Text

Insp Rept 50-289/90-04 on 900124-0226.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Refueling Activities & Maint/Surveillance Activities Related to Plant Safety
	ML20033H050
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	04/06/1990
From:	Tondi D; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20033H049	List: IR 05000289/1990004; ML20033H048;
References
	50-289-90-04, 50-289-90-4, NUDOCS 9004180005
	Download: ML20033H050 (14)
	v • d • e

{{#Wiki_filter:p .- /w '. ..,. w . [G: U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

< Docket / Report No. 50-289/90-04 License: DPR-50-Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation P. O. Box 480 Middletown,. Pennsylvania 17057 Facility: Three Mi.le Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 tocation: Middletown, Pennsylvania Dates: January 24, 1990 - February 26, 1990 Inspectors: R. Brady, Resident Inspector D. Johnson, Resident Inspec. tor . -T. Moslak, Resident Inspector Approved by: McD14

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' t Dominic Tondi, Acting Chief . Date Reactor Projects Section.No. 4B Division of Reactor Projects Inspection Summary: . Areas Reviewed: The NRC staff conducted routine safety inspections of outage activities. The inspectors reviewed plant operations, refueling activities and maintenance / surveillance activities as they related to plant safety.

These activities included reactor building sump screen i repair, pressurizer heater repair.and review of a licensee identified violation concerning the RM-L-12 effluent radiation monitor.~A review of the licensee's radiological controls program implementation was conducted.

A review of plant modifications included cold leg nozzle dams,. main feed water flow nozzle replacement and the EFW flow element replacement.

Licensee action on previous inspection findings were also reviewed.

Results: Plant outage activities were carried out in an orderly and safe fashion.

Identification of leaking fuel pins following a 100% fuel inspection-resulted in a core reload free of known fuel leaks.

Installation of the cold leg dams was also carried out in a safe fashion. Two leaking dams were removed' and replaced with new dams even though the leakage into the OTSG was minor.

The licensee identified a violation of technical specifications concerning an effluent radiation monitor for the plant water treatment system, I Corrective actions and administrative changes that have been implemented since the RM-L-12 problem occurred in 1983 were adequate to correct the problem.

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Modification. work was--adequately evaluated for safety concerns and work was '

. carried.out safely,, Licensee action on, previous inspection findings-was' ' adequate.

In general,. good interface between=GPUN Division personnel was- . n oted.'. The good i_nterfacing allowed early resolution of' technical ' problems - - associated with the outage.. ' - , . , I E O,

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. P d ~t TABLE OF CONTENTS

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. 1.0 Introduction and Overview................

'! 1.1" Licensee. Activities................... I'

1.2 NRC Activities......'...-..........-..

4 ._ 1.3 Persons Contacted..,..'... ,0.

' . .......,. .a '2.0 ' Plant 10perations~(NIP 71707)*... .:.z.

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. . 12.1 : Facility. Inspection..

.... '........... - 2" ~2.2 Refueling Activities / Fuel UltrasonicLTesting,....

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- 2. 3 ~ Ope rat i on s :S umma ry =. :.............. >... 1F " + a 3.0 Equipment 0perability (NIP 61726/62703)*.....=..... -3.

3.1~ Surveillance Observations.............. 3-

3.2 RM-L-12 Surveillance Problem............ 4L ' 3.3 Maintenance Observations............... 5' ' 3. 4.

Pressurizer Heater Repair...............-

I 3'.5 Reactor Building. Sump Screen Repair......... 7-t 3.6 Equipment Operability Summary.. .........-...: 7> 4.0 Radiological Controls. Program Implementation.......

: 5.0 Modifications (NIP 37700/37828)*...-...........

8r 5.1 Cold Leg Nozzle Dams................. -9 5 ~. 2 Main Feedwater (MFW) Nozzle Replacement'.

l ...... 5.3 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Flow Element. >10.

" .-... ... 5.4 Modification Summary. - 11 ? ...........-.... , 6.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (NIP 92703)* 11 L 6.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-289/87-09-18) Cycle.8 I y Startup IST Activities............... 11-

6.2: (0 pen). Unresolved Item (50-289/90-04-02): Review- - , ' Methods of' Internal. Dose Assessment.

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........ n o 7.0 Management Meetings...................

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Identifies.NRC inspection procedures.used.

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. . ' . ,, . . DETAILS 1.0 Introduction and Overview , .1.1 Licensee Activities P The licensee maintained the plant in cold shutdown through the inspection period. As of 8:00 am.on February 26, 1990, the plant ' was in cold shutdown at approximately 100 degrees Farenheit and 300 .y psig.

