IR 05000341/1986031
| ML20214F799 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1986 |
| From: | Foster J, Snell W, Williamsen N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214F789 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-86-31, NUDOCS 8611250436 | |
| Download: ML20214F799 (24) | |
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.U,. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-341/86031(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43 Licensee: The Detroit Edison Company 6400 North Dixie Highway Newport, MI 48166 Facility Name:
Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2 Inspection At:
Fermi 2 site, Monrce, MI Inspection Conducted: October 21-23, 1986 Inspectors:
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!d Team Leader Da"A~/
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. Williamsen
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Approved By:
W ne ief o/a/2c, Emergency Preparedness Date'
Section Inspection Sumary Inspection on October 21-23, 1986 (Repert No. 50-341/86031(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the annual Fermi Unit 2 Emergency Exercise, involving observations by five NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise. The inspection involved three NRC inspectors and two consultants.
Results:
No violations, deficiencies, or deviations were identified. No exercise weaknesses were identified, t
8611230436 861113 PDR ADOCK 05000341 G
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted a.
NRC Observers and Areas Observed J. Foster, Control Room, TSC, OSC, E0F N. Williamsen, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
W. Rogers,_0SC, PASS Sample F. McManus,~ Control Room T. Lonergan, E0F b.
Detroit Edison Company
- R. Sylvia, Group V.P.
- R. Lenhart, Plant Manager
- T. Randazzo, Emergency Officer, EOF
"M. Hoffman, Emergency Coordinator
- J. Mulvehill, RERP
- E. Madsen, Exercise Coordinator
- G. Overbeck, Director, Nuclear Training
- G. Preston, Operations Engineer C. Hall, Communicator J. Tibgi, Shift Technical Advisor D. Hoskins, Reactor Engineer R. Johnson, Reactor Operator R. Bovinet, Senior Control Room Operator L. Barker, Reactor Operator
- R. Speek, Assistant Shift Supervisor
- A. Inks, Control Room Communicator G. Pierce, Shift Supervisor D. Johnson, Simulator Operator C. Lin, Simulator Operator J. Conen, E0F Controller
- R. Anderson, Radiological Protection Coordinator L. Bomgart, RET Field Teams M. Hubney, Dose Assessor
- M. Lico, Dose Assessor B. Cummings, Asst. Radiological Protection Coordinator M. Radenberg, Meteorologist M. Stewart, Health Physics
- M. Cooley, RERP Group
- B. Lewis, Nuclear Training
- B. Heffner, Public Information
- R. Kelm, Nuclear Security
- E, Cochrane, Computer Service
- J. Wynn, Information Systems
- R. Eberhardt, Rad. Chem.
- J. Bobba, Rad. Chem.
- G. Trahey, Director, NQA
- L. Simpkin, Nuclear Safety Adv.
- D. Diroff, Information Systems
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- R. DePriest, Information Systems
- M. Kluska-Vierk, Nuclear Prod. - Serv. Adm.
- E.
Dragon, HPASS
- L. Borek, HRISS
- P. Poole, Information Systems
- S. Washburn, Information Systems
- C. Sexauer, Comp. Serv./ Info. Systems
- H. Ebner, Information Systems-
- J. Nolloth, Comp.. Serv.
- S. Kalisek, Nuclear Security
- J. Korte, Nuclear Security
- L. Barker, Nuclear OPS R. Szkotnicki, Controller
- Denotes all personnel who attended the exit interview on October 23, 1986.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously-identified Items a.
(Closed) Open Item No. 50-341/86018-01:
Lack of guidance on consideration of a two mile precautionary evacuation in case of
" loss of physical control of the facility." The applicable Procedure, No. EP-545 " Protective Action Guidelines and Recommendations", Revision 4, was reviewed and found to contain appropriate guidance in Table 5.1.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Open Item No. 50-341/86018-02:
Lack of delineation of drills for emergency call-out procedures (shift augmentation).
Procedure No. EPA-4, Revision 3, " Drills and Exercises" now contains this information in Section 5.2.9.
This item is closed.
c.
(Closed) Open Item No. 50-341/85041-01:
Failure to incorporate current and forecast meteorology into protective action decisionmaking.
During the current exercise, dose assessment personnel made excellent use of current and projected meteorological information, and the information was well utilized in protective action decisionmaking.
This item is closed.
d.
(Closed) Open Item No. 50-341/85041-02:
Failure to follow ALARA considerations for off-site teams.
