IR 05000341/1985041

Insp Rept 50-341/85-41 on 851001-03.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Exercise Weakness Identified Re Protective Action Decisionmaking.Scope,Objectives & Simulations for Fermex 85 Encl

ML20133N040
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	10/21/1985
From:	Phillips M, Snell W, Williamsen N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20133N010	List: IR 05000341/1985041 ML20133N009
References
50-341-85-41, NUDOCS 8510280359
Download: ML20133N040 (23)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-341/85041(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-33 Lisensee: The Detroit Edison Company 6400 North Dixie Highway Newport, MI 48166 Facility Name: Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant Inspection At: Fermi 2 site, Monroe, MI Inspection Conducted: October 1-3, 1985 Inspectors:

W W. SntIll fof2/ff f Team Leader Date N Williamsen

///2/fS5 Date Approved By: M. P Emergency Preparedness Section

/0!2 /M[

Date Inspection Summary:

Inspection on October 1-3, 1985 (Report No. 50-341/85041(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2 emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by seven NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercis The inspection involved 105 inspector-hours by three NRC inspectors and four consultant Results: No violations, deficiencies, or deviations were identified; however, one exercise weakness was identified in the area of protective action decisionmakin @ * Rear eq

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DETAILS l 1. Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed B. Haagensen, Control Room i G. Arthur, Technical Support Center (TSC)

T. Essig, Operational Support Center (OSC), Inplant Tearas N. Williamsen, Emergency Operations facility (E0F)

M. Phillips, EOF J. Pappin, Offsite Radiological Emergency Teams W. Snell, Control Room, TSC, EOF P. Byron, SRI, NRC Detroit Edison Company W. Jens, Vice-President, Nuclear Operations F. Agosti, Manager, Nuclear Operations T. Randazzo, Director, Regulatory Affairs E. Madsen, Principal Engineer, RERP J. Mulvehill, EP Response Planner J. Conen, Engineer

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S. McCann, Technical Specialist R. Eberhardt, Rad-Chem Engineer R. Andersen, Supervisor, Rad Engineering S. Bartman, Chemical Engineer J. Tozser, Senior Engineer J. Korte, Acting Nuclear Security Coordinator S. Thomson, Assistant Director, NJClear Security R. Taylor, Nuclear Shift Lieutenant K. Thompson, Senior Nuclear Training Specialist S. Latone, Director, Nuclear Training S. Pembleton, Work Leader D. Johnson, Lead Simulator Specialist J. Petoskey, Associate Nuclear Training Specialist M. Hall, Nuclear Shift Supervisor M. Batch, Supervisor, NFE G. Ohlemacher, Technical Engineering Supervisor C. Sexauer, Nuclear Production Administrator M. Kluska-Vleik, Staff Assistant D. Ferencz, QA Advisor T. Barrett, Nuclear Training Specialist L. Cook, Nuclear Training Specialist D. Piening, Nuclear Training Specialist G. Kenney, Senior Nuclear Training Specialist R. Lenart, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Power E. Preston, Operations Engineer, Nuclear Power P. Lovallo, Engineer, Nuclear Power B. Cummings, Radwaste Operations Engineer M. Hoffmann, Senior Nuclear Operations Specialist L. Layton, Supervisor, Nuclear Information

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J. Piana, General Director, NOS G. Trahey, Director, NQA W. Colbert, Director, Nuclear Engineering J. Kepus, Environmental Programs Coordinator A. Wegele, Licensing Engineer B. Wickman, Supervisor, M&M QA All personnel listed above attended the exit interview on October 3, 198 . General

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An exercise of the licensee's Radiological Emergency Response

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Preparedness (RERP) Program was conducted at the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2, on October 2, 1985, testing the response of the licensee to a hypothetical accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive effluen Attachment 1 describes the Scope and Objectives of the exercise and Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenari This was a utility only exercis . General Observations Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the Enrico Fermi Unit 2 RERP and RERP Implementing Procedure , Coordination

! The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely. If the events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate action Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with seven NRC observer Critique

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A critique was held with the licensee and NRC representatives on October 3, 1985, the day after the exercis The NRC discussed the observed strengths and weaknesses during the exit intervie . Specific Observations Control Room The Control Room Operators pursued accident mitigation actions l throughout the exercise. They solved problems using a coordinated, teamwork approach and demonstrated tenacity in their attempts to find alternate methods of injecting water into the cor . - . . .- . _ . - _ - -

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r Offsite notifications were conducted promptly and professionally with the declaration of the Unusual Event and the Alert emergency

classifications completed within 15 minute The major shortcoming identified in the control room was that the ,

