IR 05000361/1982006
| ML20041C776 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 02/10/1982 |
| From: | Bishop T, Wagner W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041C765 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-82-06, 50-361-82-6, 50-362-82-02, 50-362-82-2, NUDOCS 8203020553 | |
| Download: ML20041C776 (6) | |
Text
-
-.
_
_
.-
f
.
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
50-361/82-06 Report No. 50-362/82-02 Docket No. 50-361, 50-362 License No. CPPR-97, -98 Safeguards Group
,
Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company
'
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name:. San Onofre Units 2 and 3-Inspection at: Construction Site, San Diego County, California Inspection conducted: January 25-29, 1982 Inspectors:.
msu///
A
[8 2.
'W.'d.' Wagner,PpctorInspector
/ Dafe Signed W
V Approved by:
lh c ch 2 /10 /82-T. W. Bishop, Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 1 Summary:
Inspection on January 25-29, 1982 (Report Nos. 50-361/82-06 and 50-362/82-02)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectorc of construction activities involving licensee action on 50.55(e) items, items of enforcement, and Unit 3 preservice examination. The inspection involved 34 onsite inspection hours by one NRC' inspector.
Results: No deviations.or items of.. noncompliance were identified.
-
.
i U203020553 820211 PDR ADOCK 05000361
'
-
.
,
...
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Southern California Edison -Company (SCE)
- D. B. Schone, Project QA Supervisor
.
- G. Vaslos, QA Engineer
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- L. W. Hurst, Project QA Manager
- J. W. Sheppard,. Project QA Supervisor
- J. H. Mc Carty, Project QC Manager R. Shah, QA Engineer R. Cook, Electrical QC Engineer J. Hansen, QA Engineer c.
Combustion Engineering, Inc. (CE)
B. A11 bee, Project Engineer
- Denotes those attending exit meeting.
3.
Licensee Action on 50.55(e) Items The following 10 CFR 50.55(e) items were examined to determine the 6dequacy of the licensee's. corrective action:
a.
Magnatrol Flood Level Alarm Switches, Unit 3 Licensee's corrective action on this item is in progress. A list is currently being generated spccifying all ' level switch enclosures that are required to be replaced with watertight NEMA Type 6 enclosures. A start-up work permit (SWP) was initiated. The
. inspector will examine the adequacy of the corrective actions taken during a subsequent inspection.
,
_
-x w ~ * -
,
'
..
,
W
,.-
.
. -.
.
.
-2-
-
.s
.
..
b.
. Determination of Pipe Supnort Material Content, Unit 3
'
^
Visual examination-of welds on wrapper plates revealed linear
.
,
mindicatioris'in the base metal and weld material.
Subsequent
..
chemical analysis revealed that the material was Inconel 718 i
- -
Alloy instea'd of the required 304 stainless steel as certified
'
by the material' manufacturer. The licensee's final report of
,
October.13,' 1981 suninarizes the corr.ective action taken.
This
,
,
includes'a complete accountability of all. Inconel 718 Alloy i
> received and installed by San Onofre Units 2 and 3.
Results
,
of testing to.detennine material content of all suspected material
- - showed that no Inconel 718 Alloy was identified in Unit 2, and seven wrapper plates were identified in Unit 3 as Inconel 718 Alloy. These seven wrapper plates were cut out and replaced with 304 stainless steel.
It appears that the Inconel 718 Alloy material (two 5 foot by 10 foot sheets) was mismarked by the material manufacturer. The actions taken by the licensee are considered adequate. This item is closed.
4.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Item of Noncompliance (50-361/81-04/01 and 50-362/81-01/02):
Internal Wiring in Electrical Panels This noncompliance concerned inadequate separation between field cabling within enclosures for redundant and associated circuits (IE Inspection Report No. 50-361/81-04 and 50-362/81-01). To verify the effectiveness of the corrective actions taken by the licensee the inspector reviewed the revised procedures, specifications, training session roster, and inspected the electrical cabinets where the problem was identified.
In addition to these cabinets, the inspector examined seven other Class IE cabinets for compliance with cable separation requirements. No separation problems were identified. This item is closed.
While inspecting Unit 3 for cable separation the inspector found Class IE electrical cables lying on the deck unprotected in three locations.
Licensee immediately issued a Corrective Action Request (CAR No. F-1395) recommending verification that protection from physical damage be provided for all cable, and that appropriate personnel be instructed on the requirements for handling electrical cables.
Due to licensee's prompt response to this problem no further action was taken by the inspector. This matter of electrical cable protection will be inspected in the normal course of future inspection.
-3-b.
(Closed) Item of Noncompliance (50-361/81-34/01) Removal of Completed Work (Conduit) without Proper Documentation.
The inspector verified that the recommended corrective actions in Corrective Action Request (CAR No. F-1377) was completed.
Licensee action included review of the requirements of procedure WPP/QCI-037 with the cognizant field engineer, and investigation to determine cause. The inspector also verified that the conduit supports were installed as required by drawing 39399.
The actions taken by the licensee are considered satisfactory.
This item is closed.
5.
Preservice Inspection (Baseline), Unit 3 a.
