IR 05000289/1980006
| ML19318B264 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/1980 |
| From: | Ebneter S, Gage L, Paolino R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19318B259 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-80-06, 50-289-80-6, NUDOCS 8006250182 | |
| Download: ML19318B264 (7) | |
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O U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I i-Report No.
50-289/80-06 Docket No.
50-289
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License No. DPR-50 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Metropolitan Edison Company
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P. O. Box 542 Readina, Pennsylvania Facility Name:
Three Mile Island, Unit 1
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Inspection at:
Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted:
Ma ch 1-31, 1980
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<FC Inspectors:
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L. Gage, Rphctor / Inspector
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b Sc R. Paolino,/ Reactor Inspector datit signed
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WW dd-sh/so W. Sanders, R ctor Inspector dat6 signed
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t/, /se y, Reactor Inspector (ate' signed S. Ibneter S. Ebnetar, Chief, ESS #2, RC&ES Branch date signed ak 5//3/#o Approved by:
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S. Ebneter, Chief, Engineering Support ddte sig'ed Section, RC&ES Branch Inspection Sumary Inspection on March 1-31, 198_0 (Report No. 50-289/80-06)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional-based inspectors of work activities and records associated with ~the Unit 1 Restart Program, ir.cluding:
engineering design, quality assurance audits, electrical heat shrink tubing / butt splicing (modifications nos. RM-1 and RM-4), fire protection (modification no. NM-
40), in-service inspection non-destructive examination (ISI NDE) program, ';pgrade of l
the decay heat system (modification no. RM-2), installation of the hydrogen recombiner (modification no. RM-12), high pressure safety injection cross-connect piping (modi-
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l fication no. RM-14), upgrade of the waste gas system (modification no. LM-5), re-l placement of pipes cracked by intergranular stress corrosion (modification no. NM-17), review of licensee event report 80-03, and tendon surveillance. The inspection
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ir.volved 224 inspection hours on site by four NRC regional-based inspectors and one
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section chief.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted GPUSC
- N. Kazanas, Manager of Ouality Assurance
- J. Fornicola, Operations QA Supervisor R. Fenti, Supervisor, QA Audits R. Markowski, QA Auditor H. Decker, Fire Protection Engineer
- J. Fritzen, Project Management J. Wright, QC Manager E. Steudel, EP&I Section Manager Metropolitan Edison
- G. Troffer, Unit 1 Restart Project
- M. Shoffer, Engineering Assistant
- L. Harding, Licensing Engineer
- J. Herbein, Vice President G. Miller, Unit 1 Director, Restart T. Hawkins, Supervisor, Start-up and Testing Gilbert Associates, Inc.
J. Daly, Senior QA Program Manager P. Shipper, Jr., Project Electrical Supervisor W. Brannen, Fire Protection Engineer R. Rogers, Project Manager D. White, Manager, Nuclear Systems W. Sailer, Manager of Projects Hartford Steam Boiler Company R. Toms, Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- A. Fasano, Chief, Site Operations Section, TMI
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- D. Haverkamp, TMI-1 Senior Resident Inspector
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- denotes personnel present at exit interview.
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2.
Engineering Design (Refer to IE:IV Inspection Report No. 9900525/80-01)
The inspector reviewed the design activities in support of the Unit 1
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Restart Program at the offices of the architect-engineer, Gilbert Asso-ciates, Inc. (GAI). The following Deviations from GAI commitments were
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a.
Failure to effect corrective action to resolve area of concern No. 1, in audit SA-79-1.
b.
Failure to conduct reviews of design verification records, at least quarterly, in the area of structural-design.
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Failure to identify drawings as being " safety related."
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Failure to provide a procedure for execution and followup of the annual management evaluation of the quality assurance program.
The following items of concern were identified:
a.
An inconsistency between the quality assurance (QA) requirements in a purchase requisition in engineering change memo (ECM) No. 017 and the QA involvement specified on the ECM release sheet.
b.
The apparent exclusion of the " Recommended Requirements for Restart of TMI-1" (the Restart Report) from the list of design verification bases.
A complete description of the above Deviations and items of concern appears in the referenced IE Inspection Report.
3.
Quality Assurance Audits The inspector performed a surveillance of the licensee's audit function during licensee audit No. 0-TMI-I-V-80-01 of his " continuing-services" contract with his architect-engineer, Gilbert Associates Incorporated.
The inspector reviewed the audit plan, observed the audit team conducting the audit, observed the audit team's presentation of their findings and their recommendations for corrective action, and provided the audit team with a critique of their performance subsequent to the audit.
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The inspector indicated that the audit was satisfactory; no items of non-compliance were identified in the licensee's conduct of the audit.
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4.
Fire Protection The inspector examined the following licensee specifications, in review of the fire protection modifications associated with task NM-40:
SP354004692-094(firedetection)
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SP.355044692-094(halon1301)
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SP 356044692-094 (fire standpipe & hose)
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SP.358044692-094'(auto deluge)
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SP366044692-094(firedampers)
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The inspector did not find any evidence that a quality assurance program, as set forth in the NRC Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 and the licensee's procedure GP-1008 (Rev. 2) had been implemented.
The licensee, in their audit No. 0-TMI-V-1-80-01 of their architect-engineer had also identified this:
the architect-engineer, in his generation of engineering change memos (ECMs) for task NM-40, had not identified the ECMs as being of safety significance--and therefore, did not require the implementation of the QA program.
