IR 05000341/1986019

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Insp Rept 50-341/86-19 on 860603-0728.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety, Lers,Ie Bulletins,Regional Requests,Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Reactors & Mgt Meetings
ML20205F747
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/12/1986
From: Defayette R, Jacobsen J, Wright G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205F729 List:
References
50-341-86-19, IEB-86-001, IEB-86-1, NUDOCS 8608190321
Download: ML20205F747 (13)


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{{#Wiki_filter:. . U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-341/86019(DRP) Docket No. 50-341 Operating License No. NPF-43 Licensee: Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226 Facility Name: Fermi 2 Inspection At: Fermi Site, Newport, MI Inspection Conducted: June 3 through July 28, 1986 Inspectors: W. G. Rogers

 )l. E. Parker
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J. M. Jacobson Blit/1%,

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Date Approved By: .W ght ief f//2[f(p ReactorProjectsSection2C Date Inspection Summary Inspection on June 3 through July 28, 1986 (Report No. 50-341/86019(DRP)) Areas inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of operational safety; licensee event reports; IE bulletins; regional requests; onsitefollowupofeventsatoperatingreactorsjinspectionofLimitorque motor. valve operator wiring; survey of licensee s response to selected safety issues; management meetings; and surveillance testin Results: No violations or deviations were identifie egeijgj{{ $N 1

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= l I - DETAILS Persons Contacted Detroit Edison Company

*F. Agosti, Vice President, Nuclear Operations L. Bregni, Compliance Engineer
*J. Conen, Licensing Engineer R. Eberhardt, Rad-Chem Engineer
*J. Leman. Superintendent, Maintenance and Modification
*R. Lenart, Plant Manager, Nuclear Production L. Lessor, Consultant to the Plant Manager, Nuclear Production R. May, Maintenance Engineer W. Miller, Supervisor, Operational Assurance  ,
*S. Noetzel, General Director, Nuclear Engineering J. Nyquist, Supervisor, Independent Safety Engineering Group
*G. Ohlemacher, Technical Engineering T. O'Keefe, Technical Engineer G. Overbeck, Superintendent, Operations J. Plona, Assistant Operations Engineer E. Preston, Operations Engineer W. Ripley, Assistant Operations Engineer, Administrative B. R. Sylvia, Group Vice President
*G. Truhey, Director, Quality Assurance
*R. Wooley, Acting Supervisor, Licensing Nuclear Regulatory Commission
*C. D. Anderson
*R. DeFayette
*P. L. Hartman
*R. A. Kopriva
*M. E. Parker
*W. G. Rogers
* Denotes those who attended the exit meeting The inspectors also interviewed others of the licensee's staff during this inspectio . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period from June 3 through July 28, 1986. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the

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drywell, reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the , station security pla The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Residual Heat Removal, Division I and II; Standby Gas Treatment,

,  Division I and II; Core Spray, Division I and II; and Emergency Diesel

' l Generator, Division I systems to verify operability by comparing system lineup with plant drawings, as-built configurations, or present valve lineup lists; observing equipment conditions that could degrade performance; and verifying that instrumentation was properly valved, functioning, and calibrate l The inspector also witnessed two days of simulator training during the , week of July 13, 1986. The training consisted of plant startup including pulling rods to achieve criticality. This particular training session

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utilized a shift " team" training philosophy with the simulator activities i being handled as they would be in the plant. The inspector determined through interview and observation that all six shifts received this l simulator training.

< These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility l operations were in conformance with the requirements _ established under . technical specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedure l Control Room Tours (1) During a control room tcur the inspector reviewed the Out of Specification Log against P0M 21.000.18. The inspector determined that the information in the log was technically correct but not in the specified format. The format j discrepancies were:

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, ' _ The out of specification log entries were numerical instead of the three-section fonnat stated in the procedur '

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The log contained an additional index sheet not .

