IR 05000341/1985037
| ML20138J555 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 10/25/1985 |
| From: | Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138J542 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-85-37, NUDOCS 8510290387 | |
| Preceding documents: |
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| Download: ML20138J555 (16) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
R: port No. 50-341/85037(DRP)
D:cket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43 Licensee:
Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226 Facility Name:
Fermi 2 Inspection At:
Fermi Site, Newport, MI Inspection Conducted: July 1 through September 30, 1985 Inspectors:
P. M. Byron M. E. Parker D. C. Jones
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S. G. DuPont J. M. Ulie
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Approved by:
ght, Clfief
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R actor Projects Section 2C Date Inspection Summary Inspection on July 1 through September 30, 1985 (Report No. 50-341/85037(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of licensee action on previous inspector identified items; licensee action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) items; headquarters requests; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; plant trips and operational events; systematic appraisal of licensee performance; sustained control room and plant observation; startup t:st witnessing and observation; independent inspection; and fire protection.
Tha inspection involved a total of 687 inspector-hours onsite by five NRC inspectors, including 221 inspector-hours onsite during off-shif ts.
R:sults: Of the 12 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in 10 areas.
Within the remaining areas, two violations were identified (Paragraph 6 - inadequate procedure and Paragraph 8 - failure to perform technical specification surveillance testing) which, due to plant status, were of minor safety significance.
- 8510290387 851025 l PDR ADOCK 05000341
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
- F. Agosti, Manager, Nuclear Operations S. Booker, Assistant Maintenance Engineer
- L. Bregni,. Compliance Engineer
- J. Conen, Licensing Engineer J. DuBay, Director, Computer Service & Information Systems-0. Earle,~ Supervisor, Licensing R. Eberhardt, Rad-Chem Engineer P. Fessler, Maintenance Engineer
- E. Griffing, Assistant Manager, Regulation & Compliance
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- W. Jens, Vice-President, Nuclear Operations S. Leach, Director, Nuclear Security J. Leman, Superintendent, Maintenance and Modification Engineer
- L. Lessor, Consultant to the Assistant Manager, Nuclear Production
- R. Lenart, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Production R. Mays, Outage Management Engineer
- W. Miller, Supervisor, Operational Assurance S. Noetzel, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Engineering i
J. Nyquist, Supervisor, Independent Safety Engineering Group T. O'Keefe, Supervisor, Mechanical Civil Engineering
- G. Overbeck, Assistant Plant Superintendent, Startup
J. Plona, Technical Engineer E. Preston, Operations Engineer i
l W.~ Ripley, Assistant Operations Engineer - Administrative C. P. Sexauer, Nuclear Production Administrator
- G. Trahey, Director, Quality Assurance-
- R. Wooley, Acting Supervisor, Licensing
- Denotes those who attended the exit meetings.
The inspectors also interviewed others of the licensee's staff during
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this inspection.
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l-2.
Followup on Inspector Identified Items (92701)
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a.
(Closed) Open Item (341/84-07-01(DRP)):
Failure of CR8 Rectifier in Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs).
During the 24-hour test of EDG No. 12 at 3250 kw, rectifier CR8 overheated.
In earlier tests of l
EDGs 13 and 14, the same component (CR8) also overheated.
The CR8
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rectifier protected the EDGs from certain EDG output bus faults.
The licensee's investigation of the CR8 rectifier failures concluded
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that the rectifiers were undersized and should be replaced by larger l
units.
The licensee issued Nonconformance Report No. 84-1199 which calls for the replacement of the present rectifiers with new selenium surge suppressors (rectifiers) which have thirty-two, 6"x8"
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plates each.
The inspectors verified completion of replacement by
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review of work orders PN21-991742, 991743, 991744, and 991745 for EDGs 14, 13, 12, and 11 respectively.
This item is considered closed.
b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (341/84-20-13(DRP)):
Purchasing inspection report inadequacies.
A DECO source inspection report dated May 27, 1975, for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) revealed that testing delays were encountered.
A Deco inspector believed the malfunctions should have been detected during preliminary inspection and functional testing.
Since control malfunctions and termination deficiencies were documented in the May 27, 1975, report, the licensee should have been alerted to the potential for problems.
