IR 05000361/1982017
| ML20054L597 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1982 |
| From: | Kirsch D, Willett D, Zwetzig G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054L591 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-1.C.1, TASK-1.C.7, TASK-1.C.8, TASK-1.D.1, TASK-1.G.1, TASK-2.D.3, TASK-2.E.1.1, TASK-TM 50-361-82-17, 50-362-82-09, 50-362-82-9, NUDOCS 8207080280 | |
| Download: ML20054L597 (14) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION V
50-361/82-17 Report fio.
50-362/82-09 NPF-10 (Unit 2)
Docket ?!o.
50-361 and 50-362 License No.
CPPR-98 (Unit 3) Safeguards Group Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company P. U. Box 800 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead. California 91770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Inspection at:
San Onofre Site, San Clemente, California Inspection conducted: May 17 - June 4, 1982 Inspectors:
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'D. F. Kirsch, Recctor inspector Date Signed
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M. Willett/ Reactor Inspector Date Signed Approved by:
- d UMO / la, / 9 f ? -
G.QB' ffetzigO Cpief, Reactor Projects Section 1 (/
Date Signed Reactor Operations Projects Branch Summary:
Inspection from May 17 - June 4, 1982 (Report No. 50-361/82-17 and 50-362/82-09)
Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of the licensee's actions on previously identified items and IE Circulars; TMI Action Plan requirements; review of plant administrative, maintenance, operating and emergency procedures; and independent inspection of low power license conditions, Unit 3 10 CFR 50.55(e) item applicability,10 CFR 21 item applicability, operator awareness of procedure revisions and verification of selected Technical Specification surveillance requirements.
This inspection involved 84 inspector-hours on site by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8207080280 820617 RV Fonn 219 (2)
PDR ADOCK 05000361 Q
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DETAILS 1.
Individuals Contacted
- J. G. Haynes, Manager, Nuclear Operations
+ H. B. Ray, Station Manager
+*J. M. Curran, Manager, Quality Assurance
+*W. C. Moody, Deputy Station Manager
+*0. B. Schone, Project Quality Assurance Supervisor
+ B. Katz, Assistant Station Manager, Technical
+*H. E. Morgan, Assistar,t Station Manager, Operations
+*P. A. Croy, Manager, Configuration Control and Compliance
+*P. R. King, Unit 2/3 Operations Quality Assurance Supervisor
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- C R. Horton, Unit 2/3 Startup Quality Assurance Supervisor
+*C. A. Kergis, Unit 2/3 Operations Quality Assurance Engineer
+*T. A. Mackey, Compliance Engineer
+ F. Briggs, Compliance Engineer
- W. McRory, Unit 2/3 Operations Training Administrator t C. H. Welch, Unit 2/3 Operations Quality Assurance Engineer W. Wilczeck, Unit 2/3 Instrumentation and Control Su'pervisor D. Locker, Senior Reactor Operator, Unit 2/3 V. Fisher. Unit 2/3 Supervisor, Plant Coordination D. Stonecipher, Construction Quality Assurance Supervisor The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees during the course of the inspection. These included Operations, Instrumentation and Control (I&C), Quality Assurance (QA), and Maintenance personnel.
- Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview on May 21, 1982.
+ Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview on June 4, 1982.
Also present at the exit interview on May 21, 1982 was A. E. Chaffee, Unit 2 Senior Resident Inspector.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items a.
(Closed) (50-361/82-12-02) Follow-up Item:
Examination of the Motor Operated Valve Maintenance Program The inspector examined the licensee's program for maintenance of motor operated valves and determined that the program includes provisions for:
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-2-(1)
Identification of valve open/close torque, torque switch type, and torque switch settings.
(2)
Identification of motor size, voltage, full load amps, locked rotor amps, breaker size and breaker trip setting.
(3) Assuring that torque switches cannot demand a larger torque than the motor can supply.
(4) Assuring that valve operator motors and breakers are not under or marginally sized.
(5) Assuring that torque switches will generate the required opening / closing torque.