Preservice Inspection Program The inspector reviewed the licensee's preservice inspection (PSI) program and procedures for compliance with requirements of the SAR and ASME Section XI,1974 edition through Sunner 1975 Addenda. The prime contractor for the nondestructive examination (NDE) portion of the program is CE; part of the NDE activities is subcontracted out to Sonic Systems International. The program plan is adequately described in CE Document No. TR-ESS-063, Revision 1 of March 15, 1980. The plan describes the number of items to be inspected, and the method and extent of the examinations. The hydrostatic tests will be performed by Bechtel in accordance with Bechtel's ASME Section III quality assurance program.
b.
Observation of Work Activities The majority of wort performed during this PSI is ultrasonic (UT)
examination of pipe welds. The inspector observed calibration of the UT equipment including instrument linearity calibration, instrument settings, and establishment of the DAC plot from test blocks representative of the pipe welds to be examined.
The inspector observed UT examined being performed on two pipe welds of the safety injection systems identified as Zone 72 in the program plan. The weld designations were 03-072-760 (12-inch diameter pipe-to-elbow) and. 03-072-1010 (14-inch diameter pipe-to-elbow). Attributes evaluated by the inspector were type of apparatus u;ed, scanning technique, extent of coverage, calibration size and frequency of search units, beam angles, DAC current, transfer mechanisms, limits of evaluation and recording of indications, and determination of acceptance limit,_
_
_
_
._-
.. _
,
.
.
-4.
c.
NDE Personnel Qualifications
'
The qualification and certifications of three of the NDE personnel involved in the NDE activities observed during this inspection were reviewed by the inspector. This included one Level I and two Level II NDE individuals from Sonic Systems International.
All were qualified to perform UT examination within their respective certification level.
Review of the vision test records indicated that the annual visual acuity and color vision examination are still valid.
d.
Data Review and Evaluation The inspector examined the UT records of welds to ascertain whether the following documents were provided:
Examination results and data sheets, examination equipment data, calibration data sheets, examination evaluation data, extent of examination, disposition of findings and evaluation of indications in compliance with NDE procedures and ASME Section XI requirements.
The records examined were selected from the following areas:
(1) Reactor Pressure Vessel Area Designation Area Description 03-001-012 Lower Shell-to-Middle Shell Girth Wgld 03-001-017 Upper Shell Longitudinal Weld at 90 g
03-001-022 Inlet Nozzle-t'-Shell Weld at 60 (2) Steam Generat6r No. 2 - Primary Side 03-004-009 Primary Extension Ring-to-Tube Sheet Weld (3)_ Pressurizer 03-005-005 Lower Shell-to-Upper Shell Girth Wefd 63-005-006 Upper Shell Longitudinal Weld at 45 (4) Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Loop 2A Safety Injection
_
03-019-200 8" Sch 140 Elbow-to-Pipe 03-019-700 12" Sch 160 Elbow-to-Pipe Pressurizer Safety Valve Piping 03-025-130 6" Sch 160 Nozzle-to-Pipe at 315 03-025-220 6" Sch 160 Pipe-to-Valve Flange
.
,
-5-
"
1. cop 1 Reactor Coolant Piping Hot Leg
.03-008 008 Pipe-to-Elbow 03-008-014 Pipe-to-Elbow The organization, filing and maintenance of the preservice inspection records is satisfactory.
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified in the area of preservice inspection.
6.
Allegation'Regarding Plagiarized Audit Reports On January 12, 1982 NRC:RV received an allegation concerning subcontractor audits performed by BPC. The allegation contents that some audit reports were plagiarized causing speculation as to whether or not the audits were actually performed.
Finding: The allegation regarding plagiarized reports was correct, but does not represent a safety concern since the audits were perfonned.
Between June 1981 and January 1982 approximately 42 subcontractor audits were performed by BPC._ 0ut of these 42 audits one individual on several
-
. occasions plagiarized. reports, that is, the auditor copied identical words from~ previous reports. cHowever, a review of this situation
,
disclosed that all of these audits were, in fact, performed in accordance with the BPC quality assurance program. The inspector
. has no further questions on this matter.
~
7.
Plant Tour'
'
During inspection tour through the Unit 3 auxiliary feedwater (AFW)
pump room the inspector noted that the two AFW pumps were removed from the area. The first was removed after the AFW pump motor failed during a test on January 7, 1982. The bearing and rotor shaft were found to be damaged beyond repair. This problem to AFW pump motor 3MP141 is documented on Startup NRC No. 1101-E. The second AFW pump was requisitioned for use in Unit 2.
Testing of this pump on January 18, 1982 resulted in failure to the pump motor similar to the first AFW pump motor. This pump motor is identified as S21305 MP 141 on NCR-F-0598. At the time of this inspection this problem is believed to be due to operator error.
During the exit meeting the licensee agreed to keep the inspector informed as to the actual cause of the motor failures; that is, whether it is a design problem, operator error or improper operating procedures
(Followup Item 50-362/82-02/01).
8.
Exit Meeting The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
on January 29, 1982. The scope of the inspection and findings as detailed in this report were discussed.
(