IR 05000341/1985043
| ML20198E617 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 11/08/1985 |
| From: | Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198E602 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-85-43, NUDOCS 8511140117 | |
| Download: ML20198E617 (9) | |
Text
'
.
< 3
'..
.
'
~
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
. Report No. 50-341/85043(DRP)
' Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-33
. Licensee: Detroit Edison Company-2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226-Facility Name: ' Fermi-2
,
Inspection At: Fermi Site, Newport, MI Inspection Conducted: August 18-20 and September 16-20, 1985 Inspectors:
'G. C. Wright
.
'
A. J. Mendiola
,
'
LM. E. Parker
.M. J. Jordan p.etopg C. - Wri
, Chief
//
Approved By:
Projects Section 2C Date
-
-Inspection Summary:
-Inspection on August 18-20 and September 16-20, 1985 (Inspection Report No. 50-341/85043(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Special unannounced operational readiness assessment team inspection of the Fermi 2 facility in the areas of Conduct of Operations and corrective actions associated with recent events. The inspection involved 110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> on site by five inspectors including 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> on backshifts.
Results:
No violations, deviations, or significant safety concerns were identified.
8511140117 8511CM3 PDR ADOCK 05000341
.G :
_
-
.
. _ -.
-_
.
..
.
. -
..
...
.
.
__ _ - -.. -
_ _..
_- ---. -.. --.
.
.
DETAILS 1.
' Persons Contacted Detroit Edison Company
+*F. Agosti, Manager, Nuclear Operations
+*R. Lenart, Assistant Manager Nuclear Production
- K. Earle, Engineering, Operations
+*E. Griffing, Assistant Manager Nuclear Operations
+*J. Conen, Licensing Engineer
- R. Woolley, Acting Supervisor, Licensing
- W. Miller, Jr., Supervisor 0A, NQA
- F. Reimann, Rad Assessor
- W. Ripley, Assistant to Operations Engineer
+*G. Overbeck, Superintendent of Operations NRC
- E. Greenmar., Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects
- G. Wright, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2C
+*M. Parker, Resident Inspector, Fermi
- D. Jones, Resident Inspector, Fermi
- M. Jordan, Senior Resident Inspector, LaSalle The inspectors also talked with and interviewed members of the operation, maintenance, surveillance, and health physics sections.
- Denotes personnel attending exit interview held on August 20, 1985.
+ Denotes personnel attending routine resident inspectors exit interview held on September 30, 1985.
2.
Scope
'
The purpose of the Operational Readiness Assessment Team inspection was to assess the readiness of the Fermi 2 facility for full power operation by. evaluating the effectiveness of management controls over operations, conduct of operations, authority / responsibilities defined and understood, observation of shift turnovers, communication and quality of logs and records.
In addition, the Licensee's corrective actions associated with a Confirmatory Action Letter dated July 19, 1985 were reviewed. The methods of evaluation used included procedure review, personnel interviews at the senior site management and operations staff level, document review, and direct observation of activities.
Particular emphasis was focused on the interfaces among the various operations personnel for accomplishment of their assigned tasks.
3.
Operations The inspectors spent many hours in the control room observing operations and speaking with the control room staff. The operations staff acted in a professional and knowledgeable manner. Alarms were responded to in an appropriate and timely fashion.
- -
.
-
-
-
-
-
-
,
-. -
.
.
I w
'
.
The operating crews worked well together with frequent interchanges
'
.between the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS), Nuclear Assistant Shift Supervisor-(NASS), Nuclear: Supervising Operators (NS0s), Nuclear Power Plant: Operators -(NPP0s) and Nuclear Assistant Power Plant Operators
. (NAPP0s).. Also shift meetings were held after the -individual shift
,
turnovers for better communications.
- Through discussions and observation with the operations staff (Nuclear
,
iShift Supervisor (NSS)',' Nuclear Assistant Shift Supervisor (NASS), and -
~ Nuclear Supervising Operators.(NS0)) several concerns were raised.
a.:
The communications ~and direction from management on current issues, and operating practices were not transmitted well to the shift to
^ allow for a clear understanding of what was expected and why.
Examples of this were:
(1) The NS0s. felt unnecessary restrictions were implemented on -
control room operations such as no coffee and soda within the brown area of the control room.