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described in the procedur The inspector interviewed operations personnel on the discrepancies and determined that they were aware of the situation and a procedure revision was being processed.- The inspector stressed to the licensee management the necessity

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to always maintain administrative controls as stated in administrative procedures. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's connent. Procedure POM 21.000.18 has since been revise (2) During one of the control tours for the inspection period, the inspector observed discrepancies between the Functional Operating Sketch (FOS) and the P&ID for the EECW system. The licensee performed a review of F0S versus P& ids for a number of systems and determined that the discrepancies were generated prior to onsite engineering having the lead for drawing control, and that present drawing control procedures preclude repetition of the problem. The inspector reviewed the licensee's investigation and considered it adequate. This matter is considered close b. Systems Walkdowns (1) During the Residual Heat Removal walkdown the inspector identified a and the (FOS)forposition valvesdifference E11-F007A between the procedure and E11-F007 After lineup discussion with the licensee the procedure lineup was determined to be correct. The license committed to revise

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the valve positions on the appropriate drawin (2) During the drywell walkdown/ critical valve verification the inspectors identified the improper assembly of the packing holddownLnuts for a safety relief tail pipe pressure isolation valve and observed the lack of some electrical motor cover bolts on valve E41-F002. The licensee initiated corrective actions for both item (3) The inspectors accompanied numerous operators on valve and electrical lineups. The operators exhibited the appropriate proficiency and knowledge in performance of the lineup Also, independent verification of the lineups was being properly performe (4) The inspector accompanied two I&C technicians in performance of an instrument lineup. The two technicians were performing the initial and independent verification at the same time. The inspector determined through discussion with the individuals and licensee management that this was permissible for I& The inspector determined this to be an unacceptable method for independent verification and the licensee has accepted the inspector's position. The licensee determined which instrument lineups had been accomplished in this manner and would reperform the independent verification. Also, I&C personnel exhibited difficulty in locating some of the . instruments. Tha problem existed in the lack of detail and

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correctness in where the instruments were located as identified cr. the instrument lineup sheet.s. Those initiatives taken by the licensee to correct this problem are considered an open item (50-341/86019-01(DRP)).  ! '

(5) During the walkdowns the inspectors noted minor discrepancies (labeling, housekeeping) which were identified to the licensee for correction. Generally, the plant cleanliness was excellen No violations or deviations were identified in this are .

3. Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700) Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review oi' records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification (Closed) LER 86005: Failure of Division I Backup Manual Scram Breaker to Trip. While in cold shutdown, power was interrupted to Reactor Protection System (RPS) A, which caused a number of - Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuations and a half scra ThelossofpowertoRPSbusAalarmedinthecontrolroomanban operator was dispatched to the RPS Motor-Generator (M-G) roam to determine the cause of the power failure.' The operator found the M-G running properly but the Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) breakers and backup manual scram breaker were tripped. These breakers _ were reset, restoring power to RPS bus A. With the breakers reset, the operator noted voltage fluctuations. While observing voltage fluctuations on the output of M-G set A, control room personnel decided to transfer power from the M-G set to the alternate power supply and to trouble shoot the voltage regulato The licensee then observed that the Division I backup manual scram breaker did not trip as expected whcn bus A was transferred from the primary to the alternate power supply. (The backup manual scram breaker is designed to trip automatically on under voltage).

Licensee personnel then pressed the backup manual trip button in the control room to actuate the trip breaker and approximately ten seconds later the breaker tripped. The breaker was then reset and the backup manual trip button pressed again. This time the breaker did not open. The licensee inserted an RPS manual scram on Division I in respense to the backup breaker being inoperabl The backup manual scram breaker was subsequently replaced, functionally tested and returned to service. The licensee then decided to replace the Division II breaker to maintain consistency between the two divisions as the original breaker model was obsolete and an equivalent breaker was purchased. The inspectors observed the licensee's actions (consisting of trouble shooting, procurement, design change, breaker removal and installation, and surveillance testing) which have been documented in Inspection Report N <