During the current exercise, concern for the radiological exposure of the off-site teams was adequately demonstrated through dose projection, authorization for doses beyond regulatory limits if required, and discussion of the need for teams to be administered potassium iodide tablets.
This item is closed.
e.
(0 pen) Open Item No. 50-341/85041-04:
Revision of dose assessment computer code to support Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)
conditions.
Licensee personnel indicated that revisions to the computer code have been made to accommodate ATWS conditions.
The modified program was not reviewed during this inspection, and this item will remain open pending review of the program.
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3.
General An unannounced, off-hours exercise of the Fermi 2 Emergency Plan was conducted at the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2, on October 22, 1986.
The exercise. tested,the licensee's and offsite emergency support.
organizations' capabilities to respond to a simulated accident scenario resulting in.a major release of radioactive effluent.
The exercise was integrated with a test of response capabilities of the State of Michigan and counties of Wayne and Monroe, whose extent of participation.is delineated in Attachment.1.
This was'a partial participation exercise for the State of Michigan.
Attachment 1' describes the: Scope and Objectives of.tbe exercise and Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenario.
4.
General Observations a.
Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the Enrico Fermi Unit 2 Power Station Radiological Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
b.
Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If the events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee's would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to-
'take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safety.
c.
Observers
.The licensee's observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with five NRC observers and a number of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) observers,
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FEMA observations or, the response of State and local governments will be provided in a separate report.
d.
Exercise Critioues A critique was held with the licensee and NRC representatives on October 23, 1986. The NRC discussed the observed strengths and (
weaknesses during the exit interview.
In addition, a public critique was held by FEMA on October 24, 1986, to present the
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preliminary offsite findings of the FEMA exercise observers.
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5.
Specific Observations a.
Control Room Team work and overall conduct of personnel in the Simulator Control Roon was excellent.
The shift supervisor displayed detailed plant knowledge and maintained positive control of activities in the Control Room.
Reports to State, local agencies and the NRC were timely, within the fifteen minute requirement for State and local agencies and the one hour requirement for the NRC.
Operations and communications, both via telephone and face to face, were conducted in a formal and efficient manner throughout the exercise.
However, all forms and checklists were not completely filled in.
Examples of this included the " plant response" section
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of the Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) request for an ambulance, and the assembly / accountability section of the Shift Supervisor's alert checklist.
At some time after the NUE notification information form was approved and transmitted to the State and local agencies, e
the block for ambulance was checked.
The licensee did not fully implement Procedure No. RERP-EP-290,
" Emergency Notifications".
The Control Room communicator continued to make NRC notifications via the ENS telephone throughout the exercise.
Procedure No. EP-290 requires the ENS notifications to be the responsibility of the TSC once the TSC is activated.
Licensee personnel indicated that there was a conscious decision to have the responsibility for communication with the NRC remain in the Control Room, based on the assumption that the NRC would request this in an actual incident.
The governing procedure should be revised to describe the actions expected.
During review of Procedure No. RERP-EP-290, it was also noted that the Control Room is the only location authorized to use the notification form used for communication with the NRC.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
However, the following item should be considered for improvement:
Procedure No. RERP-EP-290 should be revised to describe who will communicate with the NRC in a drill or actual incident.
It should also reflect that the notification form for NRC communications be utilized at whatever location has NRC communication responsibility.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
On activation of the TSC, personnel arrived promptly, in an orderly, professional manner.
Radiological monitoring equipment (air sample station, survey meter) were placed into operation, and offsite dose projection computer programs were initiated.
Noise levels were low.
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There was an excellent use of meteorological data, both as input to
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current dose assessment calculations, and as information for
consideration for future Protective Action Recommendations.
Forecast meteorology was obtained and properly utilized.
' Status boards were well utilized.- Early in the exercise, the Emergency Officer decided to concentrate on status board parameters of central interest. Much later in the exercise, when the press of activity lessened, parameters of minor interest were also posted.
It was noted that the TSC status boards lack provision for trending selected plant parameters of major interest (the capability for
' trending two parameters had previously been added to the E0F).
Assembly / accountability was conducted during the time the TSC was activating.
Initial assembly / accountability took approximately 35 minutes (with a goal of thirty minutes), with only two personnel'
(both NRC observers) unaccounted for.
Full accountability was achieved approximately two minutes later.
The (simulated) second shift of TSC personnel was advised of routes to take to the plant which would minimize their exposure to the release plume.
A frisker station / step-off pad was established at the door to the TSC'once the scenario included a radiological release.
