234993 G-3 N 3HY-9218 HSB SOLENOID PILUT FOR HV-9218 A 3-2D 48124ASO3 F-4 Y k 3HY-9231 HSB BAMU PUMP P-175 RECIRC LINE ISOL A 3-96 4012b4903 D-8 N JHY-92J6 HSB BAMU PUMP P-1/4 HECIRC LINE ISOL A 3-96 40125AS03 D-1 N 3HY-92b7 SOE SOLENOID PILO 1 FOR HV-92b7 X 3-78A 49125B883 E-2 Y I 3LV-0227B HSB VOL CONTR TANK UUTLET VALVE B 2-192A 40124ASO3 B-5 Y [
*'> 3LV-9227C HSB RWST OUTLET VALVE B 2-76 401249803 B-7 Y !
3 3P-912 SOE CONTAINMENT SPHAY PUMP A 3-137C 48114A903 C-4 Y ' I
- rn 3P-013 SOE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP B 3-137A 40114AS03 G-4 Y
.$ 3P-017 80E HPSI PUMP #1 A 3-137C 48112ASO3 G-4 Y
- y 34-018 BOE HPSI PUMP 3 AB 3-137B 40112Ase3 E-4 Y ,
JP-919 SOE HPSI PUMP #2 B 3-137A 48112A803 C-4 *Y -
'W 3P-174 HSB BAMU PUMP A. 3-78A 4012bBSO3 D-6 N JP-175 HSB BAMU PUMP A 3-78B 40125B903 B-6 N L 3p-199 HSB CHARG1NG PUMP #1 A 3-93 401249803 G-3 . Y JP-191 H'JB CHARGING PUMP #2 AB 3-92 40124D983 D-3 Y 39-192 HSB CHANGING PUMP #3 8 3-91 401249983 C Y 3T-095 HSB RWST 995 -
3-163 441229803 C-3 N i e '
3 . i SAFE SHUTDL JN COMPONENT LIST SORTED BY SYSTEM Page 10 - FIRE TRAIN CYZTEM COMPONENT CATEGOHY DESCRIPTION TRAIN AREA / ZONE (S) REF DRAWING INTERACTION CVC3 3T-006 HSB RWST 006 - 3-166 40122BS03 C-3 N 3T-071 HSB BAMU TANK B - 3-96 4012 BAS 03 D-3 N 3T-072 HSB BAMU TANK A - 3-96 40125AS03 D-6 N 3T-077 HSB VOLUME CONTROL TANK - 3-109 40124AS03 D-6 N
, 3TV-9267 HLP NORMAL LETDOWN ISO VALVE (IRS) B 3-1C 40123A803 F-3 N DG 2A-274 HSB DB G002 ROOM EMhR FAN "A" A 2-158 40177B H-68H-5 N 2A-275 HSB DG G002 ROUM EMER FAN "B" A 2-158 40177B H-68H-5 N 2A-276 HSB Du G003 ROOM EMER FAN "A" B 2-155 40177B H-6&H-5 N 24-277 HSB DG 0003 ROOM EMER FAN "B" B 2-155 401779 H-68H-5 N 2E-546 HSB G-002 - 20 CYLIN ENGINE - CW RAD A 2-158 40110A G-8 N -
2E-547 HSB G-003 - 20 CYLIN ENGINE - CW RAD B 2-155 40110C G-8 N 2E-549 HSB G-003 - 16 CYLIN ENUINE - CW RAD 9 2-155 40110D G-7 N 2E-550 HSB G-002 - 16 CYLIN ENGINE - CW RAD A 2-158 40110B G-8 N 20-002 HSB DIESEL ENGINES FOH TRAIN A A 2-158 401104/B N 2G-003 HSB DIESEL ENGINES FOR FRAIN B B 2-155 40110C/D N 2HY-59b541 HSB G-002 - 20 CYLIN ENU - AIR STANT A 2-158 40110A E-1 N 2HY-5955B1 HSB G-002 - 16 CYLIN ENG - AIR START A 2-158 40110B E-2 N 2HY-59b5C1 HSB G-002 - 20 CYLIN ENG - AIR STANT A 2-158- 40110A E-2 N 2HY-5955D1 HSB G-032 - 16 CYLIN ENG - AIR START A 2-138 401109 E-1 N 2HY-59tSE2 HSB G-003 - 20 CYLIN ENU - AIR START B 2-155 401100 E-1 N 2HY-5955F2 HSB G-003 - 16 CYLIN ENG - AIR START B 2-155 401100 E-2 N 2HY-5955G2 HSB G-003 - 20 CYLIN ENU - AIR START B 2-155 40110C E-2 N 2HY-5955H2 HSB G-003 - 16 CYLIN ENG - AIR START B 2-155 40110D E-1 N 29-093 HSB T-035 DFO THANSFER PUMP A 2-159 40116A C-7 N " EP-094 HSB T-036 DFO TRANSFER PUMP B 2-160 40116A C-4 N 2P-095 HSB T-036 DFO THANSFER POMP B 2-160 40116A C-3 N 2P-096 HSB T-035 DFO TRANSFER PUMP A 2-159 40116A C-6 N 81-035 HSB G002 Dr0 STRG TANK - 2-159 401164 B-7 N 2T-0J6 HSB 6003 DFO STHG TANK - 2-160 40116A B-3 N 21-133 HSB G002 DFO DAY TANK - 2-158 40110B G-3 N ET-134 HSB 0003 DFO DAY TANK - 2-155 40110D G-3 N
- 21-161 HSB 20 CYL G003 COOL WATEN EXP TANK -
2-155 401100 G-7 N 2T-162 HSB 20 CYL G002 COOL WATER EXP (ANK - 2-158 40110A G-7 N e 2T-189 HSB 16 CYL 6003 COUL WATEH EXP TANK - 2-155 40110D G-7 N ! 2T-190 HSB 16 CYL 0002 COOL WATER EXP FANK - 2-158 40110B'G-7 N
- % 27-274 HSB G002 AIN START RECE1VEN -
2-1S8 40110A G-1 N 93 2T-275 HSB G002 AIR START HECEIVER - 2-158 40110A G-2 N * $@C3 2T-276 HSB G003 AIN S1 ART RLCE1VEN - 2-155 401100 G-1 N 2T-277 HSD 0003 AIR STANT HECEIVER - 2-155 40110C G-2 N ,N 3A-274 HSB Du G002 - HUOM EMERG FAN "A" A 3-158 401778903 H-6/5 N ~ JA-275 HSB DG 0002 - ROUM EMENG FAN "B" A 3-158 401779903 H-6/5 =N 3A-276 HSB Du G003 - ROOM EMERG FAN "A" B 3-155 40177BS03 H-6/5 N JA-277 HSB DG G003 - ROOM EMEHG FAN "B" B 3-155 401778S03 H-6/5 N 3E-546 HSB G-002 - 20 CYLIN ENu - CW RAD A 3-158 40110AS03 G-8 . N JE-547 HSB G-003 - 20 CYLIN ENG - CW RAD B 3-155 40110CS03 G-8 N 3E-549 HSB G-003 - 16 CYLIN ENU - CW RAD B 3-155 40110DS03 G-7 N 3E-530 HSB G-002 - 16 CYLIN ENG - CW RAD A 3-158 40110BS03 G-8 N
y I . g SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SORTED BY SYSTEM Page 11-FIRE TRAIN CYCTEM COMPONENT CATEGOHY DESCRIPTION TRAIN AREA /2ONE(S) REF DRAWING INTERACTION DG JG-002 HSB DIEGEL ENGINES FOR TRAIN A A 3-158 40110AS03/BS03 N 3G-003 HSB DIESLL ENGINES FOR THAIN B B 3-1b5 40110CS03/DS03 N 3HY-5955A1 HSB G-002 - 20 CYLIN ENG - AIR START A 3-158 40110ASO3 E-1 N 3HY-S9b5B1 HSB G-002 - 16 CYLIN ENU - AIR S7 ANT A 3-158 40110BS03 E-2 N 3HY-5955C1 HUB G-002 - 20 CYLIN ENG - AIR START A 3-158 40110AS03 E-2 N 3HY-59t5D1 HSB G-002 - 16 CYLIN ENU - AIR STANT A 3-1b8 40110BS03 E-1 N 3HY-5955E2 HSB G-003 - 20 CYLIN ENG - AIR START B 3-155 40110CS03 E-1 N 3HY-59b5e2 HSB G-003,- 16 CYLIN ENU - AIR S1 ANT B 3-155 40110DS03 E-2 N 3HY-5955G2 HSB G-003 - 20 CYLIN ENG - AIR START B 3-155 40110C803 E-2 N 3HY-59b5H2 HSB G-003,- 16 CYLIN ENU - AIR S1AHT B 3-155 40110DS03 E-1 N 3P-093 HSB T-035 DFO FRANSFER PUMP A 3-159 40116AS03 C-7 N 3p-094 HSB T-036 DFO THANSFEH PUMP B 3-160 40116AS03 C-4 N 3P-095 HSB T-036 DFO TRANSFER PUMP B 3-160 40116AS03 C-3 N 3P-096 HSB T-035 D>O THitNSFEH PUMP A 3-169 40116AS03 C-6 N 3T-035 HSB G002 DFO SrHG TANK - 3-159 40116A803 B-7 N 3T-036 HSB G403 DPU STRG TANK - 3-160 40116AS$3 B-3 N 3T-133 HUB G002 DFO DAY TANK - 3-1b8 40110BS03 G-3 N 3T-134 HSB G003 DFO DAY TANK - 3-1b5 40110DS03 G-3 N JT-161 HSB 20 CYL G003 COOL WATER EXP TANK - 3-155 40110C803 G-7 N 31-162 HSB 20 CYL G002 COOL WATEN EXP TANK - 3-158 40110AS03 G-7 N 3T-189 HGB 16 CYL G003 COOL WATER EXP TANK - 3-155 40110DS03 G-7 N 3T-190 HSB 16 CYL G002 COOL WATEH EXP TANK - 3-158 40110BS03 G-7 N 3T-274 HUB G002 AIR START HECEIVER - 3-1b8 40110AS03 G-1 N 3T-275 HSB G002 A1H STAR 1 RECE1VEH - 3-158 40110AS03 G-2 N d 3T-2/6 HSB G003 AIR START HECEIVER - 3-155 40110CS03 G-1 N 31-277 HSB G003 A!H STAR 1 RECE1VEN - 3-155 40110CS03 G-2 N ECW 2/JE-335 HSB EMERG WATER CHILLER - LOOP B B 2-11 40180A E-3 N 2/3E-336 HSB EMERG WA1EH CHILLhH - LOOP A A 2-9 401794 E-3 N 2/3HY-J888A HSB OIL COOLER INLET ISOL VALVE A 2-9 40179A E-4 N 2/3HY-J888B Hb8 OIL COOLEH' INLET ISOL VALVE B 2-11 40180A E-4 N 2/3P-160 HSB EMERG CHILLED WATER PUMP B D 2-11 40180A E-6 N 2/34-162 HSB EMERO CHILLhD WATEN PUMP A A 2-9 401794 E-5 N 2/3P-444 HSB OIL PUMP FOR EMERG CHILLER E-3J5 B 2-11 J0156 F-4 N 2/3P-4 45 HSB 01L PUMP FOR EMERO CH1LLER E-336 A 2-9 30154 F-2 N 2/3T-122 HSB ECW 'B' COMPRESSION TANK B 2-11 40180A H-2 N 3m 2/31-123 HSB ECW
- A' COMPHESSION TANK A 2-9 40179A G-6 N m
2/3 TIC-9720-2 HSB TEMP CONTROLLER FOR VLV TV-9720 B 2-20A 40180B E-7 N
- 2/3 TIC-9749-1 HSB TEMP CONTHOLLhH FOR VLV TV-9749 A 2-204 40179B E-6 N
@ 2/3TV-9720 HSB CONTR VLV (O CR COOLER E-419 D 2-26 40180B D-7 N y 2/3TV-9749 HSB CONTH VLV TO CH COOLEN E-418 A 2-23 401799 E-6 N EP 2/3L-176-B HSB EMERG CHILL WATER CONTRL PNL-LOOP B D 2-11 40180D B-7 *N W 2/3L-177-A HSB EMkHO CHILL WATEN CONTRL PNL-LOOP A A 2-9 40179m C-7 N 261-1641 HSB 2A06 BUS VOLTMETER X 2-20A J02Je Y 261-1662 HSB 2A04 BUS VOLTMETEN X 2-20A 30220 . Y 2L-032-A HSB PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET A 2-204 53000 F-7 N 2L-032-B HSB PLANT PHOTECTION SYSTEM CABINET B 2-204 31541 N 2L-032-C HGB PLANT PROrECTION SYS TEM CABINET C 2-20A 31541 N O 9 e
t . g 1 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SOHTED BY SYS1EM- Page 12 FIRh TRAIN SYSTEM COMPONENT CATEGOHV DESCRIPTION TRAIN AREA / ZONE (S) HeiF DRAWING INTERACTION EP EL-932-D HSB PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET- D 2-20A 31541 N EL-933-A HSB THIP CINCUIT BHiAMER CABINET A 2-162A - 31542 N-2L-933-9 HSB TRIP CIHCUIT BREAKER CABINET B 2-192A- 31542 N. 2L-933-C HSB THIP CIRCUIT BHEAKER CABINET C 2-192A 31542 N
, 2L-933-D HSB TRIP CINCUIT BREAKER CABINET D 2-192A 31542 - N BL-934-A SOE ESF ACTUATION AUX CABINET A A 2-29A 53600 G-7 N-2L-935-B SOE ESF ACTUATION AUX CABINET B B 2-29A' 53068 G-7 N 2L-942-A ALT EVACUAlION SHUTDOWN PANEL A 2-43 31551 N 2L-942-B ALT EV6D TRAIN B B- 2-43 31551 N 2L-842-C ALT EVSD TRAIN C C 2-43 31551 N 2L-942-0 ALT EVSD TRAIN D D 2-43 31551 N 2L-971-A HSB NSSS AUX RELAY CABINET A 2-20A 534@0 F-7 N 2L-971-B HSB NSSS AUX HELAY CABINET B 2-2eA 53098 F-7 N EL-971-C HSB NSSS AUX RLLAY CABINkT C 2-29A 38563 N 2L-971-D H'iB NSSS AUX HELAY CABINET D 2-20A Je176 N 2L-871-X HSB NSBS AUXILIARY RELAY CADINET X 2-29A 31568 N 2L-121-A HSB CHANNEL A FOXBORO TERNIN PANEL A 2-20A 5304G G-6 N 2L-124-A HSB SPEC 200 TkRM CAB PHUC PROT CHAN 1 A 2-29A 30632 N EL-125-B HSB CHANNEL B FOXBOHO TERMIN PANEL B 2-29A 33904 G-6 N 2L-126-9 HSB CHANNEL B FOXBOHO EQUIP PANEL B 2-ReA 53099 G-6 N 2L-127-B HSB SPEC 299 INSTR CAB PROC PHOT CHAN 2 B 2-20A J1695 N EL-128-B HSB SPEC 298 TERM CAB PHUC PROT CHAN 2 B 2-29A 32637 N 2L-129-C HSB CHANNEL C FOXBOHO TERMIN PANEL C 2-29A 53600 G-6 N 2L-130-C HSB CHANNEL C FOXBONO EQUIP PANEL C
- 2-29A 53040 6-6 N 2L-133-D HSB CHANNEL D FOXBOHO TERMIN PANEL D 2-20A 53900 G-6 N 2L-134-D HSB CHANNEL D FOXBORO EQUIPMENT PANEL A 2-29A 530@6 6-6 N.
