IR 05000289/1980010

IE Insp Rept 50-289/80-10 on 800427-0630.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas inspected:TMI-1 Restart Testing Program, Plant Operations & Records Review

ML20003H471
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	03/27/1981
From:	Fasano A, Haverkamp D, Nicholas H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20003H469	List: IR 05000289/1980010 ML20003H468
References
50-289-80-10, NUDOCS 8105060075
Download: ML20003H471 (10)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0fEISSION

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Report No.

50-289/80-10 Docket No. 50-289 License No. DPR-50 Priority Category c

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Licensee:

Metropolitan Edison Company P. O. Box 480 Middletown, PA 17057

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Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 Inspection at: Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted: April 27 - June 30,1980 Inspectors:

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D.R.Haverkamp,SeniorgResidentInspector date ' signed Y. Y.

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x H. H. Nich las, Reactor Inspector date signed P/

Approved by:

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F4sano, Chief, Three Mile Island Resident date/ signed Section, Projects Branch No. 2 Inspection Sumary:

Inspection on April 27 - June 30,1980, (Inspection Report No. 50-289/80-10)

Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by resident and region-based inspectors (86 nours) of the TMI-1 Restart Testing Program; plant operations including facility tours and record reviews; review of licensee event reports; review of periodic (monthly) reports; Reactor Coolant System drain down; and Reactor Coolant System overflow event which occurred on June 27, 1980.

Results:

No items of noncompliance were identified.

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Details 1.

Persons Contacted Metropolitan Edison Company

• W. Acker, Deputy Supervisor of Construction, Unit 1 B. Ballard, Modifications / Operations Quality Assurance Manager R. Barley, Lead Mechanical Engineer J. Colitz, Manager, Plant Engineering, Unit 1 R. Dubiel, Supervisor, Radiological Engineering D. Dyckman, Supervisor, Corrective Maintenance J. Fornicola, Operations Quality Assurance Supervisor L. Harding, Supervisor of Licensing, Unit 1 T. Hawkins, Superintendent, Startup and Test J. Kunkel, Manager, Procurement G. Miller, Manager, Restart Project

• I. Porter, Supervisor, Startup and Test W. Potts, Manager, Radiological Controls, Unit 1 M. Ross, Supervisor of Operations, Unit 1

• M. Shaffer, Technical Analyst Senior I H. Shipman, Unit 1 Operations Engineer

• W. Shoemaker, Lead QC Electrical Inspectiom D. Shovlin, Superintendent of Maintenance, Unit 1 R. Toole, Manager, Unit 1

• G. Troffer, Deputy Manager, Restart Project

• R. Troutman, Unit 1 Supervisor Management Control P. Velez, Supervisor of Radiological Controls Technicians L. Zubey, Supervisor, Unit 1 Restart Construction The inspector also interviewed several other licensee employees during the inspection.

They included control room operators, maintenaace personnel, engineering staff personnel and general office personnel.

• denotes those present at the exit interview on July 11, 1980.

2.

TMI-l Restart Testing Program

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The inspector reviewed the following licensee correspondence, manuals, procedures, and records relevant to TMI-l restart testing to obtain an overview of the restart testing program.

l TMI-1 Restart Project Organization and Respasibilities

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Document

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TMI-l Startup and Test Manual

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Recommended ReqJirements for Restart of TMI Unit i (Restart

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Report), Volumes 1, 2 and 3 TMI-l Restart Report, Supplement 2, Operational QA Plan

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TMI-1 General Arrangement Drawings

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-3-TMI-l Electrical Arrangement Drawings

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TMI-l Piping and Ventilation Drawings

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The inspector subsequently held discussions with members of the TMI-l Restart Project and the Startup and Test Group to determine the status and/or acceptability of the following items.

TMI-l Restart Preoperational Test Phase

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TMI-1 Restart Startup Test Phase

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Organization of the Restart Project

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Startup and Test Manual

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Rascart Modifications

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Test Procedures

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Generic Procedures

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Test Instructions

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This was the first inspection which addressed the area of TMI-1 Restart preoperational and startup testing.

The inspector was informed of the licensee's overview schedule for testing, including discussions of all areas involved with preoperational and startup testing.

Review and inspections of the above listed reference will continue during subsequent NRC inspections. The inspector had no further questions at this time.

3.

Review of Plant Operations Inspection tours of selected plant areas were conducted during the day shift with respect to housekeeping and cleanliness, fire protection, radiological controls, physical security and plant protection, operation and maintenance administrative controls and Technical Specification ccmpliance.

Acceptance criteria for the above areas included requirements of Technical Specifications, applicable regulatory guides and standards and approved licensee plans and procedures.

In addition to conducting the plant area tours, the inspector regularly visited the Control Room during normal work hours to observe operations in progress, review logs and records and to canduct discussions with Control Room personnel.

The inspector also frequently attended the licensee's Plan-of-the-Day (P00)

meetings, held by licensee management and supervisory personnel at 9:00 a.m., each Monday, Wednesday and Friday, to assess licensee

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-4-evaluation of plant conditi<as, status and problems and to review the licensee's plans for conducting certain major plant operations and maintenance activities which require special department coordination and management review.

No items of noncompliance were identified during the review and observation of plant operations.

4.

In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)

The inspector reviewed the LER's listed belo*>, which were submitted to the NRC Region I office, to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported including the accuracy of the description of cause and the adequacy of corrective action.

The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether the event should be classified as an Abnormal Occurrence, whether the information involved with the event should be submitted to Licensing Boards, and whether the event warranted onsite followup.

The following LERs were reviewed:

• LER 79-005/03L-0, dated March 22,1979 (Decay Heat Removal

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System total leakage during refueling outage mode was 8.9 gal./hr.,

which exceeded the 6.0 gal./hr. limit of T.S. 4.5.4.1, due to excessive packing gland leakage from five valves)

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LER 79-006/03L-0, dated March 26, 1979 (Local leak rate test total allowable leakage was exceeded when gate valve CA-V5B did not fully close during refueling frequency surveillance, due to packing gland binding caused by bent valve stem)

• LER 79-007/0lT-0, dated April 26,1979 (Borated Water Storage

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Tank dome was partially collapsed, due to apparent failure of vacuum breaker DH-V27 to relieve differential pressure when required)

LER 79-008/03L-0, dated April 26, 1979 (Local leak rate test

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aliawable leakage was exceeded when butterfly valve AH-VlB would not fully close due to loose valve seat retaining screw.;)

LER 79-009/03L-0, dated May 2, 1979 (Turbine-driven Emergency

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Feed Pump Steam Reguhting Valve MS-V6 was found closed, preventing feed pump cperation from the main steam lines, due to failure to open valve following maintenance)

LER 79-010/0 L-0, dated May 2,1979 (Several surveillances

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relating to chemistry and radiological r.nalysis were not performed at the required frequency after the TMI-2 accident, due to reassignment of personnel and use of analysis facilities S r TMI-2 samples)

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• denotes tr.,se LER's selected for onsite followup during a sub-sequent ins,1ectio *LER 79-Oll/03L-0, dated May 16, 1979 and LER 79-011/03X-1,

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dated June 30,1979 (Abnormal degradation (through wall piping leaks) of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System piping and other 304SS piping in zther plant systems due to intergranular stress corrosion cracking)

• LER 79-012/01T-0, dated July 6,1979 (Failure of Engineered

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Safeguards Actuation System relay (GTE Sylvania Relay Type PM)

to drop out when the coil was deenergized due to a notch in the operating rod (potentially generic problem))

• LER 79-013/0!T-0, dated July 5,1979 (Crack in suction piping

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from Borated Water Storage Tank, attributed to intergranular stress corrosion cracking produced by residual weld stresses)

• LER 79-015/01T-0, dated August 9,1979 (Error in accident

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analysis for small break LOCA's, which could result in un-covering the core and exceeding 10 CFR S0, Appendix K criteria, due to nonconservative assumptions of flow)

• LER 79-016/01T-0, dated October 19,1979 (Nonconservative

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error in seismic analysis of pipe supports for the~ "B" Decay Heat Closed Cooling and Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water Piping, due to error between as-built piping and drawing analyzed)

• LER 79-017/0lT-0, dated November 26, 1979 and LER 79-017/0lX-1,

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dated December 11,1979 (Size of support bolting for rigid anchors was found to be inadequate in both design and instal-lation, and under seismic conditions the affected piping may exceed code allowable stresses)

The above LER's were closed based on satisfactory in-office review, except those selected for subsequent onsite followup (80-10-01).

