IR 05000269/1980032
| ML19353A337 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1980 |
| From: | Jape F, Martin R, Myers D, William Orders, Beverly Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19353A327 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-80-32, 50-270-80-28, 50-287-80-25, NUDOCS 8101080177 | |
| Download: ML19353A337 (7) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Report Nos. 50-269/80-32, 50-270/80 't8, and 50-287/80-25 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 Inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station near Seneca, SC Inspectors:
d 10/31/go Frank Jape Date Si'gned
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N m.i io/2 /s, gl. Orders
Dat'e Si'gned D5 k_-
to/m /so p. Myers Dats Sikned b6D to /ai/so g. Smith Date Signed
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Approved by:
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// #.7 R. D.' Martin, Section Chief, RONS Branch Date S{gned SUMMARY Inspection on September 2-30, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine unannounced inspection involved 234 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant operations, surveillance testing, review of Special Report en Unit 2 Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT), followup on unresolved item 287/80-21-01 and followup on Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins (IEB's).
Results Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were iden-tified in four areas; two items of noncompliance were found in one area (Infrac-tion:
failure to comply with T.S. 3.7; paragraph 8; Infraction:
failure to comply with Technical Specifications (TS) requirement for processing a major procedure change, paragraph 8).
8101080177
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
- J. M. Davis, Superintendent of Maintenance
- J. N. Pope, Superintendent of Operations
- T. B. Owen, Superintendent of Technical Services
- R. T. Bond, Licensing and Projects Engineer
- J. Brackett, Senior QA Engineer Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included 10 oper-ations supervisors, 6 technicians, 15 operators, 4 mechanics, and 3 I&E Support Engineers.
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 5,18, and 29, 1980, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspection findings were acknowledged without significant comment from licensee manage-ment. The items of noncompliance were acknowledged by licensee management who indicated the events were currently under investigation.
3.
Licensee Actioa on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (287/80-21-01). Additional review of this item resulted in two items of noncompliance. These are discussed in paragraph 8 of this report.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or devi-ations. An unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 9.
5.
Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operations throughout the report period, September 2-30, 1980, to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications and administrative controls. Control room logs, shift supervisor's logs, shift turnover records, and equipment removal and restoration records for the three units were reviewed. Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics and performance personnel on day and night shifts.
Activities within the control rooms were monitored during the shift and at shift changes. Actions and activities observed were conducted as prescribed
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in Station Directives 3.1.3 and 3.1.8.
The complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by IEB 79-05C. Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and appeared to be cognizant of plant conditions.
Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a continual basis. The areas toured included the following:
Turbine Building a.
b.
Auxiliary Building Units 1, 2, and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms c.
d.
Units 1, 2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Station Yard Within the Protected Area e.
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations wcre identified.
6.
Surveillance Testing The surveillance test procedures detailed below were reviewed and selected tests witnessed to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy.
The completed test procedures examined were analyzed for embodiment of the necessary test prerequisites, preparations, instructions, acceptance criteria and sufficiency of technical content.
The selected tests witnessed were examined to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment used was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, system restoration completed and test results were within acceptance criteria.
The selected procedures conformed with applicable Technical Specifications and procedural requirements, appeared to have received the required administra-tive review and were performed within the surveillance frequency prescribed.
Procedure Title IP/0/A/301/03S SR&IR Channel Test IP/0/A/305/3B RPS Channel Test IP/0/A/310/14A ES Analog Test CH-A IP/0/A/310/14B ES Analog Test CH-B IP/0/A/310/14C ES Analog Test CH-C PT/2/A/204/07 Reactor Building Spray Test PT/0/A/290/05 Secondary Systems Protection PT/2/A/600/11 Emergency Feedwater System PT/0/A/251/13 Component Cooling Check Valve PT/3/A/202/11 HPI System Perf Test IP/3/A/305/3D RPS Channel Test
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-3-The inspector employed one or more of the following acceptance criteria for evaluating the above items:
10 CFR ANSI N18.7 Oconec Technical Specifications Oconee Station Directives Duke Administrative Policy Manual Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Special Report Review, ILRT for Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.6.3.(f) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J require the reactor containment building integrateo leak test results to be reported within 90 days of completion of tne test. The ILRT for Unit 2 was completed in June 1980 and the final report is dated August 1980. The repo-t was received on time and reviewed by NRC Region II personnel. The test results indicated a leak rate within the acceptance criteria specified in Technical Specification 4.4.1.1.2. (b). No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Emerge;cy Power Switching Logic Review of Licensee Event Report R0-287/80-19, Revision 2, Shift Supervisor Logs, Reactor Operator Logs, Work Requests, and Removal and Restoration records, as well as interviews with personnel involved with the event resulted in two items of noncompliance. These are discussed below. Pre-liminary review of this event was reported in IE Inspection Report 50-297/
80-21, paragraph 21.
Following the Unit 3 reactor trip at 1914 hours0.0222 days <br />0.532 hours <br />0.00316 weeks <br />7.28277e-4 months <br /> on July 10, 1980, DC breaker 3DIA-13 tripped. The "A" phase of the Normal Source Voltage Monitor Circuit of the Emerget.cy Power Switching Logic (EPSL) was lost due to a burned out relay coil on relay 27NXA2.