However, the discrepancies were not identified until Checkout and Initial Operation (CAIO) testing and not during installation.
Therefore, it appeared as though source inspections were not adequate and the findings in the source inspection reports were not followed properly.
To determine if there was a problem, the licensee looked at 1191 (100%) of the Purchase Inspection Reports (PIR) written before July 1981 on QA level I material.
The purpose of the review was to assure that all problems identified in the PIRs were resolved.
After reviewing the PIR, if there was an unresolved "open loop", an investigation was conducted to determine if actions had been taken for closure.
This included a documentation search and, if required, physical inspections to verify that work which was to be done had been satisfactorily completed. When it was concluded that an item lacked objective evidence of satisfactory resolution, a Deviation /
Event Report (DER) was issued.
Of the 1191 PIRs, 12 DERs were written covering 15 PIRs.
The DERs will provide for adequate resolution of the 15 identified "open loops."
The inspectors reviewed a sample of 10 PIRs that were determined not to have an "open loop." The results of the review indicated that the ' licensee's study provided adequate resolution of the concern.
It should also be noted that current QA program implementing procedure prevents recurrence of this problem.
This item is considered closed, c.
(0 pen) Open Item (341/84-49-04(ORS)):
The licensee was requested to reassess each FSAR commitment to the NRC's fire protection criteria and identify all areas of violation, deviation, and exception.
By letters dated February 4 and March 4, 1985, the licensee submitted information regarding deviations from either previous commitments or from NFPA codes to provide justification and resolution of certain fire protection issues.
By letter dated February 18, 1985, the licensee indicated that a specific walkdown was to be conducted by a third party knowledgeable in the NFPA codes by June 30, 1985, to identify any potential deviations from the NFPA codes.
This walkdown is considered an item required to be performed prior to exceeding five percent of full power.
The licensee submitted for l
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Region III information and review, the completed "NFPA Code Compliance Summary Report" dated June 14, 1985, prepared by the licensee's consultant.
This summary report included a review of thirteen NFPA codes and identified eight deviations with seven of the NFPA codes.
According to the report the identified deviations were dispositioned for corrective action by an appropriate Detroit Edison procedure.
In discussions between the NRR fire protection reviewer and Region III personnel on August 19, 1985, it was determined that these deviations need not be submitted to NRR for formal review and acceptance.
Since the NFPA code reassessment has been performed and only minor deviations were identified, the five percent requirement is considered to have been met.
However, this item will remain open until the corrective actions covering the eight deviations have been completed.
d.
(Closed) Open Item 341/85014-02(DRS)):
During plant tours, the inspectors noted that a Conditional Release (CR) Card No. 83-41 was attached to a relay inside the switchgear cubicles for RHR service water pumps A and C.
Further review revealed that the Conditional Release had been closed.
The presence of CR tags in the plant for CRs that are actually closed could lead to confusion.
Therefore, the licensee was requested to determine which QA conditional release numbers were still outstanding and ensure those were the only ones still attached to their respective components.
The licensee corrective action included the issuance of a memo from the Director of Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) and the Superintendent of Nuclear Production to the NQA Staff and the Nuclear Production Section Heads concerning the subject of Conditional Release Tags.
The memo requests the personnel to assist in the removal of tags associated with closed CRs.
This is to be accomplished in the course of assigned activities by noting the tag number and location of any CR tags observed.
This information is then phoned in to Procurement QA so that a check of the Conditional Release Log can be done to verify that the CR is indeed closed and the equipment is acceptable for use.
Following verification, the tag is then removed and mailed to Procurement QA for filing with the original CR records.
The corrective actions provide for the proper handling of CR tags when they are found in the plant.
Implementation of the corrective action will resolve the problem of closed CR tags in time and this item is considered closed.
e.
sClosed) License Condition 2.C.9.(e):
Fire Protection.
License Condition 2.C.9.(e) required the licensee to complete the installation of all early warning fire detectors, have all fire door assemblies labeled or listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory (unless accepted by NRR), and rehydro the fire protection i
yard piping prior to exceeding 5% power.
See Inspection Report 50-341/85025 for additional details concerning this item.
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(1) Detectors During a walkdown of several fire detecticn systems for interference from mechanically induced air flows, the inspectors noted three areas which did not strictly conform to NFPA 72E.