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. - 50-341/86016(DRP). Additional troubleshooting to determine the initial cause of loss of RPS bus A (EPA and backup manual scram breaker trip) have been indeterminate even though the licensee has taken action to clear and adjust the output voltage adjustment potentiomete As a result of additional information obtained during the backup manual scram breaker failure analysis testing, the licensee has decided to provide a supplement to this LER. The inspectors will review this supplement when issued. This LER is close (Closed) LER 86006: Initiation of Division II Emergency Equi Cooling Water (EECW)/ Emergency Equipment Service Water (EESW)pment due to Failure of the Digital Load Sequencer to Reset. While perfonning  ! a monthly surveillance operability test of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 14, the Division II EECW and EESW automatically started. This inadurtent start of EESW/EECW is an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation. These systems were started by the Division II EDG automatic digital load sequencer when the output breaker on EDG 14 was closed during the operability test of the ED Control room operators were alerted to the system actuations by annunciation of control room alarms. The control room Nuclear Shift * Operator (NS0) completed required actions of abnormal operating procedure. After verifying system integrity and that no actual emergency conditions were present, the NS0 shutdown the EECW and EESW systems and reestcblished normal system lineup with the reactor building closed cooling water syste The licensee's investigation of the event revealed that the actuation of the EECW and EESW systems was caused by a malfunctioning reset switch in the Division II EDG automatic digital load sequence This switch failed to reset on a monthly functional test of the 4160 volt emergency bus under voltage circuit two weeks prior to the event. The inspectors observed licensee's actions and consider that the licensee has taken prompt action in determining the cause of the actuatio The licensee subsequently reworked, retested, and returned the reset switch to service. As a result of this ESF actuation, the licensee has been able to review previous EECW/EESW actuations and determine that these events were initiated by the EDG digital load sequence To prevent recurrence the licensee has revised P0M 42.302.01, POM 42.302.02, and P0M 23.321 which are the monthly functional test of 4160 volt emergency bus undervoltage circuitry,18 month calibration procedure, and system operating procedure, respectivel The licensee has required additional steps to verify that the digital load sequencer is reset by placing the load sequencer in the test condition and verifying the red indicating light is illuminate This item is close .  !

- (Closed) LER 86007: Trip of Division I CCHVAC Makeup Radiation Monitor during Surveillance Testing: Actuation of the CCHVAC recirculation mode was inadvertently initiated by a radiation monitor that monitors makeup air to the CCHVAC system. The EFF actuation was initiated by the I&C technician while attempting to reset the radiation monitor. The technician bumped the unit several times while performing independent verification after a surveillance test of the monitor. Deco considers that the technician's actions, which were not in accordance with the surveillance procedure, were the cause of the ESF actuatio The control room immediately responded to the event and dispatched personnel to the relay room to determine the cause of the actuation and alarms. After verifying that no actual emergency conditions existed, the CCHVAC was returned to its normal mode of operatio The operations staff subsequently reperformed the surveillance to repeat the event and to verify operability. The event could not be repeated and the surveillance was considered satisfactor To prevent recurrence the licensee has counseled the individual regarding his actions. All I&C personnel were notified of this event and reminded that unless directed to do so in a procedure, I&C personnel who perform independent verification are not to manipulate or touch equipment, but are to perform verification visually. The inspector considers the licensee's actions to be adequate and this item is close The inspectors initially followed up on these events immediately and observed and reviewed the licensee's actions, as documented in Inspection Report No. 50-341/86016(DRP)

