IR 05000320/1980017
| ML20009B449 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1981 |
| From: | Barley W, Conte R, Fasano A, Thonus L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009B445 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-320-80-17, NUDOCS 8107160013 | |
| Download: ML20009B449 (10) | |
Text
,
See n:xt page for
TERA Document Control Numbers
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I lReportNo.'50-320/80-17 Docket No. 50-320 Category C
License No. DPR-73 Priority
--
Licensee:
Metropolitan Edison Company P. O. Box 311 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Inspection at: Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted: October'19 - December 6, 1980 Inspectors:
bddu
>oPi R.-ronte, Senior Resident Inspector, TMI-2 date~ signed L R f/L
.
zA /o L. Thonus,~ Radiation Specialist date signed
~Ol d
te/r
%lJolTl r
W. Barley,RadiatiogSpecialist dat'e signed
'
Approved by: [ e/
Q Mp/#/
A. FasYno, Chief, Site Operations Section, dat'e signed TMI Program Office Inspection Summary:
Inspection on October 19 - December 6,1980, (Inspection Report No. 50-320/80-17)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection by resident inspectors of plant oparations; licensee event reports (in-o7 %. mvie;'. plant operations review committee (PORC)
activities; solid waste storege piaging) facility; health physics and environmental activities; and, radiological training organization.
The inspection involved 96 inspector-hours by 3 NRC resident inspectors.
Results: Of the six areas reviewed, two items of noncompliance were identified in.two areas (Deficiency - failure to maintain radiological training organization in accordance with Technical Specifications, Paragraph 7; Deficiency - failure to
' follow procedures on radioactive material shipment, Paragraph 8).
8107160013 8'10320
'
PDR ADOCK 05000320
.
_
_
.
.
~
' Report Cover Page Continued
-
TERA Document Control Numbers-50-320'-80-05-18 50-320-80-06-03 50-320-80-05-29 50-320-G0-06-07-50-320-80-06-18 50-320-80-07-09 50-320-80-07-07
.'
50-320-80-07-14 50-320-80-07-17 50-320-80-06-23 50-320-80-07-19 50-320-80-07-30 50-320-80-07-25 50-320-80-07-31
-
50-320-80-08-08 50-320-80-08-08 50-320-80-08-26
,
50-320-80-08-22
'
50-320-80-09-05 50-320-80-09-09 50-320-80-09-09 50-320-80-09-02 50-320-80-09-25 50-320-80-09-29 50-320-80-09-30 50-320-80-10-16 50-320-80-10-17
.
j
~
,sp
.
,
-,y-
...,,,
.
_
.,,,
.._,e._
. ~...,..,,.,.
..,..__.w.
.
_e., _ _, _
,,,,,..,,..m.,.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted General Public Utilities Nuclear Group
- J. Barton, Manager Site Operations
- M. Beers, Operations Quality Assurance Engineer
- S. Chaplin, Licensing Engineer (Unit 2)
- J. Chwastyk, Supervisor Plant Operations (Unit 2)
- C. Deltete, Process Support Manager
- M. Herlihy, Startup and Test Manager (Unit ?)
- J. Hildebrand, Manager Radiological Services Group (Unit 2)
- G. Hovey, Vice President and Director of TMI-2
- G. Kunder Technical Specification Compliance Supervisor NRC TMI Program Office
- L. Barrett, Acting Deputy Program Director Other members of the operations, radiological controls and admin-istrative staffs were also interviewed.
- denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Plant Operationi On a periodic basis the resident inspector obtained information on plant conditions, reviewed selected plant parameters for abnormal trends, ascertained plant status from maintenance / modification viewpoint, and assessed logkeeping practices in accordance with administrative controls.
During the review the resident inspector made random visits to the control room during regular and back shift hcurs, discussed operations with control room personnel, reviewed selected control room logs and records and observed selected licensee plan of the day meetings.
In addition, a plant tour was conducted to assess housekeeping and fire protection measures.