Discussions with licensee personnel indicated that all safety-related valve motors have jumpers removing the overload trip with inspections performed each 18 months to verify removal of the overload feature; breaker reset is always manual; all valves have lecking gear / brake assemblies; and breaker trips are based on the valve motor manufacturer's specified full load current.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
(Closed) (50-361/81-28-06) Follow-up Item:
Inadequate Controls Governing Rigging and Handling Equipment The inspector sampled and examined several licensee procedures controlling the certification, storage, use, and inspection of rigging and handling equipment to ascertain whether requirements of industry standards (e.g., ANSI B30.2.0, 830.9, B30.10, N45.2.6, and SNT-TC-1A) were satisfactorily implemented. The licensee's program established:
Controls specifying routine and special handling measures.
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Controls over hoisting equipment.
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Responsibility assignments to implement controls over rigging
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and handling equipment.
The inspector observed that the licensee's program requires certain visual inspections and nondestructive examinations of rigging and handling equipment. However, the program did not invoke or implement the personnel qualification requirements, of ANSI N45.2.6 or SNT-TC-1A, for personnel performing the required inspections and nondestructive examinations. The licensee stated that the program would be reexamined and revised to implement the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6 and SNT-TC-1A.
This area will be examined during a future inspection.
(50-361/82-17-01)
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Licensee Action on IE Circulars a.
(Closed) Circular 81-13:
Torque Switch Electrical Bypass - Circuit Missing on Safeguard Valve Motors The inspector examined the licensee's actions to resolve the concerns identified by the subject circular.
Bechtel had identified all valves which are required to have torque switch bypass circuits installed and verified that the drawings properly reflect the requirements. SCE had performed a sampling type inspection of these valves to verify that the as-built condition corresponded to the electrical drawing requirements.
Furthermore, SCE had taken action to assure that procedure controls were in place to prevent inadvertent removal of the required torque switch bypass circuits.
b.
(Closed) Circular 81-14:
Evaluation of MSIV Programs The licensee evaluated the circular's applicability to SONGS 2/3.
The evaluation determined the Unit 2/3 MSIV's utilize electrohydraulic operators, with nitrogen used as a charging medium for the actuator cylinder and as a control medium on the hydraulic dump valves.
In addition, no failures to close had been identified or observed.
The licensee concluded that the maintenance manuals contained adequate procedures for tightening packing glands. An additional feature installed allows test positioning the valve, to about 10 percent from full open, to verify valve operability with an automatic reopen feature when this test is used.
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(Closed) Circular 80-15: Loss of Reactor Coolant _ Pump Cooling
and Natural Circulation Cooldown
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In response to the concerns identified by the circular, the licensee
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.had requested that Combustion Engineering (CE) provide guidelines
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for recognizing and mitigating the consequences of the event in question. Combustion Engineering provided the requested information by publication.CEN-199. Appendix A to CEN-199 defined emergency procedure guideli6es for dealing with the reactor coolant system voiding. event.
l The inspector examined Operating Instructions Nos. 5023-3-2.30
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(Determination of Adequate Core Cooling) and 5023-3-2.31 (Natural l
Circulation Guideline) to establish whether the guidelines provided by CE had been adequately incorporated. The inspector found
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-4-that procedure 5023-3-2.31 contained several procedural inconsistencies and did not adequately incorporate all of the CE recommended guidelines.
The inspector brought these concerns to the licensee's attention and the licensee took immediate action to resolve these concerns. The inspector reviewed the revised procedure and found that the procedure adequately incorporated the CE recommended guidelines and resolved the observed inconsistencies. This item is closed.
4.
TMI Action Plan Requirements a.
(0 pen) Items I.C.1, Guidance for the Evaluation and Development of Procedures for Transients and Accidents, I.C.7, NSSS Vendor Review of Procedures, and I.C.8, Pilot Monitoring of Selected Emergency Procedures for Near-Term Operating License Applicants (1)
(0 pen) Item I.C.1 (License Condition 2.C(19)d):
The licensee had submitted emergency procedure guidelines for fRR review and approval by letter dated April 30, 1982.
Following NRR approval of emergency procedure guidelines, the inspector will verify incorporation of the approved guidelines by reviewing selected emergency procedures before the first refueling outage.
(2)
(Closed) Item I.C.7: The inspectors verified that Combustion Engineering (CE) had reviewed the licensee's power ascension and emergency procedures, provided coments to the licensee, and that the licensee had adequately incorporated CE's comments in all emergency procedures except one.
