ML13333A941
| ML13333A941 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1982 |
| From: | San Diego Gas & Electric Co, Southern California Edison Co |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13317A467 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC 64883 NUDOCS 8212170168 | |
| Download: ML13333A941 (34) | |
Text
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 DOCKET 50-206 CONCEPTUAL STUDY OF THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL AND ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS EVALUATION RELATING TO APPENDIX R SECTION III.G.3 AND NRC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION DECEMBER, 1982 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY 8212170166 821215 ate 1 -1 5-8staf Decus PDR ADOCK 05000206 REGULTORY DO= FLE p
CONCEPTUAL STUDY OF THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL AND ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS EVALUATION RELATING TO APPENDIX R SECTION III.G.3 AND NRC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1 2.0 RSP DESIGN CRITERIA 1
2.1 RSP Operating Conditions 2
2.2 RSP Functional Requirements 2
2.3 RSP Operational Requirements 3
2.4 RSP Additional Requirements 3
3.0 RSP SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT 4
3.1 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) 5 3.2 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) 6 3.3 Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFS) 7 3.4 Main Steam System (MSS) 8 3.5 Salt Water Cooling System (SWCS) 8 3.6 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) 9 3.7 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) 9 4.0 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS EVALUATION FOR THE RSP 10 5.0 SPECIFIC RESPONSES TO NRC REQUESTS 11 5.1 Request 2.c 11 5.2 Request C.1 and C.I.a 15 5.3 Request C.1.b 20 5.4 Request C.1.c 21 5.5 Request C.1.d 23 5.6 Request C.I.e 24
6.0 REFERENCES
24
LIST OF TABLES Table No.
Description
- 1.
Remote Shutdown Panel Instrumentation 25
- 2.
Isolation Cabinet Equipment 29 0T
LIST OF FIGURES Figure No.
TITLE
- 1.
- 2.
Chemical and Volume Control System P&ID
- 3.
Auxiliary Feedwater System P&ID
- 4.
Main Steam System P&ID
- 5.
Salt Water Cooling System P&ID
- 6.
Component Cooling Water System P&ID
- 7.
Residual Heat Removal System P&ID
- 8.
Elementary Diagram for Reactor Coolant System:
Pressurizer Heater Group "B" A.C.B
- 9.
Elementary Diagram for Chemical and Volume Control System:
MOV-LCV-11OOD
- 10.
Elementary Diagram for Chemical and Volume Control System:
MOV-357
- 11.
Elementary Diagram for Chemical and Volume Control System:
CV's -NNN6, 203, NNN9 and NNN11
- 12.
Elementary Diagram for Auxiliary Feedwater System:
G-NN12
- 13.
Elementary Diagram for Auxiliary Feedwater System:
MOV-NN13
- 14.
Elementary Diagram for Main Steam System:
SV's -85, 86, 87 and 88
- 15.
Elementary Diagram for Salt Water Cooling System:
G-13B
- 16.
Elementary Diagram for Component Cooling Water System:
G-15B
- 17.
Elementary Diagram for Residual Heat Removal System:
G-14B
- 18.
Elementary Diagram for Residual Heat Removal System: MOV-822B
- 19.
Block Diagram of Shared Enclosures
CONCEPTUAL STUDY OF THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL AND ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS EVALUATION RELATING TO APPENDIX R SECTION III. G.3 AND NRC REQUEST-FOR-TNFORMATTON December, 1982
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This study is made to provide the NRC with design information on the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP), and on the Associated Circuits Evaluation related to the RSP, in response to the NRC request dated May 10, 1982 for information on fire protection rule schedular requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c) -Exemption Request. References I through 3 provide the background for this study and provide the basis for the information supplied.
2.0 RSP DESIGN CRITERIA The RSP will contain Train 2 controls and instrumentation for essential equipment and components of the normal plant shutdown systems. Remote actuation and/or monitoring of this equipment will achieve a safe plant shutdown (see paragraph 2.2.a and b for details) under a postulated design basis fire in the Main Control Room (MCR) and concurrent loss of offsite power.
I
The principle design criteria used in the development of the RSP are as follows:
2-.1-RSP-Operat-ing-Gondi-t-ions
- a.
fire is assumed in the Main Control Room (NCR) or cable spreading area concurrent with loss of offsite power.
- b.
no fires are assumed in other areas concurrent with fire in NCR.
- c.
equipment and circuits outside the MCR are assumed to perform their function as designed.
- d.
access to containment is not required for equipment control.
- e.
reactor and turbine are tripped upon leaving the MCR.