Security guards located on the opposite side of the entrance door questioned all entrants.as to whether they had frisked themselves for contamination.
A similar frisking station / step-off pad arrangement was established at the entrance to the EOF.
In both cases, however, the guards could not actually observe the frisking performed by entrants.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable. -However, the following items should be considered for improvement:
Frisker stations should be located where individuals frisking
themselves can,be observed, to better insure that adequate contamination control is achieved.
A status board for trending selected plant parameters of major
interest should be available in the TSC.
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c.
Operational Support Center (OSC)
During the period of observation in the OSC, personnel were reacting to the exercise scenario in a professional manner. -The OSC noise level was low, and the location, composition and p/ projection for OSC urpose of each in plant team was known.
Radiation dose tracking team members was adequately demonstrated.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.
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d.
Post-accident Sample In general, the team selected to perform the PASS sample performed adequately.
However, two problems were noted during the taking of a drywell gas sample.
The first dealt with the lack of valve and instrument labeling associated with the demineralized water storage tank and the flowmeter used to determine the flush time.
The second dealt with personnel not being directed to wear Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) face masks while taking and transporting the sample.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.
However, the following item should be considered for improvement:
Valves and instruments on the PASS system panel should be
clearly labeled.
The procedure for taking a PASS sample should be revised to
require the use of full SCBA (including facemasks) at all times while taking and transporting a PASS sample.
e.
Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
Personnel began arriving in the E0F approximately thirty minutes after the Alert was declared.
The key personnel in the E0F were responding to the signal on their beepers, while other personnel responded to phone calls from the Detroit Dispatch.
As the players arrived, the E0F was quickly and efficiently set up with access control, ventilation system on " Emergency", a frisking station outside of the double doors, EPIPs on desks, etc.
Thus, when a Site Area Emergency was declared at 0431 hours0.00499 days <br />0.12 hours <br />7.126323e-4 weeks <br />1.639955e-4 months <br />, most of the players in the EOF had already arrived.
Transfer of command and control to the EOF was done very efficiently about fifteen minutes after the Site Area Emergency was declared.
This was also about five minutes after the TSC declared a General Emergency.
Transfer of command and control was correctly delayed for several minutes while the TSC was in the final stages of declaring the General Emergency and TSC staff were completing the associated offsite notifications.
When command and control was transferred to the E0F, the status
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new information was available.
Periodic briefings were used to j
inform E0F personnel of current plant status and current actions.
Communications between the EOF and Canada and between the E0F and the State of Michigan were handled in an expeditious and professional manner.
Extensive telephone discussions with State of Michigan personnel always preceeded the issuing-of a Protective Action Recommendation (PAR). The verbal communications were so good
that one minor communication failure initially slipped by unnoticed:
the telefaxed Message No. 6 incorrectly showed the PAR " keyhole" as i
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- whereas all the parties knew that the intended recommendation-(that the State'had accepted and was implementing) was to evacuate n
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L 0-5 miles'in all s.ectors, and 5-10 miles downwind of the plant.
This error was accurately reflected in the EOF ~ status boards, and
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was later observed to be corrected by the players by the issuance of Message No. 9.
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NRC personnel contacted both the State of Michigan and Canada following the exercise, and were advised that communication during the exercise had been satisfactory.
Good communications.with the TSC was maintained using a dedicated
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ring-down speakerphone.
Communications to the corporate headquarters was through an electronic data link by the Emergency Officer's log-keeper. The TSC could have asked for copies of the messages via their own data link,-but did not do so during the
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Meteorological proje'ctions were continually updated and the State was always informed when a dose calculation based on updated
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weather conditions was being computed.
Data frori the field teams was posted and assessed and integrated into the dose calculations.
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The dispatch control from the E0F to the offsite field teams was s
. good.
The RET coordinator communicated by radio to the teams; the radio room was an adjacent low-noise room in a corner of the EOF; the teams responded promptly to instructions from the E0F.
Status i
I boards, both in the radio roem and in the main E0F showed the
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locations of the teams and the results of their surveys.
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pertinent Emergency Planning Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).
Dose
assessment personnel aggressively pursued their procedurally
assigned responsibilities throughout the exercise.
Information regarding radiation dose conditions and projections were continuously developed and were frequently and effectively communicated to the
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E0F's Emergency Officer as well as dose assessment counterparts in
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communications equipment (telephones, radios,' a,and accessories),
Dose assessment equipment (computers, printers nd directories)
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necessary for the acquisition, calculation, display, documentation and dissemination of pertinent meteorological and plant conditions were'available.
