IR 05000289/1998001

Insp Rept 50-289/98-01 on 980125-0321.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20216F087
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	04/09/1998
From:	Marilyn Evans NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216F077	List: IR 05000289/1998001 ML20216F075
References
50-289-98-01, 50-289-98-1, NUDOCS 9804160416
Download: ML20216F087 (15)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION l c

Docket N License N DPR-50 Report N Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation Facility: Three Mile Island Station, Unit 1 Location: P.O. Bcx 480 Middletown, PA 17057 Dates: January 25,1998 - March 21,1998 Inspectors: Wayne L. Schmidt, Senior Resident inspector Samuel L. Hansell, Resident inspector Approved by: Michele G. Evans, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch No. 7 9004160416 900409 PDR ADOCK 05000289 O PDR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Three Mile island Nuclear Power Station Report No. 50-289/98-01 This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers an eight week period of resident inspection for Unit .

Plant Operations

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GPUN operated TMl-1 safely over the period, with no significant plant transients or equipment problems. Operators performed routine activities wel Plant management and operations' sensitivity to small changes in the reactor coo; ant system (RCS) leakrate calculations and associated plant indicators led to the discovery and isolation of two smallleaks in the Reactor Building (RB). The aggressive response to the leakrate indications have resulted in an RCS leakrate well below the technical specification (TS) limit (Section 01.2).

A diligent review by the chemistry department resulted in the discovery that a TS required spent fuel pool (SFP) boron concentration sample was missed, and they promptly initiated a corrective action process (CAP) form to document and correct the error. GPUN reported the missed surveillance as required (Section 08.1).

In review of licensee event report (LER)98-002 concerning the inissed SFP sample, the inspectors concluded that GPUN focused the initial root cause analysis and associated corrective actions too narrowly, GPUN concluded that the primary cause for the missed sample was a missing operator aid plaque because the auxiliary operator informed the control room when the water addition was stopped. Through independent review the inspectors determined that the shift operating crew did not coordinate the performance of the required SFP sample after a routine water addition. Senior GPUN management, after a timely review of the submitted report, concluded that a revised report containing a more comprehensive description of the issue and broad based corrective actions was necessary (Section 08.1).

Maintenance Maintenance technicians demonstrated consistent use of the foreign material exclusion (FME) barriers throughout the intermediate closed (IC) cooling heat exchanger and pump motor bearing replacement work activities. All heat exchanger and connected pipe openings were properly covered throughout the maintenance outages (Section M1.1).

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e The surveillance test activities observed during this inspection were performed satisfactorily and demonstrated that the associated systems could perform their design safety functions. The 'D' reactor protection system (RPS) surveillance test procedure was revised satisfactority to compensate for the bypassed 'C' RPS channel (Section M1.1).

Enoineerina The questioning attitude of a system engineer resulted in the reversal of a 1993 plant review group (PRG) operability determination for the emergency core cooling system flow transmitters. The 1993 PRG incorrer:tly determined that the ECCS system remained operable when the associated flow instruments were out of service for maintenanc GPUN reported the issue to the NRC and took comprehensive corrective actions once the issue was noted. (Section E8.1.)

Plant Support The central and secondary alarm station (CAS and SAS) operator performance was professional and responsive to ensure that control was maintained for the vital and protected areas of the plant. The necessary CAS and SAS support equipment was reliable and well maintained (Section S2.1).

The plant continues to strive toward lower dose to plant workers by flushing system hot spots. Plant housekeeping has improved since the refuel outage with the exception of the emergency diesel generators (Section R1.1).

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TABLE OF CONTENTS EX EC UTIVE S U M M A RY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii TA 8 L E O F C O NT E NTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv 1. Operations ....................................................1 O1 Conduct of Operations (71707) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 01.2 Reactor Coolant System Leakrate Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 08 Miscellaneous Operations issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 08.1 (Open) LER 50-289/98-002-00: " Missed Spent Fuel Pool Sample Following a Water Addition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 II . Mainte n anc e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 M1 Conduct of Maintenance (62707,61726) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 M 1.1 G e ne ral Com m e nt s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 111. E ngi ne e ring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 E1 Conduct of Engineering (37551, 92700) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 E8 Miscellaneous Erigineering issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 E (Closed) LER 50-289/98-001-00: " Safety System Flow Instruments inoperable for Greater Than the Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time Due to Misinterpretation of Design requirements ... 5 IV. Plant Support .................................................7 R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls (71750) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment (71750) ............... 8 M a nagement Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 X1 Exit Meeting Summ ary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 X2 TMl Systematic Assessment of Licensee (SALP) Management Meeting . . 8 PARTI AL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 LIST O F ACRONYMS U S ED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 iv