- f.
automatic systems and equipment identified through negative process interaction analysis, whose operation may defeat the plant shutdown operating actions of the RSP are manually isolated/ de activated or put into the desired configuration.
2.2 RSP Functional Requirements
- a.
provide the ability to achieve and maintain hot standby (Mode 3).
2
- b.
provide the ability to achieve and ipaintain cold shutdown (Mode 5).
2-.-3RSP-Opera-tton a-1-Requ-i-remen-ts
- a.
all equipment controlled from the RSP will be Train 2 energized from standby emergency power (Diesel #2) through the new 4160V Bus.
- b.
The RSP will only contain Train 2 instrumentation and controls.
An MCR fire can cause damage to both Train 1 and Train 2 circuits (at a common panel section).
The Train 2 isolation/transfer switch panel located near the RSP will be utilized to isolate the Train 2 damaged MCR circuits, and to transfer control to the RSP.
- c.
transfer of control of the Train 2 safe shutdown equipment from the MCR to the RSP is effected at the isolation/transfer switch panel (see page 13 for a description of the isolation/transfer switch panel).
2.4 RSP Additional Requirements
- a.
the RSP will be designed, constructed and installed as safety related.
3
- b.
locaLion of RSP will complty with Appendix R and appropriate secur ity requirements.
- c. _vyicecommun icat ion ssystemsbetween-theRSP-and-other-plant locations is available.
- d.
no LOCA, MSLB or DBE is considered to occur concurrently with an MCR fire; the RSP is not designed to operate plant equipment that will mitigate the effects of design events such as LOCA, MSLB or DBE.
- e.
single failure of power source, control systems or equipment not required for safe shutdown has not been considered.
- f.
a fire in the RSP will not degrade the safe shutdown capability of the MCR. Negative process interaction analyses will be utilized to assure MCR controllability (see Section 4.0 for details).
3.0 RSP SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT Table I provides a listing by plant system of the equipment to be monitored and controlled from the RSP. Table 2 provides a listing of the Isolation Cabinet equipment. A description of each system controlled from the RSP is given in the following.
4
3.1 Reactob Coolant System (RCS)
Reactor Coolant System pressure during hot shutdown, hot stand-by and cold shutdown-wil-1-be-moni-t-ored-and-cont-ro-l-l-ed-from--the-RSP.-F-igure-1-shows-a simplified P&ID for the Reactor Coolant System (from Reference 2) marked to show the equipment controlled/monitored from the RSP. RMS-NNN1 will ener gize pressurizer heater Group B to increase system pressure. At the isola tion cabinet ISO-NN27 will transfer control of heater Group B from the MCR to the RSP. System pressure indication will be provided by PI-434A and reactor core startup range neutron flux will be displayed by N-1202.
Reactor coolant pressure reduction will be achieved by operation of the pressurizer auxiliary spray and system water inventory will be controlled by remote actuation of valves on both the charging and the letdown lines (see details on the Chemical and Volume Control System operation description).
Pressurizer water level will be indicated by LI-430A. Reactor core decay heat removal progress will be monitored on reactor coolant Loop C. Hot-leg temperature will be displayed by TI-NNN2 while cold leg temperature will be displayed on TI-422.
Figure 8 shows the conceptual electrical elementary diagram for the Reactor Coolant System.
3.2 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)
Reactor Coolant System water inventory control will be achieved from the RSP by controlling-the-flow-rates-ofboth-the-char-g-ing-and-t-he-let-down-l-i-nes.
Figure 2 shows a simplified P&ID for the Chemical and Volume Control System (from Reference 2) marked to show the equipment controlled/monitored from the RSP. RMS-NNN3 will.provide open/close actuation of LCV-1100D and there fore suction flow to charging pump G-8A. Pump operation will be controlled by RMS-NNN4.
Pump discharge flow, into reactor coolant Loop B, will be allowed by RMS-NNN5 actuation of MOV-357. Flow rate will be remote manually controlled by operation of FCV-1115B and FCV-1115E via FC-NNN7. Pressurizer water level will be indicated by LI-430A. Flow through the letdown line will be via CV-NNN9, operated by RMS-NNN9. CV-203, actuated by RMS-NNN8, will provide flow control downstream from the shell side discharge of regener ative heat exchanger E-13. Operation of CV-NN11, by RMS-NN11, will permit flow from the letdown line to the pressurizer relief tank. This arrange ment enables preheating of auxiliary spray flow. FC-NN10 will remote manu ally control FCV-NN10 on the discharge line of the charging pumps. RMS-NNN6 operation of CV-NNN6, downstream from the tube side outlet of regenerative heat exchanger E-13, will permit use of the pressurizer auxiliary spray line for the reduction of reactor coolant system pressure. ISO-NN32, located at the isolation cabinet, will provide isolation/closure of CV-304 and FCV-1112.
