IR 05000289/1989011

Insp Rept 50-289/89-11 on 890510-0609.Two non-cited Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Equipment Operability (Maint & Surveillance) & Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings

ML20246E039
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	06/28/1989
From:	Cowgill C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246E015	List: IR 05000289/1989011 ML20246E012
References
50-289-89-11, NUDOCS 8907120072
Download: ML20246E039 (10)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I-

-Docket / Report No. . 50-289/89-11 License: OPR-50 Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation P. 0.. Box 480

'Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057

. Facility: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 J

Location: Middletown, Pennsylvania Dates: May 10 - June 9,1989 i

' Inspectors:

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D. Johnson, Resident Inspector,'TMI T. Moslak, Resident Inspector, TMI ung, Senior' Resident Inspector, TMI Approved by: 4},e C.Cowgil M bownA

, Chie Reactor 7rojects Section No. 1A d!a7/h Date Inspection Summary:

Areas Reviewed: . The NRC staff conducted routine safety inspections of power operations activities. The inspectors reviewed the following functional areas:

plant operations, equipment operability (maintenance and surveillance), and licensee action on previous inspection finding Results: Plant operations were conducted in a safe manner. One minor plant transient occurred due to an anomaly in the unit load demand module of the in-tegrated control system (ICS). Operator response to the transient was good and

.resulted in minimizing the plant transient. Maintenance and surveillance at-tivities were conducted satisfactorily. One non-cited violation was noted con-

-cerning performance of a PORV surveillance. Failure to follow procedures was partially attributable to technicians inability to perform the required main-tenance and testing within.a limited amount of time. Additionally, another non-cited violation was noted in the security surveillance area. This failure to follow procedure was considered to be an oversite on the part of the tech-nician conducting the surveillance. In both cases, management involvement was timely.and effectiv Corrective action for security surveillance, which in-cluded procedure change and equipment modification, was noted as a positive

.. indication of licensee ability to recognize and correct problems. No unre-solved items were identified. Licensee action on previous inspection findings was adequat yDR907120072g9054 w g ADOCM 05000 89 i PNV y i

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE 1.0 Introduction and 0verview............................................ I 1.1 Licensee Activities....................................... 1 1.2 NRC Activities.................................................. ..... I 1.3 Persons Contacted......................................... ..... I 2.0 Plant Operations..................................................... 2 2.1 Criteria / Scope of Review (NIP 71707)............................ 2 2.2 ICS Transient........................................ 2 2.3 Operations Summary.............................................. ........... 3 3.0 Equipment Operability Review - Maintenance / Surveillance.............. 3 l

3.1 Criteria / Scope of Review (NIP 62703/61726)........-.............. 3 3.2 Inadvertent Pressurizer Relief Valve Lift............ .......... 3 3.3 Equipment Operability Summary......... ......................... 5 Security..................................... ....................... 5 4.1 Inope rable Explosive Detector (NIP 71707) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (NIP 92703).......... 6 5.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-289/85-08-01): Licensee Perform Independent Safety Review of Limitor Va1 ve s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . q ue Motor Ope ra ted

.......................... 6 5.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-289/85-21-03): NRR to Review Design Adequacy With Respect to Post Accident Instrumentation........ 7 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-289/86-19-01): Procedure Com Task Group Corrective Action......... .................pliance

... ... 7 6.0 Management Meeting (NIP 30703).. ........................ ........... 8 1 \

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DETAILS 1.0 Introduction and Overview

1.1 Licensee Actinties The licensee operated the plant at full power during the report period except for a brief time during the ICS transient. No major plant transients occevred. As of June 9,1989, the TMI reactor was ,

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at 100 percent powe .2 NRC Staff Activities The purpose of this inspeccion was to assess licensee activities for l reactor safety, safeguards and radiation protection. The inspectors made this assessment by reviewing information on a sampling basis through actual observation of licensee activities, interviews with licensee personnel, or independent calculation and selective. review of applicable documents. Inspections were accomplished on both nor-mal and back shift hour NRC staff inspections are generally conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedures (NIPS). These NIPS are noted under the appro-priate section in the Table of Contents to this repor Back shift inspections were accomplished during the following periods:

Day /Date Time Saturday May 13, 1989 10:00 pm - 12:30 am Monday (H) May 29, 1989 10:00 am - 1:00 pm Wednesday June 7, 1989 9:00 pm - 12:00 am 1.3 Persons Contacted

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• Broughton, Operations / Maintenance Director

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J. Colitz, Manager, Plant Engineering

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• J. Enders, Security

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J. Fornicola, Manager, Quality Assurance

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• C. Hartman, Manager, Plant Engineer

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• W. Heysek, Licensing Engineer

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• Hukill, Vice President and Director, TNI-1

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C. Incorvati, Audit Manager

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M. Nelson, Manager, Safety Review

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A. Palmer, Manager, Radiological Field Operations

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M. Ross, Plant Operations Engineer

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H. Shipman, TMI-1 Operations

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D. Shovlin, Plant Material Director

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• P. Snyder, Manager, Plant Material Assessment

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C. Smyth, Manager, Licensing

• Denotes attendance at final exit meeting (see Section 6.0)

2.0 Plant Operations 2.1 Criteria / Scope of Review 1 l

The resident inspectors routinely inspected the facility to determine the licensee's compliance with the general operating requirements of Section 6 of Technical Specifications (TS) in the following areas:

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review of selected plant parameters for abnormal trends;

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plant status from a maintenance / modification viewpoint, includ-Ing plant housekeeping and fire protection measures; control of ongoing and special evolutions, including control

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room personnel awareness of these evolutions; control of documents, including log keeping practices;

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implementation of radiological controls; and,

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implementation of the security plan, including access control, boundary integrity, and badging practice Specific findings are addressed belo .2 ICS Transient On June 4,1989, the unit load demand module of the integrated con-trol system (ICS) failed to the mid field value (500 megawatts).

This failure caused the ICS to demand a power decrease from approxi-mately 880 megawatts (100% power) to 500 megawatt However, the on-shift control room operator recognizing the problem, took manual control of the ICS system and stopped the power decrease at 90% reac-tor powe Investigation of the problem by the licensee indicated a contact in the unit load demand module had failed open. The module was repaired immediately and the plant was returned to normal ICS alignmen Review of the event showed operator action to be prompt and plant response to be as expected. The inspector noted that the plant has l

experienced similar contact / connection problems with the ICS in the last few months. The inspector further noted that a failure of this type does not cause audible alarms in the control room. The opera-tor's attentiveness to the panel limited this transien __- _-________-__ -_ _ - _ - _ - .

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The inspector expressed his concern to licensee management about the plant's susceptibility to this type of transient. A discussion with the licensee's management indicated that they were very aware of and sensitive to the problem associated with contact problems in the IC The ICS. contact problem is being actively reviewed and worked by the licensee's maintenance organization. Proposed corrective action in-clude increased inspection frequencies of all critical ICS module The.long term solution to the problem is being studied by the B&W owners group with resolution several years away. At the conclusion of the inspection report, the inspector reiterated his concern about the sensitivity and susceptibility to this type of problem. The lic-ensee acknowledged the inspector's concer .3 Operations Summary -

The licensee continues to exhibit positive control over the various operational, maintenance, surveillance, and other work related ac-tivities that were conducted during this period. The inspector's review of the ICS transient indicated plant response was as expected 1 and operator reaction was good in minimizing the transient caused by l the ICS failure. In general, the inspector determined that the lic- '

ensee, from a housekeeping and fire protection perspective was main-taining the plant in good condition. Overall, proper management at-tention toward plant safety was note .0 Maintenance / Surveillance 3.1 Criteria / Scope of Review The inspectors reviewed selected activities to verify proper imple-mentation of the applicable portions of the maintenance and surveil-lance programs. The inspector used the general criteria listed under the plant operations section of this report. A more detailed review of equipment operability is addressed belo .2 Inadvertent pressurizer Relief Valve Lift On June 1,1989, while performing Surveillance Procedure SP-1303-11.45, licensee personnel momentarily lifted the electrically oper-ated pressurizer relief valve (RC-RV-2). A technician was in the process of performing the setpoint check of the relief valve, fol-lowing maintenance, to replace a sliding link terminal block in the valve control cabine The technician performing the setpoint check inadvertently left a volt-ohm meter (V0M) installed across test jacks when reinstalling the valve control fuses The meter set up a current flow path which l