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Report Details Summary of Plant Status GPU operated Three Mile Ishnd Unit 1 (TMI) at 100% power throughout the inspection perio . Operations 01 Conduct of Operations (71707)'

01.1 General Comments The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. GPUN operated TMl safely and conducted operations in a professional and safety conscious manner. In particular, the inspectors noted that plant management and the operations department aggressively pursued the reason for a very small increase in the reactor coolant system (RCS) leakrate. The initiatives taken to determine the potential leak location were thorough and comprehensiv .2 Reactor Coolant Svstem Leakrate Evaluatian Scope The inspectors reviewed GPUN's approach to a minor increase (to about 0.1 gpm, TS limit is 1.0 gpm) in the unidentified RCS leakrate, including the RCS leak evaluation process, TS 3.1.6, " Leakage,' the applicable control room indications, and operator actions taken to evaluate the leak locatio Observations and Findinas On March 11,1998, a radiological control technician and plant operators entered the

. Reactor Building (RB) to perform an oil addition to the 'D' reactor coolant pump (RCP) and perform a walkdown of accessible RCS components. The radiological control technician discovered a two drop per second (DPS) leak at the cap downstream of make-up (MU)

valve MU-V-158B, "'B' RCP seal vent line isolation valve." Plant operators checked the valve closed and tightened the pipe cap to stop the leakage. Opnrators also checked the  ;

other three similar valves, finding and correcting a one DPS leak at the cap for the 'C' vent l valv j The shift supervisor (SS) evaluated the magnitude of the leak per TS 3.1.6.6 and consulted I the engineering department about the need to review the potential safety implication I related to the leak. Engineering performed a safety evaluation to document the fact that

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the leakrate and affected equipment did not compromise the integrity of the RCS or safety l system capabilities. The inspectors determined that the SS and engineering personnel  ;

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Topical headings such as 01. M8. etc., are used in accordance with the NRC standardized reactor j inspection report outline. Individual reports are not expected to address all outline topic ]

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l thoroughly addressed the RCS leakage requirements of TS 3.1.6.6. I'he leakrate value l was approximately .03 gallons per minute after the valves were tightened, well below the l TS limit of one gallon per minute for unidentified leakag Conclusions Plant management and operation department's sensitivity to small changes in the RCS leakrate calculations and associated plant indicators led to the discovery and isolation of j

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two small RCS leaks. The aggressive response to the leakrate indications have resulted in an RCS leakrate well below the TS limi j 08 Miscellaneous Operations issues l

08.1 (Open) LER 50-289/98-002-00: " Missed Spent Fuel Pool Sample Following a Water i Addition." Scope (92700)

Following GPUN identification that a TS sampling requirement had been missed, the inspectors independently reviewed the spent fuel pool (SFP) TS, operating procedure, corrective action process (CAP) documentation, and the associated licensee event report (LER). The inspector also performed a plant walkdown to verify the location of the SFP water addition components and associated operator aid and discussed the issue with the operations crew involved. In addition, the inspectors observed the plant review group (PRG) meetings to determine the reportability and root cause of the missed SFP sampl Observations and Findinas in independent review of this issue, the inspectors fc.und the following:

e A diligent review by chemistry management resulted in the discovery of the missed I sample and prompt initiation of CAP form T1998-066to document the error and determine the proper root cause and associated corrective actions, e On January 23, the operations department added water to the SFP to makeup for l the water loss due to evaporation. The auxiliary operator (AO) informed the control room at the completion of the water addition at 5:05 p.m. The control room !

operator that received the AO's information did not inform the SS and control room personnel did not inform the chemistry department of the TS required boron sample after the water addition. TS Table 4.1-3, item 4., required a SFP boron i concentration sample monthly and after each water addition. Operating procedure !

(OP) 1104-6," Spent Fuel Pool System," required chemistry to sample the SFP ;

within 24 to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after the completion of a water addition. The shift operating '

l crew did not coordinate the performance of the required SFP sample after the water addition.