6
Figures 9, 10 and 11 show the conceptual electrical elementary diagrams for the Chemical and Volume Control System..
3-.-3-Aux-i-l-ia-r-y-Feedwa-ter-System-(AFS)
Control of adequate feedwater flow into steam generators E-1B and E-1C, from the auxiliary feedwater system, will be provided at the RSP. Figure 3 shows a simplified P&ID for the Auxiliary Feedwater System (from Refer ence 2), marked to show the equipment controlled/monitored from the RSP.
Start/stop control of auxiliary feedwater pump G-NN12 will be provided by RMS-NN12. Pump discharge via MOV-NN13, automatically opened by the pump startup logic, or remote manually actuated by RMS-NN13, will permit flow into the auxiliary feedwater header. Flow rate into steam generator E-1C will be controlled by FC-NN14, through FCV-3300. FC-NN15 will control the flow rate into steam generator E-1B, by actuation of FCV-3301. Flow rate indication will be provided by FI-NN16 for SG E-1C, and by FI-NN17 for SG E-1B. For a description of the RSP instrumentation for steam generator level indication see details on the Main Steam System operation description.
Figures 12 and 13 show the conceptual electrical elementary diagrams for the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
7
3.4 Main Steam System (MSS)
Reactor core decay heat transferred by the primary coolant via natural circulation at the steam generators, during hot shutdown,_willbe-removed-by the main steam system and discharged to the atmosphere, during hot shutdown by the atmospheric steam dump valves. Figure 4 shows a simplified P&ID for the Main Steam System (from Reference 2) marked to show equipment controlled/
monitored from the RSP. FC-NNI8 will remote manually operate CV-77 and CV-79. Water level in steam generators E-1B and E-IC will by indicated at the RSP by LI-451C and LI-452C respectively. Solenoid valves SV-86 and SV-88, which provide quick opening of the dump valves, will be maintained deenergized and prevented from operation by ISO-NN45 at the isolation/
transfer switch panel.
Figure 14 shows the conceptual electrical elementary diagram for the Main Steam System.
3.5 Salt Water Cooling System (SWCS)
Ultimate heat removal from the plant, via component cooling water heat exchanger E-20A, will be accomplished through operation of salt water cooling pump G-1313, by RMS-NN19 which will be located on the new 480V load center.
Figure 5 shows a simplified P&ID for the Salt Water Cooling System (from Reference 2) marked to show equipment controlled/ monitored from the RSP.
MOV-720A, part of the Component Cooling Water System, is shown on Figure 6.
8
The operational logic of pump G-13B will provide interlocks for the automatic actuation of valve POV-6, at the pump discharge, and MOV-720A which is located downstream from the shell side outlet of heat exchanger E-20A.
Figure 15 shows the conceptual electrical elementary diagram for the Salt Water Cooling System.
3.6 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)
Core residual heat will be transferred to the Component Cooling Water System via residual heat exchanger E-21B. Figure 6 shows a simplified P&ID for the Component Cooling Water System (from Reference 2) marked to show equipment controlled/monitored from the RSP. TC-NN21 will remotely control the actua tion of TCV-6018, at the component coolant discharge line of the heat exchanger, and RMS-NN20 will operate component cooling water pump G-15B.
Figure 16 shows the conceptual electrical elementary diagram for the Com ponent Cooling Water System.
3.7 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)
Flow through the Residual Heat Removal System will be provided by RHR pump G-14B. Figure 7 shows a simplified P&ID for the Residual Heat Removal System (from Reference 2) marked to show equipment controlled/monitored from the RSP.
Pump operation from the RSP will be via RMS-NN22. Actuation of 9
MOV-822B at the inlet of residual heat exchanger E-21B will be performed by RMS-NN23 and indication of the heat exchanger discharge temperature will be provided by TI-NN26. Suction flow to RHR pump G-14B will be via MOV-NN24 and MOV-NN24A actuated yRMS=NN24F.
Ilowinto-the-cold-leg-of-reac-tor coolant Loop C will be provided through MOV-NN25 and MOV-NN25A actuated by RMS-NN25.
Figures 17 and 18 show the conceptual electrical elementary diagrams for the Residual Heat Removal System.
