Text

Enforcement Conference Rept 50-289/93-08 on 930824 to Discuss Delay in Callout of Emergency Response Organization During Vehicle Intrusion on 930207
	ML20057A386
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	09/03/1993
From:	Laughlin J, Mccabe E; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20057A382	List: ML20057A381; ML20057A386;
References
	50-289-93-08-EC, 50-289-93-8-EC, NUDOCS 9309140133
	Download: ML20057A386 (25)
	v • d • e

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Region I

Docket / Report:

50-289/93-08

License: DPR-50

Licensee:

GPU Nuclear Corporation

P. O. Box 480

Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057

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Facility Name:

"Ihree Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit No.1

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Meeting:

August 24,1993

Meeting At:

NRC Region I, King of Pmssia, Pennsylvania

Prepared by:

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U

J. Iidghlig7 Emergency Preparedness Specialist

date

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Approved:

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E. McCabe, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section

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Meeting Summary

This was an enfortement conference held at NRC Region I, King of Pmssia, Pennsylvania on

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August 24,1993. The purpose of the conference was to discuss 1) The delay in callout of the

Emergency Response Organization during the vehicle intmsion on Febmary 7,1993, 2) The

safety significance of the augmentation delay, 3) The root causes and contributing factors, 4)

Corrective actions and measures to prevent recurrence, and 5) Matters in extenuation or

mitigation. The meeting was attended by NRC and licensee representatives and lasted for

approximately two hours and twenty minutes.

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DETAILS

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Participants

Licensee Personnel:

G. Broughton, Vice President and Director, TMI-l

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J. Fornicola, Director, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs

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G. Giangi, Manager, Cogorate Emergency Preparedness

D. Hassler, Licensing Engineer

C. Mascari, Director, Nuclear Assurance

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R. Rogan, TMI Licensing Dire: tor

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M. Wells, Media Relations Manager

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NRC Personnel:

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D. Beaulieu, TMI Resident Inspector

R. Cooper, Director, Division of Reactor Projects

T. Frye, Reactor Engineer, Projects Section 4B

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C. Gordon, State Agreements Officer

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R. Hernan, TMI Project Manager, NRR

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D. Holody, Enforcement Officer

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J. Joyner, Chief, Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch, DRSS

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J. Laughlin, Emergency Preparedness Specialist

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J. Luehman, Office of Enforcement

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J. Lusher, Emergency Preparedness Specialist

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E. McCabe, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section

S. Shankman, Deputy Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

D. Silk, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist

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G. Smith, Senior Security Specialist

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K. Smith, Regional Counsel

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2.0

Purpose

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The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the safety significance and corrective action for an

apparent violation identified during an NRC inspection performed on June 7-11,1993. The

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apparent violation involved a delay in the callout of the licensee's Emergency Response

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Organization during the vehicle intrusion on February 7,1993. Also discussed were the

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licensee's view of the root causes and contributing factors, and matters in extenuation or

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mitigation.

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Licensee Presentation

The licensee discussed the background of emergency preparedness at TMI, and summarized their

view of the different aspects of the apparent violation including: callout timeline, safety

significance, root causes, corrective actions, matters of extenuation / mitigation, and severity.

These were documented in the attached handout titled, NRC Enforcement Conference. Delay

in ERO Callouts. August 24.1993

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Concluding Statements

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NRC Region I management stated that the licensee would be informed of the need for and nature

of appropriate enforcement action relative to these matters at a later time.

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THREE MILE ISLAND

NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

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NRC ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE

DELAY IN ERO CALLOUTS

AUGUST 24, 1993

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NRC ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE

DELAY IN ERO CALLOUTS

AUGUST 24,1993

PRESENTATION OUTLINE

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A.

INTRODUCTION

T. G. BROUGHTON

B.

BACKGROUND ON EMERGENCY

G. J. GIANGI

PREPAREDNESS AT TMI

C.

CALLOUT TIME LINE

G. J. GIANGl

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D.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

G. J. GIANGl

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E.

ROOT CAUSES

G. J. GIANGl

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F.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

G. J. GIANGl

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EXTENUATION / MITIGATION

R. E. ROGAN

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H.