2L-137-X HSB SPEC Ree TERMINAT CABINET NSSS X 2-29A 31616 N 2L-140-X HSB SPEC 296 PWR Sl* PLY & NEST AHEA NSSS X 2-20A 34585 N 2L-144-X HSB SPEC 20e PWR SPPLY 4 NEST AREA NSSS X 2-294 JG896 N EL-154-A HSB HVAC Euu!P CONTNUL PANEL A 2-20A 53000 F-7 N 2L-154-B HSB HVAC SYSTEMS CONTHOL B 2-20A 31293 N 2L-1$8-B HSB BhCHTEL INTEHFACE CABINET B 2-20A 31636 N 2L-160-A H:19 CONTROL PANEL FOR DG G-942 A 2-158 35842 N 2L-161-B HSB CONTRUL PANEL FOH Du G-993 8 2-1b5 35942 N 2L-188-A HSB NSUS INTERFACE SPEC ese A 2-29A Je762 N 'g 2L-188-9 HSB NSSS INTERFACE SPEC 200 B 2-29A 30793 N o 2L-298-C HSB PUMP P-148 STEAM TURB CNfRL PANEL C 2-161A 491699 F-2 N IQ .o 2L-344-A 2L-345-9 HSB HSB CL 1E AUX Re: LAY PNL - LOAD GHP A CL 1E AUX RELAY PNL - LOAD SRP B A B 2-48 2-J5 39876-2 JOS89-2 N N Q 2L-376-A 2L-377-B HSB HSB THANSI-ORMEN PANEL TRANSFORMER PANEL A B 2-158 30329-2 N '" 2-155 30333-2 *N 2L-411-X ALT EMERGENCY PLAN 1 PAHAM MONITON PANEL A 2-3A 30321 N-2L-429-A HUB CL 1E AUX RELAY.PNL - LDAD SHP A A 2-49 Je582 N 2L-421-B HSB CL 1E AUX RLLAY PNL - LOAD SNP B. B 2-35 36b83-1 N 2MS4705 HSB AFW DC POWER SUPPLY A 2-161A Je996 Y 2MS4706 HSB AtW DC POWER SUPPLY B 2-161A 30954 Y 2MS4716 HSB AFW DC POWER SUPPLY C 2-161A JO999-1 Y O
# y 8
I I SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SURTED BY SYSTEM Page 13 FIRE TRAIN CY3 FEM COMPONENT CATEGORY DESCRIPTION TRAIN AREA /ZONC(S) HEF DRAWING INTERACTION EP 361-1641 HSB JA06 DOS V0LTMETER X 2-20A J22JO Y 3El-1662 HSD 3A04 BUS VOLTMETEH X 2-20A 32220 Y 3L-0J2-A HSB PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET A 2-20A 53000 F-4 N 3L-032-B HSB PLANT PHOTECTION SYSTEM CABINET B 2-20A 31541 N
, 3L-032-C HSB PLANT PHOTECfl0N SYSTEM CABINET C 2-20A 31541 N 3L-032-D HSD PLANT PHOTECTION SYSTEM CABINET D 2-20A 31541 N 3L-0J3-A HSB TRIP CIRCUIT BREAHER CABINET A 2-102A 31542 N 3L-033-B HSB TRIP CINCU1T BHEAKER CABINLT B 2-102A 31542 N 3L-033-C HSD TRIP CIHCUIT BREAKER CABINEr C 2-102A 31542 N 3L-033-D HSD TRIP CINCUIT BHEAKER CABINET D 2-102A 31542 N
.'5L-0.14- A SUE EUF ACTUATION AUX CABINET A A 2-20A 53000 0-3 N 3L-035-B SOE ESF ACTUATION AUX CABINET B B 2-204 53000 G-4 N 3L-042-A ALT EVACUATION SHUIDOWN PANEL A 2-43 J3551 N 3L-042-9 ALT EVSD TRAIN O B 2-43 33551 N 3L-042-C ALT EVSD TRAIN C C 2-43 33551 N 3L-042-D ALT EVSD TRAIN D D 3-43 31551 N 3L-071-A HSB NSSS AUX HELAY CABINET A 2-20A 53000 F-4 N 3L-071-B HSB NSSS AUX RLLAY CADINET B 2-20A 53000 F-4 N 3L-071-C HSD NSSS AUX HELAY CABINET C 2-20A J0563 N 3L-071-D HSB NSSS AUX RFLAY CABINET D 2-204 30176 N 3L-071-X HSD NSSS AUX RELAY CABINET X 2-20A J2764 N 3L-121-A HSB CHANNEL A FOXBONO TENM PANEL A 2-204 53000 0-4 N 3L-124-A HSB SPEC 200 TERM CAB PROC PHOT CHAN 1 A 2-204 32632 N 3L-125-B HSB CHANNEL B FOXBOHO TEHM PANEL B 2-20A 53000 G-4 N ,
CHANNEL B FOXBOHO EQUlp PANEL 2-204 53000 0-4 N */ 3L-126-B HSD B 3L-127-B HSB SPEC 200 INSTR CAB PHOC PHOT CHAN 2 B 2-204 34b57 N 3L-128-B HSD SPEC 200 TERM CAB PHOC PHOT CHAN 2 B 2-20A J2637 N 3L-129-C HSB CHANNEL C FOXBOHO TEkM PANEL C 2-20A 53000 G-4 N 3L-1J0-C HSB CHANNEL C FOXBO.iO EQUIP PANEL C 2-20A 53000 G-4 N 3L-133-D HSB CHANNEL D FOXBOHO TEHM PANEL D 2-20A 53000 G-4 N 3L-134-D HSB CHANNEL D FOXBOHO EQUIP PANEL D 2-204 53000 0-4 N 3L-137-X HSD SPEC 200 TERMINAT CABINET NSSS X 2-20A 32577 N 3L-140-X HSB SPEC 200 PWR SUP & NEST AREA NS89 X 2-20A 31619 N 3L-144-X HSB SPEC 200 PWR SPPLY & NEST AREA NSSS X 2-20A 32745 N ,
> 3L-154-A HSB HVAC EQUIP CONTHOL PANEL A 2-20A 53000 N T 3L-154-B HSB HVAC SYSTEMS CONTROL B 2-20A 31293 N
$ 3L-158-B HSB BECHTE1. INfERFACE CABINET D 2-20A J36J6 N y 3L-160-A HbB CONTROL PANEL FUH DG G-002 A 3-158 35046 N , >m 3L-161-B HSB CONTROL PANEL FOR DG G-003 B 3-155 35046 N
- 3L-188-A HSB NSSS INTERPACE SPEC 200 A 2-20A 32701 N ,
ED 3L-188-9 HSB NSSS INTEHFACE SPEC 200 B 2-20A J2700 'N 3L-298-C HSB PUMP P-140 STEAM TUHB CNTRL PANEL C 3-161A 40160BS03 F-2 N 3L-344-A HSD CL 1E AUX HELAY PNL - LOAD GRP A A 3-60 J2876-2 N 3L-345-B HSB CL 1E AUX RLLAY PNL - LOAD GHP B B 3-34 32880-2 N i 3L-376-A HSB THANSFORMER PANEL A 3-158 J2329-2 N 3L-377-B HSB THANSFORMEN PANEL B 3-155 32333-2 N 3L-411-X ALT EMER PLANT PRAM MUNITOR PANEL 9 A 3-3A J2321 N
3 . g-SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SURTED BY SYSTEM Page 14 , FIRE TRAIN CY% TEM COMPONENT CATEGORY DESCRIPTION TRAIN A ntCA/ 20NE (S) REF DRAWING INTERACTION EP 3L-420-A HSB CL 1E Aux HELAY PNL - LOAD GRP A A 3-60 J2582 N 3L-421-B HSB CL 1E AUX RELAY PNL - LOAD GRP B B 3-34 30583-1 N JMS4705 HSB AFW DC POWER SUPPLY A 3-161A Ja996 Y 3MS4706 HSB ArW DC POWEH SUPPLY B 3-1614 32954 Y
, 3MS4716 HSB AFW DC POWER SUPPLY C 3-161A J2999-1 Y CvS CPS CPS CABLES N ESF 2LI-0305-1 HSB RWST LEVEL IND A 2-20A 401229 C-5 , N ELI-0305-2 HSB RWST LEVEL IND D 2-204 40122B C-4 N 2LI-0305-3 HSB RWST LEVEL IND (ESF) C 2-20A 40122D C-4 N 2LI-03(b-4 HSB RWST LkVEL IND (EbF) D 2-204 40122D C-4 N 2PI-0351-1 SOE CNTMT PRESS INDICATIUN A 2-20A 40172A E-7 N 291-0351-2 BOE CNTM1 P;<ESS INDICA 110N 9 2-204 40172A G-7 N 2PI-OJ51-3 SWE CNfMT PRESS INDICATION C 2-20A 40172A G-2 N 291-0351-4 SOE CNTM1 PHESS INDICATION D 2-204 40172A E-2 N 2PI-0352-1 SOE CNTMT PRESS INDICATION A 2-204 40172A E-7 N 2PI-03S2-2 GOE CNTMT PRESS INDICATION B 2-20A 40172A G-7 N 2PI-0352-3 SOE CNTMT PRESS INDICATION C 2-20A 40172A G-2 N D
291-0352-4 SOE CNTNT PHESS INDICATION D 2-20A 40172A E-2 N 3LI-0305-1 HSB RWST LEVEL IND A 2-20A 40122B803 C-5 N 3LI-8305-2 HSB RWST LEVEL IND B 2-204 40122B603 C-4 N 3LI-0305-3 HSB RWST LEVEL IND (ESF) C 2-20A 40122D803 C-4 N 3LI-0305-4 HSB RWST LEVEL IND (ESF) D 2-20A 40122DS03 C-4 N 3PI-0351-1 SOE CNTMT PRESS INDICATION A 2-20A 40172A803 E-7 N
! 391-0351-2 SOE CNTM1 PHESS INDICATION B 2-20A 40172AS03 G-7 N d 3PI-0351-3 SUE CNTMT PRESS INDICATION C 2-20A 40172A803 G-2 N 3PI-0351-4 SOE CNTMT PHESS INDICATION D 2-20A 40172AS03 E-2 N 3PI-0352-1 SUE CNTMT PRESS INDICATION A 2-204 40172AS03 E-7 N 3PI-0352-2 SOE CNTMT PHESS INDICATION B 2-20A 40172AS03 G-7 N 3PI-0352-3 SOE CNTMT PRESS INDICATION C 2-20A 40172AS03 G-2 N 3PI-0352-4 SOE CNTMT PHESS INDICATION D 2-20A 40172AS03 E-2 N HVAC 2/3E-418 HSB EMERGENCY AC UNIT A A 2-23 40173C D-3 N *Mo 2/3E-419 HSB EMERbENCY AC UNIT B B 2-26 40173C G-3 N 2/3HV-9702 HSB CR NORMAL VENT SUPPLY DAMPER 'A' A 2-26 40173A F-5 N
- I$O 2/3HV-9703 HSB CH NONMAL VENT SUPPLY DAMPhu *B' B 2-26 40173A E-5 N 2/JHV-9711 HSB CR NORMAL HETURN DNPR D 2-12 40173A B-7 N N 2/3HV-9712 HSD CH NONMAL RtTURN DAMPER A 2-12 40173A C-7 N 2/3HV-9717 HSB NORMAL EXT A 2-26 40173D E-3 .N 2/3HV-9/56 HSD NORMAL EXT A 2-36 40173B G-3 N 2/3HV-9757 HSB NORMAL EXT ISL B 2-36 40173B G-4 N 2/3HV-9758 HSB NORMAL EXT ISOL B 2-26 421739 E-4 N 2/3HV-9769 HSB AUX BLDG SMOKE EXH DAMPER A 2-26 40173C E-7 N 2/3HV-9778 HSB CH EMEH VENTL RECIRC DAMPtHS B 2-26 40173C F-4 N 2/3HV-9779 HSD AUX BLDG. SMOKE EACH DAMPER D 2-26 40173C E-8 N
8 . g a SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SURTED BY SYSTEM Page 1b FIRE TRAIN EY3 TEM COMPONENT CATEGORY DESCRIPTION FRAIN AREA / ZONE (S) HEF DRAWING INTERACTION HVAC 2/3HY-9702 HSB SOL OPEHATOR FOR VALVE HV-9702 A 2-26 40173A F-5 N 2/3HY-9783 HSB SUL OPERATON FOH VALVE HV-9703 9 2-26 40173A E-5 N 2/3HY-9711A HSB SOL VALVE FOR HV-9711 B 2-12 40173A B-7 N 2/3HY-97119 HSB SQL VALVE FOH HV-9711 B 2-12 401734 B-6 N
