IR 05000289/1993010
| ML20045D835 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/21/1993 |
| From: | Laughlin J, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045D834 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-93-10, NUDOCS 9306300109 | |
| Download: ML20045D835 (10) | |
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I Docket /Repon:
50-289/93-10 License:
DPR-50 Licensee:
GPU Nuclear Corporation P. O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Facility Name:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit No.1 Inspection:
May 18-20,1993 Inspection At:
Londonderry and Susquehanna Townships, Pennsylvania
/8/93 Inspectors:
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' date J. Ld[ghlingmergency Preparedness Specialist B. Norris, Project Engineer, DRP J. Lusher, Emergency Preparedness Specialist D. Beaulieu, Resident Inspector D. Lane, Sonalysts, Inc.
l Approved:
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d21/if E. McCabe, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section date
Scope Announced emergency preparedness inspection of the annual, full-panicipation exercise.
Results Overall, the on-site response to this exercise scenario was good. Expected Emergency Plan implementation actions were done well. No exercise weaknesses were identified. The most significant areas for potential improvement were (1) accuracy of initial dose assessment information from the Radiological Assessment Coordinator, (2) adequacy of battery-powered emergency lighting in the Emergency Operations Facility, and (3) elimination of inappropriate pmmpting of exercise players.
9306300109 930623
PDR ADOCK 05000289 G
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TAllLE OF CONTENTS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Exercise and Inspection Scope................................ 3 3.
Scenario Planning
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Exercise Scenario..
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Activities Observed........
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Exercisc Finding Classifications....
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General Findings..........
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Emergency Control Center (ECC)..........
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8.1 Observer Prompt of Radiological Assessment Coordinator
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8.2 Radiological Assessment Coordinator Performance...............
8.3 Event Response Realism................
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Technical Support Center (TSC)
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9.1 OTSG Leakage Rate Responsibility
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9.2 TSCC Prompt
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9.3 Communications Between TSC and ECC...,................. 7 9.4 Use of Temperature / Pressure Indicators...................... 7 10.
Operations Support Center (OSC).
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Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
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11.1 EOF Emergency Lighting.............................. 8 11.2 Correctness of News Release Information
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Overall Response Timing.................................
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TABLE 12.1: RESPONSE PERFORMANCE TIMETABLE
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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items.....................
13.1 OSC Status Board Maintenance..........................
13.2 EOF Emergency Report Form Event Descriptions..............
13.3 Commonwealth Protective Actions........................
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Licensee Critique
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NRC Exit Meeting...........
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DETAILS l
1.
Persons Contacted The following individuals were contacted during the inspection. All attended the exit meeting on May 20,1993.
G. Broughton, Vice President and Director, TMI-l i
D. Ethridge, Manager, Radiolegical Engineering E. Frederick, Human Performance Enhancement System Coordinator, TMI-l G. Giangi, Manager, Corporate Emergency Preparedness i
D. Hassler, Licensing Engineer R. Janati, Pennsylvania Burean of Radiation Protection C. Mascari, Director, Nuclear Assurance G. Simonetti, Manager, TMI Emergency Preparedness
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The inspectors also interviewed and/or observed the actions of other licensee personnel.
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2.
Exercise and Inspection Scope l
The Three Mile Island Nuclear Station conducted a full-participation exercise on May 19,1993, from 3:15 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the five risk counties fully participated in the exercise. Off-site activities were evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The NRC inspection included scenario review, observation of exercise activities, discussions with licensee staff, and review of selected records.
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3.
Scenario Planning Exercise objectives were submitted to NRC Region I on February 10, 1993. The complete scenario package was submitted to the NRC on March 9,1993. Following NRC review of the submitted scenario, Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. The final scenario adequately tested the major portions of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures. It also provided the opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate areas previously identified by the NRC for further evaluation.
The NRC observation team attended a May 18, 1993 scenario briefing provided by licensee controllers. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent disrupting normal plant activities.
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Exercise Scenario The scenario was run on the plaat simulator and included the following simulated events:
Initial Conditions: Makeup Pump C was out of service due to a cracked shaft.
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The Pressurizer Spray Block Valve stuck in the shut position.