As corrective action, the licensee conducted a study of Fermi 2's fire detection system to determine conformance to NFPA 72E and committed to relocate affected existing detectors and install additional detectors to meet the requirements of NFPA 72E.
As a result of the study, 50 existing detectors required relocation and 54 additional detectors had to be added.
The inspectors visually verified the relocation of 16 detectors and the addition of 17 new detectors as per the design drawings.
Also, the inspectors reviewed all Surveillance Performance Forms (SPF) to verify proper operation of 100% of the new and relocated fire detectors.
No problems were noted in either area.
The licensee is continuing to update all affected drawings.
License Condition 2.C.9(e) regarding fire detectors has been satisfied.
(2) Fire Doors During a fire protection / safe shutdown capability inspection, the inspectors observed several designated fire doors either nothavinganUnderwritersLaboratories(UL)labelidentifying the doors fire resistance capability or the doors had 1 1/2 hour UL labels affixed instead of the required 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rtsistive rating as stated in the FSAR.
License Condition 2.C.9.(e) required the labeling or listing of all fire door assemblies by a nationally recognized testing laboratory prior to exceeding five percent of full power.
The licensee's corrective action included issuing a contract to UL to investigate, evaluate, and fire test where necessary, to assure the doors in question will satisfactorily perform their intended fire protection function.
To conform to acceptable UL design criteria many fire door assemblies required modifications such as filling screw holes where signs had been removed, adding steel bar stock to the frame, and installation of a sill plate on the floor in the door assembly opening.
Also, thirteen fire doors were replaced with new doors.
All UL required modifications were completed for the applicable fire door / frame assemblies with the exception of four doors.
These four doors were approved by NRR for exemption.
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The inspectors visually verified that all 55 fire doors and
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their frames were properly labeled by UL.
No problems were noted and License Condition 2.C.9(e) regarding fire door assemblies has been satisfied.
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r (3) Hydrostatic Test of the Underground Fire Main As documented in Inspection Report 50-341/84049, a review of pre-operational test results indicated inconsistent pressures and flows recorded for the ten year old underground fire main system hydrastatic test.
The licensee acknowledged the inconsistendies in the test and agreed to retest the system at 200 psig.
This was completed on May 31, 1985, and the measured leakage rate was 253 gallons for two hours.
NRR accepted the licensee's hydrostatic test and License Condition 2.c.9.(e),
regarding the hydrostatic test was satisfied.
Additional details on this issue are contained in Inspection Report 50-341/85025(DRS).
3.
Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Items (92700)
a.
(0 pen) 50.55(e) Item 50-341/84-03-EE (Licensee No. 111): " Design Deficiency on the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Reservoir Freeze Over." On December 28, 1983, water in the RHR reservoir which serves as the ultimate heat sink, froze to a depth of two to three inches.
Safety-related Diesel Generator Service Water, Emergency Equipment Service Water, and Residual Heat Removal Service Water f
(RHRSW) deep draft pumps take suction from these reservoirs.
Ice formed around the column of these pumps and had the potential to rencer the pumps inoperable.
The RHR complex design did not provide an adequate method to prevent freezinq of the reservoirs for the period between the end of construction and initial plant operation.
The licensee corrective action originally was to run the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water system and/or the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs), while the unit is operating, to maintain the water temperature above 43*F.
While the unit is not operating, the decay heat from the reactor core would supply adequate heat.
After discussions with NRC Region III and NRR staff, the licensee made a decision to use a temporary auxiliary boiler to add any heat necessary to prevent freezing of the RHRSW reservoirs.
Therefore, the EDG's would not be operated to provide heat to the reservoirs.
The licensee's compensatory measures were considered adequate for g (this item will remain open pending NRC the interim period. However Nuclear Reactor Regulations NRR) written response.
b.
(Closed) 50.55(e) Item 50-341/85004-EE (Licensee No. 147),
" Additional Fire Dampers Required." By letter dated February 28, 1985, the licensee identified deficiencies in fire barriers between fire zones in the Auxiliary Building.
The Fire Hazards Analysis
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drawings identify the walls which are required to be fire barriers but some drawings do not clearly indicate that a floor n.ay also be a i
Therefore, some HVAC ducts which penetrate floors were not identified as crossing a fire barrier and the required dampers were not installed.
The licensee's corrective action included:
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A drawing verification, which supplemented the walkdown
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inspection, of the HVAC duct penetrations, pipe chases, and other unusual. fire barrier configurations to determine if other fire zones required additional barriers.
The installation of six additional HVAC fire dampers and
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one pipe chase fire barrier.
The expansion or modification of the Fire Hazards Analysis
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drawings to identify which floors, or parts of a floor, are fire barriers.
The inspectors verified proper installation and noeration of the six HVAC fire dampers and the pipe chase barrier.
Also, the inspectors verified that the Fire Hazards Analysis drawings are being revised and expanded to illustrate complete fire zone boundaries including floors, walls, ceiling, chases, and doorways.
This item is closed.
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4.
Followup on Headquarters Requests (92704)
a.
Commissioner Asselstine Tour Commissioner Asselstine, with his technical assistant, the Deputy Regional Administrator and members of his staff, accompanied by senior licensee management and site management toured Fermi 2 on July 1, 1985.
The tour was conducted by the Senior Resident Inspector and included individual discussions with licensed operators and members of the shift staff by Commissioner Asselstine.
Commissioner Asselstine met with the resident staff and licensee management prior to and subsequent to the tour.
b.
Commission Briefing for the Full Power License The Region III Deputy Regional Administrator, the Fermi 2 Section Chief, and the Senior Resident Inspector were at headquarters July 8-10, 1985, to as.est the NRR staff in their preparation of the presentation for the Fermi 2 full power license briefing.
The emphasis of the Region III support focused around the completion of license conditions, plant operational history and the SAFETEAM.
The staff briefed the Commissioners on July 9, 1985, regarding the SAFETEAM and its effectiveness.
The program's strengths and weaknesses were identified.
The findings of the resident, Region III, and NRR/IE inspections were discussed.
The Commission voted on July 10, 1985, to grant Fermi 2 a full power license after being briefed by IE, NRR, and Region III management.
The full power license was issued July 12, 1985.
l No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicaole logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period from July 1 to September 30, 1985.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
During the inspection period the inspectors verified that surveillance tests were conducted, containment integrity requirements were met, and emergency systems were available as necessary.
The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
During the inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the following systems to verify operability by comparing system lineup with plant drawings, as-built configuration or present valve lineup lists; observing equipment conditions that could degrade performance; and verified that instrumentation was properly valved, functioning, and calibrated.
High Pressure Coolant Injection System
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The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
On August 27, 1985, the inspector witnessed Radwaste Shipment No.85-007, the licensee's first radwaste shipment.
This shipment consisted of condensate polisher resins, solidified in concrete with a total activity of approximately 8.5 millicuries.
The inspectors observed radiation and contamination surveys which were well within the limits established by the Department of Transportation.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility l
operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
6.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accJrdance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
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The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting l
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were l
removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
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work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; the procedures used were adequate to control the activity; quality control records were maintained; activities were
l accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire l
prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to
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determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is i
assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system l
performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
EDG-14 Lube Oil Filter and Oil Change
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Crossover Cable Fire Stop Seal Maintenance
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The inspectors witnessed the lube oil filter replacement on EDG No. 14.
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After the filters were removed from the filter housing, there was still
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approximately an inch of oil in the bottom that had to be cleaned out.
The procedure did not specify the type of material to be used for cleanup
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and as such the maintenance personnel opted to use paper disposable wipes.
The paper rags promptly dissolved in the oil, thus rendering the EDG systemDivisionIIinoperableduetoforeignmater{alcontaminationof l
the lube oil system 10 CFR Appendix B, Criterion V, as implemented by the licensee's procedure QAPR 5, requires that procedures appropriate to the circumstances shall be used to control activities affecting quality.
Contrary to the above, the licensee's procedure governing preventive maintenance on the diesel generator was not appropriate in that it failed to specify the type of material to be used in cleaning activities
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l resulting in the diesel generator being inoperable (341/85037-01).
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In response to the event the licensee issued Deviation / Event Report (DER)
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No. NP-85-0392 and hung a Deficiency Notice tag No. 1827 on the system.