(2)- Onshift personnel did not have a clear understanding of why) of -
there has been an increase in audits (NRC, INPO, Management j
control room functions from prior to licensing as to after
'
receiving the license.
(3) Why'it was important for dating and time marking all. plant recorders once a shift.
(4) The change in adverse personnel actions taken as the re wit of an event, from prior to licensing (firing) and after licensing (retraining) was not understood.: The lack of consistent disciplinary' action had the operating staff unsure of where they would stand if they were involved-in-an~ incident.
It appeared to the team that the licensee.did not have a clear policy in this area.
-
l-(5) The management's action taken on recent events that was published in the paper was not well understood by the operating staff. The operation staff felt a definite split between the management and the operation department. Operation's staff l
often heard of management's decisions through the local papers.
,
This overall communication problem will remain as an open item
[
(341/85043-01)DRP)).
,
b.
- At times the inspectors observed problems with the team effort of the control room operating staff.
L L
(1) The control room NSO at times was extremely busy and the NASS
' '
did not appear to restrict or redirect the activities in the control room to assist the control room NSO.
_ -(2) Alarms as a result of surveillance or maintenance work were acknowledged and cleared by other than the operating shift.
,
This: type of performance could result in a separate alarm on the same board.being acknowledged or cleared without the NSO being aware of it.
<
1:
- -
4.
.
~
i(3) Operator watch relief for meals were 'not' of the same high
quality and detai1 Las the. shift turnover.
'
"(4)'.The'NASS turnover was accomplished over an hour late. The
-
relief NASS had his. phone turned off and the on duty NASS was not able to get.in touch with him.
,
.TheLitems discussed above will beitracked as open-item
- (341/85043-02(DRP)).-
c.>
. Additional-concerns of. control room conditions and behavior were z
,
- noted.
.(1) There are informational dot stickers on certain annunciators in
'
the control room which were used during construction to indicate nuisance alarms. They serve no purpose now and should
^
be removed.
>
i-(2)-The.useoffmagneticdotsinplaceofout-of-servicetags. The
~
dots are small and blended into the colored panels such that
'
they do not visually highlight the component that needs work.
-
They are also subject to being moved during plant operations
- or cleaning of the panels such that the dot
'y migrate to an improper component.
(3) Simulator training was geared to casualties and not normal plant evolutions. The simulator training'did not allow the
{
crews'to complete evolutions (startup/ shutdown) from start to
'
- finish. One crew interviewed had only performed one startup from start to finish and then.only because the NSS had requested
,
-it.
They-showed interest in more training on loss of feed water events.
.
.(4) The shift-indicated that-training at the simulator was accomplished by dividing the shift into two sections for training. This detracts-from the-team / crew concept of an
!
integrated shift.
.(5) The NSO responds to a problem which required operator action l
including a review of the procedures. This action seemed to
.
be slow and somewhat hesitant by the NS0 to accomplish the procedure. When this was brought to the attention of the NSS,
-t he indicated he~was aware of the issue and was trying to get the NSO to act.more promptly.
'-
-
v
.The inspectors observed the following shift operations which were good practices:
(m
!
(1) Moving the NASS out of the NSS office and into the " horseshoe"
-
portion of the control room was a good practice. This will provide a greater level of control and knowledge of plant L
evolutions and events.
J d
,.~--.-___.___-__.__.__._.._.,,__.__-..-_-,_._,__-,_.,_.-.a
.. - -
,
.
.
(2) Communication from the control room to personnel in the plant was good.
In most cases, repeat back of actions prior to taking them were transmitted both from the plant to the control room as well as from the control room to the plant.
Observations and discussions were also made with the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) and the Shift Operating Advisor (SOA). These individuals appear to understand their responsibilities and the communication channel they would take to resolve any problems they may have. A review of the Administrative Procedure 21.000.01,
" Shift Operating and Control Room", indicated the STO and STA are
" administrative 1y" members of the operating shift. Discussions with these individuals indicated they are administratively a member of the shift as advisors and not a mainstream member of the shift.