Control. Room Operators were not aware that a release was in progress <

until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 30 minutes from the time that the release had '

starte They had positive indications of a release from the l standby gas treatment system effluent monitors (AXM and SPING i monitors) but the operators did not realize that these conditions

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meant that a release was in progress. Effuent monitor readings of 4 x 10(E+4) pCi/cc (normal background reading was 1 x 10(E-5) pCi/cc)

were not correlated with a release. This caused a delay in

[^ recognizing that conditions were appropriate for escalation to a General Emergency Classification. The fact that there was an on going major release in progress was finally recognized when the control room overheard the reports from offsite radiation monitoring teams showing high radiation levels offsite.

i Theinspectoralscbeliev'eTthattheControlRoomstafftookan unnecessarily long period of time to determine the magnitude of

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the unidentified leakage. It took 58 minutes from the time that

, the leak started and 31 minutes from the time that the Control Room staff realized that a leak existed, to compute a leak rat l Assembly / accountability, which was initiated from the Control Room j was completed within the requirea 30 minutes. In addition, the

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contaminated injured person scenario was coordinated and tracked

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carefully from the control roo Proper notifications were made j to the hospital, plant security, the OSC, and E0F. The site public announcing system was used very effectively to inform personnel and to grect activities when such direction was warrante Control Room Operators continued to verify emergency classification i

decisions and protective action recommendations even after being relieved of the responsibility to make the classification and protective action recommendations. They were an excellent backup i to the TSC and E0F teams throughout the exercise.

I Technical Support Center (TSC)

The TSC was quickly and methodically manned and activated, and the

Emergency Director made frequent and detailed status reports on the

TSC internal public address system. The members of the TSC worked

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together effectively to solve problens and attempting to mitigate j the emergency condition :

j Declarations of the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency were

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both made in the TSC. Notifications to offsite authorities as a result of those declarations were completed within 15 minute However, protective action recommendations (PAR) relating to those

declarations were poor. Based on worsening plant conditions, a PAR of sheltering was provided to the State of Michigan, while still in

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the Site Area Emergency. Since by definition, a Site Area Emergen y does not warrant offsite PARS (see EP-545, Protective Action Guidelines Recommendations), this recommendation should have been accompanied or preceded by an escalation to a General Emergency ,

based on these same worsening plant conditions. In addition, the

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recommendation of sheltering in the downwind sectors never gave 1 consideration to the forecast of a changing wind direction. The inappropriateness of the downwind sectors selected for sheltering was compounded by the fact that the Emergency Director recommended protective actions for only two sectors when the wind direction was near the sector boundar Had the more conservative approach of going to the four downwind sectors or picking a third sector in the direction towards which the wind was expected to change would have kept the PARS closer to what the conditions actually called for. These weaknesses in the area of PARS will be tracked as Open Item No. 341/85041-01. It was also noted that when making the notifications to the State of Michigan per EP-290, Emergency Notifications from the Control Room, Technical Support Center or Emergency Operations Facility, for the Site Area and General Emergencies, the PAR portion of Attachment 2 was never filled out as required. Instead the Emergency Director gave the PARS to the State by telephon Although information on status boards were generally maintained current, some information on the " Plant Status" board in the TSC was obviously out date For example, reactor power was still shown at 70% and decreasing at the end of the exercis c. Operational Support Center (OSC)

The OSC radiation protection staff demonstrated proper knowledge of nealth physics principles and practices. In particular, good ALARA practices were demonstrated by the in plant team The Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) operation went smoothly and was well within the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> objective for this activit The individuals collecting and analyzing the sample (RHR liquid) were knowledgeable of the procedures used. However, only a single individual from the chemistry group was involved with sample l collection. The technique most frequently used at other facilities includes one individual calling out and checking-off completion of procedural steps (e.g., specific valve operations), while a second individual actually performs the operations. Although no problems were observed with the single person carrying out the task, observations of PASS operation at other facilities has shown the two person approach can significantly decrease the chance of errors being introduced into the proces l l

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All players were present in the OSC quickly following the PA announcement for all staff to report to their respective duty stations. However, it was not clear when the activation of the OSC was complete because no announcement was made relative to the OSC's readines The leadership fur.ction in the OSC (the OSC Coordinator position)

needs to be strengthened. In addition to the fact that there were no statements of OSC readiness issued by the Coordinator, no briefing of the staff with regard to the status of repair and other support activities were made during the exercis Although communication capability between in plant team members while wearing a supplied-air breathing apparatus was demonstrated, the lack of voice amr.lifiers appeared to hinder communications via _,

the plant PA system. Had the background noise been somewhat higher (which is quite possible in certain areas of the plant), team members would have had considerable difficulty understanding the briefing provided to RET No. 6 by the HP Technician at 1125, likely necessitating the use of voice amplifiers.