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o A routine SFP sample was taken on January 28, at 4:30 a.m. The results indicated a boron concentration of 2897 ppm. The SFP boron concentration was significantly H greater than the 600 ppm boron concentration required by TS section 5.4, "New and Spent Fuel Storage Facilities," for moving components in the SFP. The SFP boron requirements are zero ppm boron for no fuel movement in the pool and the

. plant operating at power. The safety consequences were minimal because the as-found SFP boron concentration after the fill was 2897 ppm and no fuel was moved between the time of the water addition on January 23rd and the subsequent sample l on January 2 The inspectors reviewhd the'SFP chemistry sample documentation and the control room log to determine if there were additional occurrences of missed samples after SFP water additions. The review of documentation for the six month period prior to the missed sample did not reveal any additional missed samples. Also, the inspectors reviewed the documentation of thrse SFP water additions since the January 23rd event and did not find I any missed sample The missed TS required sample was identified as a non-cited violation because GPUN discovered and reported the missed surveillance as required, ar.J the safety consequences were minimal. The inspectors considered this a minor violation, in accordance with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 98-01-01).

The PRG, on February 4, determined that the missed SFP sample issue required a licensee event report (LER). Following PRG review, GPUN submitted LER 98-002 on March 3. The LER concluded that the primary reason for the missed sample was a " missing operator aid plaque" located at the SFP fill valve, which served as a rc ninder to the operator to notify chemistry and the shift supervisor at the completion of the fill process. The plaque was l replaced as part of the planned corrective actions. The AOs turnover checklist was also l revised to include a requirement to notify chemistry and the shift supervisor of sample requirements if water was added to the SFP.

- The inspectors reviewed the LER and determined that the corrective actions did not address oversight of control room personnel to coordinate the TS required sample after the AO communicated completion of the SFP fill. The LER's root cause was narrowly focused and did not consider the broader issue of the control personnel's responsibilities to ensure the completion of TS requirements. Senior GPUN management reviewed the initial LER and

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questioned the limited corrective actions. In response to_ feedback on the initial LER, the L PRG met on March 20,1998, to review and discuss a revision to the original LER. At that-meeting, the PRG discussion included additional corrective actions to address the control room staff's responsibility to ensure understanding of TS requirements. The revised LER should result in a report that contains a more comprehensive description of the issue and

[ -- broad based corrective actions. The LER remained open pending inspector review of the

. ' revision to LER 98-002.

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4 j . Conclusions i

The shift operating crew did not coordinate the performance of the required SFP sample l after the water addition. The missed TS required sample was identified as a non-cited L - viola. ion. GPUN identified and reported the missed surveillance as required, the inspectors L

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A diligent review by the chemistry department resulted in the discovery that the sample l win missed and they promptly initiated a CAP form to document and correct the erro ~

The inspectors concluded that LER 50-289/98-002 initial root cause analysis and associated corrective actions were narrowly focused. Specifically based on an independent review, the inspector did not conclude that the primary cause for the missed sample was a missing operator aid plaque because the auxiliary operator informed the control room et the completion of the water addition. The initial LER failed to address I possible causes dealing with a broader issue of control room understanding and control over TS requirements. Senior GPUN management after a timely review of the submitted report concluded that a revised report containing a more comprehensive description of the issue and broad based corrective actions was necessary, 11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance (62707,61726)  !

M1.1 ' Generel Comments Scope The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintew ce and surveillance work !

activities:

e Job Order No. 135519, " Nuclear River Water Strainer, NR-S-1C, Motor Oil Leak."

i e Job Order Nos. 141393 and 142840," Intermediate Closed Cooling Heat Exchangers, IC-C-1 A&18, Clean and Inspect Preventive Maintenance."

e Job Order No. 148863," intermediate Closed Cooling Pump, IC-P-1B, Upper Motor Bearing Replacement."

e Job Order No. 145712,"Thermolag Repair and Modification."

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e . Electrical Procedure E-28, " Westinghouse DHP Magnetic Air Circuit Breaker I

Inspection and Alignment."

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- o- Surveillance Procedure 1303-4.1 D, "RPS Channel 'D' Test."

- e- Surveillance Procedure 1303-3.1," Control Rod Movement Test." .

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e Surveillance Procedure 1301-1," Shift and Daily Checks." Observations and Findinos The inspectors noted good use of the foreign material exclusion (FME) barriers throughout the intermediate closed (IC) cooling heat exchanger and pump motor bearing replacement work activities. All heat exchanger and connected pipe openings were properly covered throughout the maintenance outag The surveillance test activities observed during this inspection were performed satisfactorily and demonstrated that the associated systems were operable. The 'D'

reactor protection system (RPS) surveillance test procedure was revised to compensate for the bypassed 'C' RPS channe Conclusions Maintenance technicians demonstrated consin.ent use of the foreign material exclusion (FME) barriers throughout the intermediate cl< Led (IC) cooling heat exchanger and pump motor bearing replacement work activitin. All heat exchanger and connected pipe openings were properly covered throughout the maintenance outage Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering (37551,92700)