Events in July and August 1985, indicate that the licensee has not made effective use of the SOA or the STA. To get the maximum advisory effect from these people they need to be integrated into the mainstream of the shift. When equipment is removed from or returned to service, these individuals should be made aware of it. Any changes in major plant parameter such as reactor vessel level, pressure, that are recognized by NS0 as abnormal, should be brought to the attention of the SOA and STA.
These individuals should be made aware of all Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuations so that at all times they have an accurate status of plant conditions and can perform the advisory function from a position of knowledge of the plant and plant status in lieu of from a position of gathering knowledge of the plant and plant status. These individuals should be in the control room during all major testing and plant evolutions so that they can perform the function of an advisor as they observe a problem starting to occur and not only advise when requested by the HSS or NASS. The team also feels that the above comments are applicable to the Reactor Engineer during the startup testing phase of operation.
This item is considered to be an open item (341/85043-03(DRP)).
4.
Information Flow Through review of records, observation of control room activities and interviews with onshift personnel an assessment of information flow and adequacy was made.
a.
The review of records included log books, out-of-service log, control room information system cards and shift check sheets. Although all the logs were being kept in accordance with applicable procedures, a number of weaknesses were identified as follows:
(1) While the NS0 log was routinely reviewed by middle level management there was no evidence that the NSO and NSS logs were reviewed by upper level management (ie Superintendent-Operations andabove)
(
.
l-I h
_(2) While the out-of service log tracked long term LCO's there j
appeared to be-no mechanism for tracking short term LC0's.
p~
nor is'the out-of-service log kept in a location that would i
provide ready access to onshift control room personnel
(3) While the shift check sheet contained good information, instances were noted where instead of a value (ie level, pressure, etc)
the word " SAT" was used.
It is felt that where a parameter is L
to be verified, a value should be provided.
L l
Theaboveitemsareconsideredopenitems(341/85043-04(DRP))
b.
-Shift turnovers were observed. The practice of holding one on one panel walkdowns and information exchange is viewed as a positive aspect of the system. The followup group meeting while appropriate
could be improved by providing a better description of plant status, and planned activities, including reasons.
c.
The Control Room Infonnation System (CRIS) was reviewed for adequacy and implementation. The magnetic " dots" are discussed elsewhere in this report. The other basic concern about the CRIS is that, although providing good information, the information is one step removed from the panels. To determine equipment status the operator must go to the panel, obtain the number of the " dot" associated with the equipment, and then go to the " card" file to obtain the information. The licensee should review the system for potential improvement. OpenItem(341/85043-05(DRP))
d.
The processing of work requests was discussed with onshift personnel.
One potential problem was identified when it was determined that work requests can be signed by either the NSO or the NASS. This
,
situation could lead to one or the other individual being unaware l
of ongoing work. The licensee should review this situation and establish one focal point. Open Item (341/85043-06(DRP))
5.
Confirmatory Action Letter As a result of the premature criticality which occurred on July 2, 1985, a Confirmatory Action Letter, dated July 19, 1985, was issued to the licensee. The licensee was subsequently requested to complete the following actions:
-
a.
Provide to the NRC Region III the results of the evaluation of the inadvertent criticality event of July 2, 1985, including corrective actions that have or will be taken.
Include in the report the basis for not reporting this event to the NRC.
The licensee met with NRC Region III on July 23, 1985, to discuss the licensee's evaluation and their corrective actions. As an interim measure, the licensee has initiated the following actions.
(1) Required a second qualified member of the unit technical staff to verify all rod pulls for Groups 3 and 4 until the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) has been reprogrammed.
I
L
,.
..
.
(2) Modified the rod pull sheets to' eliminate confusion.
(3) Required' the use of current rod pull sheets at the simulator.
- As a result of augmented inspection coverage during the week of August 5,1985, the resident inspectors observed the rod pull to criticality and observed general control room activities. During this time, the inspectors observed licensed operator actions to ensure they were complying with the above commitments. The inspectors consider the licensee's interim measures ade The licensee has reprogrammed the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM)quate.
to enforce in Groups 3 and 4.
This action was completed per Engineering Design Package (EDP) 4224 under PN-21-(Work Order) 552909 on August 23, 1985.
The licensee, therefore, is no longer requiring a second qualified member of the unit technical staff to verify all rod pulls for. Groups 3 and 4.
