IR 05000341/1986035

Safety Insp Rept 50-341/86-35 on 861111-1215.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Routine Control Room Operations,Shift Turnovers & Plant Maint & Surveillance

ML20207G326
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	12/31/1986
From:	Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207G323	List: IR 05000341/1986035 ML20207G317
References
50-341-86-35, NUDOCS 8701070098
Download: ML20207G326 (5)

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, U.. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPfilSSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-341/86035 Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43 Licensee: Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48224 Facility Name: Formi 2 Inspection At: Fermi Site, Newport, MI Inspection Conducted: November 11 through December 15, 1986 Inspector: M. J. Farber t

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Approved By: G. C. Wrigh , hief /8h/!8[o Reactor Pr jects Section 2C Date Inspection Summary Inspection on November 11 through December 15, 1986 (Report No. 50-342/86035(URP))

Areas Inspected: Announced special safety inspection by the Augmented Restart Inspection Team Leader of routine control room operations, shift turnovers, and plant maintenance and surveillanc Results: No violations or deviations were' identified, h0

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• F. E. Agosti, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• L. P. Bregni, Compliance Engineer, Licensing

• S. G. Catola, Chairman, Nuclear Safety Review Group

• L. Collins, Engineer, Nuclear Engineering

• S. Frost, Licensing

• J. Leman, Superintendent, Maintenance / Modifications

• R. S. Lenart, Plant Manager R. A. May, Maintenance Engineer G. R. Overbeck, Director, Operator Training C. V. Phillips, I&C Supervisor

• E. Preston, Operations Engineer

• T. Randazzo, Director, Regulatory Affairs

• L. E. Scheurman, General Supervisor, Nuclear Engineering

• F. n. Sondgeroth, Region III Engineer, Licensing

• B. R. Sylvia, Group Vice President

• G. M. Trahey, Director, Quality Assurance

• M. Tucker, Acting Superintendent, Operations

• C, T. Weber, General Supervisor, Radwaste

• Denotes those who attended the exit meeting on December 16, 1986.

The inspectors also contacted other licensee administratice and technical personnel during the course of the inspectio . Routine Control Room Operations The inspector monitored routine control operation on a periodic basis during the inspection period. The team was not assembled during this inspection period since the plant was shutdown for a maintenance outag While monitoring control room operations the inspector focused on communications among shift personnel, adherence to procedures, recognition of and response to annunciators, involvement of shift supervisors in plant operations, and congestion in the control roo Equipment out-of-service and restoration On November 17th, while returning the HPCI test line to service following maintenance on a valve, a valving error caused the line to be overpressurized. The operating CRD pump uses the HPCI test line as a return to the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). The HPCI test line isolation valve at the CST had not yet been opened when CRD miniflow was restored and so the line was overpressurized. The overpressurization caused the line to move and broke the welded connection of the HPCI test return line at the bottom of the CST. The CST began to drain through the broken weld at approximately 50,000 gallons per hou The operators noticed a decreasing level in the CST, and immediately began emptying the tank by transferring water to the condensate return

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tank. They managed to transfer about 100,000 gallons, however, approximately 283,000 gallons leaked into the area adjacent to the CST. The water was contained.in the dike surrounding the CST, was sampled by the licensee, and no contamination was detected. Due to the porous nature of the ground around the CST, some of the water seeped under the ground into Lake Erie. The event was caused by a combination of personnel error, procedural inadequacies, and design deficiencies. The tagging center operator directed the non-licensed operator to restore the test line to service without specifying a sequence, the Abnormal Lineup Sheet procedure does not require approval of the restoration sequence by the control room, and there was no overpressure protection for the section of the pipe that was damage The licensee presently is repairing the damaged piping and supports inside the CST, plans to put a liner inside the dike area to contain any possible future spills, make modifications to the HPCI test line piping to provide necessary overpressure protection, and revise the Abnormal Lineup Procedure to prevent recurrence of similar event A further discussion of the design deficiencies and procedural inadequacies is contained in the resident inspector's report (50-341/85034(DRP)). Shift Turnover Meetings The inspector monitored shift relief and turncver meetings to assess log reviews, panel walkdowns, problem identification, equipment statusing, proper communications, crew attentiveness, and supervisor effectivenes The inspector noted that shift turnovers continued to be generally efficient and well-ru . Maintenance and Surveillance The irispector monitored maintenance and surveillance activities to assess adequacy of procedures, adherence to procedures, understanding of plant status, and adherence to technical specification The following maintenance was reviewed:

Installation of EDP 1708-2 on RHR Motor Operated Valves Installation of Varistors on the Hydraulic Control Units to correct the RSCS power supply spiking problems

Main Condenser Internal Support Modifications

Paint removal from LP Turbine exhaust hoods Condenser tube eddy current testing Installation of CST /CRT dike area vinyl liner Modification of HPCI test return line piping The inspector had the following comments with respect to the Varistor installation on the Hydraulic Control Units (HCU):

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The instructions for the post-maintenance testing to be conducted before returning the HCus to service were vague and unspacified. A surveillance was listed to be performed and was to be augmented by verifying the sequence of the operation of the solenoid directional control valves. The method for conducting this verification was not included nor was the method for documenting it. The inspector met with a member of the licensee's staff and discussed what was required for the post-maintenance testing procedure. During the course of the discussion it was identified that during the installation of the modification some corrective maintenance was performed on the HCU terminal blocks which resulted in determination of all the associated leads. The scope of the post-maintenance testing did not include verification of the proper operation of those circuits which had been determinated as a result of the corrective maintenance. This is an open item (50-341/86035-01(DRP))

pending the inspector's review of the procedures and the results of the testing for both the modification and the corrective maintenanc The inspector had the following comment with regard to the installation of Engineering Design Package (EDP) 1708-2:

EDP 1708-2 provided for modification of the wiring in MCC 72C-F for Residual Heat Removal (RHR) valves E11-F010, Crosstie Header Valve, and E11-F015A, RHR to Recirculation Inboard Isolation Valv Although the work involved changes to the wiring of the valve, no post-maintenance testing was being required. The inspector discussed this issue with cognizant licensee engineers and resolution of the need for post-maintnenance testing for EDP 1708-2 is an open item (50-341/86035-02(DRP)).

The'following surveillances were reviewed:

44.030.251, ECCS - Reactor Vessel Water Level (Levels 1, 2, and 8),

Division I, Channel A Functional Test 44.030.253, ECCS - Reactor Vessel Water Level (Levels 1, 2, and 8),

Division I, Channel C Functional Test The inspector had the following comments with respect to these surveillances:

Step 6.3.10.2 of 44.030.251 turned on the power for the Z3 Calibration Unit for B21-N610A on panel H21-P080. The I&C technician completed the test and the inspector noted that the power was still turned on. Review of the procedure showed that there was no step to turn the power off. The technician consulted with the Nuclear Assistant Shift Supervisor (NASS), who after reviewing the circumstances, directed that the switch be turned of Prior to the performance of 44.030.253, a procedure change request was processed to insert a step which deenergized the Calibration Unit. A revision will be necessary to permanently correct these two procedures and the two comparable procedures for Division I _

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There appeared to be an inconsistency between step 6.4.12.2 of the procedure and the corresponding sign-off in Attachment:1. The step required action if a Level 8 trip was sealed in and the sign-off blank had a note requiring action Tf a Level 8 trip is sealed i A similar inconsistency appeared between step 6.4.12 T of the procedure and its corresponding sign-off in Attachment 1. Revision is necessary for all four of the ECCS - Reactor Vessel Water Level Functional Test The Transient Polarity switches on the Calibration Units on the Division I Testability Panel were not all in the same position; some were set for positive and some were set for negative. The Division II Testability Panel had similar conditions, however the switch positions on Division I did not correspond to the switch positions on Division II. These inconsistencies imply that the testing which operates these switches does not restore them to a predetermined consistent starting position. This would result in inability to properly perform that test at its next required interval because the Transient Polarity switch would be out of position at the start of the test. The inspector met with the I&C Supervisor to discuss these inconsistencies. The I&C department will need to identify, review, and revise, as necessary, those procedures which operate the Transient Polarity switche Revision of surveillance procedures to resolve the identified discrepancies is an open item (50-342/86035-03(DRP)), pending inspector review of the revised procedure . Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, will be reviewed further by the inspector, and may involve some action on the part of the NRC, the licensee, or both. Open items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph . Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

on December 16, 1986 and informally throughout the inspection period and sumarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary. The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspectio , -- . _ . __ _.