E8 Miscellaneous Engineering lasues E (Closed) LER 50-289/98-001-00: " Safety System Flow Instruments inoperable for Greater Than the Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time Due to Misinterpretation of Design requirements." Inspection Scope (92700)

in assessing the significance of the issue discussed in LER 98-001,the inspectors revhwed the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) section 7.3, " Nuclear Instrumentation," operations training handout No. 3210-97-224, applicable procedures and instrumentation in the plant, and Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident." The review included an assessment of the adequacy of the

. completion of the short term corrective actions and incorporation of the long term corrective actions in the corrective action process syste Observations and Findin,gg A system engineer performed very wellin questioning a prior plant review group position concerning the need of emergency core cooling systems flow instruments to meet system operability requirements. In 1993 the PRG concluded that the flow instrumentation for high pressure injection (HPI), low pressure injection (LPI), and building spray (BS) systems

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were not required for system operability. The PRG meeting did recommend that both system trains of instrumentation should not be taken out of service at the same time and the instrument should be returned to service expeditiousl On December 19,1997, the PRG met after engineers questioned the validity of the 1993 -

PRG guidance The PRG concluded that control room flow indication was required for the HPI, LPI, and BS systems to perform their intended safety function under all conditions within the design basis. During accident conditions the flow instruments are required to allow operators to throttle system flow to maintain pump net positive suction head (NPSH) )

requirements or to prevent pump runout. To address the issue PRG requested a review of J the maintenance history for the system flow instruments since January 1,1993 to determine if any of these instruments were out of service in excess of the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.2 limiting condition for operation (LCO) allowed outage tim On January 22,1998,the PRG met to evaluate the results of the review which determined that on two occasions flow instruments required for system operability were inoperable for greater than the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> TS LCO. The review determined that a flow indicator for the BS system was inoperable for approximately 122 hours0.00141 days <br />0.0339 hours <br />2.017196e-4 weeks <br />4.6421e-5 months <br /> between August 24 and August 29, 1995. On another occasion, a flow indicator for the HPl system was out of service for approximately 97 hours0.00112 days <br />0.0269 hours <br />1.603836e-4 weeks <br />3.69085e-5 months <br /> between Nov.imber 22 and November 26,1996. GPUN concluded that both conditions were a violation of TS Section 3.3.2 and were reportable as an operation or condition prohibited by the plant's TSs.

L The subsequent review of this event, performed during the preparation of LER 50-289/98- j 001, identified a design deficiency of the BS control room flow indicators BS1-F1-1 and BS1-FI-2.' Both instruments were needed to perform safety related actions and were required to be qualified to meet Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, Category 1 criteria. The BS flow instruments meet RG 1.97 Category 2 requirements but not Category 1. The inspector verified that the HPl and LPI flow instruments meet RG 1.97 Category 1 -

requirement *: as documented in UFSAR Tablo 7.3-2, " Evaluation of TMI-1 Compliance w m ;

Regulator,' Guide 1.97 Requirements." On Fabruary 19,1998, the PRG determined that l the BS flow instrument design deficiency constituted a condition outside the design basis )

of the plant and reported the issue to the NRC.

l The inspectors verified that GPUN completed the immediate corrective actions I l satisfactorily. Operation's management briefed the licensed operators on the flow i

! transmitter TS operduility requirements and provided a training handout that described the '

l BS, LPI and HPl flow indications requirements to ensure that the TS 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO will be i me I l

GPUN developed the following long term corrective actions which were tracked in the ;

corrective action process (CAP) to ensure completio e Provide clarification for PRG members on the use of NRC guidance in Generic Letter 91-18 by May 199 l l

• Revise procedures prior to the next performance that remove BS, LPI or HPl flow l

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instruments from service (1302-5.18,"HPl/LPl Flow Channel Calibration," and 1302-14.1, " Calibration of IST Related instruments,") to identify the required allowable outage time permitted by TS 3.3.2. Currently the next performance of these procedures is scheduled for September 199 !

o Modify BS flow instrumentat!on to meet RG 1.97 requirements or modify the design basis use of these instruments, no later than plant startup from the next refueling outage scheduled to begin in September 199 GPU completed a .:omprehensive root cause analysis and associated corrective action Therefore, this licensee identified, non-repetitive issue is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 98-01-02).

