IR 05000289/1990008
| ML20043H962 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/15/1990 |
| From: | Thonus L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043H961 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-90-08, 50-289-90-8, NUDOCS 9006270134 | |
| Download: ML20043H962 (10) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RE610N I Docket / Report No. 50-289/90-08 License:
DPR-50 Licensee:
GPU Nuclear Corporation P. O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Facility:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Location:
Middletown, Pennsylvania Dates:
April 4, 1990 May 15, 1990
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Inspectors:
R. Brady, Resident Inspector D. Johnson, Resident Inspector T. Moslak, Resident Inspector F. Young, Senior Resident-Inspector Approved by:
L. Thonus, Acting Section Chief Date Reactor Projects Section No. 4B Division of Reactor Projects.
Inspection Summary:
Areas Reviewed:
The NRC staff conducted routine safety inspections of power operations.
The inspectors reviewed plant operations, maintenance /
surveillance, radiological practices, security measures, and engineering support activities as they related to plant safety.
Licensee action on previous inspection findings were also reviewed.
Results:
A summary of this inspection is described in the executive summary of this report.
Details follow.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1.0 Introduction and Overview...................
p 1.1 Licensee Activities....................
1.2 NRC Activities......................
1.3 Persons Contacted.....................
2.0 Operations (NIP 71707)*.................... 2 2.1 Facility Inspection.................... 2 2.2 Condenser Of fgas Continuous Iodine Sample........
3.0 Maintenance and Surveillance (NIP 61726/62703).........
3.1 Surveillance Observations.................
3.2 Maintenance Observations.................
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4.0 Radiological Controls (NIP 71707)............... 4 5.0 Security (NIP 71707)........-,..............5 6.0 Engineering and Technical Support (NIP 37700)......... 5 6.1 Safety Evaluation Report Review (10 CFR 50.59).....,.5 6.2 Review of Nuclear Engineering 8R Startup Report......
7.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (NIP 92703)..
7.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-289/87-08-04) Regulatory Required Definition.................... 6 7.2 (Closed)UnresolvedItem(50-289/88-23-01) Review Licensee Training of Fire Brigade Personnel............
7.3 (Closed)UnresolvedItem(50-289/88-24-02) Licensee Establish Program to Access Facility Areas for Equipment and Material Discrepancies........,.......
7.4 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-289/88-29-02) Licensee Evaluation Action to Streamline Job Ticket Closecut.... 7 7.5 (Closed) Violation (50-289/89-26-01) Inadvertent-RPS and ESAS Actuation During Surveillance Test..........7 8.0 Licensee Event Report (LER) Review............... 7 9.0 Management Meetings (NIP 30703).................
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DETAILS 1.0 Introduction and Overview 1.3 Licensee Activities 1.2 NRC Staff Activities The purpose of this inspection was to assess licensee activities for re; _ tor safety, safeguards and radiation protection.
The inspectors made this assessment by reviewing information on a sampling basis, through actual observation of licensee activities, interviews with licensee personnel, or independent calculation and selective review of applicable documents.
Inspections were accomplished on both normal and back shift hours.
NRC staff inspections are generally conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedures (NIPS).
These NIPS are noted under the appropriate section in the Table of Contents to i
this report.
Back shift inspections were accomplished during the following periods:
Day /Date Time April 8, 1990 7:30 pm - 9:30 pm April 21, 1990 8:00 am -10:00 am April 28, 1990 7:30 am - 9:30 am
April 30, 1990 6:00 pm - 8:00 pm i
May 9, 1990 4:00 am - 6:00 am i
1.3 Persons Contacted I
- D. Atherholt, Operations Engineer
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- G. Broughton, Operations / Maintenance Director
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- G. Derk, QA Support Supr.