No items of noncompiluce were iden+1fied.
3.
In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER)
The inspector reviewed LER's submitted to the NRC:Regicn I a.
office to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite followup.
The following LER's were reviewed.
I
.
.
'3 80-22/03L-0, Low flow in fuel handling exhaust system due
--
to manual' inlet damper _ failure (closure)-the valve was
_ repaired; 80-23/03L-0, High boron concent ation in boric acid mix
--
tank due to use of air.spargei temporary installation for permanent mixer) which caused excessive evaporation; 80-24/03L-0,Reactorcoolantsystem_(RCS) pressure
-
--
indication was isolated from RCS due to defective procedure; 80-25/03L-0, Reactor coolant inlet temperature indication
---
on remote shutdcwn panel failed - temporary voltmeter installed; 80-26/03L-0, One fire pump inadvertantly taken out of
--
service leaving two of four pumps operable - one pump immediately restored; 80-027/03L-0, Reactor building (RB) purge exhaust filter
--
fire protection deluge isolation valves shut to prevent inadvertant actuation; 80-28/03L-0, Emergency diesel trippped during surveillance
--
test due to low crank case pressure which resulted from a hose vibrating off a pipe connection; 80-29/01L-0, Balance of plant (B0P) diesel (" Gray")
--
failed to start due to damaged speed sensor connectors; 80-30/0ll-0, 9entainment personnel airlock inner door
--
seal failed leak test due to foreign material on seal surface. Recleaning and testing was successful; 80-31/01L-0, B0P diesel (" Gray") tripped for unknown
--
reasons - LER 80-29 reports determination; 80-32/03L-0, Radioactive leak in coupling for EPICOR-I
--
system due to worn coupling; 80-33/03L-0, Pneumatic timer malfunction on emergency
--
diesel generator, apparently due to end of life for component; 80-34/03L-0, Operators failed to restore fuel handling
--
building ventilation on inadvertant trip due to false fire alarm; 80-35/03L'-0, Fire detector for B0P diesel (" White")
--
failed - detector replaced; J
.
.
80-36/Oll-0, RCS chemistry analysis for baron and H2 not
--
performed within required time period due to contractor lab unavailability; 80-37/01L-0, Outer door seal for personnel airlock No. 2
--
to reactor building failed leak rate test due to apparent failure to properly open door on entry; 80-38/01L-0, Cable /transformar room halon system failed
--
surveillance test - full charge weight not maintained due to procedurs deficiency; 80-41/0ll-0, Incore thermocouple M-9 failed - reason
--
unknown - instrument inaccessible for repair; 80-42/01L-0, RCS flow instrument failed calibration check
--
due to drift - instrument was recalibrated; 80-43/OlL-0, Auxiliary building "B" train out of service
--
while "A" train was out of service due to "B" train fan trip (circuit breaker failure);
80-44/Oll-0, Reactor building personnel airlock No. 1
--
failed outer door seal leak rate test.
Seal repair delayed due to inaccessibility of reactor building; 80-45/01L-0, During test of diesel IB it failed to start
--
due to operator error on inadvertant setting of load limit control to minimum instead of governor control; 80-46/0ll-0, Feeder breakers for busses 2-38, 2-48
--
inoperable for maintenance beyond permitted TS time limit due to operator error; 80-47/03L-0, Reactor building personnel airlock No. 2
--
inner door seal failed leak test due to foreign material on seal surface - cleaned and retested; and, 80-48/03L-0, Inner containment isolation valve for core
--
flood tank sampling, CF-V115, faile' to close on openning for sample - valve inaccessable.
b.
During this review, coding discrepancies were noteJ an the LER form with respect to LER form instructions (NUREG 0161) based on narrative information and cause description.
Specific examples are noted below.
u
.
.
'
g
In some cases the root cause was used instead of the i
--
proximate cause code.
For example LER 80-33 describes a i
relay timer failure on an emergency diesel generator.