For the most part, all such equipment performed
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adequately throughout the exercise.
Dose assessment and g
meteorological personnel demonstrated an awareness of backup or
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alternate systems and the procedures for their use.
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The physical arrangement of the dose assessment area, equipment, i
decisional. aids, status boards, etc. provided for easy' access, display and coordination of information collected by the functional
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Status boards, decisional aids.and displays were well maintained and provided pertinent C
- information in a concise, legible manner. Trending of conditions
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- were displayed where possible.
Many of the Public Address (PA) announcements received in the EOF from the Simulator Control Room during the exercise were at times
accompanied by interfering noise, i.e. squeals or other feedback-like noise. This was subsequently identified as a circuit problem not related to the exercise.
EOF dose assessment personnel (dose assessors and meteorologists)
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experienced a temporary loss of displays on their ERIS computer
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terminals during this exercise.
Exercise controller personnel were observed to actively participate in hands-on manipulation of the
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terminals to bring them back on-line.
This was due in part to an
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" exercise artifact", in that the ERIS system utilizes file information rather than real data during exercises.
The controller noted above-was knowledgeable of the ERIS system, and was present to i
assist with the system in case of failure.
EOF players were frequently reminded to check their Direct Reading
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Dosimeters (DRDs). A random check of a small sampling of the
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1-players in the E0F indicated a variation in their understanding of j
readings obtained and the actions required of them based on the l
readings obtained.
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program
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is acceptable.
However, the-following item should be considered for
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improvement:
i Training for personnel involved in the Emergency Preparedness
program, especially those personnel who do not utilize L
dosimetry on a routine basis, should include information as to
how to read a DRD, and what actions should be taken in response i
to DRD readings.
6.
Exercise Scenario and Control The licensee's exercise scenario was challenging, including: a
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assembly / accountability.
The degree of challenge in an exercise scenario is considered when assessing observed exercise weaknesses,
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f Exercise control was considered adequate in all areas.
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f A General Emergency, based on a loss of two, with the potential loss of the
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third Fission Product Barrier (FPB) was properly declared at 0443 hours0.00513 days <br />0.123 hours <br />7.324735e-4 weeks <br />1.685615e-4 months <br />.
i However, the scenario did not expect the General Emergency declaration
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until approximately 0510 hours0.0059 days <br />0.142 hours <br />8.43254e-4 weeks <br />1.94055e-4 months <br />, based on Projected Whole Body dose at the
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site boundary or loss of three FPBs. The concept that a serious challenge to a FPB should be considered the same as a breach of that barrier should be considered by exercise scenario authors.
The simulator failed at 0634 hours0.00734 days <br />0.176 hours <br />0.00105 weeks <br />2.41237e-4 months <br />, shortly after the operators manipulated controls to flood the drywell with water from the spent fuel
. pool, an action for which the simulator is not programmed.
The scenario timeline was subsequently maintained by the combined efforts of the operators (players) and controllers extrapolating data from the time of failure.
The operators should not be expected to provide input for the scenario.
If the simulator had failed earlier, at the time of, or just before the reactor scram, the plant parameter cata to maintain the
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scenario would not have been available.
It is recommended that a backup
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system for providing plant parameter data to the operators be available for future exercises.
7.
Licensee Critiques The licensee held three levels of exercise critiques, one at each individual facility immediately following the exercise, a critique for controllers / observers following the facility critiques, and a presentation at the Exit Interview.
NRC personnel attended critiques at their respective facilities, and both subsequent critiques, and determined that exercise deficiencies of significance had been identified by licensee personnel.
8.
Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview the day after the exercis3 on October 23, 1986, with the representatives denoted in Section 1.
The NRC Team Leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.
The applicant was also asked if any of the information discussed during the exit was proprietary.
The applicant responded that none of the information was proprietary.
Attachments:
1.
Exercise Scope and Objectives 2.
Exercite Scenario Outline l
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Ex;rciss Manual FERMEX '86
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Page 3-2 SECTION 3 - SCOPE, OBJECTIVES, AND SIMULATIONS FOR FERMEX 86
i 3.1 DETROIT EDISON
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3.1.1 SCOPE FERMEX 86 will be a small scale exercise that will simulate an emergency at Fermi 2
that will result in offsite radiological releases that will require response from the Fermi 2. Counties of Monroe and Wayne, and State cf Michigan Emergency Response
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Organizations. The counties will be fully operational with the State of Michigan operational from the State EOC in Lansing only. The EXERCISE is designed to test Edison's response to various plant emergencies; to establish the communications.and coordination between Edison and offsite governmental Emergency Response Organizations and Facilities; and address the specific responsibilities, capabilities, and interfaces of each organized element of the Fermi 2 RERP Plan and implementing Procedures.