SEVERITY OF VIOLATION

' R. E. ROGAN

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civil PENALTY ADJUSTMENT FACTORS

R. E. ROGAN

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SUMMARY

T. G. BROUGHTON

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

T. G. BROUGHTON

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

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GPU NUCLEAR RECOGNIZES THE DELAY IN THE INITIATION AND

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COMPLETION OF THE CALLOUT PROCESS EXPERIENCED ON

FEBRUARY 7*, DID NOT MEET GPU NUCLEAR EXPECTATIONS AND

IMPROVEMENTS ARE NECESSARY

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GPU NUCLEAR PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED THE TIMELINESS OF THE

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CALLOUT ON FEBRUARY 7* AS DEFICIENT:

GPU NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY REVIEW GROUP (SERG)

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REPORT - A SIGNIFICANT EFFECTIVENESS ISSUE

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LER 93-S001

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THE DELAYED CALLOUT HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY REVIEWED AND

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NUMEROUS ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO PRECLUDE A

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BT! BACKGROUNDlO.N!EMERGENCKPREPAREDNESS7ATeTMI

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SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS MADE SINCE 1979

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EMERGENCY PLANNING INCLUDED AS A PART OF THE RESTART

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HEARINGS

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THE GPU NUCLEAR EMERGENCY PLAN REQUIRES A 60 MINUTE

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lNITIAL RESPONSE FOLLOWING CONTACT OF ERO PERSONNEL

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FORMAL DUTY ROSTER ROTATION

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MINIMUM OF 3 SHIFTS WITH SOME AREAS HAVING 4 SHIFT

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ROTATION

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GPU NUCLEAR HAS CONSISTENTLY DEMONSTRATED A STRONG

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COMMITMENT TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

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AGGRESSIVE DRILL SCENARIOS AND SCHEDULE

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SHIFT DRILLS, FULL ERO QUARTERLY DRILLS AND ANNUAL

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THE FEBRUARY 7* INCIDENT - POSED NO THREAT TO THE PUBLIC

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HEALTH AND SAFETY

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FROM THE OUTSET, ACTIONS WERE TAKEN TO ADDRESS POSSIBLE

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CONSEQUENCES.

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CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS CLOSELY MONITORED THE

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DIRECTOR O&M REACTED TO THE SITUATION AS IF A BOMB

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WAS IN THE VEHICLE AND INTRUDER HAD WEAPONS. THE

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POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF A BOMB WERE EVALUATED

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EARLY IN THE EVENT, THE SECURITY MANAGER AND DIRECTOR

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O&M CONCLUDED THAT THE INTRUDER HAD NOT BREACHED A

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VITAL AREA AND REMAINED IN TURBINE BUILDING. CRITICAL

COMPONENTS REMAINED SECURE.

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THROUGHOUT THE EVENT THE PLANT COULD HAVE BEEN

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SHUTDOWN SAFELY FROM THE CONTROL ROOM

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ABILITY TO MAINTAIN THE PL. ANT SECURE AND STABLE WAS

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NOT COMPROMISED BY THE DELAY IN MANNING THE

EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES. NO CRITICAL CAPABILITY

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WAS SACRIFICED.

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TMI ON-SHIFT STAFFING MEETS THE NUREG 0654 30 MINUTE

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RESPONSE REQUIREMENT.

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CAPABILITIES IMPACTED ON FEBRUARY 7*

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REDUCED ENGINEERING SUPPORT DURING THE DELAY.

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ACCESS THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES, OR ALTERNATES,

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WHEN NORMAL ACCESS IS RESTRICTED.

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A PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT TO LOCK THE CONTROL ROOM

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FIRE DOORS PREVENTED ACCESS TO THE SHIFT SUPERVISORS

OFFICE AND AUTOMATED CALLOUT SYSTEMS.

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UNLOCKING THE DOORS WAS OBSERVED IN PREVIOUS DRILLS

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WHEN A SECURITY OFFICER ARRIVED

UNLOCKING THE DOORS WAS NOT PROCEDURALIZED

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THE METHOD FOR CALLOUT FROM AN AREA OTHER THAN THE

SHIFT SUPERVISORS OFFICE WAS NOT ADEQUATE.