d. Offsite Radiological Emergency Teams All equipment used by the offsite Radiological Emergency Teams (RET)

were in good operating condition and within calibration date The teams did a good job of log keeping with all forms and labels adequately filled ou Checklists were available and used during the initial equipment checkout. However, the RET kits were too large to fit into two of the three vehicles used by the teams. This necessitated disassembly of the kits which caused time delay Although the teams were knowledgeable of the duties and responsi-bilities and performed their tasks as assigned, their main weakness was in their lack of ability to look out for their own personal health and safety. For example, they did not analyze instrument readings themselves, but instead filled out the forms, and transmitted all the information on the forms back to the RET Coordinator for analysis while in the middle of the plume. This resulted in the team waiting in a high dose area for an excessive amount of time while communicating the information and waiting for the RET Coordinators response. If the teams were alde to analyze the instrument readings themselves, they would know when to leave a high dose area and could avoid lengthy exposure times. This failure to follow ALARA considerations for the offsite teams is an Open Item, and will be tracked as Open Item No. 341/85041-0 The teams made frequent checks of their self-reading dosimeters (SRD)

and called the readings back to the RET Coordinator. However, in one instance a SRD malfunctioned (offscale high) and was replaced with another from the kit; but this was never reported to the RET Coordinato _,

Radio communications with the RET's was goo Teams were frequently updated on plant and meteorological conditions.

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e. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

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The E0F was quickly and efficiently set up well ahead of the functional activation, including access control, dosimetry, and air sampling. Log-keeping was excellent, with a typist entering data and reports directly into electronic memory. The communications to the corporate headquarters in Detroit were prompt, via an electronic data link from the Emergency Officer's desk directly to corporate headquarters. This data link was also tied in to the log-keeping

electronic memor The formal activation of the EOF was poorly done from two stand-points. First, there was no deliberate questioning of the various EOF section heads to ensure that each team was ready to accept their responsibilities, and secondly thers was no two-way conversation between the Emergency Director at the TSC and the Emergency Officer at the EOF which would culminate with transfer of control. Instead, the E0F coordinator announced to his staff that the EOF was activated, and then telephoned the Emergency Director at the TSC to inform him that the E0F had taken contro Status boards in the EOF were generally well used and kept up to dat However, although there were status boards for meteorological data, notification information, offside dose rates, and a log of emergency events, there was no status board for plant status, especially conditions necessary to make protective action recommendations based on care and containment conditions, and trending. This made it difficult for the staff to understand events happening at the plant. The failure to maintain adequate status boards to trend plant conditions affecting protective action recommendations on offsite releases will be tracked as Open Item No. 341/85041-0 The dose assessors were knowledgeable of their dutie They properly verified their calculations with the dose assessment team at the Technical Support Center. However, the TSC and E0F dose projection was performed using the containment high range radiation monitor system readings instead of actual release rate information from the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) process monitors. Use of the SGTS monitors would have yielded more accurate dose projections. In addition, neither the TSC nor E0F aggressively pursued the determination of PARS using dose assessments based on projected plant condition Combining information on plant status with trending of data can lead to projections on time of release, release durations, and release magnitudes which can be used in dose projection to help determine future PARS. The E0F did pursue this late in the exercise, and what was done by both facilities was good, but it should have been pursued much earlier and to a greater exten The dose assessors had available to them procedures for both hand-calculated, and computer calculated dose rates, of which they used

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the computer exclusively. However, the computer was not programmed to handle an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS), or any other calculation where the time of reactor shutdown was not prior to the time of the data point valu This caused a problem early in the exercise when the assessment team tried to input an accident time earlier than the reactor shutdown and the computer would not accept such data. Although this problem subsequently disappeared since the relatively small amount of radioactive release prior to shutdown became insignificant compared to the progressively larger releases during the scenario, the computer program should be modified to handle the A1WS type of scenario. Problems with the dose assessments code's ability to handle calculations with a future or no reactor shutdown time will be tracked as Open Item No. 341/85041-0 The major problem in the E0F was that the protective action recommendations failed to take into account both the current wind direction and the forecast wind direction. Specifically, when the E0F became activated at 1010 hours0.0117 days <br />0.281 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.84305e-4 months <br />, the existing PAR to the State was for sheltering in all sectors out to 2 miles, plus additional sheltering downwind in sectors M and N. That PAR had been made by the TSC at 0950 hours0.011 days <br />0.264 hours <br />0.00157 weeks <br />3.61475e-4 months <br /> when the wind was indeed towards sectors M and However, at,the time that the EOF became activated, the wind had already shiftcd towards sector R, and more important, the wind direction fnrocast had been entered on one of the status boards as i