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G. Giangi, Manager, Corp. Emergency Preparedness
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R. Harper, Manager, Plant Material
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C. Hartman, Manager, Plant Engineering
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D. Hassler, Licensing Engineer
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- H. Hukill, Vice President and Director
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- R. Knight, Licensing Engineer
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M. Nelson, Manager, Safety Review
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M. Ross, Plant Operations Director
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T. Seaver, QA Auditor
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H. Shipman, Operations Engineer
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G. Simonetti, Manager Emergency Preparedness-
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- G. Skillman, Director, Plant Engineering
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P. Snyder, Manager, Plant Materiel Assessment
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C. Smyth, Manager, Licensing
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R. Wells, Licensing Engineer
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- Denotes attendance at final exit meeting (see Section 9.0)
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l 2.0 Plant Operations 2.1 Facility Inspection The resident inspectors routinely inspected the facility to determine
the licensee's compliance with the general operating requirements of Section 6 of Technical Specifications (TS) in the following areas.
review of selected plant parameters for abnormal. trends;
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plant status from a maintenance / modification viewpoint,
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including plant housekeeping and fire protection measures;
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control of ongoing.and special evolutions, including
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control room personnel awareness of these evolutions; control of documents, including log keeping practices;
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implementation of radiological controls; and,
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implementation of the security plan, including access
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control, boundary integrity, and badging practices.
In general, the inspector determined that the licensee, from a housekeeping and fire protection perspective, was maintaining the plant in good condition.
Continued observations of middle managers were noted in and about the plant at offshift hours.
Observations noted by these managers on their backshift tours appear to have positive effects on the licensee's ability to quickly identify potential problems in the plant, Overall, management attention toward plant safety continued to be noted.
Details of the observa-tions are noted below.
2.2 Condenser Offgas Continuous Iodine Sampler i
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Ouring.the perfor.T.ance of surveillance procedure (SP) 1301-5.9
" Condenser Vacuum Pump Release Sampling" 'a chemistry technician l
l isolated the condenser vent continuous iodine sampler for approxi-
mately 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br />.
SP 1301-5.9 requires that the sample cartridge be
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preheated for 15-20 minutes prior to placing it in service.
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this preheat period,. the chemistry technician lef t the job site to complete another work task and neglected to return and complete the surveillance procedure.
The continuous iodine sampler is required by technical specifications, and can be out of service for~48 hours.
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The flow through the continuous iodine sampler is a parameter logged by the secondary auxiliary operator.
During.the period in question, most secondary auxiliary operators logged the flow as zero and annotated that this abnormal flow'was due to the ongoing surveillance procedure. However, two secondary auxiliary operators annotated that
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3 normal flow was exhibited. The operations director questioned these
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individuals and determined that they mistook a mark on the flow-meter
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for the reading, and logged this mark as an actual flow rate.
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The. shift foreman and shift supervisors did not note the
. inconsistency in the logs for this parameter, nor-did they note that this was equipment required by technical specifications.
Additionally, the procedure did not require that the chemistry technician notify the control room that the equipment was out of service.
The' licensee reviewed all chemistry procedures to ensure
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that prior to taking technical specification equipment out of service, chemistry technicians must first notify the
shift supervisor or foreman.
No other chemistry procedures
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were found with this notification problem, The licensee is
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also highlighting those log readings associated with technical specification equipment to aid in log review.
Based on review of this event, the inspector. concluded that tnis was an isolated event and is net indicative of a programatic weakness in licensee log keeping practices.
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inspector also concluded that the licensee adequately addressed the issue and implemented proper corrective actions, y
3.0 Maintenance and Surveillance Observations On a sampling basis, the inspector reviewed selected maintenance and surveillance activities to ensure that specific programmatic elements described below were being met.
Details of this review are documented in the following sections.
3.1 Surveillance Observations The inspector observed performance of the following surveillance tests to determine that:
the test conformed to technical specifica-tion (TS) requirements; administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained before initiating the surveillance; testing was' accomplished
by qualified personnel in-accordance with an approved procedure; test instrumentation'was calibrated; limiting conditions for operations
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were met; test data was accurate and complete; removal and restora-tion of the affected components was. properly accomplished; test results met technical specifications and procedural requirements; deficiencies.noted were reviewed and appropriately resolved; and the surveillance was completed at the required-frequency.