4.0 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS EVALUATION FOR THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL (RSP)
The associated circuits evaluation is limited to insuring that power supplies for the RSP, certain local controls and the equipment controlled by them are not lost due to exposure fires affecting associated circuits. A more detailed associated circuits evaluation will be conducted during the Final Design Phase of the Appendix R Modifications and Additions. The evaluation will include an analysis of negative process interactions (unacceptable valve configurations) due to spurious operation of equipment resulting from the fire.
The Modifications and Additions described in Reference 2 will provide a configuration in which all circuits to the RSP will be routed in a new Train 2 separated raceway system and will be independent of (or capable of 10
being isolated from) the Control Room and cable spreading area.
In addi tion, the equipment on the RSP will be powered from reconnected Train 2 power.supplies which include a new 4160V switchgear bus and associated equipment located in a new building or existing structure which-meets-the separation requirements of Appendix R. Thus the Train 2 circuits and power supplies for the RSP are separated from circuits in the Control Room.
Isolation and transfer switches will be used to ensure that there will be both power and control capability for the required safe shutdown equipment at the RSP and certain specified local control stations.
The "Systems Approach" will be used in analyzing associated circuits.
(See Reference 1.)
5.0 SPECIFIC RESPONSES TO NRC REQUESTS 2.C AND C.1.a,.b,.c,.d, and.e.
The NRC requests for which information has been developed are given below,.
5.1 REQUEST 2.c 2.c. Provide drawings of the Alternative Shutdown System which high light and connections to the normal shutdown systems (P&ID's for piping and components, elementary wiring diagrams of electrical cabling).
Show the electrical location of all breakers for power cable and isolation devices for control and instrumentation_-
circuits for the alternative shutdown systems for that fire area.
RESPONSE
The only Alternative Shutdown System is theRemote Shutdown-Pane--(-RSP-)
and other local control stations. The Main Control Room (MCR) (including the cable spreading area below the Control Room) is the only fire zone for which an alternative shutdown system (RSP) is required. In all other fire zones, separation of equipment and circuits of redundant trains in accordance with Appendix R,Section III.G.2, will be provided (Reference 2).
The RSP will be located in a new separate building, or an existing structure meeting the separation requirements of Appen dix R. The RSP will therefore be in a separate fire zone from the MCR.
In the event of a fire in the MCR, control of that portion of Train 2 equipment required for safe shutdown will be transferred to the RSP or other local control stations. The design ensures that the plant can be safely brought to a cold shutdown condition from outside the MCR.
Simplified P&ID's for the required seven safe shutdown systems are Figures 1 thru 7. The P&ID's highlight the equipment monitored/
controlled from the RSP. The electrical elementary diagrams are Fig ures 8 thru 18.
The elementary diagrams show the electrical location of isolation devices.
12
ELECTRICAL ELEMENTARY DIAGRAMS RELATING TO THE RSP A complete set of elementary diagrams will be available at the comple t-ion-of-de-t-a-i-led-de s-ign---As-many-p rei-iminary-etementary-di-agramsas possible, have been included in this report.
These elementaries are representative of all known control permutations for the RSP.
The elementary diagrams which are a part of this report are Figures 8 thru
- 18.
The elementary diagrams indicate the electrical location of isolation/
transfer switches (ISO).
During normal operations the isolation/
transfer switches allow control from the MCR, and preclude any actua tion from the RSP or local stations.
After the isolation/transfer switches are placed in the local position (see elementary diagrams) control is exclusively at the RSP, or at local control stations, and the NCH circuits are isolated. The isolation/transfer switches consist of manually operated, maintained contact switches housed in a panel.
located near the RSP. The switches are not accessible without opening a panel door causing an alarm in the MCR. The panel and associated components will be qualified to IEEE 344-75, IEEE 323-1974 and NUREG 0588-CAT.1 criteria.
Isolation/transfer switches are used in electri cal control circuits wherever the alternate shutdown system (RSP or local stations) interconnects with the normal shutdown system (MCR).
13
The elementary diagrams indicate the electrical location of circuit breakers, fuses, and local controls.
It should be noted that the portion of control circuits which terminate in the MCR (i.e., hand switches, indicating lights, etc.) are protected byindiv idualfuses-.
The fuse is coordinated with the upstream circuit breaker which protects the overall control circuit.
In the event that the MCR portion of the control circuit shorts out (as in the case of a fire) before a transfer can be effected, the fuse will clear the MCR portion of the control circuit and leave the remaining portion energized. After the isolation/
transfer switch is operated, control will be available at the RSP or local station.
