ML20138L268

Insp Repts 50-254/85-20 & 50-265/85-22 on 850610-14.No Potential Enforcement Items Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee/Vendor Info Interface,Including Sys for Receipt,Evaluation & Implementation of Actions

ML20138L268
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	10/09/1985
From:	Jocelyn Craig, Mcintyre R, Miegel N, Petrosino J, Robert Pettis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138L259	List: ML20138L252 ML20138L268
References
50-254-85-20, 50-265-85-22, GL-83-28, GL-83-285-22, IEIN-84-29, NUDOCS 8510310247
Download: ML20138L268 (14)

See also: IR 05000254/1985020

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

j OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

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l Report No.: 50-254/85-020 and License No.: DPR-29 and DPR-30

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50-265/85-022

Docket Nos.: 50-254 and 50-265

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

i Post Office Box 767

Chicago, Illinois 60690

Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 <

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Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, Illinois

! Inspection Dates: June 10 through 14, 1985

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Inspectors: b. c 8.

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! R. L. Pettis, Jr., Special Projects Inspection Date

l Section (SPIS)

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R. P. mci tyre,' SPIS ' tok/e

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J. liegel jK tive Inspection Section (RIS) / pate

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Approved by: IG [K[

1. IfW.Craig, Chief,SPIS,fepdorProgramBranch Date '

O(visionofQualityAssurance, Vendor,and

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Technical Training Center Programs

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INSPECTION SUMMARY

Areas Inspected: This routine, announced inspection involved 168 inspector

] hours by five NRC inspectors both on-site and in Commonwealth Edison's (CECO)

) Corporate Office to review the licensee / vendor information interface. This

was accomplished by an examination of CECO's system for receipt, evaluation,

and implementation of actions, if any, determined by CECO to be appropriate

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in response to technical information received from General Electric such as

Service Information Letters (SILs) and Service Advice Letter's (SALs); 10 CFR

j Part 21 evaluations; and diesel maintenance records.

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Results: No potential enforcement items were identified concerning the

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licensee-vendor interface program as implemented with respect to GE SILs/

i SALs. Based upon the results of this inspection, the utility-GE information

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interface is effective and information is current and controlled. While

information from other vendors was being received, the licensee did not have .

a formal system which could be audited to determine whether the information l

l was evaluated by Ceco and actions implemented as determined by the licensee

l to be appropriate. However, based upon discussions with station personnel,

j and a review of selected vendor information, the licensee is receiving

information from vendors such as the diesel vendor (General Motors EMD),

j and routing this infomation to appropriate personnel for review, evaluation,

and implementation of appropriate action. Licensee's formal Vendor Technical

j Infomation program, in response to Generic Letter 83-28 " Required Actions

i Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events," Section 2.2.2 is scheduled

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for implementation on July 1, 1985.

! Within the areas examined, one potential enforcement finding was identified

i with respect to Part 21 evaluations and one open item with respect to work

} classification in Nuclear Work Requests.

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DF7 AILS

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1.0 PERSONS CONTACTED:

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CECO-Corporate Office

K. Bussman, Office Supervisor

J. Pizzica, SWnior Staff Engineer

P. LeBlond, Nuclear Licensing

S. Miller, Senior Engineer

CECO-Quad Cities Site

! *N. Kalivianakis, Manager

l *D. VanPelt, Asst. Superintendent-Maintenance  ;

t , G. Spedl, Asst. Superintendent-Tech. Services

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• R. Robey Asst. Superintendent-Operations

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• T. Tamlyn, Services Superintendent

, *D. Gibson, QA Supervisor

! *H. Lihou, Tech Staff Supervisor

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• C. Smith, QC Supervisor

i' *B. Strub, Compliance Coordinator

• J. Fish, Master Mechanic

• D. Crabbick, Master Electrician i

,; *D. Rajcevich, Master Instrumentation Mech.

! J. Reed Fire Protection Coordinator

C. Elassar, Electrical Maintenance Planner

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H. Do, Engineer

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T. Vanloo, Maintenance

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L. Krueder, Central Files Surarvisor

D. Jessen, Engineer- GSEP

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NRC Representatives

! *A. Morrongiello, Resident Inspector

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• Attended Exit Meeting - June 14, 1985

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2.0 Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 14, 1985, with

those persons indicated in Section 1 above. The licensee was informed

of and acknowledged the inspection findings discussed below.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials

provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

3.0 Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

4.0 Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.0 Licensee / Vendor Interface

The inspectors reviewed the implementation of the Quad Cities Administrative

Procedures that identify, track, and resolve identified deficiencies.

This was accomplished by reviewing the final disposition of technical

information provided by General Electric (GE), INP0, the NRC, and vendors

of safety-related equipment and components.

a. Licensee /GE

CECO's program has controlled the receipt and evaluation of GE

Service Information Letters (SILs) and Service Advice Letters (SALs)

since 1973. However, CECO's documentation of evaluations for the

majority of the items reviewed during this inspection consisted of

a short note written on either the GE response form or the SIL/ SAL

itself. This method does not contain sufficient information to

determine if any equipment modifications or procedural changes had

been implemented. This will be discussed further in Section 6.0.

Of the SALs reviewed, one in particular highlighted the fact that

the SIL/ SAL evaluation does not include the complete disposition

of actions taken. This SAL, issued by GE in 1982, recommended relay

and coil replacement of IAC overcurrent relays with certain "date

codes." A CECO interoffice memo listed the affected relays to be

replaced. However, information necessary to determine whether or

not CECO had implemented corrective action was unavailable,

indicating deficiencies in documenting the evaluation and

implementation of actions CECO determined to be appropriate.

CECO maintains a list of SILs and their disposition. A review of

this list revealed that two SILs applicable to the Quad Cities

Station had not been received from GE, Darien, Illinois. This

is a failure on the part of GE to assure that all applicable SILs

are sent to the appropriate licensees. At present, CECO has a list

of SALs issued by GE for equipment and components applicable to their

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facility. However, CECO (or any other licensee) cannot be certain

that all applicable SALs are received, since GE's distribution system

involves numerous GE service organizations responsible for distributing

SALs.

b. Licensee and Other Vendors

Although information from vendors other than GE was being received,

CECO did not have a formal system which could be reviewed to determine

whether the technical information received was being evaluated and the

action determined by CECO to be appropriate was being implemented.

At the time of the inspection, Quad Cities was in the process of

implementing Quad Cities Administrative Procedure (QAP) 1800-9,

Control of Vendor Equipment Technical Information. The purpose of

this procedure is to establish control of vendor equipment technical

information (VETI) used to perform work on safety-related and certain

nonsafety-related equipment. Quad Cities is implementing this procedure

to provide the documentation for the evaluation and implementation of

actions determined appropriate in response to technical information

received from GE (SILs, TIls, SALs), the NRC, and INP0. The NRC

inspectors noted that this procedure did not include provisions for

other vendors of safety-related equipment and components.

6.0 Evaluation of Information Contained in General Electric Service

Information Letters (SIls) and Service Advice Letters (SALs)

a. SILs

The SIL is the method normally used by GE to provide their customers

with recommendations for equipment modifications, plant design

improvements, or changes to improve plant performance.

Quad Cities Administrative Procedure (QAP) 400-13 Revision 1, " Receipt

and Processing of General Electric Co. Vendor Information," is the

procedure that defines the requirements for review, evaluation, and

action taken, when necessary, on technical information for SILs,

Turbine Information Letters (TILs), and Service Advice Letters (SALs).

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When performing a review for receipt of SILs the inspector found that

numerous SILs were not included in the original SIL binder and no

response form had been returned to GE or retained by the Technical

Staff Engineer. During discussions with the resident GE Operations

Engineer, the inspector learned that Quad Cities does not receive

SILs that are not applicable to the station. All SILs are sent from

GE Nuclear Services Operations, San Jose, California, to GE's Nuclear

Energy Business Operations (NEBO) office in Darien, Illinois, and from

there only those SILs determined by GE's Darien office to be applicable

to the Quad Cities Station are forwarded to the licensee.

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The inspector found two instances, SIL 320 Supplement i and SIL 404,

both dated February 24, 1984, that were applicable to the Quad Cities

Station. However, these SILs had not been reviewed by the licensee,

due to the fact that they had not been received on site.

The inspectors reviewed a sample of 20 SIls for receipt, evaluation

and action taken as deemed appropriate by CECO. SIL status is

maintained through the SIL response form log. When action has been

completed in response to GE recommendations it is identified on

the GE response fonn as being fully implemented. This is one of

the categories used by GE to identify implementation status in their

SIL Status Report System. This fonn does not contain sufficient

information to determine what activity had actually been performed,

such as a procedural change, or equipment modification. Station

personnel developed a list of CECO actions for 12 SILs requested by

the inspector for review of evaluation and implementation of recom-

mendations. These SIls and the action taken by Quad Cities are

described below.