Reactor coolant system pressure was being maintained using'_a' -steam bubble in the pressurizer. _ During.the inspection period, the-licensee -completed fuel offload, ul_trasonic inspection of all fuel assemblies and core reload. Major modification work to the heat sink ' ' protection system was also completed. Once through steam generator-(OTSG) eddy current inspection was completed along with tube plugging t and plug replacement. The reactor coolant pump seals for all -four i pumps were inspected and repaired.

1.2 NRC Staff Activities ~ The purpose of this inspection was to assess licensee activities for reactor safety, safeguards and radiation protection.

The inspectors made this assessment by reviewing information on a sampling basis through actual observation of licensee activities, interviews with licensee personnel, independent calculation and-selective review-of-applicable documents.

Inspections were accomplished.'on both normal L and back shift hours.

NRC staff inspections are generally conducted in accordance with.NRC Inspection Procedures (NIPS). These NIPS are noted under the , appropriate section in the Table of Contents to this-report.

Back shift inspections were accompli. sped during'the following periods: ' Day /Date Time February 17, 1990 12:00 a,n - 2:00 pm-February 26, 1990 12:00 am - 6:00 am 1.3 persons Contacted

G. Broughton, Operations / Maintenance Director

-- J. Colitz, Director, Plant Engineering -- R. Harper, Manager, Plant Material -- C. Hartman, Manager, Plant Engineering -- -- M. Ross, Plant Operations Director

D. Hassler, Licensing Engineer

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H. Hukill, Vice President and Director

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< .. ,. . '~ 2: . ' R. Knight, Licensing Engineer -- M. Nelson, Manager, Safety Review - -- M. Ross, Plant Operations Director ' --

R. Shaw, Radiological Controls Manager

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H. Shipman,. Operations Engineer

-- D. Shovlin,1 Plant Materiel-Director - -- P. Snyder, Manager, Plant Material Assessment- -- r C. Smyth, Manager, Licensing ' --

M. Wells, Communications

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R. Wells, Licensing Engineer

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Denotes attendance at final exit meeting (see Section 8.2)

- ', 2.0 Plant Operations

2.1 Facility Inspection a The resident inspectors routinely _ inspected the facility _to. determine . -the licensee's compliance with the general operating requirements off Section 6 of Technical Specifications (TS) in the following areas: , review of selected plant parameters for abnormal trends;

-- plant status from a maintenance / modification viewpoint,- including --

plant housekeeping and fire protection measures;. - t control of ongoing and special evolutions, including-control room ' -- personnel awareness of these evolutions; . control of documents, including log keeping practices; -- implementation of radiological controls; and, -- implementation of the security. plan,- including access control, -- boundary integrity,- and badging practices.

In general, the inspector determined that the-licensee, from a house-keeping and fire protection perspective, was maintaining the plant in i ! good condition. Overall, management attention toward: plant safety l , continued to be noted.

Details of-the observations are noted below.

2.2 Refueling Operations / Fuel Ultrasonic Testing , l

' i During this inspection period, _the inspectors observed the licensee's I refueling operation.

The inspectors verif'ed that proper containment conditions were in effect and that the applicable Technical Specifica-tions (TS) were satisfied, t I ' ,

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.. The inspectors verified that all' core alterations were controlled by - e cn approved procedure.- The inspectors observed fuel movements at the-reactor building operating floor, the spent. fuel pool and the control room. The inspectors had no safety concerns.

n The licensee performed a full core off-load.

Each assembly underwent i an ultrasonic test-to verify fuel rod' integrity.

Out of the 177 assemblies that were tested, three.sssemblies had-positive indications-of defective fuel rods. The only' defective fuel assembly which was-scheduled for' reuse was recaged using'a specially. designed assembly with a removable upper end fitting- -The recaging effort involved relocating the intact fuel rods i_nto the new assembly and replacing the two defective fuel rods with' dummy fuel rods. The fuel reload-was completed February 7,1990.

-The inspectors c g ucted a meeting with licensee engine'ers and NRR personnel to disM$s the impact of Generic Letter. (GL) 90-02.

The-licensee provide'd an explanation of how their present TS and.the- ! proposed update to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR):would D appropriately document licensee action on the rec' aged. fuel assembly

with two dummy fuel rods.

The NRC staff concluded.that' operation' with the present TS and the proposed-update to'the FSAR would appro-i priately document licensee action on the recaged fuel assembly with I two dummy fuel rods. The NRC staff (NRR) concluded that operation with.present Technical Specifications was acceptable.