A simulated abnormal radiological incident at Fermi 2 will escalate from an UNUSUAL EVENT to a GENERAL EMERGENCY. The emergency will then doescalate to the Reentry and Recovery Phase where it will terminate.
As the capabilities of Edison and the various offsite governmental response organizations are brought into play, the effectiveness and efficiency of the organizations'
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response will be independently evaluated by the NRC and FEMA.
3.1.2 OBJECTIVES i
The specific objectives of FERMEX 86 will demonstrate:
1.
The adequacy of the RERP Plan and its implementing Procedures and test the
proficiency of the Emergency Response Organization to select and use the
appropriate p'rocedures for response to the emergency.
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The capability of the Control Room operators to respond to a radiological incident
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at Fermi 2, by manipulating the simulator controls, with a minimum of exercise
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messages and exercise Controller interface and to use the Simulator Control Room (
communications to conduct an exercise. (The Simulator is not being evaluated).
3.
The integrated capability of the Emergency Response Organization to respond to a
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j simulated emergency event. -
4.
The effectiveness of the interfaces between the Control Room and the ' permanent Emergency Response facilities, including the Operational Support Center, Technical Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility.
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Ex:rcis] Manu 1 FERMEX '86 Page 3-3 5.
The adequacy and effectiveness of the permanent emergency communications network between Fermi 2, the State of Michigan, Monroe County, Canada and the
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NRC's Emergency Notification System.
6.
Proficiency in recognizing, understanding, and applying the Emergency Action Levels in classifying emergency events.
7.
The capability of the Control Room to properly use the procedures and forms provided for notification of the State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes of classification of the emergency event (Canada when required) and provide followup reports on a periodic basis.
8.
The capability of the Control Room to notify the NRC within I hour of declaration of the emergency event.
9.
The capability of the Control Room to recognize when a release limit from an effluent stack is exceeded.
10.
The capability of the TSC and EOF (when activated) to properly notify State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes of classification of the event, to notify and maintain contact with the NRC within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and provide followup reports on a periodic basis.
11.
The capability to perform timely and effective offsite dose assessment based on the use of computer software.
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12.
The capability to recommend to the responsible State officials protective actions for the general public in the 10-mile EPZ based on plant conditions, potential and/or actual radiological releases and meteorological data on a timely basis (within 15 minutes of declaring a GENERAL EMERGENCY).
13.
The capability to recommend to the responsible State officials protective actions for the general public in the 10-mile EPZ based on meteorological forecasts.
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The capability of the Offsite RETs to locate the plume, to obtain air samples and collect environmental samples and deliver them to the EOF Laboratory.
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15.
The use of personnel dosimetry by the Emergency Response Organization in the Control Room, OSC, TSC and EOF.
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The capability of Health Physics personnel to establish control points at the TSC and EOF and perform routine radiological surveys in the facilitle's.
17.
The capability of Health Physics personnel to perform inplant surveys with the l
proper procedures and instrumentation.
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FERMEX '86 Page 3-4 18.
The capability to authorize exceeding 10 CFR 20 exposure limits within the plant.
19.
The capability to use inplant lodine monitoring.
20.
The capability to obtain lodine grab samples, analyze, and properly use the results in offsite dose assessment.
21.
The capability to obtain and analyze PASS samples as may be requested.
22.
The capability to evacuate an injured / contaminated worker from the site to a hospital offsite for decontamination and treatment.
23.
The capability of the Offsite RETs to observe ALARA monitoring practices while
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perforaing offsite monitoring.
24.
To perform Assembly and Accountability within 30 minutes.
25.
To promptly, concisely, and accurately notify local news media of an Unusual Event or Alert at Fermi 2.
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26.
To update the media at the JPIC at the Site Area or General Emergency classification or when a significant change in Emergency Classification, Meteorological Conditions, Radiation Release, and Protective Action Recommendations occurs.
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To provide the news media with up-to-date coordinated, comprehensive media O
briefings at least hourly once the Joint Public Information Team (JPIT) is available.
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To respond as fully as possible to all relevant media inquiries no later than the next scheduled media briefing.