The RSP will be fed from two separated 120V AC vital buses and will contain an automatic bus transfer switch. The electrical protection for the 120V AC vital buses (and all other voltage levels) will be a coordinated design which insures selective tripping on occurrence of a short circuit. The instrumentation at the RSP therefore will not be disabled due to fire related short circuits or overcurrents of an associated circuit on either of the 120V AC buses.
Design criteria for installation of cables for the RSP and local control stations, will adhere strictly to Paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R.
This will insure adequate physical separation for the alternative ShUt(dOwnI svsten.
Final design documents and analyses will portray the methods utilized to meet the requirements of Paragraph III.G.2 (eg:
use of three hour rated barriers, 20 foot separation, etc.) including 14
process interaction analysis per the "Systems Approach" discussed in Reference 1.
5.2_REQUEST-C.-1-and-C-.-a C.1 For each area where an alternative or dedicated shutdown method, in accordance with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R is provided, the following information is required to demonstrate that associated circuits will not prevent operation or cause maloperation of the alternative or dedicated shutdown method:
C.I.a.
Describe the methodology used to assess the potential of associated circuit adversely affecting the alternative or dedicated shutdown. The description of the methodology should include the methods used to identify the circuits which share a power supply or a common enclosure with the alternative or dedicated shutdown system and the circuits whose spurious operation would affect shutdown. Additionally, the description should include the methods used to identify if these circuits are associated circuits of concern due to their location in the fire area.
15
RESPONSE TO C.I.a The objectives of analyses in response to C.I.a and methodologies are as follows:
- 1.
In the event of a fire in the MCR, control of the required Train 2 equipment (pumps, valves, instrumentation, etc.) necessary to shut the plant down will be available at the RSP or local control stations (see Item a below).
- 2.
Power supplies for the equipment of Item 1 above will be available regardless of fire in the MCR (see Item b below).
- 3.
Any unacceptable process control configurations, which could prevent shutdown of the plant by the Train 2 equipment of I above, will be identified by analysis of the P&ID's (see Item c below).
- 4.
All control cables for any equipment in an unacceptable process configuration identified will be analysed for existing routing.
Where the cables of redundant trains of equipment are routed through a common fire zone, the individual conductors will be reviewed to determine if shorts to ground, hot shorts, or open circuits can result in inadvertent actuation of the subject equipment in the defined unacceptable combinations.
16
- 5.
If it is determined that any unacceptable process control configu ration can result, steps will be taken to preclude its occurrence.
This may involve operator action, rerouting of circuits, and/or incorporation of isolation devices.
JUSTIFICATION OF METHODOLOGY:
- a.
Statement #1 Statement #1 is the commitment by SCE to meet the requirements of Appendix R. The systems are identified in Reference 2. The methods of achieving, retaining, and protecting control are explained in the response to Request 2.c above.
- b.
Statement #2 A new Train 2 electrical distribution system will be added. The system will include 4.16KV switchgear and associated equipment.
The new electrical equipment will be located in the same area as the RSP and the new electrical distribution system, as explained in response to Request 2.c above. All Train 2 safety related loads will be fed from the new system. A new, Train 2, cable raceway system will be installed in accordance with III.G.2 of Appendix R.
17
Iu general the design of all buses includes coordinated electrical protection.
This ensures selective tripping of circuit breakers during a fault condition, and only that circuit which is faulted is cleared. All of the SONGS 1 electrical buses (4.16KV switch gear and associated equipment) include, or will include this design feature.
Power to Train 2 shutdown equipment will be available because:
- 1.
The Train 2 circuits ( and therefore the power circuits for safe shutdown equipment) are routed per III.G.2 of Appendix R and will not be in the MCR fire area or will be adequately protected.
- 2.
A fire in the MCR (or any area in which Train 2 power and control circuits are routed) will not cause the Train 2 buses to deenergize on occurrence of a fault since short circuit protection is selective.
- c.
Statement #'s 3, 4 and 5 Control of safe shutdown equipment will be available as discussed in a. above. A source of power will be available to operate the safe shutdown equipment as discussed in b. above. The only possi bility for prevention of safe shutdown is the spurious operation 18
of equipment caused by fire (open, short circuits and grounds) which are incidental to a safe shutdown process. An analysis will be conducted to determine if spurious signals, caused by fire in the MCR/cable spread area, can resultin any-unacceptable-system configurations.
Identifying only unacceptable system configurations limits the circuit isolations to those functions which require it.
Those circuits which cannot prevent safe shutdown need not be isolated.
Where analysis shows that spurious signals caused by fire in the MCR, or elsewhere, could result in unacceptable system config urations, procedures will be developed describing operator actions which are necessary to restore desired system configuration, and/or design changes will be made to prevent unacceptable configurations.