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allowed the valve to open for approximately 5 seconds. An internal circuit protective device in the VOM actuated to break the circuit and allow the valve to de-energi7e and clos All valve indicators functioned normally (flow delta pressure, acous-tical and tail pipe delta temperature.) The valve tail pipe tempera-ture returned to normal the following day, June 2, indicating that the valve had reseated fully.

l-Control room operators identified the problem immediately and took

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action to monitor the valve status. As the valve reseated almost immediately, no action was required to shut the block valve RC-V- In accordance with administrative procedure AP-1029, the licensee convened a Plant Review Group (PRG) meeting on June 8, 1989 and sub-sequently issued a report detailing corrective action, These cor-rective actions consisted of a PCR to SP 1303-11.45 to reemphasize the need to take additional care in restoring the system to norma Maintenance was to review the need for additional procedure walk-

! downs when inexperienced technicians are used and operations was to review the practice concerning closing the block valve when the one hour time limit for an inoperable PORV is approached. Additionally, the licensing group is evaluating a possible technical specification l

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. change to reduce the frequency of PORV testing to be more in line with standard technical specification The inspector reviewed the PRG report per AP-1029 (No. 89-02) and conducted discussions with various licensee personnel. The procedure correctly specified that test equipment be removed prior to rein-stalling system fuses. The inspector determined that the technician failed to follow the applicable steps in the procedure as required by TMI-1 Technical Specifications, Section 6. Enforcement discretion is being exercised in not issuing a violation because the criteria specified in section V.G of the Enforcement Policy were satisfied. This non-cited violation is being tracked as (NCV 289/89-11-01)

The inspector concluded that this problem was an isolated incident limited to this surveillance test, which was aggravated by the time restraints of the technical specifications. Pending technical speci-ficatiors improvements for this surveillance, the inspector concluded that corrective action was adequate. The inspector had no other safety concerns on this ite For the purpose of open item tracking, NCV 289/89-11-01 is close _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - - - -

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3.3 E_quipment Operability Summary Generally, maintenance and surveillance activities continue to be conducted safely. Additional management attention is needed to en-sure surveillance, that are accomplished with time restraints, are performed without detracting from overall safe plant operation .0 Security is 4.1 In-Operable Explosive Detector On May 22, 1989 at approximately 11:45 pm, the licensee security force determined that the Unit 1 Processing Center explosive detector had been left in the calibrate mode following a previously performed surveillance. This was found when a technician opened the cabinet to perform the same surveillance procedure on the det ctor. The last time the cabinet had been entered was on the previous day, approxi-mately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> earlie The licensee security organization reviewed the event and determined that the detector, in this mode, was not fully functional. The lic-ensee declared the detector inoperable for this period of time and notified the NRC of the event via telephone to the NRC headquarters operational duty officer. The resident inspector was also informed of the event at approximately the same time. The licensee also dis-cussed this event with regional security personnel as to the report-ability requirements of this type of event and after consultation, determined that the event should not be classified as a one hour re-p rtable event, but should be recorded as an event to be captured in their quarterly report made to the NRC. The determination regarding deportability was provided by the NRC Headquarters Operational Duty Office The licensee security personnel immediately reviewed the event to determine the cause and corrective actions to prevent recurrenc From their review, the licensee determined the cause to be failure of the technician to follow the surveillance procedure. Specifically, Surveillance Procedure IMP 1530.05 required that the technician re-turn the functional mode switch to the operation position at the com-pletion of the surveillance. To prevent reoccurrence, the licensee instituted a second verification by an independent individual on shift to ensure that the equipment had been returned to an opera-tional status. In addition, the licensee modified the explosive de-tector by adding an additional external light ; hat informed the securit; guard when the detector was not n the operational mod The inspector reviewed and discussed the event with licensee security managemen From the review, the inspector concurred with the lic-ensee's finding that the event had been caused by the technician's

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failure to follow the procedure as required by TMI technical speci-fications, section 6. The inspector also noted that the licen-see, on its own initiative, had increased the surveillance frequency from weekly to daily. This was due to instrument drift that had been noted during previous surveillance. This increase in frequency and routine performance of this surveillance contributed to the techni-cians failure to follow the procedur '