No violations or deviations were identified in this are . IE Bulletin Followup (92703) Each of the following IE Bulletins was reviewed by the resident inspectors to determine if: (1) the licensee's written response was submitted within the time limitations stated in the bulletin, (2) the written response included all information required to be reported, (3) the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the bulletin and the licensee's response, (4) licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the required onsite management representatives, (5) information discussed in the licensee's response was accurate, and (6) the corrective action taken was as described in the respons (0 pen) IEB 86-01: Minimum Flow Logic Problems that could Disable RHR I Pumps. The inspector performed a preliminary review of the logic diagrams associated with the RHR minimum flow logic valves and determined that the problem identified in the bulletin does not exist. The inspector shall complete the review of the flow logic following issuance of a temporary inspection instructio l

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_ -_ __ _ -___ - No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Followup on Regional Requests (92705B) NRC Region III requested the inspector to determine the status of a 10 CFR 21 report from Telemecanique Company as it applied to Fermi The 10 CFR 21 report identified three electrical contactors (cat No. A103G12) purchased by Detroit Edison which may have been damaged during shipnent due to inadequate packaging. The inspector contacted the licensee with regard to this matter. Through document review and interview the inspector ascertained that the licensee was informed of the problem by letter dated February 25, 1986, from Telemecanique and the three contactors were returned to Telemecanique in April. This matter is close No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Reactors (93702) During the inspection period, the licensee experienced several events, some of which required prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. The inspectors pursued the events onsite with licensee and/or other NRC officials. In each case, the inspectors verified that the notification was correct and timely, if appropriate, that the licensee was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were conducted within regulatory requirements and that corrective actions would prevent future recurrence. The specific events are as follows: During the day and afternoon shift on July 15, 1986, the licensee commenced heatup of the reactor pressure vessel for hydrostatic testing of the pressure vessel. The pumps being used for the heat source were recirculation pump A and the two Division II RHR pump At 2307 the heatup was terminated at 170 F and about 30 psig by turning off the two Division II RHR pumps. Upon turning off the last RHR pump a full scram and ECCS actuation was received on indicated low reactor level. These actuations caused an injection into the reactor vessel of approximately ten gallons of water from the core spray pumps and pressurization of the vessel to 380 psig (shut off head of core spray pumps). An unusual event was declared at 2320. Upon reviewing level indication in the control room, the licensee determined that level did not change from its normal indication and therefore, the actuated safety equipment was secure The unusual event was terminated at 2332. The apparent cause of the low level signal was a pressure spike near the lower instrument tap of the Division I level transmitters from the ficw perturbation caused by securing the RHR flo The inspector reviewed the post scram evaluation and deviation event report and did not identify any areas of concern. However, the inspector questioned the format of the procedure utilized to validate the proper functioning of the LPCI loop selection logic. This

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validation was performed during the post-scram investigatio The inspector determined that the procedure received a number of operational staff reviews and the test results were reviewed by the onsite review committee. The inspector informed the licensee that the appropriate testing format should be utilized in the futur b. On July 7, 1986, during final reactor internals assembly the licensee installed the reactor vessel head on top of the steam dryer. The licensee observed that the head was not seating properly and moved the head to the laydown area. The steam dryer was determined not to be fully seated as determined by installation drawings. The dryer was lifted and inspected. Minor galling of the seating surface was identified. The steam dryer was reinstalled to the proper height and the head was properly seated on the reactor vessel flange. The ramification of setting the reactor vessel head on the steam dryer was evaluated by General Electric with no adverse effects identified. The inspector determined this sequence of events through review of the deviation event report and the General i Electric letter to the licensee (TDEC-5349) on this even c. On July 5, 1986, the licensee experienced an actuation of the CCHVAC system. Actuation appears to be linked to radio transmission in the area of a sping unit which actuates the CCHVAC system. The inspector has noted past LERs on this condition. Also the inspector has noted that the hi-com speaker system inputing the control room to be a distraction. After discussion with licensee management it was apparent that the licensee was aware of communication deficiencies and a long-term solution was being formulated. The inspector considers the control room communication / radio utilization issue and the licensee's corrective actions an open item (50-341/86019-02(DRP)). d. On July 1, 1986, the metallurgical inspector from the Division of Reactor Safety, Region III office, visited the Fermi 2 site to review the issue concerning corrosive indications on the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) head seal groove surface. Pitting of the RPV head inner 0-ring groove surface and corresponding staining of the silver-coated Inconel Alloy o-ring was observed during the cleaning of the seal surface. Similar indications, though.less in number, were also observed on the RPV flange seal surfac Indication depths were initially measured using a stereoscope and found to be a maximum of approximately five mills. Eddy current examination techniques were also qualified to provide characterization of these indications. One of the indications, approximately 3/4 inch in length and appearing linear in nature, was found to vary from five to 27 mils in depth. The indication was ground out to a depth of 30 mils and weld repaired using ER 308L electrode. This indication is believed to be a weld defect in the stainless steel cladding and opened to the surface via a corrosion mechanism. The remainder of the indications were non-linear, less than five mils in depth and did not require weld repai _