becoming sout,hsesterly (towards sectors B and C) af ter noon. The E0F failed to r' cognize either of these factors and upgrade the protective action recommendatio At 1024 the State telephoned to say that they were o n accepting the PAR for sectors M and N but were ordering the 2 to 5 mile downwind sheltering for sectors Q, R and A, consistent with the then-existing wind direction. At that point the E0F properly ,

recommended sheltering to 5 miles for all sectors, because of the highly variable wind direction and at 1035 hours0.012 days <br />0.288 hours <br />0.00171 weeks <br />3.938175e-4 months <br /> it was announced that the State concurred with that recommendation. This failure to recognize the importance of both the current wind direction and i forecast of wind direction is an exercise weakness and will be tracked as part of Open Item No. 341/85041-01 identified in Section Contmnination control at the EOF was properly executed with all i;icoming personnel self-frisking and surveys of the EOF floor conducted repeatedly in order to monitor for any radioactive contaminatio Communications with the State of Michigan were goo Information was transmitted in both directions, so that the E0F was consistently informed as to whether the State had accepted the licensee's i protective action recommendations and also whether the PAR had been accomplishe There was good dispatch control from the EOF to the offsite monitoring teams. Radio communication was from an adjacent low-noise room and the teams responded properly to their instructions from the EO l i

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. Exercise Scenario and Control The exercise scenario was very good in that it was above average in difficult Because of the particularly challenging aspect of the scenario that dealt with determining protective action recommendations in conjunction with meteorology, an important weakness in the licensee's capability was identified. A certain amount of credit is due the licensee j for their willingness to challenge themselves with a difficult exercise as l a means to uncover these types of weaknesses.

l The scenario anticipated most player actions which enabled it to

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stay on schedule with little controller interventio The use of the simulator for the Control Room staff added a significant amount of realism to the exercise and was well run by the controllers. No cases of controller prompting were observe Data for the exercise was generally detailed and comprehensive. Only two areas were noted where more data would have been helpful. The first was that beta radiation data (window open readings) were lacking for all in plant locations. Team members were noted on several occasions to request these dat Secondly, the radiation levels associated with the various samples collected by in plant teams were not available. Exposure rates associated with handling of PASS samples and air samples would have been helpfu . Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview the day after the exercise on October 3, 1985, with the representatives denoted in Section 1. The NRC Team Leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee was also asked if any of the information discussed during the exit was proprietary. The licensee responded that none of the informa-tion was proprietar Attachments:

1. Fermi Exercise Scope and Objectives Fermi Exercise Scenario Outline

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SECTION 3 - SCOPE, OBJ ECTIVES , AND SIMULATIONS FOR FERMEX 85

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3.1 DETROIT EDISON 3. INTRODUCTION

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FERMEX 85 was scheduled as a " Licensee-Only" exercise to be evaluated by the NRC. However, Monroe County has requested to participate to exercise their newly com-pleted EO Since it is not a scheduled year for local participation, the local Emergency Response Organiza-tion will not be evaluated by FEMA. As a result, the State of Michigan will function as an " answering service", not a participant, to pass through the infor-mation needed by the County to exercise their response organizatio .

Additionally, Canada has requested to participate informally from the Fermi 2 EOF to exercise their emergency response plans for the communities that lie closest to the Fermi sit Edison has completed its permanent Emergency Response Facilities, (OSC, TSC, EOF), including the closed-circuit television in the TSC, and has established the permanent Emergency Response Organizatio The Emergency Response Information System (ERIS), which *

j includes SPDS, plant parameters and trende, dose assessment, and real-time meteorology is installed but will not be functional until Decembs 198 Since FERMEX 84, Edison has completed the installation of its l Simulato >

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FERMEX 84 demonstrated that the ERFs were adequate and operational, the RERP Plan and Procedures were i,n place, and Emergency Response Organization personnel were trained and capable of responding to a radiological

event at Fermi 2 without ERIS functional.