The inspector concluded that increasing the frequency and routine performance of this surveillance by the licensee was a positive at-tempt by licensee's organization to improve the performance of the equipment. Review of test data and discussions with the security organization, indicated that this failure to follow a procedure was an isolated case. Based on this information, and the minimal safety significance, the inspector considered the violation to be licensee identified. No Notice of Violation is being issued because the cri-teria specified in section V.G of the Enforcement Policy were satis-fied. This non-cited violation is being tracked as (NCV 289/89-11-02)

and for the purpose of open item tracking is considered close .0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The inspector reviewed licensee action on previous inspection findings to ensure that the licensee took appropriate action in response to the find-ings or by self-initiative and that the licensee's action was timel .1 { Closed) Unresolved Item (50-289/85-00-01): Licensee Perform Independent Safety Review of Limitorque Motor Operated Valves This item was initially opened to track licensee corrective action for a problem with motor operated valves which was described in IE Information Notice 84-10. The licensee subsequently tested 22 valves which had the potential for failure if the motor torque switch set-tings were not proper. Several deficiencies were identified which were subsequently evaluated. This evaluation was reviewed in NRC inspection reports 50-289/85-12 and 86-06. The remaining action on this item was the licensee development of a plan to evaluate addi-tional safety related motor operated valves and to include them in the same test and evaluation program. In an internal memorandum dated June 11, 1985, the licensee established a program and schedule to test 219 Limitorque MOVS with the MOVATS Syste The list, in addition to a licensee calculation C1101-900-536-003 dated 10-27-86, which provided MOV Delta P and basis for torque switch setting on several limitorque motor operated valves that were to be tested dur-ing outage 6R was reviewed by the inspecto From this review the inspector determined that the licensee had taken adequate action to include the remaining MOV's in their test program and additionally provide documentation for valve Delta-P values for de-sign basis conditions. Additionally, the inspector reviewed licensee planned action for a Limitorque Corporation 10 CFR Part 21 report

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dated November 3, 198 The issue in that report concerned certain DC motor operated valve operating temperature limitations and also failure of some Melamine torque switches. The licensee was planning to correct these problems during the upcoming 8R outag The inspector concluded that the licensee action for maintaining a program for motor operated valves testing and evaluation was ade-quate. This item is close .2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-289/85-21-03): NRR to Review Design Adequacy With Respect to Post Accident Instrumentation This item concerned the adequacy and reliability of the power sup-plies for plant instrumentation used for post accident situation This instrumentation is described in Regulatory Guide 1.97. The NNI power supplies were modified during 7R to provide a more reliable source of power to this instrumentation. Previously, power for the NNI system was provided from primarily the "A" 115 vac vital bus and the "A" station battery. Loss of this one bus could have, in some situations, caused incorrect or misleading information in the control room. NRR staff additionally reviewed the licensee class IE power supply for an evaluation of licensee compliance to the requirements of IE Bulletin 79-27. A memo from the NRC staff, dated May 2, 1989 to the licensee, documented this review. In this review, the NRR staff determined that the ICS/NNI power supplies were adequately de-signed to withstand the loss of any single class 1E or non-class IE q bus that supplies power to these plant instrumentation system '

Additionally, in a final safety evaluation report, dated August 24, 1987, the staff determined that power supplies for Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumentation were adequate. Based upon recent modifications to the ICS/NNI power supplies and NPR evaluations noted above, this item is close .3 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-289/86-19-01): Procedure Complaince Task Group Corrective Action The remaining action on this item was documenting the completion of the long term corrective actions that resulted from the review of procedure compliance issues. The licensee issued a final report on this issue on December 16, 1988. The completion of action for the remaining seven "long term" issues was discussed. The inspector re-viewed these corrective actions and considered them acceptable. Ad-ditionally, the licensee has formed an Administrative Procedures Com-  ;

pliance Task Group to further refine their administrative procedure  !

system to eliminate noncompliance. Administrative procedure prob- i lems have been the main source of procedure non-adherenc This i group is in the initial stages of review of all site and corporate and administrative procedure _ - - -

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The inspector regards the licensee efforts in resolving procedure non-adherence problems as sufficient. No other concerns were gene-rated as a result of the inspector review. This item is close .0 Management Meeting The inspectors discussed the inspection scope and findings with licensee management weekly and at a final meeting on June 9,1989. Those personnel marked by an asterisk in paragraph 1.3 were present ct the final manage-ment meetin _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _