IR 05000341/1986017
| ML20206C865 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1986 |
| From: | Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206C840 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-86-17, NUDOCS 8606190582 | |
| Download: ML20206C865 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-341/86017(DRP)
Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43 Licensee:
Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226 Facility Name:
Fermi 2 Inspection At:
Fermi Site, Newport, MI Inspection Conducted:
May 1 through June 2, 1986 Inspectors:
W. G. Rogers M. E. Parker f
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right, Chief Approved By:
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Reactor Projects Sec ion 2C Date Inspection Summary Inspection on May 1 through June 2, 1986 (Report No. 50-341/86017(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of licensee event reports, followup of events, operational safety, maintenance, surveillance, refueling activities, Reactor Operations Improvement Program, management meetings, and report review.
Results: One violation was identified in Paragraph 2 (Failure to perform in-service testing) and no deviations were identified.
No open or unresolved items were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- F. Agosti, Vice President, Nuclear Operations S. Booker, Assistant Maintenance Engineer L. Bregni, Compliance Engineer
- J. Conen, Licensing Engineer R. Eberhardt, Rad-Chem Engineer
- J. Leman, Superintendent, Maintenance and Modification
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L. Lessor, Consultant to the Plant Manager, Nuclear Production
- R. Lenart, Plant Manager, Nuclear Production R. May, Outage Management Engineer W. Miller, Supervisor, Operational Assurance
- S. Noetzel, General Director, Nuclear Engineering J. Nyquist, Supervisor, Independent Safety Engineering Group T. O'Keefe, Technical Engineer G. Overbeck, Superintendent, Operations J. Plona, Technical Engineer
- E. Preston, Operations Engineer W. Ripley, Assistant Operations Engineer, Administrative B. R. Sylvia, Group Vice President
- G. Trahey, Director, Quality Assurance R. Wooley, Acting Supervisor, Licensing
- Denotes those who attended the exit meeting.
The inspectors also interviewed others of the licensee's staff during this inspection.
2.
Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
(Closed) LER 86-004, Missed In-Service Inspections:
Valve P44-F038 in the EECW system train 1 was removed from the In-Service Testing (IST)
procedures after a decision was made by the Plant Systems Engineer (PSE)
that the valve could not be tested given the plant configuration.
The PSE consulted the IST engineer prior to changing the procedure.
However, based upon that discussion, the IST engineer did not consider that a procedure change would take place without further discussion. The PSE perceived that the procedure change could be initiated immediately.
As a result of the miscommunication, the valve testing requirements were deleted from the surveillance test and a relief request was not initiated.
The situation was discovered following a design modification of the system during the current oute.ge that allowed testing of the vahe in question.
The valve is a check valve on the discharge of the nonessential battery
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F room space cooler.
Should an earthquake occur severing the nonessential piping, the check valve would close on reverse flow and prevent water from flowing out the break.
The valve was successfully tested on February 10, 1986.
Following discovery of Valve P44-F038's removal from the IST program, the licensee reviewed the in-service test program to determine if any other valves had t'can improperly deleted from the program.
Three other valves were identifieo.
The three valves were P44-F602A, P44-F602B, and E11-F010.
F602A and F6028 are the inlet valves to the EECW heat exchangers.
Tnese valves are normally open and their safety position is open.
Valves F602A and F602B were satisfactorily tested on April 15, 1986. F010 is the LPIS crosstie valve and is required to be open and does not receive an automatic closure signal.
The licensee does not consider this valve appropriate for the IST program and has submitted a letter to NRR on the matter.
i The inspector determined the root cause to be improper interdepartmental communication in the technical staff and an inadequate administrative structure established by management for procedural reviews of ASME Section XI in-service test requirements.
The licensee has taken appropriate corrective action as identified in the LER.
The inspector considers the failure to test the valves in question a violation of Technical Specification 4.0.5.
As such the inspector reviewed the violation against 10 CFR 2, Appendix C.V.A. and determined that all the criteria stated had been met.
Therefore, a notice of violation shall not be given.
No other violations or deviations were identified in this area.
3.
Followup of Events (93702)
During the inspection period, the licensee experienced several events, some of which required prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. The inspectors pursued the events onsite with licensee and/or other NRC officials.
In each case, the inspectors verified that thc notification was correct and timely, if appropriate, that the licensee was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were
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conducted within regulatory requirements and that corrective actions would prevent future recurrence.
The specific events are as follows:
Loss of Division II Offsite Power Source.
Failure of Division II EESW Pump to Auto Start.
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On May 16, 1986, at 12:44 EDT, Fermi 2 experienced a loss of the Division II offsite power source.
The licensee was in the process of l
cleaning the 345 KV line when the system service transformer No. 65
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breaker tripped.
As a result of the loss of power, a half scram was
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received on RPS Group B.
Division-II Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG Nos. 13 and 14) automatically started and supplied power to the division.
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All engineered safety feature systems actuated as required.
The plant was in cold shutdown with no core alterations in progress.
The inspectors followed up on the event and observed appropriate operator actions.
Also, during the inspection period the licensee identified to the inspector that a diesel generator oil sample had been broken in transit to the offsite laboratory. The inspector shall followup on this situation in a future inspection period.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period from May 1 through June 2, 1986.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
During the inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Emergency Diesel Generator No. 13 system to verify operability by comparing system lineup with plant drawings, as-built configuration or present valve lineup lists; observing equipment conditions that could degrade performance; and verified that instrumentation was properly valved, functioning, and calibrated.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
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work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
Jet Pump Plug Installation.