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A 30 gpm primary-to-secondary leak via Once-Through-Steam-Generators OTSG-A and
OTSG-B (Unusual Event).
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During a controlled plant shutdown, the OTSG leakrate increased to 120 gpm (Alert).
- During plant cooldown, Core Flood Tanks A and B failed to operate.
- OTSG leakage increased significantly and sub-cooling margin dropped below 25 (Site
Area Emergency).
Makeup Pump A and Decay Heat Removal Pump A failed to start.
- Isolation of OTSG-A.
- Loss of Makeup Pump B and Decay Heat Removal Pump B, resulting in a negative sub-
cooling margin (General Emergency).
l Loss and restoration of power to the Emergency Operations Facility.
- i Makeup Pump A and Decay Heat Removal Pump A were returned to service; the sub-
cooling margin and Reactor Coolant System inventory were restored.
Exercise termination.
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Activities Observed The NRC observed the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Facilities and actions of the Emergency Response Organization staff. The following were observed:
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Selection and use of control room procedures.
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Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events.
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Direction and coordination of emergency response.
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Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies.
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Communications /information flow, and record keeping.
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Assessment nnd projection of off-site radiological dose.
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Protective action recommendations (PARS).
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Provisions for in-plant radiation protection.
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Provisions for communicating information to the public.
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Accident analysis and mitigation.
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Accountability of personnel, t
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Post-exercise critique by the licensee.
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Exercise Finding Classifications Emergency preparedness exercise findings were classified as follows:
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Exercise Strength: A strong positive indicator of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal i
plant conditions and implement the Emergency Plan.
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Exercise Weakness: Less than effective Emergency Plan implementation which did not ofitself constitute overall response inadequacy.
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Area for Potential Improvement: An aspect which did not significantly detract from the y
licensee's response, but which merits licensee evaluation for potential improvement.
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General Findings i
Performance of the Emergency Response Organization and Emergency Response Facilities was j
generally consistent with the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
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8.
Emergency Control Center (ECC)
In the ECC (Simulator Control Room and Radiological Assessment Center), operators quickly identified equipment and system malfunctions. The Shift Supervisor (SS) noticed increased j
radiation monitor readings prior to any alarms. Operators provided a rapid analysis of the primaly-to-secondary leak and estimated the leakrate within five minutes of the Radiation Monitoring System alarms. They took prompt, effective actions to mitigate simulated accident conditions. They also closely mcnitored the leakrate and informed the SS of changes. Clear and timely plant status reports were communicated on the public address system.
The following expected actions were done well:
Use of Emergency Operating Procedures.
- Correct and timely classification of events.
augmented ED to the Emergency Support Director (ESD).
ED briefs were factual and concise, and established priorities.
- Full accountability was completed in forty-eight minutes.
- There were no exercise strengths or weaknesses. The following areas for potentialimprovement were noted.
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1 8.1 Observer Prompt of Radiological Assessment Coordinator (IFI 50-289/93-10-01)
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A licensee observer prompted the Radiological Assessment Coordinator (RAC) by mstructmg him on dose assessment computer start-up and providing input data. The licensee stated this was due to computer lock-up and loss of the central processing unit when the computer was re-booted.
j 8.2 Radiological Assessment Coordinator Performance (IFI 50-289/93-10-02)
The RAC used the wrong iodine spiking factor, which incorrectly resulted in a Site Area Emergency recommendation, though no premature event declaration was made. Later, he provided accurate dose projections for the initial release.
8.3 Event Response Realism (IFl 50-289/93-10-03)
The Emergency Director (Shift Supervisor) called out the entire Emergency Response Organization (ERO) at the Unusual Event. The licensee's procedures provide this option.
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I However, it is not a normal practice to call out the entire ERO for an Unusual Event. Also, discussions with the licensee indicated that this aspect of exercise performance _ may be developing into a practice that unnecessarily differs from the practice for an actual event.
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Technical Support Center (TSC)
When the TSC Coordinator (TSCC) arrived at the TSC, he immediately contacted the ECC and the Operations Support Center (OSC) to obtain current plant conditions and equipment status.