The licensee had conducted a surveillance during the week of May 24, 1981, to verify that all emergency procedures had been reviewed by CE. A total of 41 procedure review j
comment sheets were reviewed by this surveillance.
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found that all CE comments had been adequately incorporated i
into the appropriate procedures. However, Procedure S023-3-5.22
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(Loss of Load / Reactor-Generator Mismatch) had not been reviewed I
by CE. The licensee agreed to have CE review that procedure, provide necessary comments and appropriately incorporate
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l those coments prior to performance of loss-of-load testing.
This item is closed.
l (3)
(Closed) Item I.C.8: The inspector reviewed the licensee's emergency operating procedures to establish that generic changes recommended by NRR had been incorporated.
In addition, the review was accomplished using the checklist guidance provided in NUREG/CR-2005 (Checklist for Evaluating Emergency Procedures Used in Nuclear Power Plants) for the purpose of establishing whether the procedures contained characteristics that could possibly lead to operator performance deviations.
The inspector observed a few minor deviations from the guidance and brought these instances to the licensee's attention.
The licensee took immediate action to resolve the identified deviations and the inspector had no further questions.
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-5-The licensee had conducted training, on emergency operating instructions and procedures using simulator training, CE lectures and control room walk-throughs for operators, during the period of August through October 1981.
This item is closed.
b.
(0 pen) Item I.D.1, Control Room Design Review (License Condition 2.C(19)f)
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The inspector examined the licensee's actions to resolve this item, required by the current Operating License and-Supplement No. I to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER #1) to be completed before exceeding 5 percent power. All requirements referenced in these documents had been satisfactorily completed except for the following:
Labeling of the Foxboro containment spray controller.
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Replacing Reactor Coolant loop hot leg temperature scales
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with appropriate scale divisions.
Elimination of the 10X multiplier from Reactor Coolant hot
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leg and cold leg temperature.
Incorporation of normal and abnormal operating range indications
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on applicable instruments.
Providing increase / decrease labels for the containment spray
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chemical controllers.
The licensee had completed the control room lighting survey and P
was in the process of transmitting the results to.the NRC staff as required by SSER #1. The licensee concluded that no changes were necessary as a result of the lighting survey.
With regard to the incorporation of normal and abnormal operating range indications on applicable instruments, the inspector examined several indicators in the control room and observed the following:
(1) The licensee had established and defined, by Drawing 90021,
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a scheme of indicator marking consisting of red bars, red arrows, and black arrows; for example, a red arrow indicates a Technical Specification limit, red bars indicate alarm condition, and a black arrow indicates a control function actuation point. Discussions with operating personnel indicated that confusion regarding label type meaning existed due in part to the fact that the drawing definitions had not been provided to the operators and had not been included in the training program. The licensee took action to make
operators aware of the marking definitions.
(2) The inspector observed that red arrows had not been consistently f
installed on all indicators which have an associated Technical
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-6-Specification limit. Subsequent inspections and evaluations by the licensee identified that 31 instruments were originally identified to be marked by drawing 90021.
In addition, the licensee identified that because drawing 90021 had not been revised to be consistent with later proposed Technical Specification revisions, 59 additional indicators were observed to be without suitable markings. The licensee indicated that n1arking the additional 59 indicators, in a manner consistent with those markings specified by Drawing 90021, would significantly enhance operator visual awareness. The licensee indicated that a new design change would be generated to accomplish
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the marking of the 59 indicators and that the markings would be installed by approximately August 15, 1982.
(3) The inspector observed that certain red arrows / bars had not been installed to indicate Technical Specification limits or alarm cor.ditionr.
For example:
(a) Technical Specifications impose limits of 40 degrees l
and 100 degrees F, lower and upper, respectively, on l
Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) temperature. A
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red arrow was installed at 17.5 degrees F and no red i
arrow was installed at the 100 degrees F point.
(b) The RWST temperature indicators have red bars installed indicating alarm conditions when less than 44 degrees F and greater than 90 degrees F.
Discussions with operating personnel identified that the RWST has only a low temperature alarm, occuring at 44 degrees F.
(c) The RWST level indicators had a red arrow installed, indicating a Technical Specification (TS) limit, at 72 percent level. Discussions with operating personnel indicated that the lower limit, specified in gallons by TS, corresponded to about 74 ' percent on the indicator.
Subsequent to the above findings, the licensee inspected the control room indicator markings for conformance with the requirements of Drawing 90021 and observed that the inspector's findings were the only existing deficiencies. Thus, the licensee concluded that the original design change (DCP-130J) was not implemented correctly when installed originally. A Corrective Action Request was written to correct the observed deficiencies.
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(0 pen) Item I.G.1:
Special Low-Power Testing and Training-(License Condition 2.C(19)g)
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The licensee had contracted with CE to provide natural circulation test progran training, prior to the conduct of the natural circulation test. Review of the topics to be addressed by the classroom phase indicates that an acceptable level of training would be accomplished.
The SSER #1 position statement requires that each operator experience the initiation, maintenance, and recovery from natural circulation mode. The licensee had not established a system to assure compliance with this position. Subsequent to the identification of this concern, the licensee indicated that the natural circulation test procedure would be revised to include verification that each licensed operator had experienced these activities.
d.
(Closed) Item II.D.3, Direct Indication of Safety Valve Position (License Condition 2.C.(19)k)
The inspector reviewed the documentation of seismic and environmental qualification of the licensee's safety valve position indication system. The documentation was retained by document control and appeared to comply with appropriate regulatory guides and IEEE standards.
e.
(0 pen) Item II.E.1.1: AFW Pump 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Endurance Test (License Condition 2.C(19)1)
The inspector examined the test procedure (2ST-235-01) for the conduct of the 48-hour endurance test and examined the test results for motor driven AFW pump P-504. The procedure and test results examined appeared satisfactory.
The licensee stated that environmental qualification problems have been identified with regard to the Babbitt bearings in use, while operational problems were identified with the proposed cast-iron replacements.
This matter is being resolved by SCE with NRR.
The inspector will examine the results of the 48-hour tests
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on the other AFW pumps, taking into account the NRC approved resolution of the pump bearing problem.
In addition, the inspector will examine the results of Test Procedure 2HB-201-01 (Feedring Integrity Test to Prevent Water Hammer on Refill of the Steam Generator) for acceptability.
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Review of Plant Procedures - Unit 3 The inspector reviewed selected portions of:
Administrative Procedures Station Orders Maintenance Procedures Operating Procedures Emergency Operating Instructions These procedures were selected on a sample basis and were reviewed against the guidance contained in ANSI N18.7, Regulatory Guide 1.33, and NUREG/CRs-1369, 1970, and 2005. The inspector examined the procedures for technical adequacy and compliance with regulatory requirements.
Except as noted, examination of selected procedure checklists verified that they would accomplish their intended purposes.
Specific procedures evaluated and problems identified are as follows:
Emergency Operating Instruction 5023-3-5.19, " Loss of Boron Concentration
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Control / Excessive Dilution," (February 24,1982) did not address Valve 1901MU589 (P&ID 40124). This valve supplies demineralized water (unborated) to the suction of the charging pumps. The section of 5023-3-5.19 which is used to verify correct valve lineup references Operating Procedure 5023-3-2.2, " Makeup Operations,"
but Valve 1901MU589 was not addressed by this procedure. S023-3-2.2 references S023-3-8.10 for the primary makeup water (PMW-demineralized)
system lineup but this boundary Valve 1901MU589 was not addressed there either. The licensee corrected the procedures to provide adequate inclusion of the valve in question.
The applicable P&ID.(40124) shows that Valve 1901MU589 is a locked closed valve. A review of Operating Instruction S023-0-17, " Locking of Critical Valves and Breakers" (3-27-82 Rev. 3), states that Valve 1901MU589 is lined up in Operating Procedure 5023-3-2.1, "CVCS Charging and Letdown." However, it was not included in this procedure. The licensee corrected the procedure to adequately reference the valve in question.
Emergency Operating Instruction S023-3-5.20, " Loss of Reactor
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Coolant Makeup" (July 7, 1981, Rev. 2), Step 4.2, states:
"If charging pumps have been restarted, verify letdown, charging
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and pressurizer level have been returned to normal." These instructions have only one sign off for multiple verifications. The licensee revised this procedure to include separate steps and verifications for these actions.