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These observations included:
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Surveillance Procedure 1303-4.1 " Reactor Protection System" - Channel B
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Surveillance Procedure 1302-3.1
"R.M.S. Calibration"-
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RM-A8G Surveillance Procedure 1303-11.25 "R.B. Local
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Leakage-Access Hatch Door Seals" No deficiencies were noted
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3.2 Maintenance Observations
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The inspector observed portions of selected maintenance activities to determine that the work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, technical specifications, and ' industry codes or standards.
The following. items were considered during this review: limiting conditions for operation were met while components or_ systems were removed from service;. required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and QC hold points were established where required; functional testing was performed prior to declaring the particular component (s) operable; activities were
accomplished by qualified personnel; radiological controls were
implemented; fire protection controls were implemented; and the equipment was verified to be properly returned to service:
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These observations included the following maintenanca activities:
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JT 27954 Repack AS-V3A
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Repair / Clean SW-52A
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The inspectors reviewed maintenance activities and found that the licensee-continues to perform maintenance evolutions adequately.
l 4.0 Radiological Controls l
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The inspectors observed routine activities associated with radiological l
control practices.
These included dosimetry control, exiting radiological l
control areas, routine surveys, and area radiation monitor' operation.. In addition, the inspector on a sampling basis reviewed the outstanding Radiological Work Permits (RWP).
This included job specific and standing RWP's. ALARA reviews and specific requirements of the RWP's were reviewed.
The inspector found that the selected RWP's were complete and l
accurately reflected the requirements for the specific job to be L
accomplished.
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5.0 Security During this inspection period, the licensee had.one reportable event-in the security area.
The inspector reviewed the event with the security manager. The inspector. concluded that the event was due to personnel error in that established turnover procedures for central control station -
operators were not strictly followed. A contributing factor to this event was a computer malfulction and non-user friendly computer read-out' format that makes. turnover review difficult.
The inspector also concluded that the licensee:took conservative compensatory measures after discovery of l
the malfunction.
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t The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions, which included briefing security personnel on the importance of procedure adherence and attention to detail during turnovers.
The licensee is also in the process i
of installing a new computer system.
The licensee has designed the new system to be more reliable and user friendly. The inspector concluded these correctiv?. actions were adequate.
6.0 Eneineering Support 6.1 Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Review (10 CFR 50.59)
The inspectors reviewed the SER review dated April 26, 1990, submit-ted to the NRC by the licensee in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
This report provided a discussion of changes made to
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procedures and modifications made to systems described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
There were four procedure changes and 15 modifications made that required NRC notification for the calendar year 1989.
The inspection described in this report determined that the informa-tion was adequate and generally descriptive enough to allow the inspector to determine the significance of the particular change or modification.
The inspector reviewed several safety evaluations associated with the modifications to ensure that the evaluations were comprehensive and appropriately evaluated the affect of each modi-fication on safety. Additionally, the inspector verified that no modification or procedure change required a change to the unit tech-nical specifications.
The inspector concluded that the-licensee had adequately fulfilled the requirements of -10 CFR 50.59 in yearly re-porting of changes and modifications.
6.2 Review of Nuclear Engineering 8R Startup Report The inspe tor reviewed the BR Startup Report during this inspection period. The report outlined the results of core physics testing done.
during the startup and subsequent power escalation in March 199.
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All core performance parameters were within their acceptance cri-teria.
Compliance with applicable technical specifications require-ments was successfully demonstrated. The inspector had no unresolved issues or safety concerns regarding the results presented in this report.
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Open Items 7.1 (Closed)= Unresolved Item (50-289/87-08-04) Regulatory
_ Required feTinition In order to clarify.its clsssification process, the lictnsee has adopted the terminology of Nuclear Safety Related'(NSR), 9egulatory Required (RR), and Other for plant hardware and procedure changes.
This change was prompted due to the ambiguous areas of interpretation presented from its previous classification of.important to safety, and not important to safety.
The inspectors had previously found the revised terminology acceptable.
However, this item was opened pend-ing completion of the licensee's action to update documents to the current terminology.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's QA plan which was approved on February 7,.1989, and Technical Function Procedure EP011 regarding.
~the Component Quality Classification System. The inspector noted the i
new terminology was implemented in these procedures. The inspector considered this item closed, i
7.2 (Closed)UnresolvedItem(Personnel 50-289/88-23-01) Review Licensee
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Training of Fire Brigade
i This item concerned the fire brigaJe training interval utilized by
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the licensee for annual training of fire brigade personnel.