Good TSC support of the repairs to the Pressurizer Spray Block Valve and Makeup Pump A resulted in their timely return to service. TSCC briefings were good initially. Late in the exercise, however, they became group discussions rather than concise summaries. The TSC tracked plant conditions, developed contingency plans for makeup pump alignments, evaluated once-through-steam-generator (OTSG) isolation to reduce the primary-to-secondary leakrate, and evaluated OTSG usage as a water-to-water heat exchanger. A manual pressure / temperature plot was maintained for the primary system. Overall, TSC expected actions were done well.
No exercise strengths or weaknesses were identified.
The following areas for potential improvement were observed.
9.1 OTSG Irakage Rate Responsibility (IFl 50-289/93-10-04)
l It was unclear whether the ECC or the TSC had the lead in determining the OTSG leakage rate for use in release dosage rate calculations. TSC personnel believed they were responsible, but did not question the announced leakage rates when they differed from TSC calculation.
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9.2 TSCC Prompt (IFI 50-289/93-10-05)
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The TSC Observer prompted the TSCC. Specifically, when low pressure injection did not add inventory to the Reactor Coolant System, the TSCC asked the observer if in-line Check Valve i
CF-V-5B had failed closed. The observer responded that CF-V-5B had not failed, but that Core Flood Tank Outlet Valve CF-V-4B had failed closed. In this case, neither the question nor the response were proper because procedures should have been pursued to determine the reason for
the flow problem.
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9.3 Communications Between TSC and ECC (IFI 50-289/93-10-06)
Communications between the TSC and the ECC could be improved. For example, the TSC was
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evaluating the off-site release associated with the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump long.
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after the pump had been shifted to non-radioactive auxiliary steam. The TSC staff discovered
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the shift to auxiliary steam from an ED brie 6ng.
9.4 Use of Temperature / Pressure Indicators (IFI 50-289/93-10-07)
The TSC evaluated which temperature / pressure indicators to use in determining when to shift to decay heat removal for core cooling.
Such information could have already been proceduralized.
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Operations Support Center (OSC)
Overall, OSC expected actions were done well. The repairs associated with the Pressurizer
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Spray Block Valve and Makeup Pump A were timely and successful. P.epair teams had the
proper tools, technical manuals and equipment. TSC support of repairs was good. Electrical
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technicians were knowledgeable and aggressive in identifying and correcting failed components.
OSC status boards were generally kept current with priorities clearly identified. However, it was observed that a small status board in the OSC Coordinator's office, titled OSC PRIORITIES, had no clear purpose. It contained such information as times of event declarations.
No exercise strengths, weaknesses or areas for potential improvement were identified.
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Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The EOF was activated in 50 minutes. The majority of the staff arrived between 1625 and 1640, about 15-30 minutes after ERO callout. The Emergency Support Director (ESD) arrived at 1649,58 minutes after he was paged. The ESD announced that the EOF was one-hourstaged at 1703 (activated at 1700,50 minutes after callout) and relieved the ED at 1705. EOF staffing exceeded the minimum requirements specified by the ERO duty roster.
ESD facility briefings were informative and concise. ESD staff meetings were effective and of sufficient frequency to keep managers current on accident conditions, perform what-if
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For example, the ESD began using the protective action recommendation (PAR) flowchart at the Site Area Emergency (SAE) level to assess possible
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PARS. This resulted in rapid PAR determination and communication to the Commonwealth at the General Emergency (GE) level. Event noti 0 cations were timely and facility communications
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were well-coordinated. The ESD frequently communicated with the ED to assess changing plant conditions.
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There was no understanding of why field monitoring team (FMT) dose rates were two times the projected levels. EOF staff worked hard to reconcile the difference by re-checking calculation accuracies and investigating additional release paths, but never resolved the issue. The reason
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for the difference was that simulator-driven data were one-half the canned scenario data provided to FMTs due to the rapid response of control room operators in containing primary-to-secondary
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leakage. That was not communicated to FMT controllers. Although this was a scenario discrepancy, it was good training for the EOF staff in investigating disparate dose rate information. Also, no improper event classification or PAR resulted.
j The PAR was calculated by licensee procedure and communicated to the Commonwealth with j
the GE declaration. It was for evacuation of the Sve-mile radius and downwind sectors out to ten miles. That was consistent with licensee procedures and was assessed as conservative. The Commonwealth extended the evacuation throughout the ten-mile radius.