3.1.3 SIMULATED CONDITIONS 1.
Simulator
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h Fermi 2 is a licensed operational facility. For purposes of FERMEX 86, the
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simulated power level history and other aspects such as nonoperational equipment are defined in the scenerlo summary by the initial Simulator conditions.
i There are conditions the Simulator is not programmed to provide as described i
below:
a.
The area radiation monitor (ARM) channels will respond and indicate
offscale. The ARM readings are simulated within the plant according to the location of tha release and the area of concern.
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FERMEX '86
Pag 3 3-5 b.
Stack effluent radiation monitors for SGTS, Turbine, Radwaste, and Reactor O'
Building stacks are not available from the Simulator. Releases to the environment are simulated according to accident conditions.
2.
Other The capability to take chemistry samples for analysis will be demonstrated.
a.
The analytical results are simulated according to accident conditions.
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l 3.2 OFFSITE RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS l
3.2.1 STATE OBJECTIVES 1.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
2.
Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
3.
Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
4.
Demonstrate adequa.cy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
5.
Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
6.
Demonstrate ability to project doses to the public via plume exposure based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures based on O
PAG's, available shelter, evacuation time estimates, and all other appropriate factors.
7.
Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10 mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes.
8.
Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.
g.
Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to manage an orderly evacuation is of all or part of the plume EPZ.
10.
Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to deal with impediments to i
evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.
11.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
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' Ex;rcisa Manual FERMEX '86 Page 3-6 12.
Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
13.
Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, to issue Kl to emergency workers and/or the general population.
14.
Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner at the JPIC.
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15.
Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released at the
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JPIC.
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16.
Demonstrate ability to estimate total population exposure.
17.
Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.
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18.
Demonstrate ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.
3.2.2 WAYNE COUNTY OBJECTIVES 1.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
2.
Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
3.
Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
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4.
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
5.
Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
6.
Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an
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initial instructional message within 15 minutes.
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it 7.
Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the
public in a timely fashiori.
8.
Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.
9.
Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to deal with impediments to.
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evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.
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10.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
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Ex:rciss M:nual FERMEX '86 Page 3-7 l Q~
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Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of
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mobility-impaired individuals within the plume EPZ.
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12.
Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
13.
Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear accurate and timely manner at the JPIC.
14.
Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released at the JPIC.
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15.
Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring i
of evacuees.
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16.
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees.
17.
Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers,' equipment, and vehicles.
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18.
Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for
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controlled recovery and reentry.
3.2.3 BROWNSTOWN TOWNSHli8 OBJECTIVES
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1.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
2.
Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
3.
Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
4.
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
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5.
Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations,
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, 4 and field personnel.
6.
Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes.
i 7.
Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the
public'in a timely fashion.
8.
Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.
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. Ex:rcis? M:nu'.I FERMEX '86 Page 3-8 O
g.
Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.
10.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
11.
Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-impaired individuals within the plume EPZ.
12.
Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
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13.
Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner at the JPIC.
14.
Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released at the JPIC.
15.
Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and ra'diological monitoring of evacuees.
16.
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees.
17.
Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles.
18.
Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.
3.2.4 MONROE COUNTY OBJECTIVES 1.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
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2.
Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
3.
Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
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4.
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
5.
Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
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6.
Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an j
l initial instructional message within 15 minutes.
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Excrcisa M:nu:1
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FERMEX '86 Page 3-9 O
7.
Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.
8.
Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.
9.
Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.
10.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
11.
Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-impaired irdividuals within the plume EPZ.
12.
Demonstrate ability to coatinuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
13.
Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner at the JPIC.
14.
Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released at the JPIC.
15.
Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion at the JPIC.
16.
Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.
17.
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees.
18.
Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of
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emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.
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19.
Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for handling
- contaminated individuals.
20.
Demonstrate ability to determine and irr.plement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.
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EVE!!P
- FEIIfEX 86
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SCE!aRIO SCE!aRIO SIfEMOR 24 IlOUR TIIC
!aLFUICPION GDCT TIIE IIR: fIIII TIfE IIR: f1IN KEY EVENTS
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0200 0000 IC-17 Division 2 core spray inoperable - D pump renoved to replace 100% Reactor inpeller alignment key. Engineering Design Package (EDP) 7257.
Power (=:'3292 IUt)
Repacking valve in Radwaste building. Repairs being nude to notor controller for T4803-F602. Division II 11 and O recorder
2 inoperable.
0230 0030 Control Room notified of injured nun in the Radwaste building. The individual has head injuries and a perforation of the chest wall.
Control Room notifies ambulance and hospital according to EP-290.
Personnel are disp 1tched to renove injured person to ambulance.