l 3.1.2 SCOPE PERMEX 85 will simulate an emergency at Fermi 2 that will result in a radiological event that will require response from Monroe County and the Province of Ontario, Canada Emergency Response Organization The exercise

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is designed to test Edison's response to various .iant emergencies; to establish the communications and coordination between Edison and the local offsite governmental Emergency Response Organizations ant'

Facilities; and address the specific responsibilities, capabilities, and interfaces of the majority of the organized elements of the Fermi 2 RERP Plan and Implementing Procedure A simulated abnormal radiological incident at Fermi 2 escalates to a GENERAL EMERGENC The emergency then deescalates to the Reentry and Recovery Phase where it terminate '

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. As the capabilities of Edison and the various parti-cipating offsite governmental response organizations are brought into play, the effectiveness and efficiency of the Fermi 2 organization's response will be independently evaluated by the NRC.

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3.1.3 OBJ ECTIVES The overall objective of FERMEX 85 is to demonstrate the following capabilities from the Fermi 2 Simulator Control Room: The adeauacy of the RERP Plan and its Implementing Procedures and the proficiency of the Emergency Response Organization to select and use the appropriate procedures for response to the emergenc . To demonstrate the response of Control Room operators to a radiological incident at Fermi 2 by manipulating the simulator controls with a minimum of exercise messages and Controller interfaces To demonstrate the adequacy of the Simulator Control Room communications system to conduct an emergency exercis . The adequacy and effectiveness of the permanent emergency communications network between Fermi 2, local, and Canadian agencies and the NRC's Emergency Notification Syste . To demonstrate proficiency in recognizing,

understanding, and applying the Emergency Action Levels in classifying emergency conditions.

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. . . . - . . . . . .. .. ... .-- ....--...... . .- ..:-...--.. ~...~-. - ~....... The capabilities of the Simulator Control Room personnel to properly use procedures and forms provided for noti fication of State, local and ,

Canadian (when required) governmental agencies within 15 minutes of classification of the event and to notify the NRC within 1 hou . The capability of the TSC and EOF to properly notify State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes of classification of the event and to l notify and maintain contact with the NRC within 1 hou . The capability of the Emergency Response Organiza-tion to provide follow-up reports to State, local agencies, and to the NRC on a periodic basi . The capability to activate the Joint Public Infor-mation Center and to produce public information releases and respond to public inquires on a timely basi . The capability to perform timely offsite dose assessments, including lake breeze conditions, based on the use of a microcompute . The capability to recommend to the responsible State officials protective actions for the general r y public in the 10-mile EPZ based on plant condi-

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tions, potential and/or actual radiological releases, and meteorological data on a timely basis (within 15 minutes of declaring a GENERAL EMERGENCY).

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1 The capability of the Of fsite RETs to locate the plume, to obtain air samples, to collect environ-mental samples and deliver them to the EOF ,

Laboratory for analysi . The capability of Health Physics personnel to perform in-plant sur0eys and to issue personnel dosimetry for the entire Emergency Response Organization in the OSC, TSC, and EO . To maintain 10CFR20 exposure limits to emergency response personnel unless authorized by the Emergency Directo . The capability to obtain AXM iodine grab samples, a na lyze , and integrate the results in offsite dose assessmen . .

1 The capability to obtain and analyze PASS samples if requeste . The capability to respond to a medical eme gency using off-site assistance from Seaway Hosp I*a . To perform Assembly and Accountability of personnel in the protected area within thirty minute r

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3. SIMULATED CONDITIONS

- Simulator Fermi 2 is a licensed operational facilit For purposes of FERMEX 85, the simulated power level history and other aspects such as nonoperational equipment are defined in the scenaric summary by the initial Simulator condition ,

There are conditions the Simulator is not programmed to provide as described below: The area radiation monitor (ARM) channels will respond and indicate offscale. The ARM readings are simulated within the plant according to the location of the release and the area of concer Stack effluent radiation monitors for SGTS, Turbine, Radwaste, and Reactor Building stacks are not available from the Simulato Releases to the environment are simulated according to accident condition . Other r

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, The capability to take chemistry samples for analysis will be demonstrated. The analytical results are simulated according to accident condition Potassium Iodide distribution.

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lu 1 or 8 0815f5 FHtU 95 EVENT SMM - OCIIMi 2,1@3 S D ARID S E RRIO SIMIAIOR 34 inR TDE FWRNIION QDX TI)E fB: MIN THE HR: Mill KP1 EVENIS 0600 0000 0000 Initial corditims Sinulata Initial Cadition 10-17 o Rmeta cperatim at 100% gwr; ad of life fiel cycle core exposure (Sinulata IC-17).