Also, the LER is close , Conclusions -

The questioning attitude of a system engineer resulted in the reversal of a 1993 PRG operability determination for the emergency core cooling system flow transmitters. The 1993 PRG incorrectly deturmined that the ECCS system remained operable when the associated flow instrumerts were out of service for maintenance. GPUN reported the issue to the NRC and took comprehensive corrective actions once the issue was note The detailed engineering review also revealed a BS RG 1.97 issue that was properly addresse IV. Plant Suonort j l

R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls (71750) j Radiological Controls j

The inspectors examined work in progress to verify proper implementation of radiological procedures and controls in the Auxiliary Building (AB). The inspectors monitored ALARA implementation, dosimetry and badging, protective clothing use, radiation surveys, radiation protection instrument use, and handling of potentially contaminated equipment ,

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.The inspectors observed more proactive radiological control technicians' enforcement of the required radiological work standards, noting improvement in the area of radiological survey postings throughout the AB. In addition, the inspectors observed personnel l working in radiation work perrnit (RWP) areas and verified compliance with RWP re- I quirements. During routine tours, a sampling of high radiation area doors was verified to j

be locked as require '

i - The rad;ological control and operation departments continue to flush portions of systems to i reduce radioactive hot spots in the plant, to minimize personnel exposure.

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Plant housekeeping improved this period. In particular, GPUN reduced the transient material throughout the plant. However, despite the improvements in the overall emergency diesel generator rooms, oil leakage continued as a housekeeping problem that required management attentio In summary, the inspectors determined that overall radiological controls practices were properly implemented. The plant continues to strive toward lower dose to plant workers by flushing system hot spots. Plant housekeeping has improved since the refuel outage with the exception of the emergency diesel generator S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment (71750)

Alarm Stations The inspectors observed Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) .

operations, and verified that the alarm stations were equipped with the appropriate alarm, surveillance, and communication capabilities. Knowledgeable CAS and SAS operators performed their duties in a professional, attentive, and responsible manner and maintained positive control of all vital area access points and gates leading into the protected are In summary, the CAS and SAS operators performed wellin maintaining control over the vital and protected areas of the plant, with reliable and well maintained equipmen Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary At the conclusion of the reporting period, the resident inspector staff conducted an exit meeting with TMI management on March 31,1998, summarizing Unit 1 inspection activities and findings for this report period. TMI staff comments concerning the issues in this report were documented in the applicable report section. No proprietary information was identified as being included in the repor X2 TMI Systematic Assessment of Licensee (SALP) Management Meeting On March 18,1998, a public meeting was held between the NRC and GPU Nuclear Corporation at the TMl Training Center in Middletown, Pennsylvania. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the TMI performance during the previous 18 months end provide an opportunity for TMl to provide their perspective on the SALP repoit. The NRC Staff provided a brief overview of each SALP functional area followed by an informal discussion about the related program strengths and areas for improvement. The NRC staff also responded to questions from two members of the Publi l

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Etheridge, Radiological Health and Safety Director L. Noll, Plant Operations Director

• M. Ross, Director, Operations and Maintenance J. Schork, Nuclear Safety Manager G. Skillman, Director, Configuration Control P. Walsh, Director, Equipment Reliability l J. Wetmore, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing l i

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• senior licensee manager present at exit meeting on March 31,199 T. Colburn, TMI Project Manager, NRR

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INSPECTION P30CEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observation IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92700: Event Followup ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Ooened 50-289/98-002-00 LER Missed Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Sample Following a Water Addition. (Section 08.1)

50-289/98-001 00 LER Safety System Flow Instruments inoperable for Greater Than the Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time Due to Misinterpretation of Design requirements. (Section E8.1)

Open and Closed i

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50-289/98-01-01 NCV Missed TS required spent fuel pool sample (Section 08.1)

50-289/98-01-02 NCV Excessive TS outage times for MU and BS transmitters (Section E8.1)

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LIST OF ACROPliMS USED ALARA As low As Reasonably Achievable AO ' Auxiliary Operator j BS Building Spray System CAS Central Alarm System

-CFR Code of Federai Regulations DPS Drops per Second FME Foreign Material Exclusion gpm Gallons per Minute GPUN GPU Nuclear (Licensee)

HPl High Pressure injection (MU)

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LCO Limit.ing Condition of Operation LER Licensee Event Report LPI Low Pressure injection (DH) i

'NCV Non-Cited Violation

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.NPSH Net Positive Suction Head (Pumps)

PDR Public Document Room ,

ppm Parts per Million j PRG Plant Review Group

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RCP Reactor Coolant Pump q

RG Regulatory Guide i RWP Radiation Work Permits i SALP Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance SAS Secondary Alarm System '

SFP' Spent Fuel Pool TMI ' Three Mile Island-Unit 1 TS . Technical Specification I

.UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report l l

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