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F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

TO ENSURE PROMPT CALLOUT AND MANNING OF THE EMERGENCY

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RESPONSE FACILITIES, GPU NUCLEAR:

HAS PROCEDURALIZED THE REQUIREMENT THAT CALLOUT OF

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EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL IS TO BE INITIATED IN

PARALLEL "/ITH OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER NOTIFICATION OF

OFFSITE ALENCIES. (ROOT CAUSE 3)

HAS REVISED THE PROCEDURE FOR CALLOUT OF EMERGENCY

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PERSONNEL TO INCLUDE AN ALTERNATE METHOD OF

CALLOUTS FROM THE CONTROL ROOM AND TECH SUPPORT

CENTER OR FROM OTHER SITE LOCATIONS USING THE

PeOCEDURE. (ROOT CAUSE 3)

HAS PROVIDED GUIDANCE TO EDs, ESD, AND SHIFT

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SUPERVISORS ON HOW TO SELECT ALTERNATE ROUTES TO

THE OSC AND TSC WHEN THE PRIMARY ROUTES ARE NOT

AVAILABLE. (ROOT CAUSE 1)

IS IMPLEMENTING A ONE HOUR CA'.10UT OF SECURITY

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PERSONNEL TO SUPPLEMENT THE ON-SHIFT SECURITY FORCE.

IS CONTINUING TO EVALUATE IN TRAINING AND DRILLS THE

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CHANGES TO ENSURE EXPECTED RESULTS ARE OBTAINED.

THE LOCKING SCHEME FOR THE CONTROL ROOM FIRE DOORS HAS

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BEEN REVISED (SEE FIGURE UNDER TAB L). UNLOCKING OF SOME

FIRE DOORS IS NO LONGER RdQUIRED TO GA!N ACCESS TO THE

SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S OFFICE. THE LOCKS ON THE DOORS HAVE

ALSO BEEN UPGRADED TO UL-RATED. (ROOT CAUSE 2)

INSTRUCTIONS ON PROCEDURE CHANGES HAS BEEN CONDUCTED

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FOR EDs, ESDs, I&C TECHNICIANS, ECC COMMUNICATORS AND

SHIFT '"PERVISORS.

FUTURE DRILLS AND TRAINING WILL REINFORCE THE ABOVE

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CONCEPTS.

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NRC REGULATION FOR DESIGN BASIS THREAT DOES NOT CONTAIN

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A REQUIREMENT FOR PREVENTION OF VEHICLE INTRUSION

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AS A RESULT OF THE FEBRUARY 7"' INCIDENT, GPU NUCLEAR

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IS INSTALLING SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS IN EXCESS OF

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CURRENT NRC REQUIREMENTS

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EVENT CREATED AN UNCERTAIN RISK ENVIRONMENT WHICH

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THREATENED PERSONNEL SAFETY

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STABLE PLANT CONDITIONS PREVAILED THROUGt:OUT THE EVENT

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HESEVERITYf0F) VIOLATION

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CONSIDERING THAT NRC REGULATION RELATES THE SEVERITY

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LEVEL TO THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION, IT IS NOTEWORTHY

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THAT THIS EVENT COULD HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED AS AN ALERT.

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SUCH CLASSIFICATION IS SUPPORTED BY THE CURRENT TMl EALs

AND PROPOSED NUMARC EALs

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THE DELAY IN INITIATING THE CALLOUT WAS A CONSCIOUS,

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CONSIDERED ACTION. IT WAS THE JUDGEMENT OF THE

EMERGENCY DIRECTOR (SHIFT SUPERVISOR), NOT TO RISK

CALLING THE IREO INTO THE PLANT TO MAN THE EMERGENCY

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RESPONSE FACILITIES BASED ON PLANT CONDITIONS, VITAL AREA

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LOCKDOWN, AND OVERALL RISK TO THE IREO DURING PASSAGE

THROUGH THE PLANT.

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ABILITY TO MAINTAIN THE PLANT SECURE AND STABLE WAS NOT

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COMPROMISED BY THE DELAY IN MANNING THE EMERGENCY

RESPONSE FACILITIES. NO CRITICAL CAPABILITY WAS SACRIFICED

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FEBRUARY 7'h @CTUN

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NO CAPABILITIES WERE COMPROMISED

FEBRUARY 7th (WITH POTENTIAL RADIOLOGICAL

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CONSEQUENCES)

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A DELAY IN STRENGTHENING THE ENGINEERING SUPPORT

WOULD HAVE OCCURRED. HOWEVER, THE ONSHIFT

MANNING WAS CAPABLE OF RESPONDING TO AND

MANAGING THE POTENTIAL EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

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THIS INCLUDED DOSE ASSESSMENT,- REPAIR TEAMS,

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PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS (PAR's), ETC.