E21-063-02 (0%)

E21-FDTB valve o Stardby feaheta systan irtpertl Fail Sit 0615 0015 - Elmtrical Systan apervisor rutuests a 150 ME loai dmrmse

!!D txgins to imert contrul ruls to rtduce ps ,

0620 OTO OTO Smil lak devekps in the misolatable sectim of tie rmeta B31-07f>.01 rreirudatim articn pipir % Recirudation

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Locp "A" tak 0635 003 - Cmtrol Roan anrciata DRM1L FILOR DRAIN SW DD (a)95) actate Drpell floor drain anp prp cycle Rmeta Ibw level ruited to 94%.

0650 OC50 - tic 1mr Stift aperviar (E) declares m lfUSUAL EYENT bassi cn EP-101, 6 Tab 9, Rects omlat systen lak rates greter the time specirial in Tes Spec 3.4.3.1 as irdimtai by Arnaciata a)95 ad midatifial lak rate grmte than 5 gpn.

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!btificnticos are node moordirg to EP-290. E asarnes priticn of

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Energacy Direta (ED).

3 Rmeta power level ruiced to 86% (150 ME decrmse)

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g 2of8 0815f5 HRfX 95 - EWLSttfE SG N RIO SGNARIO SIMIRR 24 IDJR TIE PWIINTJM DLG TIE IR: M!N IILE Bh E N KEIEEtG Hmrgmcy Dimeter imy dimet catml Rocm cymtor to tq;in micirg plant Icn1 to atriply with Tainical Specifimtim Actico Statamt 3.4. Rmeter Coolant Sy: tan Enty, WOO 0200 GIO ink mte inemre! slidtly to gruiter tim 50 a B31-076-01 2% Emirmlatim locp "A" tak 0815 TIS - Cmtml ihm ammeiator DRfWEIL FIDOR RM' LEVEL IIIGMIIGI (3 D92) alar Tons mter muqyuud, systan prrp(s) trip if nmirg ard isolatim valve clos The Rmrypry Director declams m NERT in ruuawe with EP-101, Yab 9, midmtirioi Jerk rate gnnter tim 50gm with both drywell amp pnps nmir fblificaticos are rmde in ruudus with EP-29 Ehurgoy Dinrter soimis sirm ard arances assorbly ard accomttilit The E ad WC perncmel awrrble in their rupmtive Ehergmcy Reprme -

Facilitim ikn-escatial perstmel acrerble in their repective assorbly arm Wyn Bmrgrrry Director arances "asserbly caplete", rm-essmtial jumed will rvport to their work locaticm ad TDC ad WC will activate 4 (Missirg juurel will be located prior to dmlarirg asserbly cxmplete).

0915 0315 - E is fbretierel ad asames control fhm the catrul ih %

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h, 3 or 8 08155 Fan 65 - EVBF SHM EBARIO SGN\RIO SatKR 24 FwR TDE MM1 ULT 10N L10llCUlf IB: MIN IHfdik_16 I<EUMMS 0920 0320 0320 Cmtml Rocm ;mrciator FRDMRT DEAIMOE THEMEE FEAD (3D81) alan B31 @ 1 35 Recinnlation Locp "A" Isxk 0922 OE 0322 Cmtml Rxm trnrelator TEDMRf DEAI?t9E lam IEE33]RE OWML 'IRIP (M) alanm. Reretor scrron cri hid1 drybell pnmr B31-076 01 *

100% - Rmiru Icxp Pactor scran causes a transist resultirg in a rmjor

"A" trwk recinnlation artico line truk o Rmeter eter level decnnses rapidl S22-142-21 o Prirmry cmtairmmt tarperature 11uuu= V am 727 o Prmary ard smcxdary ecritairmt isolat o SHS auto starts.

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o Law Fhmre Cmlat Injecticri (IJCI) prps start ad select

'I5(M01-01 nuinulaticri pnp B for irdmti % Prirmry to o All EIIS system receive initiation signi Seccrdary contairmrt o Core spray pnpo Auto start lek o Core Spray Div II injecticn valve E21-F0058 fbils to opm de to matmical birdirg. (PnNets irdmticn ihm cxxe spray prps D & D).

B21-081-01 10% Fbel Clad Failtre 6 S22-141-11 480V tis 727 trips cn a getrd fhult disablirg toth IJCI injection valves 4160V Rs 68 Trip ad ructor ncirullation valves.

! 4160V Bus 68 trips ad locks of, de to electrimi ghase.-to-$h ese dort rurovirg MR purp A ad Core Sprg pmp A fhm service.