The licensee's response to the CAL, DECO letter RC-LG-85-0017 dated September 5,1985, documented the licensee's actions and the basis used concerning reporting requirements.
This item is considered closed.
b.
Assure that operations personnel are properly trained and understand the applicable procedure (s) for subsequent control rod manipulations.
The licensee has taken several steps to ensure operations personnel are properly trained and understand the procedures for control rod manipulation.
The licensee is implementing the following actions.
(1) Ccnducting training for operations personnel to assure that the rod pull sheets are understood by those using them.
(2) Providing a cover sheet / instructions to the rod pull sheets to assure understanding of control rod manipulation.
-(3) Conducting training sessions with the reactor operators
,
concerning the Rod Worth Minimizer.
(4) Reviewing'the format,and layout of the rod pull sheets for huma'n factors consideration.
,
(5) Providing specific instructions to the operating shift concerning control rod movement.
(6) Conducting training with licensed operators to assure they are trained and understand the intent and purpose of reduced notch worth pull concept.
The licensee has completed training for operations personnel to assure that the rod pull sheets are understood by those using them.
In addition to the training, the licensee has provided a cover sheet to the rod pull sheets which provides additional instructions to the operator and requires documentation of the individual's L
understanding of the instructions. A review was performed on the rod pull' sheets for human factors consideration. As a result of
- -
this review, the rod pull sheets have been revised to minimize i.
e
r
.
.
a confusion. The licensee has also taken advantage of the Alam Typer in modifying the rod pull sheets thereby reducing redundant documentation previously required of the operator. The inspectors have observed control rod manipulations using the new rod pull sheets and consider the licensee has taken appropriate action.
This item is considered closed.
c.
Assure that all operations personnel are aware of the event and its potential significance.
The inspectors through discussions with reactor operators and training instructors have verified that operations personnel, either through special training sessions or normal requalification training, have observed the special traini g film concerning the event and that they have been briefed on the rod pull event and its potential significance. The inspectors have observed control rod manipulation on several occasions subsequent to the inadvertent criticality event including rod pull to criticality and individual rod scram time testing, and consider that the licensee is taking positive steps. This item is considered closed.
d.
Verify the operability and/or validity of the program for the Rod Worth Minimizer.
As of August 5, 1985, the licensee had recertified the RWM program to ensure that it was operating properly. This included resolving the Deviation / Event Report No. NP-85-0397 concerning software discrepancy and resolution of the design function of the system.
In DECO letter NE-85-1013 dated July 19, 1985, the licensee clarified the design function and recommended changes to the RWM to prevent recurrence of the inadvertent criticality. The licensee has reprogrammed the RWM to enforce in Groups 3 and 4.
This action was completed per EDP-4224, under PN-21 552909, on August 23, 1985.
The inspectors have since observed control rod manipulations including a rod pull to criticality on September 13, 1985. The inspectors have verified that the RWM has been reprogramed and that the operators are using the upgraded rod pull sheet.
This item is considered closed.
e.
Verify that training programs at the simulator are consistent with the current procedures being implemented at the facility.
The inspectors have reviewed the licensee's simulator procedures to ensure they have been updated. The inspectors also verified that the rod pull sheets used at the simulator have been updated to reflect current pull sheets. The licensee is currently requiring periodic audit of these p.ocedures to ensure that only the latest revision is used. The inspectors were concerned with the use of information copies versus controlled copies of procedures at the simulator but were informed that these procedures were on controlled distribution thereby ensuring distribution of the latest revision or change. This item is considered closed.
l
,-.C'
f.
After all actions required above are completed, obtain verbal concurrence from.the NRC. Region III Regional Administrator or his designee prior _to exceeding 5% reactor power.
The licensee has completed action on these items and has met with NRC Region III on September 10, 1985, to discuss their actions taken as a result of the inadvertent criticality and to request lifting of the.five percent reactor power restriction. This item remains open pending resolution of the items contained in this report as well as other outstanding issues. -Concurrence from NRC Region III to exceed 5% power remains outstanding. Open Item
.(341/85043-07(DRP)).
6.-
Open Items-Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5.
7.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives listed in Paragraph 1 on August 22, 1985, September 30, 1985, and various other items during the inspe tion period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content =of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
l
l
,
i
!
l