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ITCIVill PENAL TYfADJUSTMENT! FACTORS ~

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REFERENCE: 10 CFR 2, APP. C, SECTION VI.B.2

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IDENTIFICATION

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GPU NUCLEAR IDENTIFIED ON FEBRUARY 7 THAT THE DELAY IN

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THE CALLOUT PROCESS DID NOT MEET EXPECTATIONS. THIS WAS

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ONE OF THE FIRST AREAS REVIEWED BY THE GPU NUCLEAR SERG.

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b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

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THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED ARE THE

RESULT OF AN IN DEPTH ASSESSMENT OF HOW TO PREVENT A

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SIMILAR OCCURRENCE. GPU NUCLEAR HAS TAKEN THESE

ACTIONS AS LICENSEE INITIATED ACTION.

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c.

.LLCENSEE PERFORMANCE

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THE RESPONSE BY GPU NUCLEAR PERSONNEL AFTER DELAYED

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NOTIFICATION WAS TIMELY AND WELL WITHIN EXPECTATIONS.

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ADDITIONALLY, PERSONNEL NOT ON DUTY VOLUNTARILY

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RESPONDED TO THE SITE AFTER LEARNING OF THE EVENT.

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IN ADDITION TO THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PREVIOUSLY

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DISCUSSED, ITEMS IDENTIFIED IN THE IIT REPORT, SERG REPORT,

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PENNSYLVANIA DER REPORT, PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY

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MANAGEMENT AGENCY REPORT AND NRC INSPECTION REPORTS

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93-12 AND 93-08 ARE BEING TRACKED AND RESOLVED. A REPORT

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ON THE TOTAL ACTIONS TAKEN AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT IS

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DISTRIBUTED INTERNALLY ON A MONTHLY BASIS.

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1[plVit{fENALTYl ADJUSTMENT [F6CIORS

(CON 1?D)

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PRIOR OPPORTUNITY TO IDENTIFY

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PRIOR DRILLS IDENTIFIED SOME ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE

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FEBRUARY 7* INCIDENT. THESE ISSUES WERE REVIEWED AND

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DISPOSITIONED AS THEY WERE IDENTIFIED. AMONG THE ISSUES

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NOT PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED WAS CONTROL ROOM STAFF

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PERSONNEL SECURITY. THE CONTROL ROOM STAFF WAS

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CONCERNED FOR THEIR SAFETY AND THE OVERALL SECURITY OF

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THE CONTROL ROOM AND PLANT. THUS, THE CONTROL ROOM

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FIRE DOORS WERE NOT UNLOCKED TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE

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SHIFT SUPERVISORS's OFFICE.

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IN DRILLS, THE CONTROL ROOM FIRE DOORS WERE UNLOCKED

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WHEN A SECURITY OFFICER ARRIVED. THIS ENABLED NORMAL

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CALLOUTS WITHOUT DELAY. IT WAS EXPECTED THAT THIS WOULD

ALSO OCCUR IN AN ACTUAL EMERGENCY.

IN THE EVENT THE AUTODIALER WAS NOT AVAILABLE, A BACKUP

METHOD WAS AVAIL.ABLE, BUT PROCEDURALLY INADEQUATE.

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PERSONNEL SAFETY OF IREO HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED, BUT WAS NOT

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PROCEDURALIZED OR INCLUDED IN TRAINING.

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MULTIPLE OCCURRENCES

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THIS EVENT WAS THE FIRST SECURITY EVENT OF THIS NATURE AT

A t/uCLEAR FACILITY IN THE COUNTRY.

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DURATION

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THE DELAYED CALLOUT RESULTED IN ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY

RESPONSE FACILITIES BEING DELAYED BY APPROXIMATELY 11/2

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HOURS BEYOND EXPECTATIONS.

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QASU_M, MARY

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THE DELAY IN INITIATING CALLOUTS AND THE LENGTH OF TIME TO

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COMPLETE CALLOUTS DID NOT MEET GPU NUCLEAR

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EXPECTATIONS.

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GPU NUCLEAR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IS AN AGGRESSIVE

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PROGRAM THAT HAS CONTINUALLY AND CONSISTENTLY

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PERFORMED WELL DURING ANNUAL EXERCISES EVALUATED BY

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THE NRC.

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THERE WAS RECOGNITION EARLY IN THE EVENT THAT ALL VITAL

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AREAS WERE SECURE AND THE PLANT REMAINED STABLE.