, 2/3HY-9712A HSB SQL VALVE *A" FOR HV-9712 A 2-12 40173A C-7 N 2/3HY-97129 HSB ,SUL VALVE "B" FUR HV-9712 A 2-12 40173A C-6 N 2/3HY-9717 HSB SQL VALVE FOR HV-9717 A 2-26 40173B E-3 N 2/3HY-9756 HSB SQL VALVE FOR HV-9756 A 2-36 40173B G-3 N 2/3HY-9737 HSB SOL VALVE FOR HV-9737 B 2-J6 4817JB G-4 N 2/3HY-9758 HSB SQL VALVE FOH HV-9758 9 2-26 401739 E-4 N 2/JHY-9769A HSB SQL VALVE "A" FOR HV-9769 A 2-26 40173C F-7 N 2/3HY-97699 NisB SOL VALVE "B" FOR HV-9769 A 2-26 40173C E-7 N 2/3HY-97/8 HSD SQL UDEHATOR FOR VALVE HV-9778 9 2-26 40173C F-7 N 2/3HY-9779A HSB SUL VALVE "A" FOR HV-9779 9 2-26 40173C D-8 N 2/3H(-97798 HSB SQL VALVE "B" FOR HV-9779 B 2-26 40173C E-8 N 2A-370 HSB SWC P-1124 ROOM EXH FAN A 2-148F 40178A B-5 N 2A-371 HSB SWC P-1139 ROOM EXH FAN B 2-148F 48178A B-5 N 2A-372 HSB SWC P-114B ROOM EXH FAN B 3-148F 40178AS03 B-4. N 2A-373 HSB SWC P-307A HOOM EXH FAN A 3-148F 4017 BAS 03 B-4 N 2E-255 HSB TRAIN A SWuR - EMEHG AC UNIT A 2-29 40174A F-5 N 2E-257 HSB TRAIN B SWGR - EMERG AC UNIT B 2-29 40174A F-3 N ,
2E-399 HSB EMERG CDOLING UNIT (TRAIN Al A 2-1D 40172AS03 D-4 N 2E-400 HSB EMEHG CUOLING UNIT (TRAIN B) B 2-1D 40172AS03 D-6 N 2L-401 HSB EMERO COOLING UNIT (TRAIN A) A 2-1D 42172AS03 D-6 N 2E-402 H99 EMERG COOLING UNIT (TRAIN B) B 2-1D 40172ASO3 D-4 N 2E-416 CSD RM 002 (LPSI P-016) EMER AC UNIT B 2-137A 4217SA E-5 N 2E-417 CSD HM 005 (LPSI P-015) ENER AC UNIT A 2-137C 40173A E-2 N 2E-423 HSB CABINET ANEA EMER COOLING UNIT B B 2-39 40173D E-4 N 2E-424 HSB CABINET AREA EMER COOLING UNIT A A 2-38 40173D E-7 N 2E-435 HSB RM 196C (CVCS P-192) EMER AC UNIT B 2-89 401789 D-3 N 2E-4J6 HSB RM 106B (CVCS P-191) EMER AC UNIT B 2-88 40178B D-3 N 2E-437 HSB RM 1968 (CVCS P-191) EMER AU UNIT A 2-8h ,40178D D-3 N 2E-4J8 HSB HM 106A (CVCS P-190) EMER AC UN!r A 2-87 40178B D-3 N
*k 2L-439 HSB HM 195A (BAMU P-174) EMER AC UNIT A 2-844 421789 B-3 N ,y 2E-440 H9B HM 105B (BAMU P-1/3) EMER AC UNIT A 2-848 40178B B-3 N 2
O
>< 2E-453 HSB RM 008 (CCW P-024) EMER AU UNIT A 2-135D 4017bA C-8 N
.m 2E-434 HHB HM 007 (CCW P-025) EMER AC UNIT A 2-13dC 40173A C-6 *N EE-4S5 HSB RM 006 (CCW P-026) EMER AC UNIT B 2-135B 40175A C-4 N 2E-518 HSB HM 007 (CCW P-025) EMER AC UNIT B 2-13SC 40173A C-5 N 2HV-9738 HSB CABINET EMER VENT RETURN DMP A 2-204 42173D E-8 N 2HV-97J9 HSB CABINET EMER VENT HETURN DMP B 2-J9 40173D E-3 N 2HY-9738 HGB SULENOID PILOT FOR HV-9738 A 2-20A 40173D E-7 N SWC P'112B ROOM EXH FAN
~
3A-370 HSB A 3-148F 40178AS03 B-5 N
I . g e SAFE BHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SURTED BY SYSTEM Page 16 FIRE TRAIN CY3 TEM COMPONENT CATEGONY DESCRIPTIUN TRAIN AREA /ZUNE(S) REF DRAWING INTERACTION HVAC 34-371 HSB SWC P-11JA ROOM EXH FAN B 3-148F 40578AS03 B-5 N 34-372 HSB SWC P-114A ROOM EXH FAN B 2-148F 40178A B-4 N JA-373 HSB SWC p-J078 RUOM EXH FAN A 2-148F 40178A B-4 N 3E-265 HSB TRAIN A SWUR - EMER AC UNIT A 2-29 40174AS23 D-6 N 3E-257 HSB TRAIN B SWGR - EMER AC UNIT B 2-29 40174AS03 D-4 N 3E-399 HSB EMERG COULING UNIT (THA1N Al A 3-1D 40172AS03 D-4 N JE-400 HSB EMERG CUOLING UNIT (TRAIN B) B 3-1D 40172AS03 D-6 N 3E-401 HSB EMERG COULING UNIT (THAIN A) A 3-1D 40172AS03 D-6 N JE-402 HSD EMEHG CU0 LING UNIT (FRAIN B) B 3-1D 40172AS03 D-4 N 3E-416 CSD RM 002 (LPS1 P-016) EMER AC UNIT B 3-137A 40175AS03 E-5 N JE-417 CSD HM 005 (LPSI P-015) EMER AC UNIT A 3-137C 4017dAS03 E-2 N 3E-426 HSB CAB INLET AHEA EMER COULING UNIT B B 3-30 401730S03 E-7 N JE-427 HSD CHB (NLET AREA EMER COOLING UNIT A A 3-31 4017JOS03 E-7 N 3E-435 HSD RM 106D (CVCS P-192) EMER AC UNIT B 3-91 40178BS03 D-3 N 3E-436 HSD HM 106E (CVCS P-191) EMER AC UNIT B 3-92 40178BS03 D-3 N 2 3L-437 HSB RM 106E (CVCS P-191) EMER AU UNIT A 3-92 40178BS03 D-3 N JE-438 HSB HM 106F (CVCS P-190) EMER AC UNIT A 3-93 401789803 D-3 N 3E-439 HSB RM 10bC (BAMU P-174) EMER AC UNIT A 3-784 401788803 B-3 N JE-440 HUD HN 10bD (BAMU P-175) EMER AC UNIT A 3-7dD 40178BS03 B-3 N 3E-453 HSB RM 000 (CCW P-024) EMER AC UNIT A 3-135D 40175AS03 C-8 N JE-454 HSB HM 007 (CCW P-025) EMER AC UNIT A 3-135C 40175AS03 C-6 N 3E-455 HSD RM 006 (CCW P-026) EMER AC UNIT B 3-135B 4017bAB03 C-4 N 3E-518 HSB HM 007 (CCW P-025) EMER AC UNIT B 3-135C 40175A603 C-5 N 3HV-9738 HSD CAB EMER VENTL RETURN DMPR A 2-20A 40173DS03 E-8 N 3HV-9739 HSB CAB EMiiR VEN rL HETUHN OMPR B 3-JO 42173D603 E-S N 3HY-9738 HSB SULENDID PILO 1 FOH HV-9738 A 2-204 40173DS03 E-8 N SAAC302191001 HSB EMERG AC UNIT A E-418 FOR C/R A 2-23 2-20A 41366-10 N SAAC302192004 HSB EMERG AC UNIT A E-418 FOR C/R A 2-23 3-209 41366-10 N SAAC302195001 HSB EMER EXH FAN A055/EMER CHIL B R117 9 2-23 2-9 41371-5 & 67-10 N SAAC302195002 HSB EMER SPPY FAN A054/EMER CHIL B R117 8 2-23 2-9 41371-5 & 67-10 N SAAC302195003 HSB EMER SPPY FAN A053/EMER CHIL A R115 A 2-23 2-9 41371-5 8 67-10 N
'%o SAAC30219b004 SAACJ02211002 HSB HSD EMER EXH FAN A056/EMtR CHIL A R115 A 2-23 2-9 41371-5 & 67-10 N EMERG EXH FAN A035/EMER CHIL B R117 9 2-22 2-23 41366-10 N IQ SAAC302211003 HSD EMER SPVY FAN A054/EMER CHIL B R117 9 2-22 2-23 41366-10 N ,O SAACJ02211004 HSD EMER SPPY FAN A053/EMER CHIL A R115 A 2-22 2-23 41366-10 N N SAAC302211005 HSB EMER EXH FAN A056/EMER CH1L A R115 A 2-22 2-23 41366-10 N ~* SAAC302304001 HSD EMEHG AC UNIT B E-419 FOR C/R 8 2-20A 2-26 41358-11 'N SAAC302332001 HSB EMERS AC UNIT B E-419 FOR C/R B 2-200 2-26 41358-11 N SAACbO302A2001 HSB 2E-257 FUR SWGR Rm8 302A 310C.D,J11 B 2-35 2-29 41357 N SAAC50302A2002 HSB 2h-Eb7 FOH SWGR RMS 302A.3100,D.311 B 2-35 2-29 41357 N SAAC50302A2004 HSB 2E-257'FOR SWGR Rm8 J02A,310C.D,J11 B 2-35 2-29 41337 N SAAC50302A3001 HSB 2h-237 FUH SWGR RMS 302A,310C,D 311 B 2-35 2-29 41357 N SAACbO302B1003 HGB 3E-257 FUR SWGR RMS J02B.3100.H.J11 B 3-34 2-29 41365 N
8 . SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SOHTED BY SYSTEM Page 17 FIRh TRAIN CY3 TEM COMPONENT CATEGOHY DESCRIPTION TRAIN AREA / Z ONE (S 1 HEF DRAWING INTERACTION HVAC GAACbO302B2002 HSB JE-257 FOR SWGR RMS J028.3100.H J11 B 3-34 2-29 41365 N SAACb6302B2004 HSB 3E-2b7 FUH SWGR RMS 3029.3100.H 311 B 3-34 2-29 41365 N SAAC50302B2005 HSB 3E-257 FOR SWGR RMS J028.3100.H,J11 B 3-34 2-29 41365 N SAAC50302B3003 HSB EMER SPpY FAN A053/EMER CHIL A R11b A 3-33 3-34 41365 N
. SAAC50302BJ004 HSB EMER EXH FAN A0s6/EMER CHIL A R115 A 3-33 3-34 41365 N SAAC50306A3002 HSB 2h-2b7 FUM SWOR RMS 302A.310U.D.311 B 2-42 2-29 41357 N SAACbO306A4001 HSB 2E-2b5 FOR SWOR RMS 308A.310B.310A A 2-42 2-29 41357 N SAAC50306A4002 HSB 2h-Eb7 FUH SWOR RMS 3e2A.310C,D.311 9 2-42 E-29 413b7 N SAAC50306H1002 HSB 36-257 FOR SWOR RFS J028.3103.H,J11 B 3-61 2-29 41365 N SAAC50306H4002 HSD 3h-Eb7 FOR SWOR RMS 302B.3100.H 311 8 3-61 2-29 41365 N SAACbO306K4003 HUB JE-235 FOR SWOR RMS J089.310E.310F A 3-61 2-29 41365 N SAAC50308A3001 HSB 2h-255 FUH SWGR RMS 308A,310A,315B A 2-40 2-29 41341 N SAAC50308A3004 HSB 2E-255 FOR SWGR RMS J08A. 310A.310B A 2-40 2-29 41341 N SAAC5030043005 HSB 2h-2bb FUH SWOR RMS 308A.310A.310B A 2-40 2-29 41341 N BAAC50308AJ007 HSB 2E-255 FOR SWGR RFB 308A.310A.310B A 2-40 2-29 41341 N SAAC5030844001 HSB 2h-255 FUH 6WGR RMS 308A,310A.310B A 2-40 2-42 41341 N SAAC50308B1001 HSB 36-235 FOR SWGR RMS 3089.310E.310F A 3-60 2-29 41349 N , SAAC5030891004 HSB 3E-265 FUN SWOR RMS 308B.310L,310F A 3-60 2-29 41349 N SAAC50308B1005 HSD 3E-255 FOR SWGR RMS J08B.310E.310F A 3-60 2-29 41349 N SAAC50308B1007 HSB 3h-255 FUM SWGR RMS 3088.3106,310e A 3-60 2-29 41349 N SAAC50308B4001 HSD JE-255 FOR SWGR RMS 3089.310E.310F A 3-60 3-61 41349 N SAAC50309A5001 HSB UNIT A E-424 C/M CAB ANkA UNIT 2 A 2-38 2-20A 41341 N SAAC50309A5002 HSB UNIT A E-424 C/R CAB AHEA UNIT 2 A 2-J8 2-20A 41341 N y SAAC5030995001 HSB UNIT B E-423 C/M CAB AMEA UNIT 2 B 2-39 2-20A 41341 N SAAC50JO985002 HSB UNIT B E-423 C/R CAB AREA UNIT 2 B 2-J9 2-204 41341 N SAAC50309C5001 HSB UNIT B E-426 C/M CAB AHEA UNIT 3 B 3-30 2-204 41349 N .