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19 4 af 8 W155 EETtfX_$ _EYENLStifEC SCDARIO SG7MRIO SIMIADR 2f4 IWR TI?E MnfRRLTION WXX THE 1EdB IR E_LE d G IGY EVENIS Fmi Wtw ainittal to Rmetw Pnmre Vessel ihm cardmnte mi realmte systen thurJ111e startw level a21tml valv Rmeta wits level irdicates lem tim 2/3 com coverage. Arm ndiatim nmitors in aburormt rapidly ircrmse mi alann Gore timverni; fbel clad fhilure Drywell pmoure mi tarprature ircrure Am relata DIV I/ DIV II agirAI?PHir APFA RMIATION PONTIOR 'IKIHE (3113)

alarns OHN rmifig 4.6x10 M Electrical pmetratim fhils due to high drywell pnrare, cateirg a let ihm drywell to Recta Ebildir Ixvel Resterni by com Spay are realmte systen to grmte ttm 26 mm coveng % Arnrelator EFFIIDir Pl0CEE ROIATION MMIDR 'IRIHE (3[y44) alarm -

Operata verifie ai Cr-21 tint dimels 07-05 ard/or G-(5 mi 07-07 mi/or 08-07 (depedirg a1 W11d1 Divisial of S7IS is nmirg) are in alert alarm statm irdicatirg exceedirg 10 Tines Tainical Spelficatim limits.

, 0940 0340 Arnrelator EFRIENT f10CEE ROIATION MMICR 'IRIHE (3Dt44) alar Omrinmtial cn Cr-33 irdicate 07-07 (07-G) is High alarm stat Onmel timis 1.1 u ci/oc ad the A X M has bee 1 activata t6 -

Einy,ecf Dirmtw declare a SIIFJIF.ARfKRU in swdsw with i EP-101, Tab 9, Recta Coolat lekge rate grmter tim 5000 gp E: Eray,ec/ Dirs:tw rray declare a GEMRALEfEENZ if he agects

, fbel clatilig fhi. lu .

tbtifimtiam am imde moordirg to EP-290.

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au 5 of 8 081585 4 -

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FHMX Bi - EULSitM anwuo a s mRIo SDiulm 24 IDIR TRE MNF1RTION '

DB2CIRE lELiflN IDL_lEtt@ ITIEDG Loss of feedster now. Rmeter vessel level dmrures below 2/3 core cruemge, Depen peore att taperature inesse.

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1000 0000 - DERi nmitor rutliin dmnnsirg (2.8 x 104 gf;p),

- FG diru:ts CDC Coordimtor to dL5stch Mmge faltml Tmm to:

Tain 1 - Divisicn I sitdger rum (Auxiliary Bldg) to investirpte ati runir 41(Of tm 64 Tmn2- Rmeter Wildirg sexn1 Door to MI 72F-42A to investigste ad effect rgnirs cn valve E21-RIS Ten 3- Rector Nildirg smarti floor 480V as 727 to irwestigate ard effect rquir ;

Tmn 4 - Rector Buildirg first noor RR valves EL1-F015 A/B to ninally op t

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Rar: tor Nildirg AMG are oft scale cn 1 thrudi I 1005 0405 -

A X M chtml 04 (Low rage) rutis 1.8 x 10 u ci/c f

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1010 0410 - Rn1th Rysics tehlicial with Ten 2 riports rai'.atim levels gruts

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ti m 14 R4r cn sruti noor Rmeter Buildirg. GC Coordiretor nqmsts TJC to evaltnte the sta times for the tarin ard possible permissicn to -

I exceal expoore limit Permission graltai fbr tes to work 10 min at, a tine, if necessry, trtil i j rgnirs crnplete. (Sta tine for edi irdiviial is 12 min. at 14 R4r 3 without exceedirg expmtre limits).. i

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1014 0414 - Ten 2 getal permissicn to ster Beactor Nildirg to imestigste the  !