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THERE WAS ADEQUATE ONSHIFT STAFFING TO RESPOND TO AN

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EMERGENCY AND EXECUTE ALL E-PLAN AND NORMAL PLANT

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OPERATIONS.

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ONCE CONTACTED, THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION

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RESPONSE WAS TIMELY AND WITHIN EXPECTATIONS.

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GPU NUCLEAR HAS BEEN PROACTIVE IN MAKING CHANGES THAT

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ARE REQUIRED TO ENSURE TIMELY AND EFFICIENT CALLOUTS AND

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TO REDUCE THE LIKELlHOOD OF VEHICUL.AR INTRUSION OF THE

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PROTECTED AREA.

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K4 CONCLUSION TAND ! REC,OMMENDATION

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BASED ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENT AND CONSIDERATION

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OF ALL THAT HAS BEEN PRESENTED, GPU NUCLEAR BELIEVES

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THAT ENFORCEMENT ACTION FOR THIS INCIDENT SHOULD BE

MITIGATED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF 10 CFR 2, APPENDIX C,

Vll.B, MITIGATION OF ENFORCEMENT SANCTIONS, BASED ON THE

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FOLLOWING REASONS

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UNIQUENESS OF EVENT

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NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE FOR THIS EVENT

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COMPLIANCE WITH NRC SECURITY AND EMERGENCY

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PREPAREDNESS REGULATIONS EXCLUSIVE OF THE DELAYED

CALLOUTS

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SINCE THE EVENT, GPU NUCLEAR HAS AGGRESSIVELY

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PURSUED AN UNDERSTANDING OF OUR PERFORMANCE

DURING THE EVENT AND HAS AND CONTINUES TO DEVELOP

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE.

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GPU NUCLEAR CONSERVATIVELY DECLARED A SITE AREA

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EMERGENCY.

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!:.

K.' CONCLUSION _ ANDi RECOMMENDATION

]

(CONTD)

\\

1

!

GPU NUCLEAR BELIEVES THE NRC SHOULD EXERCISE DISCRETION

!

.

i

IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 2, APPENDIX C, Vll.B.6, VIOLATIONS

j

INVOLVING SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. BASED ON THE MERITS OF

l

THE CASE AFTER CONSIDERING THE LACK OF SAFETY

[

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENT AND THE OVERALL GOOD

PERFORMANCE OF THE LICENSEE AND;

i

l

NOTIFICATION TO FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES

-

l

WITHIN FIFTEEN MINUTES.

i

l

APPROPRIATE ASSESSMENT ACTIONS WERE PERFORMED BY

-

4

l

ON-SHIFT PERSONNEL. NO FURTHER ASSESSMENT WAS

i

REQUIRED.

i

1

THE DELAY OF APPROXIMATELY 11/2 HOURS OF ACTIVATION

]

-

]

OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES HAD NO IMPACT

i

ON THE EVENT.

l

.

)

GPU NUCLEAR BELIEVES AN APPROPRIATE FINDING FOR THE

i

DELAY IN CALLOUT IS:

!

VIOLATION SEVERITY LEVEL IV

-

NO CIVIL PENALTY

-

j

,

!

,

.

QSUPRdRTINGilNFORMATION

i

!

1

I

N.

,

'

j

i

1

'

j'

l

4

TABLE 2: IREO RESPONSE INFORMATION*

'

.'

IREO

INDIVIDUAL

TIAE

TIME

RESPONSE

POSITION'

IN POSITION

CALLED

ARRIVED

LOCATION

!

RAD CON

UUUU

0705

Health

I

COORDINATOR

Physics Lab

)

SHIFT TECH.

JJJJ

0705

Control

ADVISOR

Room

'

ECC COMM.

FFFFFF

0705

Control

!

COORDINATOR

Room

EMERGENCY

M. Ross

0704

0741

Central

j

DIRECTOR

Alarm Station

i

j

OPERATIONS

H. Shipman

0704

0742

Control

!

COORDINATOR

Room

l

PUBLIC

R. DeSantis

0727

0810

South Admin.

1

INFO. REP.

Building

1

OSC

E. Fuhrer

0847

0901

Training

~

COORDINATOR

Center

ECC

DDDDDD

0831

0901

Training

i

COMMUNICATOR

Center

)

ED

XXXX

0825

0901

Training

l

ASSISTANT

Center

i

,

!