- Main Steam Isolation Valve Repair.
- Source Replacement
During local leak rate testing all the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)
exceeded the allowable leakage rate.
During disassembly of the valves for inspection four internal closure springs were discovered broken.
Two of the broken springs were sent to the licensee's research facility for analysis and one broken spring was sent to General Electric for analysis.
Tentatively, spring failure has been attributed to quench cooling of the springs during fabrication and did not cause the local leak rate testing failures.
Followup on this matter shall be performed by a region based inspector from DRS.
During the followup of Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT), the licensee has identified several valves that have not passed the testing.
As a result, these valves have had to undergo disassembly and repair prior to being retested.
This disassembly has identified foreign material in the system piping.
The inspectors have discussed this issue with the licensee as this has been a source of considerable interest in the past few years (reference Open Item 341/83015-EE).
The licensee believes this material is from the construction period and its current program in place has been working to prevent introduction of foreign material.
l On May 13, 1986, the licensee found a 3/4" - 1" diameter pipe nipple
lodged in the internals of a RHR manual valve.
On May 23, 1986, the licensee found a backing ring and pieces of a j
grinding wheel located in the thermal recombiner system.
The licensee has agreed to take additional steps when maintenance activities require entrance into closed systems to identify and remove foreign material.
During a recent torus inspection, the
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licensee utilized divers to perform an inspection of the torus for foreign material. This inspection resulted in the removal of a few small pieces of material but no large objects were identified.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
6.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The. inspectors observed surveillance testing required by technical specifications and verified that: -testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test. instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the
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affected components were accomplished, test.results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Refueling Bridge Surveillances.
- CRD Hydraulic Accumulator.
- Core Spray Simulated Actuation.
- Standby Gas Treatment System Auto Start.
- No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
7.
Refueling Activities (60710)
The inspectors verified that prior to handling fuel in the core, all surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications and licensee's procedures had been completed; verified that during the outage periodic testing of refueling related equipment was performed as required; verified that containment integrity was maintained as required by Technical Specifications; verified that good housekeeping practices were maintained in the refueling area; and verified that staffing during refueling was in accordance with applicable requirements.
Several shifts of'the fuel handling operations were observed and refueling activities were verified to be in accordance with Technical Specifications and approved procedures.
The inspectors observed three shifts of.. fuel, handling operations including removal and insertion of source holders.-
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On May 10, 1986, while installing the third source, the source holder
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became hung up on the fuel support assembly..The refueling-floor-supervisor directed all further movement to be stopped, the NSS was notified, and a course of action developed..The licensee first tried to free the holder with a long handle tool with no success.. Subsequently, the licensee performed a video inspection of the source holder and decided to slacken the cable attached to the holder.
The holder was subsequently freed.
Upon discussions with the NSS, the decision was made to install the source in the designated position.
The licensee's decision was based'
on,a complete visual inspection which did not identify any_ damage. The
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inspector. reviewed the licensee's course of action and the video tape of
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the source holder inspection and subsequent latching operation. -Prior to-
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resuming further core alterations, all personnel involved with source replacement were briefed and observed the video tape of the source holder problem.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
8.
Reactor Operations Improvement Plan Inspection (92706)
As identified in Inspection Report No. 50-341/86016(DRP), five items remained open or had not been reviewed. Of the three items remaining to be reviewed, the inspectors determined that the licensee has taken action as described in the ROIP.
This included:
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Briefing of personnel to consider the consequences of the simplest operation.
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Advising personnel to communicate an error to the appropriate operating staff so management action can take place in a timely manner.
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The licensee has taken initiatives to increase the reactor engineers'
participation in reactor operations.
The inspector has observed the reactor engineers in the source changeout both on the refueling floor and in the control room.
The other two items dealt with human factors training for procedure writers and development of Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG)
review procedures.
The licensee has engaged a consultant for the human factors training and this item has been incorporated into the Nuclear Operations Improvement Plan.
Part of the ISEG procedures have been issued.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
9.
Management Meetings (30702)
On May 9, 1986, an enforcement conference was held between Region III management and Detroit Edison management.
The subject of the conference was the premature criticality of July 1985.
The licensee presented its conclusions as to the premature criticality.
The NRC presented its preliminary determinations on the weaknesses identified by the premature criticality event. There was satisfactory agreement between the NRC and the licensee on the weaknesses identified.
The licensee proceeded to enumerate the corrective actions taken to preclude repetition of this or a similar event.
The NRC concluded the meeting by indicating the addition enforcement conferences may be held on this subject in the future.
On May 9, 1986, a management meeting took place between Region III management and Detroit Edison management.
The meeting was a presentation by the licensee on the Nuclear Operations Improvement Plan (NOIP).
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licensee explained the methodology used to develop the NOIP and the major elements that compose the NOIP. Also, Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia, the newly appointed group Vice President, was introduced to Region III management.
On May 30, 1986, an enforcement conference was conducted pertaining to surveillance requirements.
Details of the conference shall be a part of a future Division of Reactor Safety inspection report.
10.
Report Review (90713)
During the inspection i)eriod, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Operating Report for April 1986.
The inspector confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.A.3 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
11.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on May 27, 1986, and informally throughout the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspection.
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