. - Photomicrographs of the indications were representative of some corrosive mechanism. EDX analysis of the 0-ring surface siiowed chrome, iron, and chlorine trace It is believed that the corrosion was induced by some unknown contaminate. One possible source of this contamination is the rubber o-ring which was used to seal the RPV during hydro testin To eliminate the possibility of any active contaminate remaining on the sealing surface, a nitric acid wash was used to passivate the surface. The seal surface will be monitored during future refueling, outages for any sign of growth or accelerated corrosio No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Inspection of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring to Determine if Wiring is Environmentally Qualified, TI 2515/75 (92701) An inspection of Limitorque motor valve operator internal wiring was performed to determine if the licensee: (1) adequately established environmental qualification of the wiring in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49, and (2) adequately addressed the concerns of IE Information Notice (IN) 86-03, " Potential Deficiencies in Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring."

The inspectors: (1) physically inspected limitorque operator wiring to determine what wiring was actually installed in the operators, (2) reviewed the licensee's environmental qualification documentation to ensure qualification of wiring was adequately established, and (3) reviewed the licensee's actions relative to IN 86-0 During the review the inspector determined that the licensee has eighty-eight 10 CFR 50.49 designated limitorque valve operators. The inspector selected a sampling of at least ten percent of the operators for use in determining what wires were actually installed in the operators. As a result of a previous detailed walkdown of limitorque motor operators in May 1984, the licensee generated walkdown sheets and photographs to document internal valve qualification. To determine the validity of these sheets, the inspector selected four valve operators inside the drywell (primary containment) for physical identification of wirin This physical inspection required removal of the limit / torque switch compartment covers to observe internal wiring. The valves physically I inspected are as follows: 282103F016 - Main Steam Line Drain Inboard Isolation Valve 2E4150F002 - HPCI Inboard Steam Isolation Valve 2G3352F001 - RWCU Inboard Isolation Valve 2T4803F601 - Drywell Air Purge Inlet Supply Inboard Isolation Valve During this inspection the inspector identified discrepancies in valve 2T4803F601 in which the walkdown sheets identified Okonite Okolan,12AWG, l was installed as internal wiring. The inspector noted that two internal ; jumper wires were Rockbestos Firewall III, the remainder were Okonite