0235 0035 Control Room notified injured man is contaminated.
thclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) declares an Unusual Event in accorchnce with EP-101, Tab 12, Contaminated Injured Individual Requiring Offsite Ibdical Treatment.
NSS assumes position of Emergency Director (ED). Ibtifications are made according to EP-290 0255 0055 tialf B31-076-01 Recirc Loop "A" leak - 55 GP!1 0 1%
0257 0057 Alarm Annunciator DIMiELL FIDOR SUTIP LFNEL DATE OF OIAIGE IIIGI NAIU1.
2D75 0300 0100 Ambulance arrives on scen._
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EVErr StttmIN - PEIDEX 86
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SC22RRIO SCEtnRIO SIfiUIMOR imLETRKTION 24 IDUR TIfE KEY EVENTS
_IR MIri TIfE IFh MIN I
(7DCK TIIE Cbntrol Ibom annunciator DRYUELL FIDOR Sl!IP LLVEL 0305 0105 alarms.
Torus water managenent systen punp(s) trip if running and isolation valves close.
Ambulance departs for Seaway Hospital.
0310 0110 The Emergency Director declares an ALERP in accordance with EP Tab 9, Unidentified Leakage Greater than 50 GPl!.
0315 0115 Notifications are made in accordance with EP-290.
Emergency Director sounds siren and announces assembly and accountability.
The TSC and OSC personnel assemble in their respective Energency Non-essential personnel assable in their Response Pacilities.
respective assembly areas.
When the Dnergency Director announces " assembly conplete",
non-essential personnel will report to their work locations.
(!!issing personnel will be located prior to declaring assembly couplete.) The OSC is activated.
Onergency Director may direct Control Roan o with Technical Specification Action Statment 3.4.3.2.
TSC is functional and assumes control from the Cbntrol Room 0400 0200 Control Room annunciator PRI!nRY CDIFAIt!!EIE PR tulf B31-076-01 0420 0220 alarms.
0 3%
Control Ibom annunciator PRIlmRY CO!FAIf!IEIR llIG Reactor scrams on high drywell 0421 0221 IOV Set O 0 35%
TRIP (3D85) alarnri.
Set II' 010%
pressur of 6,
SCE!aRIO SCE2RRIO SIf0IRIOR i
24 IlOUR TIFE FELFUlKTIO!1 crnCK TIfE HR: IIIN TIFE, HR: IIIH KEY EVEIES
B31-076-01 0 100%
Reactor scram causes a transient resulting in a r.njor recirculation
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suction line break.
o Reactor water level decreases rapidly.
O Primary containment tenperature increases, Primary and secondary containment isolate with the exception of o
valve T4803-F602 due to open phase in X-105A penetration box.
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o SGl'S auto starts, Iow Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) loop select logic selects j
o recirculation Icop B for injection.
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All ECCS systens receive initiation signals.
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o LPCI punpa auto start.
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11alf E21-062-03 o
Div. I core spray pumps auto start. Pump C breaker fails to latch shut and breaker re-opens.
(Breaker will rennin closed when operator attempts closing from 01C switch)
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Drymll pressure and temperature increases.
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I2CI Icop B injection valve, Ell-F0lSB, main line contactor coil l
electrically opens upon energizing. Valve renins shut.
Bll-081-01 0 20%
Core uncovered; fuel clad failure.
j required to drive ARM's past alarm Alarm Annunciator Div. I/II Containment Area Radiation Monitor Trouble
3D43 (3D43) alarms - CIRRM reading 1.84 x 10 P/Hr.
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WUF SUfMARY - FEINEX 86
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SCDMIO SCD ARIO SIfRERDR 24 IOUR TIIE
!aLRRCPION CEOCK TIfE HR: fiIII TIf"E, flR: fIIf!
KEY EVEIRS Core level restored by core spray to 2/3 core coverage. Drywell teraperature and precs.ure decrease.
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0430 0230 Annunciator EffICE!TP PIOCESS IMDIATIOII IDf7EiOR TIOUI1LE (3D44)
e alarms. Operator verifies on CP-2B v/nich channel has exceeded the '
alarm setpoint.
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Channel reads 3.4 x 10 uc/cc.
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Annunciators 16D2,16D3,16DS and 16D6 alarm. All AITIS in the Ibactor building (all floors) are upscale high, 0445 0245 Emergency Director declares EITB ARPA HIEIUCEY in accordance with EP-lDl, Tab 9, Reactor Coolant Leakage P. ate Greater Timn 5000 GPIl (or Loss of %m Fissions Produc'c Earriers if Fuel Dar. age
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Suspected).!