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l Preventive Maintenance" was revised to include a caution against using unauthorized materials in the filter housing and specifying cloth rags for cleanup.
The inspector has reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and considers them adequate.
i No othe.r violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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7.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
i The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by technical specifications and verified that: testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting
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conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the i
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affected components were accomplished, test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspectors witnessed portions of the following test activities:
- Start and Load Test - Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) No. 13 DGSW and DF0T Pump and Valve Operability Test - (EDG) No. 13
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Division I Core Spray System Pump and Valve Operability Test
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High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Operability and Flow Test
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at 1000 psig and Valve Operability The inspector observed the performance of the HPCI surveillance and verified that the surveillance was conducted in accordance with an approved procedure (POM 24.202.01).
The purpose of tne surveillance was to verify operability after maintenance.
However, the HPCI system was not made operable because the system valve lineup was not performed for an additional two shifts.
Because HPCI had not been made operable, a later shift entered a Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation (T.S. 3.0.3)
when the Low Pressure Coolant Injection cross-connection valve was shut for a surveillance.
The licensee recognized the condition within approximately 30 minutes and the operator opened the valve per the shift supervisor's direction, thus removing the unit from the LC0.
The HPCI valve lineup was performed and the HPCI system was made operable.
This is another example of the operating shift not being aware of equipment status.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
8.
Plant Trips and Followup of Operational Events (93702)
a.
Plant Trips Following the plant trips on June 28, July 1, July 5, and July 9, September 3, and September 27, 1985, the inspectors ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant parameters, emergency system status., and reactor coolant chemistry.
The inspectors verified the establishment of proper
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communications and reviewed corrective actions taken by the licensee.
l All systems responded as expected, and the plant was returned to operation for startup testing on June 29, July 2, and July 6, July 10, September 13, and September 28, 1985, respectively.
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b.
Operational Events On September 9, 1985, at 6:00 p.m. the licensee discovered that they failed to perform the weekly channel functional test for Intermediate Range Monitors (IRMs) B, G, and H within the prescribed time interval.
IRM B became inoperable on September 6, 1985, at 7:30 a.m. due to failure to perform the channel functional test.
IRM G became inoperable on September 6, 1985, at 12:32 p.m.
and IRM H became inoperable on September 6, 1985, at 6:28 p.m. for the same reason.
The licensee was unaware that the IRM surveillances had expired and were, therefore, considered inoperable.
The licensee had the IRM surveillances scheduled but the surveillances were not performed.
They were subsequently completed on September 7, 1985.
IRM B functional surveillance was successfully completed at 2:46 a.m.,
IRM G at 1:58 a.m. and IRM H at 5:48 a.m.
As a result of two out of the four IRMs in Division II (IPM B & H)
being inoperable, the licensee was in T.S. 3.3.1 action statement and should have placed the trip system in the tripped condition within one hour.
The action statement also required the licensee to verify all insertable control rods to be inserted in the core and lock the reactor mode switch in shutdown position within one hour.
Both IRMs were inoperable for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and 18 minutes during which time the plant was in cold shutdown.
The failure to perform the surveillance in a timely manner is considered a violation of T.S. 4.3.1.1 (341/85037-02).
9.
Systematic Appraisal of Licensee Performance (990218)
The Systematic Appraisal of Licensee Performance (SALP) was given to the licensee at Fermi on July 2, 1985.
The appraisal period for SALP VI, October 1, 1984, through June 30, 1985, was abbreviated in order that an appraisal be made prior to the issuance of the full power license.
The Deputy Regional Administrator and members of his staff made the presentation to senior licensee management with public attendance.
The licensee's overall performance was average with above average performance in three functional areas and below average performance in one functional area.
The SALP is documented in Inspection Report 50-341/85027.
10.
Sustained Control Room and Plant Observation (71715)
The licensee restarted the reactor on August 10, 1985, after being in an outage since July 23, 1985.
The reactor was shut down after the South Reactor Feed Pump turbine failed.
The inspectors increased their coverage of control room activities such that control room activities l
were monitored on a three shift basis August 9-15, 1985.
The resident
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effort was supplemented by a Region III inspector commencing August 12, 1985.