CHEMISTRY

PPP

0911

0933

Training

COORDINATOR

Center

1

TSC

DDDDD

0845

0940

Training

COORDINATOR

Center

3

l

MEDICAL

FFFF

0925

0948

Training

i

REP

Center

.

EhERGENCY

000000

0917

0948

Training

,

MAINT. COORD.

Center

!

RAD ASSESS.

EEEEE

0910

0952

Training

I

COORDINATOR

Center

ECC

SSS

0928

1031

Training

COMMUNICATOR

Center

!

IRE 0 AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME FROM NOTIFICATION WAS 30 MINUTES.

3

'

Positions required by the E Plan to be umaned within one hour of notification (Time

Called).

1

56

.

TABLE 3: ESO RESPONSE INFORMATION*

ESO

INDIVIDUAL

TTME

TIME

RESPONSE

POSITION

IN POSITION

' LED'

ARRIVED

LOCATION

TECHNICAL

H. Crawford

0708

0740

EOF

SUPPORT REP.8

EMERG. PREP.

G. Simonetti'

0758

0840

EOF

REP.'

EMERGENCY

G. Giangi'

0805

0841

EOF

PREPAREDNESS

REP.'

EMERGENCY

G. Skillman'

0752

0910

EOF

SUPPORT

DIRECTOR'

ESD

QQQQQ

0845

0925

EOF

'

ASSISTANT'

to

0910

hET DOSE

XXXXX

0845

0934

EOF

COORDINATOR'

to

0910

EOF

MMMMM

0845

0936

EOF

!

COMMUNICATION

to

COORDINATOR 8

0910

EOF

IIII

0845

0940

EOF

COMMUNICATOR 8

to

0910

GROUP LDR.

R. Shaw

0845

0940

EOF

,

RAD & ENVIR.

to

CONTROLS'

0910

ENVIRONMENTAL

B. Good

0845

0940

EOF

ASSESSMENT

to

COORDINATOR'

0910

_

EOF

UUU

0845

0940

EOF

1

COMMUNICA'IDR'

to

j

0910

1

l

PUBLIC

00000

0845

1025

EOF

'

INFORMATION

to

REP.8

0910

l

MM

Npg1

Positions shown are in wh with SERG report, Figure 9.

ES0 ONE HOUR AVERAGE RESPCf4SE TI!iE FR0:1 tiOTIFICATI0il WAS 54 ;iltlVTES.

57

._

_ _ - - _ -

-

.

u

l>

.

'

.

!

TABLE 3: ESO RESPONSE INFORAIATION*

~

-

L,

l

ESO

INDIVIDUAL

TIME

RESPONSE

'

POSITION

IN POSITION

CALLED'

ARRIVED

LOCATION

,

GROUP LDR.

G. Bond

0845

1000

PTFC

TECHNICAL

to

,

SUPPORT 2

0910

SECURITY

B. Franz

0931

1020

On Site

SUPP. COORD.2

.

-

GROUP LEADER

S. Siegrist

0845

1048

EOF

ADMIN.

to

i

SUPPORT 2

0910

,

SITE SERVICES

L Medina

0845

1200

Training

COORDINATOR 2

to

Center

0910

TECHNICAL

CCC

0845

0935

EOF

1

SUPPORT STAFF 5

to

5

0910

l1

EOF STAFFING

RRRR

0845

0940

EOF

i

COORDINATOR 8

to

'

0910

f

EOF

C. Fsust

0845

0942

EOF

j

INFORMATION

to

i

COORDINATOR'

0910

TECHNICAL

M. Nelson

0845

0945

EOF

SUPPORT STAD

to

0910

i

RAD CON

AAAAA

0845

0956

Training

l

SUPPORT

to

Center

i

COORDINATOR 8

0910

t

j

TECHNICAL

HHH

0845

1003

EOF

SUPPORT STAFF 8

to

0910

i

!

TECHNICAL

EEEEEE

0845

1048

EOF

SUPPORT STAFF 8

to

0910

!

MAINTENANCE

BBBBB

0845

1115

Training

SUPPORT

to

Center

COORDINATOR'

0910

j

Note:

Positions shown are in accordance with SERG report, Figure 9.

ESO FOUR HOUR AVERAGE RESP 0!lSE TIME FROM NOTIFICATION WAS ONE liOUR 50111NUTES.

!

58

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