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l There were no EOF exercise strengths or weaknesses. Areas for potentialimprovement were:
11.1 EOF Emergency Lighting (IFl 50-289/93-10-08)
Normal EOF power loss was a scheduled scenario event.
The back-up diesel generator functioned properly and restored power in about eight seconds. During the power loss, there was no emergency lighting in the main room of the EOF. When power was restored, the EOF j
staff located battery-powered lamps and Dashlights. But, most lamps had weak batteries and insufficient replacements were available.
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11.2 Ccrrectness of News Release Infoi.mation (IFl 50-289/93-10-09)
All six licensee news releases were adequate. They were technically correct and easy to understand. However, they also contained misspelled and repeated words, and incomplete sentences. That could result in the appearance of lack of careful preparation / review and in degradation of their credibility.
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Overall Response Timing l
The following RESPONSE PERFORMANCE TIMETABLE lists the times of signiGcant exercise occurrences and actions for Unusual Event (UE), Alert (Al), Site Area Emergency (SAE), and General Emergency (GE) classifications. These include simulated emergency occurrence, l
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9 recognition, declaration, State and local (S&L) notifications, NRC notification, Emergency Response Organization (ERO) callout, and Emergency Response Facility activation and full staffing. Blocks which are not applicable are marked N.A.
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TABLE 12.1: RESPONSE PERFORMANCE TIMETABLE MILESTONE UE Al SAE GE Occurrence 1525 1555 1800 2040 Recognition 1526 1558 1803 2047.
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Declaration 1530 1559 1807 2050 S & L Notification 1538 - 1538 1602 - 1602 1812 - 1812 2052 - 2056 i
NRC Notification 1555 1618 1833
= 2105 ERO Callout 1545-1610 N.A.
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TSC Activation 1650 N.A.
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TSC Fully Staffed 1709 N.A.
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OSC Activation 1635 N.A.
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OSC Fully Staffed 1643 N.A.
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EOF Activation 1700 N.A.
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EOF Fully Staffed 1703 N.A.
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PAR Issued N.A.
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2050 The above table shows generally timely actions. The ED called out the ERO at the UE (1530).
However, drill artificiality resulted in a delay of the callout, i.e. the I&C Technician who performs this would normally respond to the Control Room from inplant, while in this case he responded to the training center (simulator)in traffic associated with shift change. That resulted in pagers being activated as follows:
Group 1 (senior management)
1551 Group 2 (initial responders)
1606 Group 3 (support organization responders) 1613 Considering the time required for travel (the exercise artificiality), callout initiation was assessed as appropriately timely. Initial responders staffed the TSC (1650) and OSC (1635), while support organization responders staffed the EOF (1700), all within prescribed time limits. The ESD was paged with Group 1 and responded at 1649, also within allowed limits.
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13.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified items
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The following areas for improvement were identified during the previous annual emergency exercise (Inspection Report 50-289/92-10).
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13.1 OSC Status Board Maintenance During the 1993 exercise, Operations Support Center (OSC) status boards were generally kept
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current with priorities clearly identified. The inspector had no further questions on this item.
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During the 1993 exercise, event descriptions were brief and non-technical, but contained no plant status information. This should be evaluated for further potential improvement.
13.3 Commonwealth Protective Actions i
During the 1993 exercise, the licensee received the Commonwealth protective action decision
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upon issuance and determined that it was consistent with ' their recommendation' and '
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Commonwealth practice. The inspector had no further questions on this item.
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Licensee Critique
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The NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique on May 20,1993.. After a brief review i
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of the scenario scope, licensee lead controllers presented their observations. The licensee's i
critique was assessed as good, with self-critical aspects which clearly characterized weak areas for management review. Most NRC findings were noted. No critique inadequacies were
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identified.
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NRC Exit Meeting i
Following the licensee critique, the NRC inspection team met with the licensee personnel listed
in Detail 1 of this report. Team observations were summarized. The licensee was informed of the following:
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Overall, the on-site licensee response to the exercise scenario was good.
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Some specific areas for potential improvement.
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