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I . . Okolan wires. Discussions with the licensee identified that since the walkdown sheets were generated in May 1984 the licensee has performed modifications to the valve logic per an Engineering Design Package (EDP) 4409 which documented the use of the Rockbestos Firewall III internal wiring. Of concern to the inspector is that even though Rockbestos is acceptable and environmentally qualified for the application inside the drywell, the licensee's approved acceptable materials list only specifies Okonite Oklan for rework / repair and/or modification of limitorque valve operators inside the drywell. The licensee has indicated that additional controls have been implemented to prevent recurrence. This includes Material Engineering / Environmental Qualifications Group being in the review cycle for EDP Other concerns identified during the inspection were motor leads, control and power cables. The inspector was able to determine that motor leads are qualified with the motor operator and are identical to those used in limitorque qualification tests. The inspectors determined that three types of control and power wiring, Okonite Oklon, Rockbestos Firewall III and Raychem Flamtrol are used by the licensee. These three types of wires have been qualified for harsh environment, as documented in central files EQ1-EF2-082, EQ-EF2-086, and EQ1-EF2-08 As a result of the physical walkdown, the inspector considers the licensee's walkdown sheets adequately reflect the internal wiring in the motor operators as of the walkdown, May 1984. Since the walkdown has taken place, the licensee has had in place the Acceptable Materials List to assure only approved internal wires are use The remainder of the review for internal wiring used was determined from a review of the licensee's walkdown sheets. The inspector reviewed an additional 22 valve operator walkdown sheets for internal wirin No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Survey of Licensee's Response to Selected Safety Issues, TI2515/77 (92701) The inspector determined the licensee's response to applicable INP0 SOERs associated with the reliability of the HPCI/RCIC systems and biofouling of cooling water heat exchangers. The inspector performed the survey provided in TI2515/77 and noted no safety concern No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Management Meetings (30702) On June 3, 1986, the Independent Overview Committee chairman made a presentation to NRC Region III management in Glen Ellyn, Illinois, regarding the committee's findings, corrective actions taken by the licensee to these findings and tentative positive conclusions as to the results of the corrective action .

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- June 26, 1986, the licensee made a presentation to NRC Region III at Glen Ellyn, Illinois. The subjects of.the presentation were the investigation of potentially defective embedment plate welds, reviews in the seismic area, reviews in the environmental area, the conclusions of the third party review of the core spray system and the results of the engineering calculation reconciliation effor The licensee identified those physical modifications that would have to be done to the facility as a result of the calculation reconciliation effor July 7,1986, a NRC Comission Meeting was held in Washington, The subjects of the meeting were to discuss the status of Fermi 2, NRC actions associated with Fermi 2, licensee corrective actions, the Independent Overview Comittee findings and actions taken, Safe Energy Coalition concerns and a response by Monroe County to matters !

from a previous Comission Meetin On July 17, 1986, an enforcement conference was held by NRC Region III management with Detroit Edison management at the plant site. The enforcement conference dealt with the four events associated with exceeding Limiting Conditions of Operation discussed in IER85040. The inspection staff and the licensee agreed with the root causes identified by these four events. The root causes were inadequate instructions, unauthorized change to a switch position, inappropriate sign-off of a work package before completion of the work and failure of operations personnel to identify off normal

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conditions. The licensee presented it's corrective actions to these root causes. In closing, Region III management stated that the four events of IER85040 were representative of the operating history of the licensee from June 1985 to November 1985. Therefore, , the enforcement action for other violations identified through LER review encompassed in this time frame shall be covered by these proceeding On July 17, 1986, the inspector attended a public meeting at the Monroe City Hall. The purpose of the meeting was to brief the Monroe County Commissioners on the status of Fermi 2. The briefing was conducted by the NRC Regional Administrator of Region II Subjects covered were the Independent Oversite Committee observations and the licensee's corrective action to the observations, security, reactor vessel head indications, premature criticality corrective actions, engineering problems and emergency diesel generator reliability. A further. briefing was tentatively scheduled for the last week in July to state the resolution to any outstanding issue During the month of June the inspector attended a meeting held between the Deputy Director of the Division of Reactor Projects, a Monroe County Comissioner and a private citizen. The meeting centered around the construction phase of the Fermi 2 projec '

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' 10. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726) The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by technical specifications and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities: _ Heatup and cooldown determination during hydrostatic testing _ Drywell pressure, Division II, Channel B, response time testing No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2.b.(4). and 6.c.

, 12. Exit Interview (30703) The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on July 29, 1986, and informally throughout the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary. The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspectio l

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