This was identified as an item of concern by the inspector.
(80-06-01)
5.
Fire Drill The inspector performed a surveillance of the licensee's implementation of an on-site fire drill.
He reviewed the scenario of the drill, observed the conduct of the site fire brigade, observed the response of the local volun-teer fire department, and attended the critique of the drill activities subsequent to the drill.
i The inspector provided the licensee with the following observations:
a.
'ihe 2h inch diameter fire hose appeared to be too heavy to be handled by the two fire brigade members, once the hose was charged.
Due to the lack of additional help the two fire fighters were forced to remain in one location.
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b.
The fire generated dense smoke inside and outside the diesel generator building, resulting in poor visibility. The fire brigade did not utilize portable emergency lights.
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The local volunteer fire department was delayed for 13 minutes due to inadequate site access procedures and lack of site-compatible radio-comunications equipment.
d.
A comand post, manned by the fire brigade leader and the volunteer fire department's fire chiefs, was not established.
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A control point, to prevent the spread of contamination, was not established.
The apparent inadeq(uacies of the drill were identified as items of concern by the inspector.
80-06-02)
6.
_ Butt Splices of Containment-Penetration Cables The inspector attended a meeting between the NRC and the licensee, on the site, to discuss the licensee's plans for testing cable splices from the containment penetrations. These splices had previously been identified as an item of concern in IE Inspection Report (50-289/80-04).
The inspector recommended that the licensee submit a detailed plan for their proposed testing program to the NRC Division of Operating Reactors.
No further items of concerns were identified.
7.
Inservice Inspection Non-destructive Examination Program The inspector reviewed the on-going activities, including procedures, test observations, and data.
The inspector reviewed the following program-defining documents:
Inservice Inspection Plan 1300-1, Rev. 3
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ISI 1979 Inservice Inspection Scope
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ISI PORD, Rev. O, Project Organizational Responsibilities
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- The inspector identified this document as requiring clarification in the areas of organization and responsibilities. He discussed this with the licensee's NDE staff; they indicated that they would review the document and respond to the inspector's concerns.
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This was identified as an item of concern by the inspector.
(80-0F -03)
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Inservice Inspection Observations The inspector made the following observations relative to the program:
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a.
An observation was made of a UT examination inside of the primary containment, to examine circle seam W6-23-A on Steam Generator A.
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inspector identified this as an item of concern, pending a review of the data evaluations.
(80-06-04)
b.
'The inspector noted that the licensee's calibration blocks for Ur examination of pipe welds did not meet the requirements of ASME Code,
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Section V, Article 5.
The Code requires a minimum distance of 1.5" between.the side-drilled calibration hole and the corner or end face of the calibration block. The licensee's calibration blocks have
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side-drilled holes 1" from the corners or end faces.
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The licensee performed demonstration tests or,'his blocks to verify that the signal responses ware not adversely affected by the position of the side-drilled holes.
He stated that he was performing these demonstration tests in accordance with ASME Section XI, 1974 Summer
'75' Addenda, Paragraph lWA-2240, alternate examinations.
The inspector observed the demonstration tests.
However, he did not i
share the licensee's interpretation of Paragraph 1FA-2240.
The
inspector identified this as an area of concern, pending the complete
verification of the calibration standards for the testing of pipe.
(80-06-05)
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High Pressure Safety Injection Cross Connections (Task RM-14)
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The inspector observed piping fitups, partial welds and completed welds on the 2" stainless steel piping inside of the containment.
The welds examined
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were located on MU-45, MU-62 and MU-57.
During the inspection, two kinds of tape and a blue paint marking were observed on MU-45.
The inspector inquired if these materials met the require.aents of GPU Specification 3064-A-007 Section 3.9 for the control of contaminations; he identified this as
anitemofconcern(80-06-06)
10. Hydrogren Recombiner Piping ~(Task ~RM-12)
The inspector performed the following inspection:
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A partial review of the quality review activities
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A review of weld procedure specification SP-4200-CS(N)-102A
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A review of NDE requirements SP 5550, Rev. V
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A partial review of isometric sketches
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The inspector noted that the quality-control review of the NDE procedure inspection hold points had been completed for 66 welds which were released for fabrication.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
11.
Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracks (Task NM-17)
The inspector reviewed activities, piping layouts, completion status and data for randomly selected areas. Followup inspections are planned for radiography activities and observations of welding of spool pieces in the decay heat system. As a result of data review, he noted that weld No. 40 in the decay heat system contained a linear indication lh" long and 10-25%
through the wall on the fitting side of a 24" schedule 20/.37b wall pipe.
This indicatior, was reported to the licensee, who provided his evaluation and acceptance. The available UT testing-instrument calibration records show that the calibration was based on notch 25% of the wall thickness instead of the required 10% of the wall. The inspector identified this as an item of concern, since this difference in notch depth could rignificaatly change the size of the indication that was evaluated and accepteo.
(80-06-07)
12. ' Licensee Event Report 80-003/0lT-0 (Loose Valve Internals)
The inspector reviewed the report with the licensee to obtain additional information. The valve seat holddown devices in three of the HPI make-up pump check valves were found to be loose.
These were identified by the licensee during the installation of stop pins per IE Circular 78-15. The holddown devices were loose because the Belleville spring was missing from the holddown bolt.
This occurred in three of the four valves inspected in the section of the system containing dormant boric acid.
The licensee has planned additional inspections.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
13.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection.
The licensee acknowledged his findings.
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