5.

In-Office Review of Periodic Reports

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The inspector reviewed the periodic reports listed below, which

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were submitted to the NRC Region I Office, to verify that the report included information rc:;uired to be reported and that test results and/or supporting information discussed in the report were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications, as applicable. The reports were also reviewed to ascertain whether planned corrective action was adequate for resolution of identified I

problems, where applicable, and to determine whether any information contained in the report should be classified as an Abnormal Occurrence.

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• denotes those LER's selected for onsite followup during a sub-sequent inspection

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-6-The following TMI 1 periodic reports were reviewed.

February Operating Report, dated March 12, 1979

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March Operating Report, dated April 12, 1979

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April Operating Report, dated May 15, 1979

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May Operating Report, dated July 5,1979

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June Operating Report, dated July 17, 1979

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July Operating Report, dated August 15, 1979

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August Operating Report, dated September 19, 1979

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September Operating Report, dated October 15, 1979

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i October Operating Report, dated November 15, 1979

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November Operating Report, dated December 17, 1979

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December Operating Report, dated January 15, 1980

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The above reports were closed based on satisfactory in-office review.

6.

Reactor Coolant System Drain Down a.

General

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The 11spector reviewed the licensee's planning, preparations ar.d conduct of partially draining the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to allow the performance of certain maintenance and testing activities.

The '.7.3pection included (1) review of applicable piping and instrumentation drawings, (2) review of the controlling procedure for the evolution, Special Operating Procedure 1-80-29A, dated May 30,1980, " Drain Down and Maintain RCS Level Between 314'10" and 315'3" Elevation,"

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(3) discussions with plant managers and department super-visors, and (4) monitoring of RCS drain down planning meetings

on April 24, April 29, and May 6, 1980.

In addition, the inspector reviewed the minutes of the RCS drain down meetings held on May 13 and May 28, 1980.

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Procedural Controls S0P l-80-29A provided limitations and precautions for nuclear safety, personnel safety and equipment protection, and listed

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the following prerequisites for comencing the plant dr&in down.

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-7-minimum RCS boron concentration

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incore thermocouple operability and monitoring

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communications between the Control Room Operator and the

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tygon tube level monitor in the containment building availability of pipe plugs and/or soft patches in the

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Shift Supervisors' Office operability of both decay heat removal trains

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minimum Borated Water Storage Tank level and boron

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concentration decay heat removal flow

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temporary RCS level monitoring using tygon tuting apparatus

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RCS venting conditions

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pressurizer and RCS temperatures

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special operator manning in the Decay Heat Vault during

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initial draining Core Flood Tank isolation

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decay heat removal low flow alarm setpoint

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containment integrity provisions

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Reactor Building sump recirculation flow path operability

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50P 1-80-29A also provided the step-by-step procedure for

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performing the initial valve lineup, verifying additional prerequisites, venting the RCS, draining water from the RCS to l

the Reactor Coolant Bleed Tank (s), establishing temporary RCS level indication, establishing comunications, establishing and maintaining long-term level control of the partially drained RCS, refilling the RCS and returning the RCS to the normal refueling shutdown status.

The inspector determined that S0P l-80-29A contained the necessary controls and steps to assure nuclear safety, i.e.

adequate core cooling, during both the transition phases of RCS operation as well as the extended period of partially drained RCS operatio. _ _ _ _.

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Management Planning and Control

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The purpose of the RCS drain down meetings was to provide proper consideration, planning, scheduling and coordination of major maintenance testing activities which were to be conducted in preparation for and during the plant condition with the RCS in the partially drained mode of operation. These major

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activities included the following.