SAACbO309C5002 HSB UNIT D E-426 C/R CAB AREA UNIT 3 B 3-JO 2-20A 41349 N SAAC5030905001 HSB UNIT A E-427 C/M CAB AHEA UNIT 3 A 3-31 2-204 41349 N
, SAAC50309D5002 HSB UNIT A E-427 C/G LAB AREA UNIT 3 A 3-J1 2-20A 41349 N SAAC50310A1001 HSB 2h-255 FCH SWGR PMS 308A 3104.310B A 2-47 2-29 41341 N SAAC50310A4003 HSB 2E-235 FOR SWGR RMS 308A,310A.310B A 2-47 2-46 41341 N SAAC50310B1001 HSB 2h-255 FOR SWGR RMS 308A 310A,310B A 2-46 2-29 41341 N SAAC50310B1003 HSB 2E-235 FOR SWGR RMS J08A.310A.3108 A 2-46 2-29 41341 N SAAC50310B1004 HSB 2E-2b5 FUH SWOR RMS 308A.3104,310B A 2-46 2-29 41341 N SAAC50310C1001 HSB 2E-257 FOR SWGR RMS J02A,310C.D,J11 B 2-45 2-29 41357 N *k$ SAAC50310C1003 HSB 2L-257 FUH SWOR RMS 302A.310C.D.311 B 2-45 2-29 41357 N 73 SAAC50310D1001 HUD 2E-257 FOR SWGR RF8 J02A.310C.D,J11 9 2-44 2-29 41357 N I ES SAAC50310D1003 HSB 2h-Eb7 FOR SWOR RMS 302A.310U,D,311 B 2-44 2-29 413b7 N
- 53 SAAC50310E3003 HSB JE-235 FOR SWGR RMS 308B.310E,310F A 3-56 2-29 41349 N
>< SAAC50310h3004 HSD 3E-255 FOH SWGR RMS 308B.310h,310F A 3-56 2-29 41349 N , o3 SAAC50310F3001 HSB JE-235 FOR SWGR RMS 308B.310E.310F A 3-57 2-29 41349 'N SAAC50310F3003 HSB 3h-255 FUH SWOR RMS 3e88.310h',310F A 3-57 2-29 41349 N SAAC5031003002 HSD JE-257 FOR SWGR RMS 3029.310G.H,J11 B 3-58 2-29 41365 N SAAC5031003004 HSB 3h-257 FUH SWGR RMS 3029.3100,H.311 8 3-58 2-29 41365 .N SAAC50310HJ001 HSB 3E-257 FOR SWGR RMS J028.3100.H,J11 B 3-59 2-29 41365 N SAAC50310H3004 HSB 3h-257 FUH SWGR RMS 3028,3100,H,311 B 3-59 2-29 41365 N SAAC503111001 H8B 2E-257 FOR SWGR RMS 302A,310C.D,J11 B 2-43 2-29 41357 N 9
I
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e SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPDNENT LIST SOHTED BY SYSTEM Page 18 FIRE TRAIN C.YSTEM COMPONENT CATEGOHY DESCRIPTION TRAIN AREA / ZONE (S) HEF DRAWING INTERACTION HVAC BAAC503114001 HSD 3E-257 FOR SWOR RMS 3028.3100,H,311 B 2-43 2-29 41357 N SAAC503155001 HSB EMER EXH FAN AOS5/EMER CHIL B R117 B 3-33 2-22 41365 N SAAC503155002 HSB EMER SPPY FAN A054/EMER CHIL B R117 B 3-33 2-22 41365 N SAAC7030295001 HSB EMER SPPY FAN A053/EMER CHIL A R115 A 3-34 2-22 41365 N
, SAAC70302BbOO2 HSD EMER EXH FAN A056/EMER CHIL A R115 A 3-34 2-22 41365 N SAAC704613001 HSB .EMER EXH FAN A055/EMER CHIL B R117 B YAHD 2-17b 41364 N SAAC704613002 HSB EMER EXH FAN A056/EMER CHIL A R115 A YAND 2-175 41364 N SAAC704615001 HSB EMER EXH FAN B055/EMEH CHIL B R115 U 2-175 3-33 41364-6 N GAAC704615002 HSB EMER SPPY FAN A054/EMER CHIL A R115 A 2-175 3-33 41J64-6 N SAAC704615003 HSB EMER SPPY FAN A053/EMEN CHIL A R11b A 2-175 3-33 41364 N SAAC704615004 HSB EMER EXCH FAN A0b6/EMER CHIL A R115 A 2-175 3-33 41364 N SAAC91161001 HSB EMER EXH FAN A055/EMkN CHIL B R117 B 2-10 2-11 41367 N SAAC91161002 HSB EMER SPPY FAN A054/EMER CHIL B R117 B 2-10 2-11 41367 N SAAC91163001 HSB EMER EXH FAN A055/EMEN CHIL B R117 B 2-10 2-9 41367 N SAAC91163002 HSD EMER SPPY FAN A054/EMER CHIL B R117 9 2-10 2-9 41367 N MFW 2FCV-40484 HSB MPIV HYD DUMP VALVE A 2-1454 40156C E-7 Y 2FCV-4046B HSB MFIV HYD DUMP VALVE B 2-145A 40156C E-3 Y 2rCV-40524 HSB MFIV HYD DUMP VALVE B 2-14SA 40156D E-7 Y 2FCV-40528 HSB MFIV HYD DUMP VALVE A 2-1454 40166D E-3 Y 2HV-4048 HSD MFW ISOLATION VALVE SG Ech8 -
2-14bA 40156C F-2 V 2HV-4052 HSB MFW ISOLATION VALVE fig E089 - 2-1454 40156B B-2 Y 2HY-4048A HSB SULENUID PILOT FOR FCV-4048A (MFIV) A 2-145A 40156C E-3 Y 2HY-4048B HSD SOLENO!D PILOT FOR FCV-4040B (MFIV) B 2-145A 40156C F-2 Y y 2HY-4052A HSD SULENOID PILOT FOR FCV-4052A (MFIV) B 2-14SA 40156D E-3 Y 2HY-4052B HSB SOLENGID PILOT FOR FCV-4052B (MFIV) A 2-1454 40156D F-2 Y 3FCV-4048A HSB MFIV HYD DUMP VALVE A 3-145A 40156CS03 E-7 Y 3FCV-40489 HSB MFIV HYD DUMP VALVE B 3-145A 40156Cu03 E-3 Y 3F CV-40b2 A HSB MFIV HYD DUMP VALVE B 3-145A 40156DS03 E-7 Y 3FCV-4052B HSD MFIV HYD DUMP VALVE A 3-1454 40156D803 E-3 Y 3HV-4048 HSB MEW ISOLATION VALVE SG E0h8 - 3-1454 40156C503 F-2 Y 3HV-4052 HSB MFW ISOLATIf]N VALVE !JO E089 - 3-145A 40156BS03 B-2 Y 3HY-4048A HSB SULENUID PILOT FOR FCV-40484 (MFIV) A 3-14bA 40156CS03 E-3 Y 3HY-4048B HMS SOLENJf D PILOT FOR FCV-404HB (MFIV) B 3-14dA 40156CS03 F-2 Y 3HY-4052A HSB SULENUID P1 LOT FOH FCV-4052A (MFIV) B 3-14bA 40156D803 E-3 Y c3 3HY-4052B HHB SOLENOID PILOT FUR FCV-405;!B (MFIV) A 3-14bA 40156DS03 F-2 Y m MSS 2FCo.8204A HSB E089 MSIV HYD DUMP VALVE B 2-145A 401410 E-6 Y * 'M o 2FCV-8204B HSB E089 MSIV HYD DUMP VALVE A 2-145A 40141G E-3 Y 2 2FCV-8205A HSB E088 MSIV HYD DUMP VALVE A 2-145A 40141H E-6 Y 3 ' X 2FCV-820bB HSB E088 MSIV HYD DUMP VALVE B 2-14b4 40141H E-3 Y 2HV-4053 HSb E089 SG DLOWDOWN ISOL B 2-161B 40141A C-2 Y - cn 26:V-4054 HSB E0d8 SG DLUWDOWN ISOL A 2-161B 40141A F-2 *Y 2HV-4057 HSB E088 BLOWDOWN SAMPLE ISOL B 2-2D 40141A B-2 Y 2HV-4058 HSD Ed89 BLOWDOWN SAMPLE ISOL A 2-2C 40141A F-2 Y 2HV-8202 SOE E089 MS1V BYPASS VALVE B 2-14SA 40141E F-7 Y 2HV-8203 SOE E038 MSIV BYPAdS VALVE A 2-145A 40141D G-7 Y 2HV-8204 HSB SU E089 MAIN SlEAM ISOL VALVE - 2-14SA 40141C B-2 Y 2HV-8205 HSB 130 E088 MAIN STEAM ISOL VALVE - 2-1454 40141D B-2 Y O
8
- 1 t
SAFE SHUTDUWN CD**.PONENT LIST SORTED BY SYSTEM Page 19 F1Rt THAIN CY2 TEM COMPONENT CATEGONY DE9% IPTION TRAIN A REA / Z ONE (S) HEF DRAWING INTERACTION 4 MS3 2HV-8419 HSB SG E088 ATM DUMP VALVE A 2-1454 40141D E-6 Y 2HV-8421 HSB SG E089 A1M DUMP VALVE B 2-14bA 40141C E-6 Y 2HY-4053 HSB SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-40b3 B 2-161B 40141A C-2 Y l 2HY-4054 HbB SULENOID PILOT FOH HV-40b4 A 2-161B 40141A G-2 Y
, 2HY-4057 HSB SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-4057 B 2-2D 40141A B-2 Y 2HY-4058 HSB SOLENUID PILQT FOH HV-40b8 A 2-2C 40141A F-2 Y 2HY-8202 SOE SOLENO D PILOT FUR HV-8202 B 2-1454 40141E G-7 Y 2HY-8203 SOE SULENOID PILO 1 Fort HV-8203 A 2-14bA 40141D H-7 Y 2HY-8204A HSB SOLENOID PILUT FOR FCV-8204A (MSIV) D 2-1454 401410 E-7 Y EHY-8204B HSB SULENDID PILO 1 FOR FCV-8204B (MSIV) A 2-14bA 401410 F-2 Y 2HY-820bA HSB SOLENGID PILOT FOR FCV-820$4 (MSIV) A 2-1454 40141H E-7 Y 2HY-8205B HS B SULENUID P1 LOT FUH FCV-8205B (MSIV) B 2-14bA 40141H F-2 Y 2HY-8419A HSB ATMOS DUMP VLV ACfR CONTROLLER A 2-143A 40141D E-5 Y 2HY-84199 HSB VLV HV-8419 ACTR SOL VALVk A 2-1454 40141D E-S Y 2HY-8419C HSB VLV HV-8419 ACTR B/D SUL VALVE A 2-145A 40141D E-5 Y 2HY-8421A HSB ATMOS DUMP VLV ACTR CONTROLLLR B 2-145A 40141C E-5 Y 2HY-8421B HfiB VLV HV-8421 ACTR 801 VALVE D 2-14bA 40141C E-5 Y 2HY-8421C HSB VLV HV-8421 AC1H B/D SOL VALVE B 2-145A 40141C E-5 Y !