The licensee - ' committed to submit a-technical specification change to. incorporate-

the guidance in GL-90-02 and_also. include the, appropriate.. reporting-l requirements for future fuel rod replacement..The inspector reviewed the FSAR update.and based on the above information, had no safety concerns on licensee-action in this area.

, l l 2.3 Operations Summa n i Operations activities were generally conducted in a safety conscious ) manner.

Identification of leaking fuel pins during UT examinations .! resulted in-a core reload for cycle 8 free of known fuel defects.

l 3.0 Equipment Operability 3.1 Surveillance Observations-On a sampling basis, the inspector reviewed selected surveillance l activities to ensure that specific programmatic elements described - below were being met. Details of this review are documented in the ' following sections.

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, The inspector observed performance of.the_following' surveillance tests to determine'that: the test' conformed to TS requirements;-.

administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained before initiating , the surveillance; testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in ' accordance with an approved procedure; test instrumentatlon was calibrated; limiting _ conditions for operations were met; test data- ' " was accurate and complete; removal and restoration of the affected components was properly accomplished; test results met TS.and pro-l cedural requirements; deficiencies ~ ~noted were reviewed and appro- ~ l priately. resolved; and the surveillance was completed at the required frequency.

This inspection included review of 'the following procedures: Surveillance Procedure (SP) 1303-11.42 " Emergency Feedwater- -. Flow Test from Condensate Storage Tank" SP 1302-5.13 " Control Rod Absolute and Relative Position -- , Indication Equipment Surveillance Calibration" SP 1302-5.37 "HSPS - EFV-30 Control Loop Calibration Test" -- The inspector had no safety concerns.regarding these procedures.

3.2 RM-L-12 Surveillance Problems .The licensee notified the inspector of a procedural' inadequacy and design deficiency concerning an effluent' radiation monitor (RM-L-12).

RM-L-12 is the process monitor for the discharge of the-effluent of the industrial water. treatment system (IWTS).

RM-L-12 was installed in 1983.

Because IWTS is a potential release path for radioactive material, a TS change was made to incorporate the RM-L-12 surveillance test to implement channel calibrations and i channel testing in the same fashion as for other effluent monitors.

, l When the TS change was processed, the licensee failed to reflect-the ! actual design of the system and surveillance procedure requirements, ! into the TS change. As a. result,.the TS change required verification-that when the_ instrument control was moved from the operate mode to.

the defeat position an alarm would be received.

This check was not possible because'the RM-L-12 circuitry was not designed for the alarm circuitry to be tested.

This~ situation was discovered during a biennial review of surveillance procedure SP-1303-4.10, RM-L-12 Interlock Test, when the reviewer compared the i procedure against the required surveillance. The licensee then voluntarily notified the NRC inspector of the problem.

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- , l The licensee took corrective action to modify the RM-L-12 circuitry ': l= via change modification request (CMR) CMR-90-015, which installed l the required relays and wiring to provide an alarm in the control ' room when the RM-L-12 operate switch was placed in the " defeat" mode.

The modification had not been completed by_the end of the inspection l pedod.

, L The inspector: reviewed the CMR and considered it adequate'to l accomplish the desired system function to meet technical specifica-tion requirements when completed.. Additionally, the. inspector verified through review of records and discussion with licensee personnel that. adequate measures were in place to prevent this type , of problem from reoccurring. The licensee has established a full time review program coordinator for the TS surveillance _ program described in administrative procedure AP-1001J, " Technical Specifi-cation Surveillance. Testing Program".

This individual maintains an up to date matrix of TS surveillance requirements matched to appro- < priate procedures.

Licensing personnel maintained adequate records of this review process.

The inspector reviewed the licensee' documentation which _ coordinates all procedure changes to modifica- , tions for the 8R outage..The record keeping system. appeared to be comprehensive and' inclusive.

l Additionally, the plant review group (PRG) was established in 1983 l and a requirement proceduralized in AP-1001J for PRG review of_ all technical specification changes.

This provided another level: of l assurance that modifications, procedures and TS changes are adequately l coordinated and implemented. The biennial review process of al1 l procedures, which changed in 1988, now requires'a check for the-reviewer to compare the procedure against the technical specification require- ' ments.

The QA organization periodically audits this. process.

The inspector concluded that the licensee had not properly completed a required surveillance for RM-L-12.

This was considered to be a licensee identified violation of TS 6.8.1 which requires surveillance procedures be implemented for radioactive waste effluent discharge ' activities.

Corrective action that has been implemented since 1983 was considered adequate by the inspector to prevent reoccurrence of the problem.

This occurrence was not required to be reported.