Emergency Operating Instruction S023-3-5.24, " Loss of Pressurizer
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Level Control" (June 30, 1981, Rev. 2). The inspector observed that some of the document control forms passing through the l
Quality Assurance Organization had the block requiring interdisciplinary review checked, but the functional manager had not yet signed the form. This decision appears to be assigned to the functional I
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managers as per Administrative Procedure 5023-VI-1.0.
The licensee stated that the functional manager may delegate this decision authority and signifies approval of that decision by subsequent approval of the' procedure and review form. The inspector also observed that, per 5023-VI-1,0, if the Onsite Review Committee (OSRC) reviews a document, that review is to be documented on the Document Control Form. However, there were no instructions on how to document this review, or a specific place for this record on the review form. The licensee stated that appropriate instructions would be provided and a space included on the review form to document any OSRC reviews performed.
The following station orders were reviewed:
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50123-A-109, " Station Documents, Preparation, Revision and Review" S0123-M-12, " Requirements for Calibration and Control of Test Equipment" S0123-M-4, " Preventive Maintenance Program"
S0123-I-7.8, " calibration of Torque Wrenches" S0123-I-7.9, " Fire Prevention During Open Flame Processes"
The inspector observed the following:
50123-I-7.9, paragraph 4.5, did not require a supervisor to do the
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final fire inspection check af ter work has been completed, as required by National Fire Protection Association Code (NFPA),
Section 51-B.
S0123-I-7.9, paragraph 6.3.4, required that the fire watch perform
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the preauthorization area inspection prior to issuing the welding permit. This inspection is required, by NFPA 51-B, to be done by the person responsible for authorizing the welding permit,
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i The inspector was informed that Bechtel is doing all welding onsite and issuing welding permits in accordance with procedure WPP/QCI-42. The inspector reviewed the above WPP/QCI and noted that step 9 had the permit requestor doing the area preauthorization inspection. The licensee revised WPP/QCI-42 to require that the foreman perform the required inspection.
The licensee was in the process of replacing S0123-I-7.9 by a new procedure (50123-XIII-14) which was in the final stages of review and approval and indicated that the inspector's comments i
would be appropriately included in the new procedure. The licensee expects that the new Fire Protection Plan and implementing procedures would be in effect prior to exceeding 5 percent power.
Based on the review conducted during the Unit 2 preoperational test
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program, the identical nature of Units 2 and 3, and the examinations conducted this inspection, the licensee's administrative, operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures appear to be adequate to operate
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-10-and maintain Units 2 and 3 during normal and emergency conditions.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Independent Inspection a.
Verification of Facility Operating License NPF-10 Conditions
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(Closed) Seismic Trip System (Oper 'ing License Paragraph 2.C(9))
Paragraph 2.C(9) of the operating licer.ae requires that the seismic. trip system shall be operable prior to exceeding five' percent power. The inspector established, through discussions with supervisory personnel, that the seismic trip. system was operational. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
(2)
(Closed) Fire Protection (Operating License Paragraph 2.C(14)b)
Paragraph 2.C(14)b of the operating license requires that fixed emergency lighting shall be installed and made operable in access and egress routes to safe shutdown areas and further requires that the lighting be sealed beam units with 8-hour
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minimum battery power supplies.
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The licensee had performed inspections and, based on the results, installed the required lighting in 33 locations where the lighting was necessary.
The inspector examined the lighting unit manufacturer's specifications and determined that the units contained 8-hour minimum battery supplies. Discussions with licensee personnel indicated that the 8-hour requirement was verified by test of a representative unit.
The inspector examined 27 of the installed lighting units and tested a representative sample of the units for operability.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, b.
Applicability of a Unit 3 Construction Deficiency Report to Unit 2 The licensee reported a potentially reportable condition for Unit 3 by letter dated April 23, 1982. The potential conditian involved the failure of the Unit 3 Main Steam Dump to atmosphere
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-11-valves to consistently return to the normally closed position on loss of control air pressure. The inspector questioned the applicability of the reported condition to the equivalent valves installed in Unit 2.