I 2LI-1105 ALT S/G E089 LEVEL IND FOR EPPM PNL A 2-3A 40141A C-5 N 2LI-1106 AL1 S/G E088 LEVEL IND FUH EPPM PNL A 2-34 40141A G-5 N 2LI-1113-1 HSB S/G E089 N.R. LEVEL IND (ESF) A 2-20A 40141A C-7 N ELI-1113-2 HSB S/G E089 N.H. LLVEL IND (hSF) B 2-20A 40141A C-6 N 2LI-1113-4 HSD S/G E089 N.R. LEVEL IND (ESF) D 2-20A 40141A B-4 N 2LI-1113A3 HSB S/G E089 N.R. LEVEL IND (ESF) C 2-204 40141A D-5 N 2LI-1115-1 HSB S/G E089 W.R. LEVEL INDICATUR A 2-204 40141A D-6 N l 2LI-1115-2 HSB S/G E0b9 W.R. LEVEL INDICATOR B 2-20A 40141A C-6 N 2LI-1123-1 HSB S/G E088 N.R. LEVEL IND (ESF) A 2-20A 40141A F-7 N l 2LI-1123-2 HSB S/G E088 N.R. LEVEL IND (kSF) B 2-20A 40141A G-6 N l 2LI-1123-3 HSB S/G E088 N.R. LEVEL IND (ESF) C 2-204 401414 G-4 N 2LI-1123A4 HSB S/G E088 N.R. LEVEL IND (kSF) D 2-20A 40141A F-4 N l 2LI-1125-1 HSB S/G E088 W.R. LEVEL INDICATOR A 2-20A 40141A G-6 N ELI-1125-2 HSB S/G E088 H.R. LEVEL INDICA 10H B 2-20A 40141A G-6 N 2PI-1013At HSB S/G E089 PRESSURE INDICATOR A 2-20A *0141A D-7 N 2PI-1013A2 HSB S/G E089 PRESSURh INDICATON B 2-204 40141A B-7 N 40141A C-4 N 2PI-191343 HSB S/G E089 PRESSURE INDICATOR C 2-204 S/G E089 PHESSURE INDICATON 2-20A 40141A B-3 N M
'O 2PI-1013A4 HSB HSB S/G E089 PRESSURE INDICATOR D
C 2-43 40141A C-4 N 2PI-1013C3 I$ 2PI-1023A1 HSB S/G E088 PRESSURE INDICATON A 2-20A 40141A H-7 N S/G E088 PRE 8SURE INDICATOR B 2-204 40141A E-7 N S 2PI-1023A2 2PI-1023A3 HSB HSB S/G E088 PHESSURE INDICATON C 2-204 40141A F-4 N 2PI-1023A4 HSB S/G E088 PRESSURE INDICATOR D 2-20A 40141R F-4 *N 2PI-1023C4 HSB S/G E088 PHESSURh INDICA 10H D 2-43 40141A F-4 N 2PI-8300 ALT S/G E0:18 PREfiS IND AT EPPM A 2-JA 40141D B-5 N 2PI-8301 ALT S/G E089 PHESS IND A1 EPPM A 2-3A 40141C B-5 N 2PSV-8401 -8409 HSD SG Eetl8 CODE SAFETY VALVES - 2-14bA 40141D G-4 N 2PSV-8410-84 2 8 HSB Su E089 CODti SAFE 1Y VALVES - 2-14SA 40141C G-4 N 3FCV-8204A HSD E089 MSIV HYD DUMP VALVE B 3-145A 401410803 E-6 Y u_
s . g SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SUR1ED BY SYSTEM Page 29 FIRE THAIN
'CY3 TEM COMPONENT CATEGOHY DESCRIPTION TRAIN AHEA / ZONE (S) REF DRAWING INTERACTION MSS 3FCV-82049 HSB E@89 MSIV HYD DUMP VALVE A 3-145A 48141GS03 E-3 Y 3FCV-820bA HSB E088 MB1V HYD DUMP VALVE A 3-1464 40141HS03 E-6 Y 3FCV-820$B HSB E088 MSIV HYD DUMP VALVE B 3-14bA 48141HS03 E-3 Y 3HV-4063 SOE E089 SG BLOWDOWN ISOL B 3,1619 40141AS03 C-2 Y
, 3HV-4054 SOE E088 SG BLOWDOWN ISOL A 3-161B 40141AS03 F-2 Y 3HV-4067 HSB E088 BLOWDOWN SAMPLE ISOL B 3-2D 40141AS03 B-2 Y 3HV-4038 HSB EG89 BLOWDOWN SAMPLE ISOL A 3-2C 49141ASO3 F-2 Y 3HV-8202 SOE E089 MISV BYPASS VALVE B 3-14bA 40141ES03 F-7 Y 3HV-8203 SOE E088 MSIV BYPA18 VLAVE A 3-1454 4e141DS03 G-7 Y 3HV-8204 HSB SU E089 MA1N S1EAM ISOL VALVE -
3-14bA 40141CS03 B-2 Y 3HV-8205 HSB UG E088 MAIN STEAM ISQL VALVE - 3-145A 48141D303 B-2 Y 3HV-8419 HSB SS E288 A1M DUMP VALVE A 3-14bA 40141DS03 E-6 Y 3HV-8421 HUB SG E089 ATM DUMP VALVE B 3-1454 40141CS03 E-6 Y 3HY-4053 HSB SOLENUID PILOT FOH HV-4053 8 3-1619 40141AS03 C-2 Y 3HY-4054 HSB SOLENOID PILui FOR HV-4054 A 3-1618 49141AS03 G-2 Y 3HY-4057 HSB SULENUID PILOT FOH HV-4057 B 3-2D 40141ASO3 B-2 Y 3HY-4058 HSB SOLENOCD PILOT FOR HV-4038 A 3-2C 40141ASO3 F-2 Y 3HY-8202 SOE SULENDID PILOT FOH HV-8202 B 3-1454 40141ES03 G-7 Y 3HY-8203 SOE SOLENOID PILUT FOR HV-8203 A 3-145A 40141D803 H-7 Y 3HY-8204A HSB SULENUID PILOT F0H FCV-8R04A (MSIV) B 3-14b4 40141GS03 E-7 Y 3HY-82049 HSB SOLENOID PILOT FOR FCV-8204B (MSIV) A 3-14bA 40141GS03 F-2 Y 3HY-8205A HSB SOLENOID PILOT FOH FCV-820bA (MSIV) A 3-145A 40141HS03 E-7 Y 3HY-82039 HSB SOLENGID PILOT FOR FCV-8205B (MStV) B 3-14bA 44141HS03 F-2 Y 3HY-8419A HSB A1MOS DUMP VLV ACTR CONTROLLEH A 3-145A 40141DS03 E-5 Y 3HV-8419B HSB VLV HV-8419 ACTR 80L VALVE A 3-145A 49141DS03 E-5 Y 3HY-8419C HSB VLV HV-8419 AC1R B/D 80L VALVE A 3-145A 40141DS03 E-5 Y 3HY-8421A HSB ATMOS DUMP VLV ACfR CONTROLLER B 3-14bA 40141 Cue 3 E-5 Y 3HY-84219 HSB VLV HV-8421 ACTR SOL VALVE B 3-1454 40141CS03 E-b- Y 3HY-8421C HSB VLV HV-8421 ACTR B/D SOLENO!D B 3-1454 40141CSO3 E-5 Y 3LI-1105 AL1 S/G E089 LEVEL IND FOR EPPM PNL A 3-34 40141AS03 C-5 N 3LI-1106 ALT S/G E988 LEVEL IND FOR EPPM PNL A 3-3A 49141ASO3 G-5 N 3LI-1113-1 HSB S/G E089 N.H. LEVEL IND (ESF) A 2-20A 431414603 C-7 N 3LI-1113-2 HSB S/G E989 N.R. LEVEL IND (ESF) B 2-20A 40141A803 C-6 N 3L!-1113-4 HSB S/G E089 N.H. LEVEL IND (ESF) D 2-204 40141AS03 B-4 N 3LI-1113A3 HSB S/G E089 N.R. LEVEL IND (ESF) C 2-20A 40141A803 D-5 N T 3LI-1115-1 HSB S/G E069 W.H. LEVEL INDICATOR A 2-20A 40141AS03 D-6 N 3LI-1113-2 HSB S/G E089 W.R. LEVEL INDICATOR B 2-20A 40141AS03 C-6 N I$ 3LI-1123-1 HSB S/G E088 N.H. LLVEL IND (ESF) A 2-20A 40141AS03 F-7 N
- S 3LI-1123-2 HSB S/G E088 N.R. LEVEL IND (ESF) B 2-204 40141A903 G-6 N
>< 3LI-1123-3 HSB S/G E088 N.H. LEVEL IND (ESF) C 2-20A 40141AS03 G-4 N .m 3LI-112344 HSB S/G E088 N.R. LEVEL IND (ESP) D 2-20A 49141ASO3 F-4 'N 3LI-1126-1 HSB S/G E088 W.H. LEVEL INDICATOH A 2-20A 40141AS03 G-6 N 3L1-1125-2 HSB S/G E088 W.H. LEVEL INDICATOR B 2-20A 49141ASO3 G-6 N 3pI-1913A1 HSB S/G E089 PRESSURE INDICA 10R A 2-20A 40141AS03 D-7 N 3PI-1913A2 HUB S/G E089 PRESSURE INDICATOR B 2-204 49141AS03 B-7 N 3PI-1013A3 HSB S/G EO89 PHESSURE INDICATOR C 2-204 40141AS03 C-4 N 3PI-1913A4 HUB S/G Eed9 PRESSURE INDICATOR D 2-20A 48141AS03 B-3 N e
s s i SW E SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIWT SudTED BY SYSTEM Page 21 FIRk TRAIN SYOTEM COMPONENT CATtEGONY DESCRIPTION TRAIN AREA / ZONE (S) REF DRAWING INTERACTION NS3 3PI-1913C3 HUB 9/G Eed9 PREWSURE INDICHTOR C 2-43 48141A993 C-4 N 3PI-1923A1 HSB 4 S/S Ee88 PR'SSURE INDICATOW A 2-29A 40141AS43 H-7 N-391-192342 HSB S/G E068 PREWSuRE INDICATOR B 2-28A 46141Aue3 E-7' N 391-1923A3 HSB S/S E988 PRESSURE INDICATON C 2-294 48141AS$3 F-4 N 3PI-162344 HSB S/G E988 PREWSURE INDICATOR D- 2-28A 46141AW93 F-4 N 3PI-1923C4 HSB 'S/S Ee48 PRESSURE INDICATON D 2-43 40141AS03 F-4' N 3PI-8300 ALT S/G Eed8 PRESS IND AT EPPM A 3-JA 48141DWe3 B-5 N , 391-8301 ALT S/S E449 PHkSS IND A1 EPPM A. 3-3A 48141C803 B-5 N 3PSV-8481-8409 HUB SG E888 CODE SAFETY VALVES , 3-145A 46141D983 G-4 N , 399V-8419-8418 HSB SW E889 CODt? SWE1Y VALVES - 3-1464 40141CSe3 6-4 N RL*3 2E-987. HSB PRESSUWIZER (PZH) - 2-18. 48111B F-5 N 2k-888 HSB S1EAM SENENATOR #2 TRAIN B - 2-1A 491114 F-2 N 2E-989 HSB WTEAM GENEHATOR #1 TRAIN A - 2-1B 46111A F-7 N 2k-122 SUE PZH PHOP HTHS X 2-1B 401119 E-5 Y RE-123 SUE PZR PHOP HTHS X 2-1B 46111B E-5 Y 2t-124 SUE PZR BACKUP HTHS NON-Ik X 2-19 49111B E-5 Y 2E-125 SOE P2R BACKUP HTHS NON-fE X 2-19 40111B E-5 Y 2k-126 SUE PZH BACMUP HTHS NON-Ik X 2-1B 401119 E-5 Y 2E-127 SUE Pl4 BACKUP HTHS NON-IE X 2-1B 441118 E-3' Y 2k-128 HSB PZH B4CMUp HEATEN A 2-1B 39171 D-5/38632 Y 2E-129 HSB PZR SACKUP HtEATER B 2-1B 39171 D-1/Je637 Y 2HV-92964 SOE REAC10H VESSkL VENT LINE VALVE A 2-1D 49111C F-6 N 2HV-62968 SUE REACTOR VESSEL VENT LINE VALVE B 2-1D 48111C F-6 N .