No other corrective action by the licensee is required to address this issue and the violation is considered closed.

No notice of violation will be issued.

(50-289/90-04-01) 3.3 Maintenance Observations , The inspector observed portions of selected maintenance activities to determine that the work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, TS and industry' codes or standards.

The following items were considered during this review: limiting , conditions for operation were met while components or systems were !

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removed from service; required administrativ'e approvals were obtained , prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and QC hold points were established where required; functional testing was performed prior to declaring the-parthular component (s) operable; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; radiological controls were implemented; fire protection controls were-implemented; and the equipment was verified-to be properly returned to service:

These observations included: ' IE Vital' Inverter Repair per Job Order JO 19826 _ -- Pressurizer Heater Connector Repair J -- The inspector had no safety concerns, concerning these activities, at: the conclusion of the-inspection.

. ) 3.4 Pressurizer Heater Connector Repair j During the past operating cycle the licensee experienced several j pressurizer. heater failures, requiring transfer of power supplies for i certain heaters from one group to another. This was required to i - maintain an adequate heater capacity in the continuously energized j heater' group.

! During the recent outage, an inspection of the three heater bundles.

revealed that 17 of 117 heaters had failed due to apparent grounding ] of the heater connector pins to the cable housing.

These heaters had.

] cunnector pins that had been damaged to the point that a.new-heater o element had to be installe%. l The licensee evaluated the pressurizer connectors and determined that f a different type connector would be better suited for this applica-tion instead of a replacement in kind. The licensee thus modified-i the damaged heater connectors'by replacing the connector with a permanent type connection instead of the existing removable type (mini-mod TI-MM-128141-001). The existing damaged connectors were removed and the pins on the connectors cleaned of oxides.

A double female connector was crimped on. each of two leads supplying each heater i and mated with the male pin using heat to slide the mated parts.

. .i together. A mold was then placed around the entire connection and poured full with ceramic insulation.

Upon curing of the ceramic -, (approx. 2 hours) a moisture boat was placed over the connection, ( clamped ar.d vulcanized.

The ceramic has curing properties (above 200 t degree F) that developed into a structure impervious'to. moisture.

The inspector reviewed the safety evaluation (SE 128141-001) which was I completed for this modification. The inspector also verified that the heaters which had previously been used for the required group 8 , and 9 heaters (TS 3.1.3.4) were not among those that were damaged.

The connectors for these heaters were r 7 aired. The inspectors also , observed portions of the work in progress.

No deficiencies were

noted.

The work was conducted in a safe and deliberate manner.

No ' safety concerns were identified as a result of this repair activity.

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. . . . . 7; , 3.5 Reactor Building Sump Screen Repair While performing visual inspections.of the -reactor building (RB) sump in conjunction with decay-heat system surveillance, the licensee discovered gaps in the one-eighth inch wire mesh screen located in the RB sump.

This wire mesh screen prevents large suspended solids.

' from migrating' to the ' suction of the low pressure injection (LPI)' pumps during long term recirculation.

This mesh screen also protects the r RB spray pumps and prevents.the RB. spray nozzles from becoming clogged.

. The licensee found three-gaps approximately 1 inch wide by 30 inches long in the horizontal section near two hatches installed in 1983.

Several smaller gaps were noted near the horizontal and vertical access hatches. These gaps were caused by damage to the wire: mesh screen when removing and reinstalling access hatches.

The Plant ' Engineering Group prepared' engineering' evaluation request-(EER) 90-014E to. repair reactor building sump screen.

The iertical i ' hatch wi.11 be permanently re-wired and no longer u' sed is:an access . point.

The horizontal surface was temporarily renaired.by wiring a second one-eighth inch wire mesh screen over the hatch area.

This temporary repair will be in place until the 9R refueling: outage when a permanent modification can be installed. The inspector. reviewed ~ ' EER 90-014E and associated safety evaluation and had no safety concerns.

The licensee made the required four hour notification to the NRC in

accordance with'10 CFR 50.72 b.iii:. The licensee prepared a. Licensee Event Report (LER) 90-002. -The inspector reviewed the'.LER..The corrective action proposed by the licensee was to revise applicable plant procedures and to visually inspect the RB sump screen every-refueling outage. The inspector reviewed Surveillance Procedure 1303-11.16 "DecayiHeat-Removal System Leakage" Rev 22 and noted that this procedure' change had been implemented. The' inspector concluded-this corrective action was adequate.

3.6 Equipinent Operability Summary i Maintenarce activities were observed to be conducted in a safe manner.

Good supervision'and QC presence was noted.