E21-RISB valv l i

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ik 6d8 4 081515  :

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HBH M - EVENT SitM SCDMRIO SIMIROR 2fl IDE

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TD PNFH LTION

.(100CTRE IB: MW I EE 1R.: MIN IILIMIG ,

1015 0415 -

Tam 1 nports 4160V Rn 61B tm irdimtions of stree-to-rfuse dat m tm *

side of bnrker D6. thy nquire 3 tours to fix. ihilatim levels rot i excessiv i Tam 3 nTats tht the 1180V tus 72 CF tm Ins dat to gmni . I thy nquim 3 trurs to fix. (Sta tine for this tmn is alm 12 mi '

withut exceedire expure limits)

Tam 4 mee Inder riports hissirg ad mter drippirg flun electrical pmctratim atxwe the dryell scuthet equipet lutd1. DiiTimit to

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a certain size of la !,

1TO Of@ -

Tam 4 riports tht Radiatial levels are grmter tim 200 RMr in the , arts of the E11-F015 A/B valves. Stay times are nquesta '

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Tmn 2 nports tint E21-F038 prrkirg glard im octkei severly birdirg :

valve stan l

t 1030 Ot00 -

Ekugscy Dinrtor declaris GEIEAL BEDLY - mmrdirg to EP-101, Tab 9, Ims of tirre fissial pukrt inrriers (if he has rot altsty dme m).

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Gmtml' Roan is takirg mtim to ruhre dryell pyrare to nduce lak i rate flun elmtrical pmetrati :

1037 Oti37 -

EEF is thetioml (if rxt alrudy fhrtioral) ad asstires offsite  !

riqxmibility flun'ISC. OfTsite Field terro dLgntdv ;

A X M drroel 07-Ott ad/or 08-@ is rmdirg 2.13 x 101 u Ci/cc rrble EP3-l Ormistry rtquested to cbtain a grab carple of ialine flun AM l

10t35 Ot445 -

Tam 4 Scene Imder nports tint a tain nerber has fhllen Wie attarptirg '

to nunally opm the E11-F015 ad has a carpxid fiactore of his r2ght leg

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ad iblth Rysics tainician nports the arter is mntaninatal (gnster 3 tim 150 cpn) due to tom anti-0-s f)un the fh1 i

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7d8 5 081585 HIMX Bi - EEEE)tM

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SONARIO SDUADR 24 I W R TDE MMRRLTION '

ILOXlDE IB: .MW IREJR.: MW IHERG Note: At this point several decisicre will inve to be mie by the <xrbined CRKOCCC rv6ardirg Wilch rtpairs to accarplish. Scerario rmy diverge ihm this ammry. Rqprtiless, there will be a axiim1 drill with ,

threy-Hmorial lirpita EC Coordimtor infbnrn PE ad Bisgucy Dirmt C Coordimtor diantchs remue tan to trirg victim to attulme ,

Omtml Roan mils mtularce servi to pid< tp ad diantch victim to  ;

Mary-Mmorial Iixpita .

0515 - ktula,ce arrives m mm htniare Imves site f'or Mgr-Hmorial ftroita f

A X M chynel 07-01 K8-00 reis 3.0 x 101 M ci/cc rrble ga l Tem 2 rgxxts it may rtguire 2 to 3 inrs trore to afrect rgnirs ad i I

mus11y opm E21-F005 i

i Other thre tmm rtport little pygh in efTectirg rquir FUIE: Dqxrdirg m Actitre t:4<m, eitler E21-FDGB er E11-F015 valve will '

be opered ad mter irdeetal to the rinctor vessel via Core Spuy -

(E21-F0058) er LEI (E11-F015).

1150 0550 - Dryell pnesame dmrtesirg. OHN relirE dectusfrg (1.6 x 1(h Mr).

OSC Goordimtor riquests Tem 2 assess leric in electrical pmetratim avi t i

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efTect runir V tas 727 r1gnirt A X M Otrnel 07-01 ad/or (B-01 riedirg 2.8 x 101 u C1/cc rrble g ;

(lat< ihm pmetratim decrvoses as drywell presstre omrtases)  ;

1220 0620 - 4160V Bus 60 rgnirt s

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8 or 8 t 08iS85 '

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i FEMX 95 - EVENLSitM  !

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3 NLRIO SIMJUtIDR '

2tl RUR TDE MMRN, TION .

DOXJPE 1R:_ MIN IEEJM MIN m _E.VENIS l

12 3 06 3 - A X M Oivnel 07-01 arri/cr @-01 rudirs 3.0 x 10 u ci/oc rxtle ga f L

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132 0652 - Tam 2 rvrts elmtrimi pnetration smla !

Rdiation levels m the 21xgin to dmru .

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132t1 0731 - E efriumt radiatiai mriitors rudirg taigrtund. Ghis is wird . ';

titre) to tamimte exercise).

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OfTsite iEr Tam rudiqp in 10 mile DE badgrur ;

1400 0000 -

i Onsite Raxnery ard Remtry orgnizatim convene l t

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i 14 0830 - Exercise termirste '

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