~
2HV-8297A SOE PZR VENT LINE VLV TO QUENCH THNK A 2-1D 48111C E-6 N 2HV-42979 SOE PER VENT LINE VLV TO QUENCH TANK B 2-1D 40111C E-6 N 2HV-9298 Suk HkAD VENT LINE VENT TO A1M B 2-1D 49111C E-5 N 2HV-8299 SUE HEAD VENT LINE DRAIN TO QUENCH A 2-1D 46111C E-4 Y 2HV-0508 Suk RCS HOT Lkk 1 SAMPLE IbuL (IHB) B 2-1C 481344 G-7 N 2HV-4509 SOE RCS HUT LEG SAMPLE IWOL (OHB). A 2-2D 48134A G-3 N 2HV-eb10 SOE PZR VApOH SAMPLtC ISOL (1NB) B 2-1C 491344 E-7 N 2HV-9511 SOE PZR VAPOR SAMPLE 190L (ONB) A 2-20 48134A E-5 N 2HV-OS12 Suk PZH SURGk LINK SAMPLE IbOL (INB) B 2-1C 40134A C-7 N - 2HV-8513 SOE PZR SURGE LINE SAMPLE ISOL -(DNB) A 2-2D 481J4A E-7 N 2HV-9517 SOE RCS HOT LES 2 SAMPLE ISOL (INB) B 2-1C 49134A H-7 N 2HY-9:509 SUE SOLEN 0fD PILui FOR HV-9549 A 2-2D 401J4A G-5 N D 2HY-9511 2HY-0513 SOE SOE SOLENUID PILOT FON HV-SS11 A A 2-2D 49134A E-5 N T 80LENGID PILOT fur HV-9513 2-2D 48134A D-6 N ' E 2]!-eeedB2 Ali SOURCE RANGE FLUX MONITOR 9 2-204 49111A B-6 N S EJI-9995C2 2JI-eee681 ALT All SU CHANNEL 2 NtEUTHON FLUX IND SOURCE RANGk FLUX MUNITON B
.A 2-43 2-20A 481254 B-6 49111A B-6 N
N , 2LI-81eJA ALT PHES9R LEVEL IND FOR EPPM A 2-JA 441118 E-5 'N
- 2LI-912441 HSb PZR LEVEL INDICATION A 2-244 401118 E-7 N 2LI-911842 HSB PAR LEVtEL INDICATION B 2-284 46111B E-5 N 29-091 SUE RCP #1 X 2-1B 49111 A C Y 29-902 SOE HCP #2 X 2-1A- 46111A C-2 Y 2P-093 SUE RCP #3 X 2-1B 401114 G-7 Y-2P-ee4 -
SOE HCP #4- X R-1A 441114 S-2 Y 9
s SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SOR1ED BY SYSTEM Page 22 FIRE THAIN CYCTEM COMPONENT CATEGOHY DESCRIPTION THAIN AREA / ZONE (S) HEF DRAWING INTERACTION RC3 2PI-0100A ALT RCS PRESSUHE IND FOR EPPM A 2-JA 48111B E-6 N Ew!-0102A1 HSB RCS PHESSURE I r,7ICAT1DN A 2-20A 40111B F-7 N 2PI-0102A2 HSB RCS PRESSURE INDICATION B 2-20A 40111B G-5 N 2PI-0102A3 HSB RCS PHESSONE INDICATION C 2-20A 401118 D-8 N 2PI-0102A4 HOB RCS PHESSUHE INDICATION D 2-20A 401118 G-3 N 2P1-0104A ALT RCS PHESS IND FOR EPPM PANEL A 2-3A 401119 H-b N 2PV-01004 SOE P2R B55 HAY VALVE X 2-1B 40111B D-2 Y 2PV-01009 SOE P2H SPRAY VALVE X 2-1B 40111B F-2 Y 2PY-01004 SOE P2R SPR VLV PV-0100A CONTHOLLER X 2-1B 401118 G-2 Y 2PY-0100B SOE P2H SPR VLV PV-01009 CONTRULLhu X 2-1B 401118 D-2 Y 2rt-0111BX ALT hor LEG LOOP 2 rEMP IND FOR EPPM A 2-JA 40111A E-4 N ETI-0111BY ALT COLD LEG 1A TEMP IND A 2-34 40111A C-7 N 2TI-0911X1 HSB HOT LEG LOOP 1 TEMP IND A 2-20A 40111A E-3 N 211-0915-2 HSB COLD tSu LOOP 1B TE*tP IND B 2-20A 40111A G-6 N 2 T I-0921 X2 HSB HOT LEG LOOP 2 TEMP IND D 2-20A 40111A D-4 N 2TI-0925-1 HSB COLD LEG LOOP 24 TEMP IND A 2-204 40111A F-4 W 21V-9144 SOE RCP 1 SEAL COOLING CCW RhTURN ISOL X 2-1B 401304 E-3 Y 2 rv-91tS 4 SOE HCP 3 SEAL COOLING CCW HETURN ItiOL X 2-1B 401J0C E-3 Y 21 V-9164 SOh RCP 4 SEAL COOLING CCW RETURN 1501. -X 2-1A 40130D E-3 Y 2rV-9174 SOE RCP 2 SEAL COOLING CCW HETURN ISOL X 2-1A 401308 E-3 Y EV-001 HSB REACTOH VtSSEL - 2-1C 40111A E-5 N JE-087 HSB PRESSUNIZER (PZH) - 3-1B 40111BS03 F-5 N 3E-088 HSB STEAM GENEHATOR #2 TRAIN D - 3-1A 40111AS03 F-2 N JE-089 HUB STEAM UENERATOR #1 THA!N A - 3-1B 40111AS03 F-7 N 3h-122 SUE PZH PHOP HTHS X 3-1B 40111BS03 E-5 Y JE-123 SOE PZR BACKUP HTHS NON-fE X 3-1B 401118803 E-5 Y 3E-124 SOE PZH BACHUP HTRS NON-IE X 3-1B 40111BS03 E-5 Y JE-125 SUE P2R BACKUP HTHS NON-!E X 3-1B 40111BS03 E-3 Y 3t-126 SOE PZH BACHUP HTHS NON-It. X 3-1B 40111BS03 E-5 Y JE-127 SOE PER BACMup HTHS NUN-tE X 3-1B 4011BS03 E-3 Y 3E-12h HSB PZH BACKUP HEATEMS ' A 3-1B 32171 D-5/32632 Y JE-129 HSB PZR BACKOP HEATERS B 3-1B 32171 D-1/32637 Y
- 3HV-02964 SOE RLE.10H VESSEL VENT LINE VALVE A 3-1D 40111CS03 F-6 Y 3HV-029EB SUE REACTOR VESSEL VEN T LINE VALVE . B 3-1D 40111CSO3 F-6 Y
'%o 3HV-02974 SOE PZH VENT LINE VLV TO QUENCH TANK A 3-1D 40111CS03 E-6 Y 3HV-02979 SOE PZR VENT LINE VLV r0 QUENCH TANK B 3-1D 40111C803 E-6 Y *
'@ 3HV-0298 SOE HEAD VENT t.INE VENT TO A1M B 3-1D 40111CS03 E-5 Y
- c3 3HV-0299 SOE HEAD VCNT LINE DHAIN TO OUENCH A 3-1D 40111C803 E-4 Y
-Q 3HV-0508 SOE RCS HOT LEG 1 SAMPLE ISOL (IHB) B 3-1C 40134AS03 G-7 N
'" 3HV-0509 SOE RCS HUT LEG SAMPLE 11i0 (ORB) A 3-2D 40134AS03 G-5 N 3HV-Ob10 SOti PZR VAPON SAMPLE ISOL (INB3 9 3-1C 40134AS03 E-7 N 3HV-0511 SOE P2R VAPOR SAMPLE ISOL (OHB) A 3-2D 40134A803 E-5 N 3HV-0512 SOE P2R SURGE LINE SAMPLE ISOL (IRB) B 3-1C 40134AS03 C-7 N 3HV-0513 SOE PZR SUHGE LINE SAMPLE ISOL (OMB) A 3-2D 40134ASO3 E-7 N 3HV-Ob17 SOE RCS NOT LEO 2 SAMPLE ISOL (IRB) B 3-1C 40134AS03 H-7 N 3HY-0509 SOE SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-0509 A 3-2D 40134AS03 0-5 N 2iE-0911Y1 h5s 05FDS E-089 T-COLD A 2-!B 40111A C-7 N 2TE-0921Y2 . HSB 05R S E-0SS i-COLD B 2-!A 40!!!A C-3 N ITE-0911VI HSB'. 05FDS E-089 T-COLD - A 3-!B 40111A503 C-7 N 3TE-092112 HSB 05FDS E-088 T-COLD B 3-14 40!!!AS03 C-3 N
3 I t SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SOR1ED DY SYSTEM Page 23 FIRE TRAIN CY3 TEM COMPONENT CATEGOHY DESCRIPTION FRAIN AREA /ZONEtSt HEF DRAWING INTERACTION RC3 3HY-0511 SUE SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-0511 A 3-2D 40134A803 E-5 N 3HY-0513 SOE SOLENOID PILOT FDH HV-Ob13 A 3-2D 40134AS03 D-6 N 3JI-0005B2 Ali SOURCE RANGE FLUX MONITOR B 2-20A 40111AS03 B-6 N 331-2005C2 ALT SU CHANNEL 2 NEUTRON FLUX IND B 2-43 4012 BAS 03 B-6 N 3JI-000691 pli SOURCE HANGE FLUX MONITOR A 2-20A 40111ASO3 B-6 N 3LI-01034 ALT PIR LhVEL IND FON EPPM A 3-34 40111BS03 E-5 N 3LI-0110A1 HSB P2R LEVEL INDICATION A 2-20A 40111BS03 E-7 N 3LI-011042 HSB PZH LEVEL INDICATION B 2-20A 40111BS03 E-5 N JP-001 SOE HCP #1 X 3-1B 40111AS03 C-7 Y 3p-002 SUE RCP #2 X 3-1A 40111AS03 C-2 Y JP-003 SOE RCP #3 X 3-1B 40111AS03 G-7 Y 39-004 SOE RCP #4 X 3-1A 40111AS03 0-2 Y 3PI-0100A ALT RCS PHEtJS IND. FOR EPPM A 3-JA 401118S03 E-3 N 391-010241 HSB RCS PHtSSURE INDICATION A 2-204 40111BS03 F-7 N JPI-0102A2 HSB HCS PRESSUHE INDICATION B 2-20A 401119803 G-5 N 3pI-0102A3 HSB RCS PHESSURE INDICATION C 2-204 40111BS03 D-8 N 3PI-0102A4 HSB RCS PRESSUHE INDICATION D 2-20A 40111BS03 G-3 N 3PI-0104A ALT RCS PHESS IND FOR EPPM PANEL A 3-34 40111BS03 H-5 N 3PV-0100A SOE PER SPHHY VALVE X 3-1B 401118803 D-2 Y 3pV-01000 Suti PIR SPRAY VALVE X 3-1B 401119803 F-2 Y 39Y-01004 SUE PZR 89R VLV PV-0100A CONTROLLER X 3-1B 401118803 0-2 Y 37Y-01008 SOE P2R SPR VLV PV-01009 CONTHOLLER X 3-1B 401118803 D-2 Y 3TI-0111BX ALT HOT LEG LOOP 2 (EMP IND FOR EPPM A 3-JA 40111AS03 E-4 N 311-01119Y ALT COLD LEG LOOP 1A TEMP IND FOH EPPM A 3-34 40111AS03 C-7 N 3Ti-0911X1 HSB HOT LEO LOOP 1 TEMP IND A 2-20A 40111A603 E-5 4 1 311-091S-2 HSB COLD leu LOOP 1D TEMP IND B 2-20A 40111AS03 G-6 N 3TI-0921X2 HSB HOT LdG LOOP 2 TEMP IND D 2-20A 40111AS03 D-4 N 31 1-092b-1 HSB COLD LEG LOOP 2A TEMP IND A 2-20A 40111AS03 F-4 N , l 31 V-9144 Sut:' RCP 1 SEAL COOLING CCW RtTUNN ISOL X 3-1B 40130AS03 E-3 Y 3 TV-91*J 4 SUE HCP 3 SEAL COOLING CCW HETURN ISOL X 3-1D 40130CS03 E-3 Y j 31V-9164 SOti RCP 4 SEAL COOLING CCW RETURN ISOL X 3-1A 40130DS03 E-3 Y 3TV-9174 SOE HCP 2 SEAL COOLING CCW HETURN ISOL X 3-1A 401308803 E-3 Y j 3V-001 HSB REACTON VESSEL - 3-1C 40111ASO3 E-5 N J HSB REACTOR THIP BREAKER A 2-192A S023-944-4 Y l RPS 2RTB-1
*Q 2H18-2 HSB REACTON THIP BHEAKER B 2-102A S023-944-4 Y I m 2RTB-3 HSB REACTOR TH P BREAKER C 2-102A S023-944-4 Y lI$ 2HTB-4 HSB REAC10H THIP BHLAKER D 2-102A 6023-944-4 Y
- C3 2RTB-5 HSB REACf0R THIP BREAKER A 2-102A E023-944-4 Y N 2HTB-6 HSB RE AC10H THIP BHEAKER B 2-102A S023-944-4 S02J-944-4 Y
2RTB-7 HSB REACTOR THIP BREAKER C 2-102A 'Y , 2HTB-8 HSB REAC10H TRIP BHEAKER D 2-102A S023-944-4 Y l 3RTB-1 HSD REACTOR THIP BREAKER A 2-102A 6023-944-4 Y 3HTB-2 HSB REACTOH TRIP BHEAKhH B 2-102A S023-944-4 Y 3RTB-3 HSB REACTOR TRIP BHEAKER C 2-192A 6023-944-4 Y 3HTB-4 HSB RhACTON TRIP BREAdhH D 2-102A S023-944-4 Y JRTB-5 HSB REACf0R THIP BREAKER A 2-102A S023-944-4 Y e
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, 2-1&*-823-C-173 CSD PUNP P-G&& WUCr!ON LINE TO RWST -
2-137A 401128 E-6 N 2E-te3 CSD SDC HK
- B' -
2-138 401148 G-7 N 2E-904 CSD SDC ltX 'A' - 2-139 481148 S-7 N 2HV-0396 CSD SDC HX BYPASS THNOTTLE VALVE A 2-139 481129 D-2 Y 2HV-95849 SUE SI PUNP HECIRC PASS WAMpLE ISOL X 2-1928 . 46134D H-7 Y 2HV-8150 CBD SDC HX E-ee4 THNOTTLE VALVE A 2-139 491149 D-5 Y 2HV-4151 CSD SDC HX E-ee3 THRuTTLE VALVE B 2-138 441149 F-5 Y 2HV-4152 CSD SDC FLOW TO HM E-te4 ISOL A 2-139 491129 F-2 N 2HV-8153 CSD SDC FLUW TO HM E-993 ISOL B 2-138 401128 G-2 N 2HV-8169 CSD SDC HX BYPASS THNO1TLE VALVE B 2-139 401129 D-3
- N 2HV-8161 CSD SDC HM BYPA99 THHOTTLE VALVE A 2-139 481128 C-2 Y 2HV-8162 CSD POMP P-015 MINI-FLOW LINK ISOL B 2-137C 401129 H-2 N 2HV-8163 CSD POMP P-916 MINI-FLOW LINE ISOL A 2-13/A 44112B E-3 N 2HV-9397 CSD PUMP P-015 MINI-FLOW LINE TO RWWT A 2-136 401140 S-3 Y 2HV-9322 CSD LPSI COLD LES INJECTION LOOP 1A B 2-20 48112D G-4 Y 2HV-9325 CBD LPSI COLD LEO INJEC110N LOUP 19- A 2-20 4G112D F-4 Y 2HV-9328 CSD LPSI COLD LEG INJECTION LUUP 24 A 2-EC 44112D F-4 Y 2HV-9331 CSD LPSI COLD LES INJECTIDN LOOP 29 9 E-2C 49112D H-4 Y 2HV-9336 CSD SDC LETDOWN LINE ISOL (OHB) B 2-2C 44112D C-6 N 2HV-9337 HLP SDC LETDOWN LINE ISOL (IN9) A 2-1C 49112D C-4 Y 2HV-9339 HLP SDC LETDOWN LINE-RCS ISOL B 2-1C 48112D C-2 Y 21W-934G Hb8 81T TANK T-Get INJ LINE ISOL VLV B 2-1C 491134 D N 2HV-9341 SOE Si r FILL LINE 190L B 2-1C AS113A D-5 Y 2HV-9342 SOE S1T T-Oe8 FILt. VALVE X 2-1C 481134 E-5 Y 2HV-9345 HSB WIT T-Sea VENT VALVE A 2-3D 401134 G-6 N 2HV-9348 CSD PUMP P-016 MINI-FLOW LINK TO RWtsT 9 2-136 40114D D-3 N 2HV-9358 HS8 SIT TANM T-967 INJ LINE IWOL VLV A 2-1C 40113A D-2 N 2HV-93bt SOE S1T FILt. LINE ISOL A 2-1C 491134 D-4 Y 2HV-9352 BOE SIT T-ce7 FILL VALVE X 2-1C 48113A E-3 Y 2HV-93S3 CSD SHUTDOWN COOLING WAHM UP VALVE A 2-2C 49112D E-8 Y