Licensee action to resolve the pressurizer heater connector problem was complete and well documented. Additionally, the voluntary identification of the RM-L-12 discrepancy was noteworth __.

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. 4.0 Radiological Controls Program Implementation The inspector conducted a limited review of the licensee's radiological controls program with special attention given to the hot particle control program. The inspector accomplished this review through routine plant- - tours, reactor. building entries, observation of on going maintenance and surveillance activities, attendance at investigative critiques of personnel contaminations and review of general radiological conditions.

During the outage period, the licensee experienced a limited' number (18)-

- of hot particle personnel contaminations _.

There were.no incidents in which any personnel contamination resulted in a dose to an individual in ' excess of regulatory limits.

i Through attendance at investigative critiques and review of follow-up corrective actions, the inspector determined that the licensee responded in a_ timely manner to characterize _the nature of each hot particle and - assess the dose to the individual. Additionally, the licensee expediti- - ' ously took corrective actions to-improve hot particle controls. These-j corrective actions included limiting the down time of the step-in personnel contamination monitors (PCM-1) thus increasing the ability to detect hot particles.

The use of the PCM-1 for reactor building egress provided more uniform personnel surveys than individual's performing self-surveys using RM-14 instrumentation.

Overall, radiological controls personnel and their management conscientiously implemented measures to assess and limit worker's dose during outage activities.

5.0 Modifications j d General l The inspectors conducted a review of modification activities in progress I for the 8R outage.

The inspector reviewed the safety evaluations (SE) and the system design descriptions (SDD) for the particular modification I l activity.

Direct observation of the work in progress was also accomplished to verify that work was conducted -in accordance with appli- ' cable instructions and drawings. The SE and SDD were reviewed to assure , ' that applicable licensee and technical specification commitments were incorporated into the modification design.

The. inspector also verified other items such as revisions to operating procedures, to reflect configuration change, training handouts accomplishment of QA/QC reviews and, in some cases, completion of testing. The following modifications were reviewed:

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5.1 Cold Leg Dam Installation The licensee modified both the Once Thru Steam Generators (OTSG).to

allow installation of cold leg nozzle dams.

Each OTSG has-two cold.

j legs thus requiring the installation of a total of four cold leg ' nozzle' dams. This removable dam seal consists of three separate seals ~, two inflatable:and one mechanical seal and is installed in the lower head of the OTSG's in the cold leg nozzles.

The purpose of these seals is to prevent water from entering the primary side of the OTSG when j primary piping and the refueling canal are filled.

This modification j allows the licensee to perform the OTSG In-Service Inspection program

in parallel with' refueling operations.

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This modification involved welding.a two piece retaining ring on each I of the two outlet nozzles'in both OTSG's,-installing the removable - dam seals, then connecting the seals to instrument air source and a.

backup nitrogen source. The nozzle dams for each' generator had its own control panel.to monitor and regulate air pressures-on the inflatable seals and to monitor overall seal performance.

The inspector r.eviewed the installation specification (TI-IS-412562-001) . for the OTSG nozzle dam retaining ring installation.

The inspector i also reviewed the modification safety evaluation (SE 412.562-001 i Rev. 3). The safety evaluation covered the installation of-the ' retaintre rings, installation, and use of the cold leg' nozzle dams.

i The inspector determined the safety evaluation was thorough. No safety concerns were identified by the~ inspector, i , The inspector observed a training brief'for licensed operators and auxiliary operators on the-operation and monitoring of the cold leg i nozzle dams.

The inspector routinely reviewed the required data readings that were maintained in the control room. The' inspector also physically observed the control panel during reactor building tours.

The inspector concluded the cold leg nozzles operated as designed.

5.2 Main Feedwater (MFW) Nozzle Replacement During this outage, the licensee replaced all 32 main feedwater (MFW)

' nozzles in both OTSGs (64 total). The original nozzles were made of~ i carbon steel, and the nozzle plate had 180 one eight inch (0.125") flow holes.

The holes were arranged in a rectangular. pattern with 12 rows with 15 holes per row. A visual inspection of these nozzles performed during the 7R outage showed indication of erosion of the flow holes.

Other B&W plants with similar MFW nozzles have also experienced.

v t e Inspection Report - Crane - 1990004
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1990 Quarterly Integrated 1Q (0) 2Q (0) 3Q (0) 4Q (0) Assessments Mid Cycle End of Cycle 7(0) 8(0) 9(0) 10(0) 11(0) 12(0) 14(0) 15(0) 16(0) 17(0) 34(0) 80(0) Security Operator Exams Emergency Planning Other

IR 05000289/1990004

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REGION I

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