- d.
Common Enclosures (Refer to Figure 19)
The new electrical equipment along with the RSP will be located in a new building or an existing structure meeting the separation requirements of Appendix R. As explained in the response to Request 2.c this is a separate fire zone from the MCR and its cable spreading area. All interconnections of the RSP/local stations with normal control circuits will be via the isolation/
19
transfer switch panel which is also to be located in the new building or existing structure meeting the separation requirements of Appendix R. The shared enclosures (see Figure.19) will be the 12OV-AC-distribution--panel, the125V-DCpanel,-the-iso-l-ation switch panel, and certain raceways leading to them.
The MCR/cable spread area is.a separate fire zone. Design will insure that a fire cannot propagate from it into tray systems in adjacent fire zones per the requirements of Appendix R. All of the circuits which enter the MCR are electrically protected, and upon occurrence of fire induced short circuits will be selectively cleared. Therefore, fire induced short circuits cannot cause cable overtemperature which might result in a fire in "shared enclosures".
5.3 REQUEST C..b.
C.1.b.
Provide a table that lists all associated circuits of concern located in the fire area.
20
RESPONSE to C.1.b Train 2 safe shutdown circuits will be separated from Train 1 safe shutdown circuits per the requirements of Appendix R. Therefore, as far as Train 2 is concerned only Train 2 associated circuits need be reviewed for impact on the Train 2 power supplies. Selective over current protection will be provided for all Train 2 associated circuits (e.g., LOCA mitigation circuits).
The power supplies will therefore be protected as discussed in Item b of the response to Request C..a.
Associated circuits,failure of which could result in unacceptable valve configurations (negative process interaction),will be analyzed and corrected as discussed in Item c of the response to Request C.1.a.
5.4.
REQUEST C.I.c.
C.1.c.
Show that fire induced failures (hot shorts, open circuits or shorts to ground) of each of the cables listed in b will not prevent operation or cause maloperation of the alternative or dedicated shutdown method.
21
RESPONSE to C.I.c As explained in the response to Request 2.c, C.l.b and by reference to the-conceptual-/p re-l-iminary-schematic-d-i-agrams--ho t-sho rts,-open-cir cuits, and shorts to ground will not prevent nor cause maloperation of the alternate shutdown system. This can be summarized as follows:
- 1.
All power and control circuits are individually protected by coordinated circuit breakers and fuses. This coordination insures selective tripping of a faulted circuit only. Therefore the alternative shutdown system will remain energized.
- 2.
The isolation/transfer switches isolate those circuits which are part of the normal system (MCR). Futhermore, isolation is effected at lan undamaged point. Once the transfer has been made, the isolation/transfer switches prevent any signal from the MCR from getting through, whether it's fire induced or other. The attached elementary diagrams make this clear.
- 3.
In the event that a portion of RSP circuit in the MCR shorts before a transfer can be made a fuse will clear that portion of the circuit. The remaining portion of the control circuit will remain energized. After the transfer is made control will be available at the RSP. The attached elementary diagrams show this.
22
- 4.
If a fire occurs in a zone other than the MCR which causes failure of Train 2 equipment, separation will ensure that Train 1 safe shutdown circuitry will not be damaged, (considering both power availability instrumentation-anidprocessinteractions-)
5.5. REQUEST C.1.d.
C.1.d.
For each cable listed in b where new electrical isolation has been provided, provide detailed electrical schematic drawings that show how each cable is isolated from the fire area.
RESPONSE to C..d As explained in the response to Request C.1.b, the design of the cable installation is not complete at this time. The available elementary diagrams are Figures 8 thru 18.
Where a requirement for isolation is identified, the elementary diagram will be revised to reflect isola tion. Upon completion of the design of Appendix R Modifications and Additions (Reference 2), all elementaries will be available.
23
5.6. REQUEST C.1.e.
C.1.e.
Provide a locationiat the site or other offices where all the tables and drawings generated by this methodology approach for the associated circuit~srevie-wma-yb-eaudited-to verify the information provided above.
RESPONSE to C.1.e All the tables and drawings generated for Appendix R, including associ ated circuits, will be available at SCE Corporate Document Management Center at Rosemead, California.
6.0 REFERENCES
- 1. Letter from NRC to Mr. R. Dietch dated May 10, 1982;
Subject:
Exemp tion Request -
Fire Protection Rule Schedular Requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c),
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit No. 1
- 2. Engineering Report on Safe Shutdown Capability Relating to Appendix R of 10 CFR 50, dated June 1982.