= 2HV-9355 HS9 SIT T-ce7 VENT VALVE B 2-1D - 40113A S-2 N m
2HV-93b9 2HV-936e CbD HGB SHUTDOWN COULING WAHM OP VALVk SIT TANN T-ce9 INJ LINE IWOL VLV B A 2-2C 2-1C 491120 E-7 Y 481138 D-6 N e-* 2HV-9361 2HV-9362 SOti SUE SIT FILL LINE IbOL SIT T-ce9 FILt. VALVE A X 2-1C 2-1C 401139 481149 D-5 E-5 Y Y
- Hb8 2HV-9365 S1T T-999 VkNT VALVE 9 2-1D 491139 S-6 N CD 2HV-9367 SUE CNTNT WPRAY UHB iSOL VLV A 2-2C 441148 D-4 *Y RHV-9368 Suk CN1M1 SPNAY ONU IHOL VLV 9 2-2C 49114W S-4 Y '
2HV-93/8 HS9 SIT TANK T-ele INJ LINE IWOL VLV B 2-1C 4811JB D-2 N 2HV-93/1 SOE S1T F1LL LINE 1904. S 2-1C 491139 D-4
- Y 2HV-9372 SOE WIT T-Gle FILL VALVE X 2-1C 481148 E-3 Y RHV-93/5 HSS S1T T-Gle VENT VALVE A 2-1D 491139 S-2 N 2HV-9377 HLP SDC LETDOWN LINE ISOL (IHB) C 2,- 1 C 44112D B-4 Y M &
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I , g SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SURTt.D BY SYSTEM Pace 25 FIRE TRAIN CY TEM COMPONENT CATEGOHY DESCRIPTION TRAIN A REA/ ZONE (S) REF ORAWING INTERACTION SDC 2HV-93/8 HLP SDC LE(DOWN LINE-RCS ISOL D 2-1C 40112D B-34 Y 2HV-9379 CSD SDC LkTDOWN LINE ISOL (ORB) A 2-2B 40112D C-7 N 2HY-9341 SOE HOLENUID PILOT FOR HV-94J1 B 2-1C 40113A D-3 Y 2HY-9342 Sun SOLENUID PILO 1 FOH HV-9342 X 2-1C 401134 E-5 Y 2HY-9351 SUE SOLENUID PILOT FOR HV-9J51 A 2-IC 4011JA D-4 Y 2HY-9352 SOE SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-9352 X 2-1C 40113A E-3 Y 2HY-9361 SUE SOLENGID PILOT FOR HV-9361 A 2-1C 40113B D-5 Y 2HY-9362 SOE SOELNUID PILOT FOH HV-9362 X 2-1C 401144 E-5 Y 2HY-9371 SOE SOLENUID PILOT FOR HV-93/1 B 2-1C 40113B D-4 Y 2HY-9372 SOE SOLENUID PILOT FOH HV-9372 X 2-1C 40114B E-3 Y 2P-015 CSD LOW PHESS SAFE INJ PUMP & MOTUR #1 A 2-13/C 401129 G-4 Y 29-016 CbD LOW PRESS SWE INJ PUMP & MOTON #2 B 2-137A 40112B E-4 Y 2T1-0351-1 CSD LP INJECTION TEMP ' A 2-20A 401129 C-3 N 2TI-03S2-2 CSD ..LP INJEC110N TEHP B 2-20A 40112B C-1 N 3-16"-022-C-173 cud PUMP P-015 SUCTION LINE TO RWST - 3-137C 40112BS03 G-5 N 3-16"-023-C-173 CSD PUMP P-016 SUCTION LINE TO RWST - 3-137A 40112BS03 E-S N JE-003 CSD SDC HX *B' - 3-1J8 40114BS03 G-7 N 3k-004 CSD SDC HX *A' - 3-139 40114BS03 G-7 N 3HV-0396 CSD SDC HX BYPA99 THROTTLE VALVE A 3-139 40112BS03 D-2 Y 3HV-058fsB SOE St PUMP RECIRC PASS SAMPLE ISOL X 2-102B 40134DS03 H-7 Y 3HV-8150 CSD HX E-004 THROTTLE VALVE A 3-1J9 40114BS03 E-5 Y 3HV-8151 CSD HX E-003 THHOT1LE VAtNE B 3-138 40114BSO3 F-S Y 3HV-8152 CSD SDC FLOW TO HX E-004 ISOL A 3-1J9 401128U03 F-2 N 3MV-8153 CSD SDC FLOW TO HX E-003 ISOL B 3-138 40112BS03 G-2 N 3HV-8160 CSD SDC HX BYPAGS THHUTTLE VALVE B 3-139 401129803 G-3 N 3HV-8161 CbD SDC HX BYPASS THHUTTLE VALVE A 3-139 40112BS03 G-2 Y 3HV-6162 CSD PUMP P-015 MINI-FLOW LINE ISOL B 3-137C 401129803 G-2 N 3HV-8163 CSD PUMP P-016 MINI FLOW LINE ISOL A 3-1374 40112BS03 D-3 N 3HV-9307 CSD PUMP P-015 MINI-FLOW LINE TO HWST A 3-1J6 40114DS03 B-3 N 3HV-9322 CSD LMS1 COLD LEW INJEC1 ION LUUP 1 A B 3-2D 40112DS03 G-4 Y 3HV-9325 CSD 1_PS1 COLD LEG INJECTION LOOP 1B A 3-2D 40112DSO3 F-4 Y , 3HV-93&8 CSD LP'J1 COLD LEB INJ EC110N LOOP 2A .A 3-2C 40112DS03 F-4 Y 3HV-9331 CSD LPSI COLD LEO INJECTION LUUP 2B B 3-2C 40112D003 H-4 Y 3HV-9336 CSD SDC LhTDOWN LINE ISOL (ORB) B 3-2C 40112DS03 C-6 N .,p 3HV-9337 HLP SDC LETDOWN LINE ISOL (IHB) A 3-1C 40112DS03 C-4 Y o 3HV-9339 HLP SDC LETDOWN LINE-RCS ISOL B 3-1C 40112DS03 C-2 Y
.M '2 3HV-9340 HSB SIT' TArJK T-808 INJ LINE ISOL VLV B 3-1C 40113AS03 D-6 N ,
3HV-9341 SOE S17 F1LL LINE ISOL B 3-1C 401134903 D-5 Y 3 3HV-9342 SOE SIT T-908 FILL VALVE X 3-1C 40113Aue3 E-5 Y 3HV-9345 HSB S1T T-908 VENT VALVE A 3-1D 40113AS$3 G-6 N ' to 3HV-9348 CSD POMP P-016 MINI FLOW LINE TO WWST B 3-1J6 40114DSO3 D-3 'N 3HV-9350 HSB CIT TANK T-007 INJ LINE ISUL VLV A 3-1C 40113AS03 D-2 N 3HV-9331 SUE SIT FILL LINE ISOL A 3-1C 4011JA803 D-4 Y 3HV-93ba SOE SIT T-007 FILL VALVE X 3-3C ~ 40113AS03 E-3 Y 3HV-9353 CSD SHUTDOWN COOLING WA:tM UP VALVE A 3-2C 40112D803 E-8 Y 3HV-93b5 HSB S1T T-007 TANK VALVE B 3-1D 40113AS03 G-2 N 3HV-9359 CSD SHUTDOWN COOLING WAiM UP VALVE B 3-2C 40112DS03 E-7 Y I I
g SAFE CHOTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SORTED BY SYSTEM- page 26 FIRE TRAIN SYETEM COMPONENT. CATEGOHY~ DESCR!pTION TRAIN AREA / ZONE t St REF DRAWING INTERACTION EDC 3HV '3360~ HSB SIT TANH T-009 INJ LINE IUOL VLV A 3-1C 4011JBS03 D-6 N 3HV-9361 SOE S1T F1LL LINE ISOL A 3-1C 401139903 P-5 Y 3HV-9362 BOE SIT T-009 FILL VALVE X 3-1C 40114BSO3 E-5 Y 3HV '3365 - HSB S1T T-809 VENT VALVE B 3-1D 40113BS03 6-6 N 3HV '9367 SOE CNYMT SPHAY OHB ISOL VLV A 3-2C 40114BS03 C-4 Y 3HV-9368 SOE CNTMT SPHAY OHB ISOL VLV B 3-2C 40114BS03 6-4 Y
, 3HV-93/0 HSB ' SIT (ANK T-010 INJ LINE IUOL VLV .B 3-1C 4011:$B903 D-2 , N 3HV '3371 SOE S1T F1LL LINE ISOL B 1-1C 40113D803 D-4 Y 3HV-9372 SOE SIT T-010 FILL VALVE X 3-1C 401149803 E-3 Y 3HV-9375 HSB SIT T-ele VENT VALVE A 3-1D 40113BS03 6-2 N
- 3HV-9377 HLP SDC LETDOWN LINE ISOL ~ (IHB) C 3-1C 40112DS03 B-4 Y
- 3HV-9378 HLp SDC LhTDOWN LINE-HCS ISOL D 3-1C 40112DS03 B-3 Y 3HV-9379 CSD SDC LETDOWN LINE ISOL (OHB) A 3-2B 40112DS03 C-7 N 3HY-9341 SOti SOLENOJD PILOT FOR HV-9341 B 3-1C 401134S03 D-5 Y 3HY-9342 SUE SOLENUID PILOT FOR HV-9342 X 3-1C 4011JAS03 E-5 Y 3HY-9351 SOE SOLENOID PILOT FOH HV-9331 A 3-1C 401134903 D-4 Y 3HY-9352 SOE SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-9352 X 3-1C 40113ASO3 E-3 Y 3HY-9361 SOL SOLENOID PILO 1 FOH HV-9361 A 3-1C 40113DS03 D-5 Y 3HY-9362 SHE SOLENOfD PILOT FOR HV-9342 X 3-1C 40114ASO3 E-5 Y 3HY-9371 SOE SOLENOID PILOT FOR HV-9371 B 3-1C 40113D903 D-4 Y 3MY-9372 sue SOLENGID PILOT FOR HV-93/2 X 3-1C 401149903 E-3 Y 3P-015 CSD LOW PHESS BAFE INJ POMP & MOTON #1 A 3-137C 40112BS03 G-4 Y JP-016 CSD LOW PRESS SAFE INJ POMP & MOTOR a2 B 3-137A 40112B803 E-4 Y 311-0351-1 CSD LP INJECTION TEMP A 2-20A 401129603 C-3 N 3TI-0332-2 CSD LP INJECTION TEMP B 2-20A 40112BS03 C-2 N SWC 2HV-6200 HSB SWC POMP 112A DISCH VALVE A 2-148F- 40126A G-3 N 2HV-6201 HSB SWC POMP 11JB DISCH VALVE B 2-148F 40126A E-3 N f 32 2HV-6202 HSB SWU POMP 307A DISCH VALVh A 3-148F 40126B G-3 N
- A 2HV-6203 2HV-64%
HSB SWC PUMP 114B DISCH VALVE B 3-148F 401269 E-3 N . HSB HX E-002B DISCH VLV TO C1HC WATER B 2-148:: 40127C E-2 N
.$ 2HV-6497 HSB HX E-001A DISCH VLV TO CIHC WATER A 2-148F 40127C B-2 N y 2HY-6200 HSB ISOL VLV HV-6200 SOL VIV A 2-148F 40126A G-3 N 2HY-6201 HSB SOL VLV HV-6201 SOL VLV B 2-148F 40126A E-3 *N
' C3 2HY-6202 HSB ISOL VLV HV-6202 BOL VLV A 3-148F 401269 G-3 N 2HY-6203 HSB ISOL VLV HV-6203 SOL VLV B 3-148F 401269 E-3 N 2P-112A HSB SALT WAltR COOLINU PUMP A 2-148F 40126A G-5 N 2P-11JB HSB SALT WATER COOLING POMP B 2-148F 40126A E-5 N 2P-114B HSB SALT WATER COOLING PUMP B 3-148F 40126B E-5 N 2P-JO/A HSB SALT WATER COOLING POMP A 3-148F 401268 G-5 N
9 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LIST SORTED BY SYSTEM Page 27 FIRE TRAIN SYSTEM COMPONENT CATtEGONY DESCRIPTION TRAIN AREA /ZDNE(S) HEF DRAWING INTtRACTION C.WC 3HV-6200 H8B SWC PUMP 112A DISCH VALVE A 3-148F 49126AS03 G-3 N 3HV-6201 HSB SWC PUMP 113B D1bCH VALVE B 3-148F 40126AS03 E-3 N 3HV-6202 H'3B .SWC PUMP 347A DISCH VALVE A 2-148F 49126B603 G-3 N 3HV-6203 HSB SWC PUMP 114B DISCH VALVE B 2-148F 4012698@3 E-3 N
. 3HV-6495 HGB HXE-002B DISCH VLV TO CIRC WATER B 3-148F 49127C803 E-2 N 3HV-6497 HSB HXE-901A DISCH VLV TO C1HC WATEH A 3-148F 4012?CS03 B-2 N 3HY-6200 HSB ISOL VLV HV-6209 - UOL VLV A 3-148F 49126A803 G-3 N 3HY-6201 HSB SOL VLV HV-6291 - ISOL VLV B 3-148F 49126AS$3 E-3 N 3HY-6202 HSB ISOL VLV HV-6202 SQL VLV A 2-148F 401269903 G-3 N 3HY-6203 HSB ISOL VLV HV-6293 SQL VLV B 2-148F 40126BS03 E-3 N JP-112B HSB SALT WATER COOLING POMP A 3-148F 40126AS03 G-3 N
! 39-113A HSB SALT WA1ER COOLING PUMP B 3-148F 49126AS03 E-S N JP-114A HSB SALT WATER COOLING PUMP B 2-148F 49126B803 G-5 N 39-347B HSB SALT WA1ER COULING PUMP A 8-148F 40126BS03 8-5 N e I 4 N '
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S SAN ONOFRE 2 & 3 APPENDIX R DEVIATION REQUESTS TITLE (Zones) PAGE I
- 1. Unit 2 Electrical Penetration and Personnel 2 Monitor Fire Area - Fire Area 2-3
- 2. Unit 3 Electrical Penetration and Personnel 13 Monitor Fire Area - Fire Area 3-3
- 3. Unit 2 CCW Pump, Heat Exchanger and Piping 24 Rooms - Fire Area 2-135
- 4. Unit 3 CCW Pump, Heat Exchanger and Piping 35 Rooms - Fire Area 3-135
- 5. Unit 2 Electrical Cable Tunnel Fire Area - 45 Fire Arca 2-142
- 6. Unit 3 Electrical Cable Tunnel Fire Area - 57 Fire Area 3-142
- 7. Unit 2 and 3 Turbine Building Fire Area 148 69
- 8. Units 2 and 3 Lobby / Motor Control Room - 81 Fire Area 2-AC-50-29
- 9. Units 2 and 3 Control Room Complex - 89 Fire Area 2/3-20
- 10. Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room and Pipe 94 Tunnel - Fire Area 2-161
- 11. Unit 3 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room and Pipe 104 Tunnel - Fire Area 3-161
- 12. Units 2 and 3 Auxiliary Building Radwaste 114 Area - Fire Areas 2-76, 2-94, 2-84 and 3-78 l 13. Unit 2 Containment - Fire Area 2-1 124
- 14. Unit 3 Containment - Fire Area 3-1 -
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- 15. Unit 2 Safety Related Pump Rooms - Fire 173 Area 2-137 and Fire Area 2-136
- 16. Unit 3 Safety Related Pump Rooms - Fire Area 180 3-137 and Fire Area 3136
- 17. One Hour Rated Barrier Material 187 1.