The inspection focused on all aspects of control room activity such as briefings and turnovers, log keeping, communications, operator response, and administrative controls.
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The inspectors identified several weaknesses and oteserved conditions which had been previously identified.
The most significant items were:
The tagging system was weak.
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- The plant status system was inadequate.
The work order system was weak.
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Preventative maintenance must have a higher priority.
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The numbar of open work orders was excessive.
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The operating crews needed to function as a team.
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The inspectors met with licensee management to discuss their concerns.
The licensee's response to these concerns was addressed in their September 10, 1985, presentation in Region III.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
11.
Startup Test Witnessing and Observation (72302)
The inspectors reviewed portions of startup test procedures, reviewed procedure results completed to date, toured the areas containing system equipment, interviewed personnel, and observed test activities of those startup tests identified below.
During this review, the inspectors noted that the latest revision of the test procedure was available and in use by crew members, the minimum crew requirements were met, the test prerequisites were met, appropriate plant systems were in service, the special test equipment required by the procedure was calibrated and in service, the test was performed as required by approved procedures, temporary modifications such as jumpers were installed and tracked per established administrative controls, and test results for the tests observed by the inspectors indicated that acceptance criteria were met.
a.
Scram Time Testing The inspectors observed the performance of portions of STUT.HUC.005, Revision 2, " Control Rod Drive System - Scram Timing":
Insertion time testing of Sequence A and Sequence B control rods at 600 psig, 800 psig, and 950 psig (rated pressure).
b.
Insert / Withdrawal Timing and Friction Testing The inspectors observed the performance of portions of STUT.HUA.005, Revision 2, " Control Rod Drive System - Insert / Withdrawal Timing" and STUT. HUB.005, Revo 'on 2, " Control Rod Drive System - Friction Testing." These te*cs were performed at rated pressure (950 psig)
during initial heatup.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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12.
Independent Inspection (92706)
a.
Valve Accessibility License Condition Attachment 1, 8.1.a, required the licensee to provide accessibility to safety related valves for manual operation.
Compensatory measures were subsequently implemented and the item was closed.
The corrective action included placing portable stands, air hoists, and ladders in strater.
locations.
These accessibility aids were to be locked in their established storage areas and all O.srators would have keys and be briefed on the operation and locations of these devices.
It was believed that since only g a tors have the correct key to unlock these dev':es, adequate control would be maintained providing the operato n properly returned the devices after use.
However, the in pectors have identified several instances of air hoists and ladders missing from their storage location.
After further investigation it is believed that Operations may be unlocking the devices for use by other departments, using the devices themselves and not returning them to the storage area, and there may also be keys held by unauthorized personnel.
This is an open item (50-341/85037-02(DRP)) pending review of licensee corrective action for maintaining control of valve accessibility aids.
b.
Open PN-21s (Work Orders)
The licensee has consistently had a large number of open PN-21s (Work Orders) in the control room.
There were 423 open orders as of June 30, 1985, and the number peaked to 481 on July 28, 1985.
The inspectors consider that the magnitude of open PN-21s contributed to some of the recent problems such as the status of equipment.
The inspectors also consider the number of the open PN-21s to be unacceptable.
The inspectors have observed several PN-21s that were still open three months after the work had been completed.
The inspectors brought their concerns to the licensee who took corrective action by making a concertive effort to complete the required actions and to closecut the PN-21s.
The licensee had 345 open PN-21s on September 29, 1985, and work had been completed on 198 of these.
This results in 147 actual open PN-21s.
The licensee's goal is to have a maximum of 120 active PN-21s with half being preventative maintenance items.
The licensee is including the control qf open PN-21s in their Operations Improvement Program.
The inspectors believe that the licensee must make the effort to successfully control the number of open PN-21s in order to reduce the probability of equipment status problems.
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c.
Temporary Solid Radiowaste System The Safe Energy Coalition (SECO) requested additional information concerning the temporary NUS solid radiowaste equipment to be used at Fermi from the Director of NRR at the February 20, 1985, meeting held at Fermi (Inspection Report 50-341/85013).
The NUS process is considered to be proprietary and SECO was told that they could not review the information and NRR would review the process for effectiveness.