- 3. Letter from K.P. Baskin to D.M. Crutchfield, dated June 30, 1982;
Subject:
Docket 50-206, Fire Protection Program Review.
24
TABLE 1 REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL INSTRUMENTATION INST. TAG NO.
FUNCTION FIELD INST. TAG NO.
FIELD INST. LOCATION TRAIN NEW/EXISTING REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PI-434A PRIMARY COOLANT PT-434A PRESSURIZER 2
EXISTING C-38)
PRESSURE INDICATION LI-430A PRESSURIZER LEVEL LT-430A PRESSURIZER 2
EXISTING (C-38)
RMS-NNN1 ON/OFF PRESSURIZER PRESS. HTR. GRP.-B PRESSURIZER 2
NEW HEATER GROUP B TI-NNN2 LOOP C HOT LEG TE-NNN2 SG E-1C HOT LEG 2
NEW TEMPERATURE TI-422B LOOP C COLD LEG TE-422B SG E-lC COLD LEG 2
EXISTING (C-38)
TEMPERATURE N-1202 NEUTRON FLUX SOURCE NM-1202-4 REACTOR VESSEL C-1 2
EXISTING (C-38)
LEVEL INDICATION CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM RMS-NNN3 OPEN/CLOSE LCV-1100D MOV-1100D CHARGING PUMP G-8A 2
NEW SUCTION LINE RMS-NNN4 START/STOP CHARGING G-8A CHARGING PUMP G-8A 2
NEW PUMP G-8A RMS-NNN5 OPEN/CLOSE MOV-357 MOV-357 LOOP B COLD LEG LINE 2
NEW RMS-NNN6 OPEN/CLOSE CV-NNN6 CV-NNN6 REG. HEAT EXCH. E-13 2
NEW DISCHARGE LINE FC-NNN7 MANUAL CONTROLLER YM-1115E LOOP B COLD LEG LINE 2
NEW FOR FCV-1115B AND FCV-1115E RMS-NNN8 OPEN/CLOSE CV-203 CV-203 REG. HEAT EXCH. E-13 2
NEW DISCHARGE LINE
TABLE 1 REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL INSTRUMENTATION INST. TAG NO.
FUNCTION FIELD INST. TAG NO.
FIELD INST. LOCATION TRAIN NEW/EXISTING RMS-NNN9 OPEN/CLOSE CV-NNN9 CV-NNN9 LOOP A LETDOWN LINE 2
NEW FC-NN10 MANUAL CONTROLLER FCV-NN10 REG HEAT EXCH. E-13 2
NEW FOR FCV-NN10 INTAKE LINE RMS-NN11 OPEN/CLOSE CV-NN11 CV-NN11 PRESSURIZER RELIEF 2
NEW TANK INTAKE LINE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM RMS-NN12 START/STOP AUX. FW G-NN12 CONDENSATE STORAGE 2
NEW PUMP G-NN12 TANK DISCHARGE LINE RMS-NN13 OPEN/CLOSE/AUTO MOV-NN13 AUX. FWP G-NN12 2
NEW MOV-NN13 DISCHARGE LINE FC-NN14 MANUAL CONTROLLER FOR FCV-3300 STEAM GENERATOR E-1C 2
NEW FCV-3300 FEEDWATER LINE FC-NN15 MANUAL CONTROLLER FOR FCV-3301 STEAM GENERATOR E-1B 2
NEW FCV-3301 FEEDWATER LINE FI-NN16 STEAM GENERATOR E-1C FTH-3455 STEAM GENERATOR E-1C 2
NEW FLOWRATE FEEDWATER LINE FI-NN17 STEAM GENERATOR E-IB FTH-3454 STEAM GENERATOR E-1B 2
NEW FLOWRATE FEEDWATER LINE
TABLE 1 REOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL INSTRUMENTATION INST. TAG NO.
FUNCTION FIELD INST. TAG NO.