Relay 27NXB, located directly above 27NXA2 was declared inoperable due to possible smoke damage.
Relay 27NX3 is in the "B" phase of the Normal Source Voltage Monitor circuit of the EPSL. With both "A" and "B" phases declared inoperable, the safety grade automatic transfer capability of the EPSL was not available.
The EPSL in conjunction with its associated circuits assures that power is supplied to the unit's essential loads. The logic system monitors normal and emergency power sources, and upon loss of normal power, the logic will I
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-4-seek an alternate power source.
First priority alternate power is the unit's startup transformer powered from either the switchyard on Keowee emergency power via the 230 kV overhead feeder. If the startup transformer is not available, the logic will select the Standby Bus with power from Keowee via the 13.8 kV underground feeder.
The EPSL detects power source availability and automatically transfers as necessary by the following voltage monitoring:
a.
Normal source voltage b.
Startup source voltage Standby source voltage c.
d.
Main feeder bus voltage The transfer from normal to startup source is performed manually during startup. Upon a reactor trip, this transfer is automatically performed by any one of three redundant control grade initiation circuits. EPSL provides a safety grade backup to the control grade initiation circuits.
On July 10, 1980, during the period both Phase "A" and "B" circuits of the EPSL were considered inoperable, and on July 11, 1980 when "A", "B" and "C" phases were out of service, and the Unit 3 auxiliar/ load was supplied through the normal power source breakers, the operability requirements of the Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.7, Auxiliary Electrical Systems, were not met.
The failure to comply with T.S. 3.7 is considered to be an item of noncompliance (287/80-25-01).
Initially, and when the EPSL was discovered inoperable, the Unit 3 auxil-iary loads were supplied from the Unit Startup Transformer, CT3. With this arrangement, the EPSL transfer function was not required since the auxiliary load was already powered from CT3 and, as described above, CT3 is the first priority alternate power source.
CT3 is energized either through the 230 kV switchyard or Keowee emergency power. However, as noted in plant
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logs, repairs to relays 27NXA2 and 27NXB were not cosipleted before the unit auxiliary loads were manually transferred to the normal source from the startup source.
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The second noncompliance identified with this event involved administrative controls and is discussed below.
Upon discovery of the problem, through receipt of trouble alarms in the Unit 3 Control Room, the Shift Supervisor issued Work Request (WR) 48969 to troubleshoot and repair the burned out relay. The WR identified the repair i
procedure as IP/0/A/3000/12, Enclosure 11.32, Cutler Hammer Type "M",120 j
VDC Relay Replacement. This procedure was originally prepared for a generic problem with Cutler Hammer Type M relays and was intended for use during
l reactor outages. The procedure required all three phases of the EPSL to be removed from service simultaneously.
The prerequisite which specified reactor shutdown conditions was revised through a major change to the procedure to allow repairs to be performed during reactor operation.
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-5-The review and approval record of this major change was examined and found to not conform to established practices as required by T.S. 6.1.2 and Administrative Policy' Manual 4.2 (APM).
Specifically, major change No. 12 to IP/0/A/3000/12, Enclosure 11.32 did not conform as follows:
The safety evaluation was performed by an I&E Technician who did not a.
recognize that this change would violate T.S. 3.7.
The safety evaluation performed to comply with 10 CFR 50.59, and is required by APM was 4.2.4.1.(e).
b.
The major change was reviewed by a qualified reviewer who indicated that cross-disciplinary review was not required. The reviewer failed to recognize that approval of this change would lead to violation of T.S. 3.7.
Temporary approval for major changes to procedures requires two members c.
of station supervisory staff, one of whom holds a Senior Reactor Oper-ator (SRO) license. Contrary to T.S. 6.1.2.1.a, this major change was approved by an SRO. The second required approval was not obtained.
d.
The procedure major change was reviewed by QA department personnel on August 7, 1980. APM 4.2.4.1.(d) requires QA be provided an opportunity to review each major change prior to use.
Collectively, the above items are considered to be an item of noncompliance against T.S. 6.1.2.
9.
Reactor Building Air Temperature On September 5,1980, Unit 3 was shutdown to repair a Reactor Protection System (RPS) pressure transmitter. An attempt to repair the RPS pressure transmitters during reactor operation could i.ot be coapleted due to the ambient temperature at the work location.
Repairmen reported a temperature of about 130*F at the RPS pressure trans-mitter location. A question was raised regarding the operative temperature limit for the RPS pressure transmitters and if such a limit should be included in the Technical Specifications. A review of the specifications for the PPS pressure transmitters revealed an operating range of -20F to 160F.
Therefore, the immediate concern of operability was resolved.
Whether or not a temperature limit should be included in the Technical Specification will be explored further by the licensee. This matter will be carried as unresolved pending further study (UNR 287/80-25-03).
10.
Followup on IEB's The licensee's response and corrective actions to the following IEB's were reviewed and found satisfactory.
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-6-IEB No.
Licensee Response Letter 79-11 July 13 & 24, 1979; and August 15, 1979 79-23 October 31, 1979 79-25 December 19, 1979 79-28 January 9, 1980 80-16 July 30, 1980 80-20 August 14, 1980
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