The licensee had evaluated the potential for reportability, as required by Technical Specifications. The inspector examined the licensee's evaluation, conclusions, and basis for determining that the problem was not reportable under Technical Specifications and found that the evaluation had addressed all necessary aspects of the situation. The licensee had completed the installation of springs with a greater spring constant on the Unit 2 main steam dump to atmosphere valves. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
c.
Potential Applicability to San Onofre Units 2 and 3 of a Deficiency Reported Pursuant to 10 CFR 21 A report of a potential deficiency was submitted to the NRC by a firm engaged in Preservice Examinations of Reactor Pressure Vessels by letter dated April 2, 1982. The report identified that the wrong Ultrasonic (UT) calibration standard may have been used in calibration of UT equipment for use at San Onofre Units 2 and 3 in the examination of reactor pressure vessel (RPV)
inlet nozzle to pipe welds from the inside diameter surface.
The inspector relayed this information to the licensee for evaluation.
Combustion Engineering had reviewed calibration records, examination data sheets, and log books from both Unit 2 and 3 RPV inlet nozzle
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examinations and concluded that the situation was not applicable to SONGS 2 and 3.
d.
Operator Awareness of Procedure Revisions The inspector briefly examined the licensee's system for assuring that operators were fully aware of revisions to emergency and plant operating procedures. The licensee had established an acknowledgement system (5023-0-18) under which procedure revisions were assioi'ed priorities and made available for operator review.
The operator must review and document that review by a particular time, dependent upon the priority assigned. The licensee stated that a new tracking system is being devised to more readily assure that high priority operator reading requirements are completed as required by the administrative procedure.
Discussions with SCE personnel indicated that the procedure review form is being revised to include a space whert.in the cognizant l
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-12-manager would indicate whether a procedure change needs to be evaluated for inclusion in the training program. Discussions with the Training Supervisor indicate that, for each such indication received by the training department, an evaluation would be performed and documented to show the evaluation results and resolution /
disposition. Although the system is not formalized, the inspector considers that the stated actions would provide assurance and documented evidence that procedure changes had been evaluated for inclusion in the training program. This, together with the reading acknowledgement system in use, provides adequate assurance that operators will be made aware of significant procedure revisions in a timely manner and that the requalification system would be appropriately revised to assure incorporation of significant procedure revisions, e.
Review of Technical' Specification Surveillances The inspector examined the surveillance. data to verify compliance with the following Technical Specification surveillance requirements.
Reactor Protection System Logic, monthly channel functional
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test, procedure S023-11-1.1, Technical Specification Table 4.3-1 Reactor Trip Breakers, 18 month functional test of shunt
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trip coil and under-voltage coil, Procedure S023-11-11.161, Technical Specification Table 4.3-1 Safety Injection Tanks, monthly boron concentration, Procedure
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S023-III-1.6, Technical Specification paragraph 4.5.1.b Refueling Water Storage Tanks, weekly boron concentration,
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Procedure 5023-III-1.6, Technical Specification paragraph 4.5.4.a.2 No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
f.
Temporary Modification Control NRC Inspection Report No. 50-361/82-12 documented, in paragraph 5.b(1), certain findings related to procedural inconsistency.
With the exception of operability testing of restored modifications (still under evaluation and resolution) the procedures controlling temporary modifications were revised and appeared consistent.
The temporary modification control form was revised to be more complete and now requires tagging of the device, power supply and operating switches in other plant areas, in addition to the operating device in the control room.
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-13-In order to provide more positive control over temporary modifications, S023-0-16 was revised to require periodic audits of the temporary modification log and the forwarding of identified deficiencies to management.'
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Noitemso['noncomplianceordeviationswereidentified.
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Review of Safety Comittee Activities The inspector examined the meeting minutes documenting the activities
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of the Onsite Review Committee (OSRC) at the April and May 1982 meetings. 'The minutes reflected an increased level of preplanning and attention to detail. The meeting minutes established verification that the OSRC had complied with Technical Specification assigned responsibilities.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
on May 21 and June 4, 1982, to summarize the inspection scope and findings.
Comitments made by the licensee are included in the applicable paragraphs of this report.
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