1. SIL No. 39 - GE Magne Blast Air Circuit Breakers

Two operator incidents occurred where Magne-Blast air circuit

breakers failed to perform as required. In both instances the

malfunction, as determined by GE, was attributed to loose or

missing bolts and/or screws within the breaker assembly.

Quad Cities Procedure QMS 200-5, " Inspection and Maintenance

of 4KV Horizontal Circuit Breakers," was written and implemented

in response to the information contained in this SIL. A check

of bolt and screw tightness, as recomended by GE, was included

in the procedure.

2. SIL No. 155 - SBM Control Switches

This SIL indicated fractures of the Lexan cam portion of the

switch may result in the inability of the switch to perform

its intended function. SBM switches are used throughout the

nuclear industry in both PWR and BWR applications.

The inspectors reviewed CECO's response which indicated SBM

switches on essential Class 1E components were ordered and

installed prior to July 1972, the cut-off date specified by

GE for the manufacture of defective switches. As a result,

CECO determined that no action was necessary.

3. SIL No. 218 - Automatic Feedwater Pump Trip

This SIL recommends that plants without an automatic high

reactor water level feedwater pump trip function consider the

installation of such a function as an operator aid and to help

prevent equipment damage.

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CECO indicated that the reactor feedwater pump automatic trip

was an original feature installed at Quad Cities. Operating

Procedure Q0P 3200-2, Revision 3, lists reactor water level

at +48 inches as a signal for an automatic feedwater pump

trip.

4. SIL No. 321 - Increasing Wetwell to Drywell Vacuum Breaker

Reliability

Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) tests for prototype Mark I

containments resulted in excessive cycling and damage of

the wetwell to drywell vacuum breakers.

Modifications wera performed by CECO to replace the portions

of the vacuum breakers that are susceptible to such damage.

Procedure QMS 500-1, " Suppression Chamber to Drywell Vacuum

Breaker Design Inspection," was written to implement GE

recommendations.

5. SIL No. 331 Suaplement 4 - Scram Discharge Volume (SDV)

Design Change Recommendations

The undetected presence of water in the SDV prior to scram

was identified as the cause of the partial insertion of

some control rods during a scram at a BWR. This water

resulted from inadequate venting and/or draining of the

piping in combination with an instrumentation arrangement

which did not directly monitor the SDV.

CECO, Per Modification No. M-4-2-81-21, modified SDV Headers,

Instrument Volume, and vent and drain valves to conform to a

Quad Cities Engineering Evaluation and GE Recommendations.

6. SIL No. 351 - HPCI and RCIC Turbine Control System Calibration

A survey of operating sites revealed problems with regard to

j existing calibration procedures used for HPCI and RCIC turbine

control systems provided by the Terry Corporation.

The inspectors learned that Quad Cities does not utilize a Terry

HPCI turbine; therefore, no evaluation was performed. For the

RCIC Terry Turbine, Adjustment Procedure QIP 1300-1 was imple-

mented to outline the method by which the RCIC EGM control box

and ramp generator / signal converter are tested ani calibrated

as recommended by GE SIL 352.

7. SIL No. 370 - Possible Fuel Damage from Loss of Feedwater

Heaters

Loss of feedwater heater reduces core inlet enthalpy resulting

j in an increase in thermal power level and a shift in power shape.

If the fuel is operating at or near the preconditioned envelope

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in any region of the core, either of these power changes may

cause fuel failures due to pellet / clad interaction.

00P 3500 and Q0A-3500-1 for Loss of Feedwater Heaters was written

and implemented by CECO.

8. SIL No. 381 - Control of Non-Approved Organic Cleaning Compounds

and Other Materials in BWRs

In two incidents, a non-approved organic cleaning compound, (as

defined in the BWR Operators Manual for Materials and Processes)

intruded into the primary system. These were contaminants which

are harmful to the plant systems.

QAP-1000-5, which provides guidelines for the approval and use of

chemical products on stainless steel, and for controlled usc of

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products harmful to plant systems, radwaste and personnel, was

implemented by CECO as a result of this SIL.

9. SIL No. 393 - RCIC Turbine Journal Bearing Locating Pin

Turbine Journal Bearings are fitted with locating pins to assure

proper orientation of the bearings within the housing. GE

indicated the possibility may exist for a reduction in the oil

supply to the bearing if the locating pin is missing and the

journal bearing is mislocated.