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Ilotifications are made according to EP-290..
-t 0450 0250
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NSS directs OSC Coordinator to dispatch Danch Control teans to:
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Team 1 - 480V Bus 72CP to investigate and repaiN!afve motor controller for Ell-F015B.
Team 2 ~- 4COV Bus 72D-3A to investigate and repair valve notoc controD er far T4803-F602.'
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Team 3 - Reactdr Building first floor to open Ell-F015B valve manually.
0500 0300 Valve T46-F411 seat begins leaking releiming radioactivity from the Drywell to the_ suctica of the m?S.
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Anntegiator EFFLUEITP bitrFLS PADIATION PDIFtOR tin 1DLE (3D44)
alarrar. - operator verifies en' the Cr-2B vinich cinnnel 07-0S (08-07)
and/or 07-07 (08-07) (depending upon which division of SGPS is running) has exceeded ita alarm setpoint.
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SCE!WIIO SCI 2N<IO SITUIMOR 24 L*JUR TIIE IIALEUtKTION CIDCK TIfE HR: !IIN TIfiE, HR: MIN KEY EVENTS Channel reads 5200 uc/cc and the AXM has been activated.
Chemistry is requested to obtain an AXM grab sample.
0505 0305 Health Physics technicians report radiation levels high in Reactor building on the second floor. Gama reading of 4.7 Wifr and Beta reading of 35 WIIr. TSC is requested to evaltnte stay times in Reactor building.
IUrE: At this point several decisions will have to be made by the combined CR/PSC/OSC regarding repaica. The scenario r.ny diverge from this summary.
0510 0310 Emergency Director declares a GErERE EfElmCY in accordance uith EP-lDl, Tab 1, Projected Whole Body Dose at Site Boundary Greater than 1 Re W Hr Winle Body, or EP-101, Tab 9, Loss of Three Fission Product Barriers.
Ibtifications are mde according to EP-290 The Emergency Officer (if the EOF is functional) or Emergency Director makes Protective Action Reconcendations to the State of Michigan.
0520 0320 Team 1 reports open in r.uin contactor coil for Ell-F015B valve.
The coil is suollen and the operating mechanism will not r.ove.
0525 0325 Team 2 reports open in T2 of notor control cable.
0545 0345 Team I reports controller repaired or jumpers installed for Ell-F0lSB valve. Valve is opened by (bntrol Room or by energizing the circuit locally.
IUTE: The coabined decision of the CP/fSC/OSC may be to mantally open Ell-F015B valve verses mking electrical repairs. However, the valve will be opened to estab.iah shutdown cooling using RIIR.
EDF is functional (if not already functional) and assumes offsite responsibility from TSC. Offsite field teams dicIntched..
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SCRRRIO SCF2RRIO SI!KHMOR 24 IKXJR TIIE fBIRRKTION CILCK TIfE HR: f1TN TIfE, IIR: MIN KEY EVE?TPS 0600 0400 Drywell pressure and tenperature decreasing. CIRIY1's reading
decreasing due to decay of radioactive isotopes.
0630 0430 Repair team 2 reports open phase for T4803-F602 found in terminal box for X-105D penetration.. Lead is separatcd from connector.
Estimte short period of time to replace connector, approxinntely 15 minutes.
0650 0450 Repairs tc T4803-F602 terminal are completed and valve T4803-I'602 closeswgndisconnectswitchisshut. CP-2B readings decrease to 1.4 x 10 uc/cc on SGrS channel 7.
0830 0630 R7tE: At scenario time 0630, after a method of core cooling and RPV water level control have been established, and the plume has moved away from the site, the scenario will time shift to two weeks later.
The Control Roan Sinulator will announce the new plant conditions'
over the HiCom and messages will be passed out to all facilities by controllers giving the new plant status, Twenty minutes will be allowed for the personnel in all plant s
facilities to orientate themselves to the new conditions.
0850 0650 Detroit Edison and the State of !!ichigan discuss de-escalation of the Emergency Classification.
0900 0700 The event is de-escalated from GI2CRAL FlEIGDCY to an N1Rf classification based on plant conditions.
The State of Michigan will commence Re-entry and Recovery. Only key Edison personnel required to maintain contact with State and local authorities will renain in the facilitieu. The individual in charge of each of the facilities will select the percormel he requires 1000 0800 The exercise will terminate at 10:00 a.m.
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