The cause code used was reported as "other" (x) in distinction to " component failure" (E) as the proximate cause.
The component code was not always used even thougn a
--
component failure was not the cause.
Events due to defective procedures and personnel error were to have a component code if a component is involved and a code (personnel error)ple LER 80-34 describes operator failure exists.
For exam to restore the fuel handling building ventilation system due to a false fire alarm.
The component code was coded as "not applicable." A specific component code could and was to be used.
In some cases action taken and future action codes are
--
not consistant with actual actions described in the narrative portion of the LER. This was noted for LER 80-34.
Specific discrepancies were addressed to the licensee representative for review and disposition on whether or not a revision to the LER is warranted. The inspector reiterated the need for accurate coding of events with respect to the NRC's program for analysis and evaluation of events.
The licensee representative acknowledged the above.
NRC review of this area will continue pending) completion of licensee action as stated above (320/80-17-01.
4.
Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) Activities PORC activities were reviewed to verify the following:
Meeting frequency per TS 6.5.1.4 of once per month was met;
--
Meeting quorum requirements per TS 6.5.1.5 of a chairman and
--
four members with provisions for alternates were met; and, Assess the adequacy of PORC exercising its responsibility to
--
review procedures and changes thereto per TS 6.5.1.6.a.
Meetings conducted on November 25, 1980, and December 2, 1980, were observed. No items of noncompliance were identified.
u
.
.
'5.
Solid Waste Storage (Staging) Facility
'
a.
Background The solid waste storage iacility (long term staging facility)
is a post accident system for the storage of spent resin liners used in the auxiliary building liquid cleanup system (EPICOR-II). The facility consists of two modules each with 60 cells and each cell is capabla of storing one 6' x 6' liner or two 4' x 4' liners (with provisions far stacking).
Further, each module has cell drainage collection facilities which lead to a common sump for both modules.
On November 23,1980', the licensee representative verbally reported to '.he resident inspector the results of an analysis by a contraccor laboratory on a sample of sump water. The results indicated 1.2 x 10-8 uCi/ml of Cs-137 and 3.9 x 10-5 uCi/ml of tritium. At that time the licensee initiated a review to determine the source of the trace amount of contamination.
Interim measures established by the licensee were as follows:
the sump water was administratively controlled (by issuar.ce of danger tags) to preclude discharge of this water off site; a sampling surveillance study was initiated to identify the source of the activity.
The resident inspectors initiated a review as noted below.
b.
Scope Licensee activities in response to the reported low level contamination in the solid waste storage facility sump were reviewed to assess the following:
Event description, including date, time, cause, and
--
systems or plant components affected including a sequence of events formulated and reviewed;
,
Safety significance of the event, and compliance with TS
--
or other license requirements;
'
Reportability of the event and licensee plans rega-ding a
--
press release; Necessity to notify state or local government officials;
--
Amount of radioactivity released, if applicable;
--
Ascertain system turnover status to the operations
--
personnel; and,
_.
-
..
.
Assess a.dequacy of existing operating procedures for this
--
system.
'c.
Review In addition to observations made in and around the storage facility and discussions with cognizant licensee representatives, selected portions of the following documents were reviewed:
Drawing 04-4283-E-311-873, Revision lA-1, dated July 31, 1979,
--
Solid Waste Staging Facility Drains; 2104-4.23, Revision 6, July 18, 1980, Auxiliary Building
--
Emergeacy Liquid Cleanin System (EPICOR-I or ALC Prefilter and Demineralizer Remova );
2104-4.24,' Revision 7 June 11, 1980, Auxiliary Building
--
Liquid Cleanup System 4' x 4' Prefilter Demineralizer Wa:.ce Staging; 2104-4.28, Revision 5, June 3, 1980, Auxiliary Building
--
Liquid Cleanup System 6' x 6' Demineralizer Waste Staging; Letter, dated December 20, 1979, from R.F. Wilson, GPU,
--
to J. T. Collins, NRR, Limited Use of Long Term Staging Facility; Letter, dated December 1,1979, from J. T. Collins, NRR,
--
to R. F. Wilson, GPU, same subject as above letter; Letter, dated December 4,1980, trom G. K. Hovey, GPU, to
--
J. T. Collins, NRR, EPICOR-II Liner Evaluation Status; Engineering Management Procedure (EMP) - 008, Revision 6,
--
November 9, 1980, Engineering Change Memorandum; (Draft) Administrative Pr,cedure (AP) 1043, Work Authorization
--
Procedure; (Draft) AP 1047, Startup and Test Manual;
--
(Draft) 1410-Y-58, General Procedure for Hydrostatic
--
Te ting; (Draft) 1410-Y-52, Preoperational, Startup and Testing of
--
Mechanical Equipment; (Draft) 1420-EL-2, Preoperational Startup and Testing of
--
Electrical Equipment; AP 1021, Revision 7, November 18, 1979, Plant Modifications;
-- c
.
e Licensee internal memorandum (II-R-1694) dated December 3, 1980,
--
from Unit 2 Startup and Test Manager on outstanding items for systems; and, Licensee internal memorandum (II-R-1679) dated November 24, 1980,
--
from Startup and Test Manager on Modification closecut checkoff list.
d.
Findings (1) During :ampling and analysis of water in the sump of the
"A" and,v liner staging) modules, pod tive tritium levels (3.9 x 10-5 uC1/ml were observed. Onsite analytical results for gammu emitting isotopes were below the lower limit for detectability. A sample of this water was sent for analysis at the Science Applications Inc. (SAI) in Rockville, Maryland.
Initial. counting results indicated
<5.65 x 10-7 uCi/ml of Cs-137. However, the sample recounting, using a more sensitive analytical technique, resulted in a positive Cs-137 concentration of 1.22 x 10-8 uCi/ml.
Samples from the individual module discharge points to the sump are being collected in order to further identify the possible source of the contamination.
The licensee is presently reviewing past sample results of water taken from this sump, as well as the disposition of any wa ~. discharged to the environment.
Past releases to the envirynent from the liner staging modules sump is an unresolved item pending receipt of the above information from the licensee (320/80-17-02).
(2) The i apector determined that this facility was not formally turned over or transferred to the jurisdiction of operating personnel from the construction department. This was identified by the licensee in June of 1980 but it appeared that other high priority jobs (i.e. mini decay system) took precedence over this system. As a result of this, no operating procedure was developed for sump pumping evolutions.
The rump level could be aute:ootically controlled by a level actuated device with possible discharge to a portable collection facility (tank truck or drums) or to a storm drain. As noted above, upon identification of this event the licensee insured that.no pumping of this water out of sump would occur until completion of further
'
review and analysis.
,
. _
.
.
,
.
The chronology of pumping evolutions for a determination of releases to the environment is addressed in the previousparagraph(Paragraph 5.d(l)).
The licensee representative indicated that the turnover of the sump system was escalated in priority and a completion date of January 15, 1981, was anticipated.
The inspector reviewed two internal memoranda (referenced above). One memo deals with_ outstanding work items for the sump system and the other delineates a modification closecut checkout list for the system. This methodology appeared adequate to control the turnover of this system and it was noted that the methodology was to be formalized into a program to control properational/startup testing for post accident systems..This is addressed further in the next two details.
This area is unresolved pending completion of action as stated aoove by the licensee and pending subsequent NRC review (320/80-17-03).
'
(3) As a result of tho above finding the resident inspector inquired into what program existed to control the design,
'
construction, preoperational/startup testing and subseque t turnover to operations personnel of all post accident systems installed or planned. The governing docurent (a preaccident administrative procedure) for the control of modifications was AP 1021. With the accident and need for installation of major modifications (new systems) this
procedure quickly became outdated.. For example, AP 1021 indicates the maintenance department as lead on modification;
"
however, with the large influx of engineering personnel onsite, maintenance department no longer had the staff-power for lead responsibility. The licensee representative indicated that Generation Department procedures (also used during construction of TMI-2) were used for control of activities in this area along with selected other onsite AP's.