FIELD INST. LOCATION TRAIN NEW/EXIS ING MAIN STEAM SYSTEM FC-NN18 MANUAL CONTROLLER FOR YM-NN18 MAIN STEAM DUMP LINE 2
NEW CV-77 & CV-79 LI-451C STEAM GENERATOR E-1B LT-451C STEAM GENERATOR E-lB 2
EXISTING (C-38)
LEVEL LI-452C STEAM GENERATOR E-1C LT-452C STEAM GENERATOR E-1C 2
EXISTING (C-38)
LEVEL SALT WATER COOLING SYSTEM RMS-NN19 START/STOP SWC PUMP G-13B SALT WATER COOLING 2
NEW G-13B PUMP G-13B COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM RMS-NN20 START/STOP CCW PUMP G-15B COMPONENT COOLING 2
NEW G-15B WATER PUMP G-15B TC-NN21 MANUAL CONTROLLER FOR YM-601B RESIDUAL HEAT EX-2 NEW TCV-601B CHANGER E-21B DIS CHARGE LINE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM RMS-NN22 START/STOP RHR PUMP G-14B RESIDUAL HEAT RE-2 NEW G-14B MOVAL PUMP G-14B RMS-NN23 OPEN/CLOSE MOV-822B MOV-822B RESIDUAL HEAT EX-2 NEW CHANGER E-21B RMS-NN24 OPEN/CLOSE MOV-NN24 MOV-NN24 & MOV-NN24A RHR PUMP G-14B 2
NEW
& MOV-NN24A INTAKE LINE
TABLE 1 REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL INSTRUMENTATION INST. TAG NO.
FUNCTION FIELD INST.
TAG NO.
FIELD INST.
LOCATION TRAIN NEW/EXISTING RMS-NN25 OPEN/CLOSE MOV-NN25 MOV-NN25 & MOV-NN25A RESIDUAL HEAT EX-2 NEW
& MOV-NN25A CHANGER E-21B DIS CHARGE LINE TI-NN26 RH EXCHANGER E-21B TE-601B RESIDUAL HEAT EX-2 NEW DISCHARGE TEMP.
CHANGER E-21B DIS CHARGE LINE
TABLE 2 ISOLATION CABINET EQUIPMENT EQUIP. TAG NO FUNCTION T RIN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ISO-NN27 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - PRESSURIZER HEATER GROUP B 2
ISO-NN28 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - SOURCE RANGE CHANNEL N-1202 2
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM ISO-NN29 ISOLATION/TRANSFER -
CHARGING PUMP SUCTION LCV-1100D 2
ISO-NN30 ISOLATION/TRANSFER -
CHARGING PUMP G-8A 2
ISO-NN31 ISOLATION/TRANSFER -
LOOP B COLD LEG MOV-357 2
ISO-NN32 ISOLATION - OF TRAIN 1 EQUIP. CV-304, FCV-1112, PRESSURIZER 1
HEATER GROUP A NJ ISO-NN33 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - REG. HEAT EXCH. E-13 DISCHARGE CV-NNN6 2
ISO-NN34 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - LOOP B COLD LEG FCV-1115B AND FCV-1115E 2
ISO-NN35 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - REG. HEAT EXCH. E-13 DISCHARGE CV-203 2
ISO-NN36 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - LOOP A LETDOWN CV-NNN9 2
ISO-NN37 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - REG. HEAT EXCH. E-13 INTAKE FCV-NN10 2
ISO-NN38 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK INTAKE CV-NN11 2
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ISO-NN39 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP G-NN12 2
ISO-NN40 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - AUX. FW PUMP DISCHARGE MOV-NN13 2
ISO-NN41 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - STEAM GENERATOR E-lC INLET FCV-3300 2
TABLE 2 ISOLATION CABINET EQUIPMENT EQUIP. TAG NO FUNCTION RAIN ISO-NN42 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - STEAM GENERATOR E-1B INLET FCV-3301 2
ISO-NN43 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - STEAM GENERATOR E-1C FLOW FU-3455 2
ISO-NN44 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - STEAM GENERATOR E-lB FLOW FU-3454 2
MAIN STEAM SYSTEM ISO-NN45 ISOLATION - MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVES ACTUATION SV-86 AND SV-88 2
ISO-NN46 ISOLATION/TRANSFER -
MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVES CV-77 AND CV-79 2
SALT WATER COOLING SYSTEM ISO-NN47 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - SALT WATER PUMP G-13B 2
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM ISO-NN48 ISOLATION/TRANSFER -
COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP G-15B 2
ISO-NN49 ISOLATION/TRANSFER -
RESIDUAL HEAT EXCH. E-21B DISCHARGE TCV-601B 2
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM ISO-NN50 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP G-14B 2
ISO-NN51 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - RESIDUAL HEAT EXCH. E-21B INLET MOV-822B 2
ISO-NN52 ISOLATION/TRANSFER -
RHE E-21B DISCHARGE MOV-NN25 AND MOV-NN25A 2
ISO-NN53 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - RHR PUMP G-14B INTAKE MOV-NN24 AND MOV-NN24A 2
ISO-NN54 ISOLATION/TRANSFER - RHE E-21B DISCHARGE TEMP TE-601B 2