Prior to RCS Drain Down Perform annual inspection / repair of the "A" Diesel

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Generator Fabricate tem,.orary drain down level instru;nent and

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provide adequate incore thermocouple temperature indications Prepare procedures and train personnel for various

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maintenance activities During RCS Drain Down Condition Perform high pressure injection cross-connect piping

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modifications Perform inspections and repairs of varicus check valves

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in the Makeup System and Decay Heat System.

Perform Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) eddy current

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testing The drain down meetings were attended by responsible managers and supervisors of appropriate plant departments, including operations, maintenance, construction, engineering, radiological controls, quality assurance / control and startup and test.

Prior to the drain down, six planning meetings were conducted which were attended by an average of twelve supervisors /

engineers of the above departments.

The objective of those meetings was to identify and plan all necessary work related to the above activities, so as to assure the safe accomplishment of those activities, while minimizing the period with the RCS in the abnormal partially-drained condition.

During the RCS drain down, the coordination of work activities and department functions was conducted during daily status meetings held Monday through Saturday at 4:00 p.m., in the TMI-1 Plan-0-Log (scheduling board) Room.

During these meetings the plant management reviewed the status of activities completed or needed to be performed and reviewed RCS drain down integrated work

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-9-activity schedules, which were developed and revised as the work progressed.

The inspector determined that the exchange of information and identification of potential manpower and equipment problems during these plant management RCS drain down meetingt and subsequent daily meetings was effective in fulfilling the meeting objectives, d.

Findings No items of noncompliance were identified during the inspector's review of the RCS drain down.

7.

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Overflow

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Event Description At 9:01 a.m., June 27, 1980, an inadvertent Emergency Safe-guards (ES) System actuation occurred when Vital Bus "A" was re-energized following transfer of inverters.

The ructor was

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ir cold shutdown with the RCS partially drained for eddy current testing.

RCS water level was being maintained near the reactor vessel inlet and outler nozzle heights and one decay heat (DH) pump was providing recirculation cooling.

After the ES actuation, the decay heat suction isolation valve from the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) (DH-V-5A) auto-matically opened at 9:02 a.m.

The open valve established a flow path from the BWST through the operating DH pump to the RCS.

The flow path was secured at 9:04 a.m. when the control room operator manually shut DH-V-5A.

At that time both the upper and lower manway covers and the lower handhole cover had i

l been removed from the "B" Ster _m Generator in preparation for plugging one tube later that day, and no one was inside the steam generator. About 10,000 gallons of water flowed from the BWST into the RCS, out the lower handhole and manway onto the Reactor Building floor during and after the time when DH-V-5A was open.

The water that spilled on the Reactor

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Building floor was transferred to the liquid waste system. At no time was there a loss of DH system cooling of the RCS.

No personnel contamination or offsite release occur. red, b.

Licensee Response The inspector observed the imediate response of licensee management and shift operations personnel between 9:10 a.m.

and 10:30 a.m., June 27, 1980.

The inadvertent ES actuation was promptly assessed and properly overridden by the Control Room Operator. Announcements on the plant public address system were made as soon as possible after completing immediate corrective actions to the event.

The Shift Supervisor notified l

the NRC Duty Officer in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 requirements.

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-10-The inspector observed the plant management critique of the RCS overflow event, which was conducted after assuring the RCS was in a stable controlled condition. The critique included interviews with operators, engineers and technicians who responded to the inadvertent ES actuation and personnel who were in the Reactor Building.

Initial plans were formulated

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for assessing the extent of contamination of Reactor Building components and structures and for commencing decontamination activities.

Based on the information obtained during the post-event review, licensee management concluded that a more detailed investigation of the event sequence and cause was necessary in order to fully assess the lessons learned and to determine appropriate carrective actions. The inspector stated that the licensee's response to the event was prompt and that the determination to conduct additional event evaluation dppeared appropriate. The inspector had no further questions concerning the event, but stated that the licensee's completed investigation would be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (80-10-02),

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Findings No items of noncompliance were identified.

8.

Exit Interview Meetings were held with senior facility management periodically during the course of the inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings.

The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on July 11,1980.

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