C' DEVIATION NO. I UNIT 2 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION AND PERSONNEL MONITOR FIRE AREA FIRE AREA 2-3 Deviation Reauested A deviation is requested from Southern California Edison's commitment to Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the extent it requires the separation of safe shutdown cables by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Specifically, this deviation is requested for safe shutdown cables in Fire Zones 2-PE-45-3A and 2-PE-63-3B separated by a 2-hour rated barrier. Discussion The Unit 2 Electrical Penetration and Personnel Monitor Fire Area consists of Fire Zones 2-PE-45-3A and 2-PE-63-3B located at the south side of Unit 2 Containment. The fire zones are located directly above cach other, one on the 45-foot (2-PE-45-3A) and the other on the 63-foot (2 PE-63-3B) elevation. The fire zones are bour.ded by 3-hour rated reinforced concrete walls, and a non-rated reinforced concrete containment wall that is approximately 4 feet thick. Except as noted below, the floor / ceiling separating these floors is 2-hour rated. A 10'X6' concrete hatch of similar thickness as that of the floor is located in the center of the fire zone. In addition, two tendon access openings exist near the containment wall creating approximately 8'X 8' openings between the two fire zones. In addition, a seismic gap is provided in the floor around the containment wall. Another seismic gap extends out from the containment near the east tendon access floor opening. The scismic gaps consist of an approximate eight to nine inch separation filled with two 1" layers of non-combustible ceramic blankets. A silicone glass fabric boot seal covers the blankets on each side and a metal plate is placed over the seismic gap. The seismic gap assembly has been sucessfully tested as a 3-hour rated construction. The floor slab of the 63-foot elevation is supported by structural steel coated with a 2 hour rated fire resistant mastic. The primary combustible in these fire zones is cable insulation and the in-situ fire loading in 2-PE-45-3A and 2-PE-63-3B is approximately 50,000 BTU /sq.ft. and 79,000 BTU /sq.ft., respectively. The postulated in-situ fire duration is 38 minutes and 60 minutes, respectively. No automatic fire suppression is installed in either of the two fire zones. However, manual fire fighting equipment, in the form of portable fire extinguishers and hose stations, is readily available in these fire zones. 2. i
Ionization smoke detectors, which are located throughout most of the zones, provide early warning alarm in the control room as well as the site fire department office. Detectors are located in the immediate vicinity of the tendon access openings (see the attached figures for detector locations). Fire department standpipe connections are provided in an adjacent fire area available for use by the San Onofre Fire DepartmeAt. Instrument, control, and power cable for a variety of safe shutdown equipment is located in this fire area. The redundant trains of the safe shutdown equipment is segregated into the two fire zones described above. Fire Zone 2-PE-45-3A has the following safe shutdown cables: Shutdown Cooling: Train A and D control and power cable Pressurizer Heaters: Train A control and power cable Component Cooling Water: Train A control cable RCS/SG Instrumentation: Channels A and D cable CVCS: Train A control and power cable Diesel Generator: Train A control and power cable HVAC: Train A control and power cable Emergency Chilled Water: Train A control cable Fire Zone 2-PE-63-3B, which is located directly above 2-PE-45-3A, has the following safe shutdown cable: Shutdown Cooling: Train B and C control and power cable Pressurizer Heaters: Train B control and power cable RCS/SG Instrumentation: Channels B and C cable HVAC: Train B control and power cable 3.
The closest safe shutdown cable between the two zones consists of Train A diesel generator cables in fire zone 2-PE-45-3A and Train B RCS/SG Instrumentation Cable in fire zone 2-PE-63-3B. The cable in 2-PE-45-3A is located approximately ten feet beneath the ceiling, below the tendon access opening to the upper floor, and approximately 3'6"in horizontal separation from the cast tendon access opening and 5'8" in horizontal separation from the west tendon access opening. The cable located in 2-PE-63-3B is approximately 6'6" in horizontal distance from the west tendon access opening and approximately 6'6" off the floor. Evaluation A deviation from the requirements of Section III.G.2 to provide for a separation of redundant safe shutdown cables by a 3-hour barrier is requested based upon the following evaluation: The safe shutdown cables in this fire area are separated by less than a 3 hour barrier due to the floor between fire zones 2-PE-45-3A and 2-PE-63-3B. The primary concern of this deviation request is the propagation of a fire from fire zone 2-PE-45-3A to 2-PE-63-3B that could damage redundant cabling. The postulated fire duration in the two zones was described above to be 38 minutes and 60 minutes, respectively. The combustibles in these areas consist primarily of cable trays, some of which are covered with a mineral wool blanket. Plant Administrative Procedures will limit the accumulation of transient combustibic materials. Metal covers will be installed over the tendon access hatches that currently are open between the floors. The installed covers will be constructed of fire resistant materials that will provide protection equivalent to a 2 hour rated barrier. The only other path of fire propagation between the two fire zones is via the seismic gap which is scaled by a 3-hour barrier. The concrete hatch is a tight-fitting assembly and is considered equivalent to the 2-hour rated floor.
- l. Although there is no automatic fire suppression installed in this fire area, the installed smoke detectors will detect any occurrence of fire and alert the site fire department to respond and manually extinguish
, the fire. Ionization smoke detectors are installed near the tendon ! access openings and the seismic gap, and will promptly notify any potential fire occurrence. The proposed 2 hour equivalent separation
- (tendon access opening covers) and existing scismic gap seal afford I sufficient time for the fire brigade to respond to the fire area and commence extinguishing activities.
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I l l 1 Deviation for the use of 2-hour barriers in lieu of 3-hour barriers to separate redundant safe shutdown trains, and the absence of an automatic suppression system was previously granted in Section 9.5.1 of the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report and Supplements 4 and 5 thereto, and in the Safety Evaluation related to the issuance of Operating License NPF-15, San Onofre Unit 3. This deviation request provides clarification of the installed geometry of safe shutdown equipment relative to the tendon access openings and provides the commitment to cover the tendon access openings with the equivalent of a 2-hour rating. Conclusion It is, therefore, Southern California Edison's position that a level of protection equivalent to Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 will be provided in the Electrical Penetration and Personnel Monitor Areas (Fire Zones 2-PE-45-3A and 2-PE-63-3B) through the addition of tendon access opening covers with an equivalent of 2 hour fire rating. The upgrading of the floor /cciling barrier between the two fire areas to a 3-hour rating, or the addition of an automatic fire suppression system in this area would not significantly enhance the level of fire protection for safe shutdown equipment. 5.
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DEVIATION NO. 2 UNIT 3 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION AND PERSONNEL MONITOR FIRE AREA FIRE AREA 3-3 Deviation Reauested i A deviation is requested from Southern California Edison's commitment to Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the extent it requires the separation of safe shutdown cables by a fire barrier having a 3 hour rating. Specifically, this deviation is requested for safe shutdown cables in Fire Zones 3-PE-45-3A and 3-PE-63-3B separated by a 2-hour rated barrier. Discussion The Electrical Penetration and Personnel Monitor Fire Area consists of Fire Zones 3-PE-45-3A and 3-PE-63-3B located at the north side of Unit 3 Containment. The fire zones are located directly above each other, one on the 45-foot (3-PE-45-3A) and i the other on the 63-foot (3-PE-63-3B) elevation. The fire zones are bounded by 3-hour rated reinforced concrete walls, and a non-rated reinforced concrete containment wall that is approximately 4 feet thick. Except as noted below, the floor / ceiling separating these floors is 2 hour rated. A 10'X6' concrete hatch of similar thickness as that of the floor is located in the center of the fire zone. In addition, two tendon access openings exist near the containment , wall creating approximately 8'X 8' openings between the two fire l zones. In addition, a seismic gap is provided in the floor i around the containment wall. Another seismic gap extends out ! from the containment near the east tendon access floor opening. The seismic gaps consist of an approximate eight to nine inch separation filled with two 1" layers of non-combustible ceramic blankets. A silicone glass fabric boot seal covers the blankets on each side and a metal plate is placed over the seismic gap. The scismic gap assembly has been sucessfully tested as 3-hour rated construction. The floor slab of the 63 foot elevation is supported by structural steel coated with a 2-hour rated fire resistant mastic. l The primary combustible in these fire zones is cable insulation and the in-situ fire loading in 3-PE-45-3A and 3-PE-63-3B is j' approximately 52,000 BTU /sq.ft. and 75,000 BTU /sq.ft., respectively. The postulated in-situ fire duration is 39 minutes and 57 minutes, respectively. No automatic fire suppression is 13.
installed in either of the two fire zones. However, manual fire fighting equipment,in the form of portable fire extinguishers and hose stations, is readily available in these fire zones,
- i. Ionization smoke detectors, which are located throughout most of the zones, provides early warning alarm in the control room as well as the site fire department office. Detettors are located in the immediate vicinity of the tendon access openings (see the attached figures for detector locations). Fire department standpipe connections are provided in an adjacent fire area available for use by the San Onofre Fire Department.
Instrument, control, and power cable for a variety of safe shutdown equipment is located in this fire area. The redundant trains of the safe shutdown equipment is segregated into the two fire zones described above. Fire Zone 3-PE-45-3A has the following safe shutdown cables: Shutdown Cooling: Train A and D control and power cable Pressurizer Heaters: Train A control and power cable Component Cooling Water: Train A control cable RCS/SG Instrumentation: Channels A and D cable CVCS: Train A control and power cable Diesel Generator: Train A control and power cable HVAC: Train A control and power cable Emergency Chilled Water: Train A control cable i Fire Zone 3-PE-63-3B which is located directly above 2-PE-45-3A has the following safe shutdown cable:
-Shutdown Cooling: Train B and C control and power cable Pressurizer Heaters: Train B control and power cable RCS/SG Instrumentation: Channels B and C cable
, HVAC: Train B control and power cable I i 14.
The closest safe shutdown cable between the two zones consists of l Train A diesel generator cables in fire zone 3-PE-45-3A and Train I B RCS/SG Instrumentation Cable in fire zone 3-PE-63-3B. The i I cable in 3-PE-45-3A is located approximately ten feet beneath the ceiling, below the tendon access opening to the upper floor, and approximately 5'4" in horizontal separation from the east tendon i access opening and 5' in horizontal separation from the west tendon access opening. The cable located in 3-PE-63-3B is approximately 5'in horizontal distance from the west tendon access opening and approximately 10' off the floor. Evaluation A deviation from the requirements of Section III.G.2 to provide for a separation of redundant safe shutdown cables by a 3-hour barrier is requested based upon the following evaluation: The safe shutdown cables in this fire area are separated by less than a 3-hour barrier due to the floor between fire zones 3-PE-45-3A and 3 PE 63-3B. The primary concern of this deviation request is the propagation of a fire from fire zone 3-PE-45-3A to 3-PE-63-3B that could damage redundant cabling. The postulated fire duration in the two zones was described above to be 39 minutes and 57 minutes, respectively. The combustibles in these areas consist primarily of cable trays, some of which are covered with a mineral wool blanket. Plant Administrative Procedures will limit the accumulation of transient combustible materials. Metal covers will be installed over the tendon access hatches that currently are open between the floors. The installed covers will be constructed of fire resistant materials that will provide protection equivalent to a 2 hour rated barrier. The only other path of fire propagation between the two fire zones is via the seismic gap which is scaled by a 3-hour barrier. The concrete hatch is a tight fitting assembly and is considered equivalent to the 2-hour rated floor. Although there is no automatic fire suppression installed in this fire area, the installed smoke detectors will detect any occurrence of fire and alert the site fire department to respond and manually extinguish the fire. Ionization smoke detectors are installed near the tendon access openings and the seismic gap, and will promptly notify any potential fire occurrence. The proposed 2 hour equivalent separation (tendon access opening covers) and existing seismic gap seal afford sufficient time for the fire department to respond to the fire area and commence extinguishing activities. 15.
Deviation for the use of 2-hour barriers in lieu of 3-hour barriers to separate redundant safe shutdown trains, and the absence of an automatic suppression system was previously granted in Section 9.5.1 of the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report and Supplements 4 and 5 thereto, and in the Safety Evaluation related to the issuance of Operating License NPF-15, San Onofre Unit 3. This deviation request provides clarification of the installed
- geometry of safe shutdown equipment relative to the tendon access openings and provides the commitment to cover the tendon access openings with the equivalent of a 2-hour rating.
Conclusion It is, therefore, Southern California Edison's position that a level of protection equivalent to Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 will be provided in the Electrical Penetration and Personnel Monitor Areas (Fire Zones 3-PE-45-3A and 3-PE-63-3B) through the addition of tendon access opening covers with an equivalent of 2 hour fire rating. The upgrading of the floor / ceiling barrier between the two fire areas to a 3-hour rating, or the addition of an automatic fire suppression system in this area would not significantly enhance the level of fire protection for safe shutdown equipment. 14TMR13 i 16. i
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