Subsequent to this meeting, SEC0 and NRR came to an agreement that members of SEC0 could review the NUS submittal in the presence of the Senior Resident Inspector (SRI) provided that those who reviewed the document sign a nondisclosure agreement.
The NUS document was sent to the resident office on April 18, 1985, and SEC0-was notified that it could be reviewed at Fermi 2.
SEC0 made arrangements with the SRI to view the documents at 1:00 p.m. on July 2, 1985.
Four members of SEC0 reviewed the documents in the presence of the SRI on July 2, 1985.
SEC0 requested that the SRI retain the documents as other members of SECO wanted to review the documents.
The resident office had no other communication with SEC0 regarding the NUS documents and returned them to NRR on July 29, 1985.
d.
Turbine Roll The licensee successfully rolled the main turbine to synchronous
. speed (1800 rpm) on September 30, 1985.
Both inspectors were in the control room during the event.
No significant problems were revealed during the run.
e.
SAFETEAM This inspection into_the SAFETEAM activities is a result of concerns raised during the licensing process of another utility.
This inspection is a followup of an initial inspection documented in Inspection Report 50-341/85029(DRP).
The inspectors reviewed the SAFETEAM findings to determine if investigative effort adequately addressed the concern and if corrective action had been completed.
At the same time, the licansee performed an independent inspection of the SAFETEAM finding", D verify adequacy of investigation and corrective action.
Througn discussions with the licensee, the licensee agreed to review fifty percent of the hardware and software safety-related concerns.
The inspectors reviewed a sampling of the remaining fifty percent of the safety-related concerns.
The inspectors reviewed over 10% of the total hardware and software
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safety-related concerns identified to the SAFETEAM.
During the inspection, DECO expanded their review to include additional concerns, resulting in the licensee looking into approxinately 67% of the safety-related concerns and over 50% of the non-safety related hardware concerns. As a result of the
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a
additional inspections, there was an overlap betw=s
_t.o review
....s and that performed by the NRC resulting in approximately 85% of the concerns reviewed and inspected by the NRC being previously reviewed by DECO.
The inspection identified some problems in the system which are believed to be isolated examples and programmatic in nature.
They included the following:
Inadequate interviews (unable to channel the problem; vague
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generic concerns)
Packages did not address the whole concern
"
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Packages incomplete (inadequate documentation)
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Packages should have been provided with additional closure
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information (i.e. 50.55(e)'s, NRC Inspection Reports, Duke Inspection Reports, DECO Reports)
Investigators unable to receive engineering support
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Although some flaws were identified in the SAFETEAM, an overall good effort went into the SAFETEAM project.
With the supplemented and augmented inspection effort by both Deco and the NRC, we were able to reach the same conclusions, although the inspectors found it difficult for the SAFETEAM to reach their conclusions on some concerns based upon the originally available documentation in the packages.
Overall the inspectors believe the packages were complete and well documented and the concerns were adequately addressed.
The licensee has since committed to improve the weaknesses identified in the NRC and Deco inspections.
The results of this inspection and DECO inspection were provided to NRC Region III and were used as the basis for regional input to the Commission briefing on July 9, 1985.
See paragraph 4.b. for additional information on the Commission briefing.
f.
Bypass Crack Piping The licensee observed leakage in the East Steam Bypass line on September 17, 1985, while operating at 4.1%.
The licensee removed insulation and observed cracks in the 30-inch bypass line and cracks in hanger retainer and lug welds.
Damage appeared to be restricted to locations to which hangers or' snubbers were attached.
Subsequent investigation by the licensee revealed similar occurrences in the West Steam Bypass Line.
Licensee actions are being monitored by t'
Region III specialists and additional information will be documented in a subsequent inspection report.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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13.
Fire Protection (64704)
License Condition 2.C.9.(e):
Inspection Report 50-341/85025, Paragraph 4.a., License Condition 2.C.9(e), " Detectors", last paragraph, stated, in part, "The fire detector study will be docketed...." The word
" docketed" should be changed to " approved by managemrint." The licensee indicated that the word " official" as used in the telephone conversation on July 3, 1985, was not intended to imply " docketed" but " approved by
. management".
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
14. Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.
Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2 and 12.
15.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on July 29, September 30, 1985, and informally throughout the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspectijn.
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