The licensee maintained that the two drill per year requirement could be extended to 15 months as with technical specification surveillances.
In a subsequent inspection, during January,1990 (Inspection Report 50-289/90-0!i) a training record review of 1988 and 1989 calendar year records was documented. No discrepancies were noted.
This item is closed.
7.3 E(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-289/88-24-02)
Licensee sUallish Program to Access Facility Areas for Equipment and Material Discrepancieg This item concerned the identification of minor plant equipmen, discrepancies that were being identified by the inspectors durinc i
routine plant tours.
The licensee established a systematic scher.J1e
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of inspectica/walkdown of specific facility areas by operations and
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maintenance pesonnel. This is controlled by Administrative Proce-dure Ap-1008.
It appears to the inspector that this increased attention to correcting minor discrepancies has resolved most problems, Recent routine tours by the inspectors have not identified
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a significant number of discrepancies as in previous inspections.
Licensee corrective action in this area is acceptable and this item is-closed.
7.4 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-289/88-29-02) Licensee
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Evaluation Action to Streamline Job Ticket Closeout This item concerned the length of time that a' job ticket remains open following completion of work, prior to final management review.
In several cases the inspectors observed instances of. greater than five months until final closecut.
This length of time is considered excessive.
The licensee during the past two years has completed implementation of the new GMS'II maintenance planning, work control syGem. With this new system, the licensee has been able to ucre olosely track job ticket closeout and reduce _ the averMc time of closeout to approximately five days.
TFe inspector reviewed several completed job tickets and job order par.kages from the recently completed 8R outage.
It appeared to the inspector, from this review, that previous problems with work package closeouts'have been eliminated. This item is closed.
7.5 (Closed) Violation (50-289/89-26-01) Inadvertent RPS and ESAS Actuation Durino Surveillance Test This violation concerned two examples of the' licensee's failure to provide adequate control and proper procedure guidance during the performance of surveillance procedure (SP) 1303-11.18B "RB Local Leak Rate Testing - RB Spray Pressure Instrumentation." This resulted in separate RPS actuation and later an ESAS actuation. This occurred during the plant cooldown during the start of the BR outage in January, 1990.
The licensee briefed all lead maintenance foreman to ensure all tech-nicians are thoroughly briefed or adequately supervised.
The opera-tions department briefed shift supervisors (SS) to emphasize the need of shift supervisor involvement-in the bypassing and reseting of safety systems, even when the plant is in a shutdown condition.
Sp 1303-11.18B is being revised to provide better work control.
This action is adequate to resolve the violation'and this item is closed.
8.0 Licensee _ Event Report (LER) Review j
The inspector reviewed the LERs listed below, which were submitted to the j
NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73.
Based on a review of the LERs, the inspec-
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tor determined that: the technical content was accurate, the corrective
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actions specified were appropriate and there were not generic issues.
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addition to the technical adequacy of the LERs, the compliance with the
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requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 were reviewed.
There were no deficiencies noted.
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LER 90-001, dated February 6,1990, for an event on January 7,
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1990, Inadvertent Reactor Protection System and Emergency Safeguards Actuations due to Inadequate Procedure and Personnel Error
LER 90-002, dated March.2, 1990, for an event on January 31,
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1990, Gaps in the Reactor Building Sump Screen LER 90-003, Dated March 27, 1990, for an event on February 27,
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1990, Isolation of Turbine Bypass: Valves During Plant Heatup Due to Personnel Error LER 90-004, Dated March 30, 1990 for an' event on March 4, 1990, l
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Reactor Trip Following Zero-Power Physics Testing t
i LER 90-005, Dated April 3, 1990, for an event on March 6, l
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1990, Plant Shut Down Due to Steam Generator Tube Leak
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9.0 Management Meetings The inspector discussed tt? inspection scope and findings with licensee
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management weekly and at a final meeting on May 15 1990.
Those personnel marked by an asterisk in paragraph 1.3 were present at the final manage-ment meeting,
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