It was reported that efforts were started earlier this year to consolidate and revise procedures to apply to the unique circumstances for TMI-2.
The resident inspector reviewed selected portions of the
" draft" nrocedures (referenced above) produced as a result of this effort. The licensee representative indicated that these " draft" procedures were to be issued by January 15, 1981.
This is unresolved pending completion of action as stated by the licensee and subsequent review by NRC (320/00-17-04).
!
,
_
.- -
,
__
, _ _ _.
__
.
..
- p '
.
.
s (4) To ascertain the effectiveness of procedural controls for the installation of post accident systems in an operational status, the resident inspector attempted to review data for completed tests on these systems. Although the data packages were not available for a majority of the systems at the close of the inspection period, the licensee.
representative reported that they were available for review shortly af ter the exit interview.
,
This is unresolved pending completion of NRC review in thisarea(320/80-17-05).
G.
Health Physics and Environmental Inspection and. Review a.
Plant Tours Shift inspectors completed a general plant inspection tour daily. These inspections included all control points and selected radiologically controlled areas.
Observations included:
Access control to radiologically controlled areas;
--
Adherence to Radiation Work Permit (RWP) requirements;
--
Proper use of respirato;y protection equipment;
--
Adherence to Health Physics and Operating procedures;
--
Use of survey meters including personnel frisking techniques;
--
Cleanliness and housekeeping conditions; and,
--
Fire protection measures,
--
b.
Measurement Verifications Measurements were independently obtained by the NRC onsite inspectors to verify the quality of licensee performance in the following selected areas:
Radioactive material shipping;
--
. Radiological control, radiation and contamination surveys;
--
and, Onsite environmental air samples.
--
No items of noncompliance were identifie.
,
,
,
i '
7.
Radiological Training Organization During the Unit I health physics evaluation, (Office of Inspection and Enforcement Inspection Report No. 50-289/80-22) the team identified a concern about th structure of the Unit 2 training organization. This area of rt.ncern was referred to the NRC resident
' inspector for review.
Discussions were held with the Unit 2 Supervisor - Radiological Controls Training concerning direction of the retraining and replacement training program for radiological control technicians.
The Supervisor - Radiological' Controls Training maintains the retraining and replacement training for radic' Wical controls technicians. The radiological training supervisor does not report to the station training supervisor. The inspector indicated to
. licensee representatives that failure to maintain direction of retraining and replacement training for radiological control technicians under the Supervisor - Station Training constituted nonconplience with Order of February 11, 1980, (TS 6.4.1) (320/80-17-07).
8.
Onsite Transfer of Resin Liners Following the Unit I health physics evaluation referenced above, a question developed concerning the records of seal replacement on a Hitman Nuclear shipping cask s required by the cask certification.
While the inspector was reviewing records of loading of the cask in question, the inspector noted that the step-by-step sign off for the shield plug hold-down stud torquing section of procedure 2104-4.13 perforred on October 3,1980, had not been completed.
In reviewing the requirements and history of procedure 2104-4.13, the inspector noted that a revirion 7, dated September 10, 1980, was in effect on Cctober 3, 1980. However, the procedure revision used on October 3,1980, had been revision 6, dated June 9,1980.
The inspector indicated to licensee representatives that failure to perform sign off steps and use the current procedure revision constituted noncompliance with Order of February 11, 1980, and Technical Specification Section 6.8.1 (320/80-17-06).
9.
.U_nresolved Items Unresolved items are findings about which more information is needed to ascertain whether it is an. item of noncompliance, a deviation, or acceptable.
Unresolved items disclosed during this inspection are diecussed in paragraphs 5.d(l), (2), (3), and (4).
10.
Exit Inte' view On December 6,198u, the resident inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
_
._.
-
-
--.
_, -
.
.