Per this GE recommendation, the RCIC turbine was inspected by

CECO to assure that the locating pin was in place. As a result,

the outboard bearing was found to have no locating pin. A pin

was installed as located on the GE drawing.

10. SIL No. 418 - Topaz Inverter Low Voltage Shutoff

A 10 CFR Part 21 report was filed with the NRC concerning the

improper adjustment of the low voltage shutoff for Topaz Class

1E inverters. The adjustment of the low voltage shutoff was

indicated to be too high, possibly resulting in an inverter trip

and failure to restart during a design basis accident.

Quad Cities Station Nuclear Work Request numbers Q41475 and

Q41476 indicated that the Topaz low voltage setpoints had been

tested and adjusted as necessary. However, no QA/QC inspection

records were in evidence to assure the work was accomplished in

accordance with documented requirements.

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b. SALs

The SAL is the method nonnally used by GE to provide their customers

with notification of product problems and/or service information on

a broad rant;e. While performing the review for receipt of SALs, the

inspector noted that the system employed by GE does not provide a

method by which each affected customer can determine if all applicable

SALs have been received.

The inspector found several instances where SALs could not be located.

The book containing the SAL series had been misplaced. The balance

of SALs reviewed indicated that a cursory review was performed with

the majority of reviews containing no evaluation. One SAL, 721-PSM-

168.1, indicated a formal review, however, documentation of corrective

action could not be identified.

SALs reviewed and the action taken by Quad Cities are described

below:

1. SAL 721-PSM-168.1 - IAC Time Overcurrent Coil Replacement

GE determined that two out of the three specific insulation

wraps were omitted between two leads of the operating coil of

the time overcurrent unit.

On May 18, 1982, Ceco 0AD (Operational Analysis Department)

generated an in-house letter to the Maintenance Department

indicating the relays affected. Documentation could not be

produced by CECO to demonstrate what action, if any, had been

taken, with respect to these relays. Interviews with cognizant

CECO personnel indicated that no action was taken since failures

were reported by GE on less than 0.02 percent of the relays.

GE had recommended relay and coil replacement of IAC overcurrent

relays with certain "date codes."

2. SAL 721-PSM-175.1 - HEA Relay Mis-0peration

Several customer reports to GE of an HEA relay mis-operation

indicated these incidents may be attributed to a problem with

the panel door on which the relay is mounted.

CECO's response to this SAL could not be determined. The book

containing this SAL was not available for review during this

inspection.

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3. SAL 721-PSM-177.1 - HSA Relay Contact Fidelity

Several vendor supplied parts used in the HSA Contact assembly

were found by GE not to conform to design drawings, thus possibly

i resulting in a contact fidelity problem. An evaluation performed

by CECO determined that this SAL was not applicable to Quad Cities.

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7.0 Evaluation of Operating and Maintenance Instructions Provided by the

Emergency Diesel Generator Vendor, General Motors

The emergency diesel generators at Quad Cities were manufactured by the

Electro-Motive Division (EMD) of General Motors and supplied through

Western Engine. EMD issues " Maintenance Instructions" (mis) and Power

Pointers as needed which cover recommended maintenance procedures and

design changes for the engines. Quad Cities received mis and Power

Pointers directly from EMD.

A work analyst in the Quad Cities maintenance department reviews the mis

and Power Pointers to determine the applicability of the recommendations

to the Quad Cities units. The work analyst discusses this review and

conclusions with the Master Mechanic. One of several methods can be

used to implement the advice of an MI or Power Pointer, if such action

is determined to be necessary. A Work Request is used if the job will

be a one time fix. A temporary procedure change is written when quick

action is required. A permanent procedure change is used to permanently

implement a temporary procedure change or a reconsnendation. The time

elapsed to complete any of these methods of action is variable.

The work analyst does not document his review of the mis and Power

Pointers, nor are his meetings with the Master Mechanic and the

conclusions reached documented. It is impossible to determine if

a particular MI or Power Pointer has been implemented without relying

on the memory of the work analyst or directly comparing the MI or Power

Pointer with the maintenance procedure.

8.0 Evaluation and Im)lementation of Appropriate Action in Response to

Specific Actions Recommended by Various Vendors

During the course of the inspection, specific deficiencies that had

been identified by vendors as requiring corrective action were reviewed

to determine if the licensee had evaluated and implemented action deemed

appropriate in response to this vendor information. These deficiencies

and the action taken by CECO are described below:

a. Technology for Energy Corporation (TEC) Acoustic Monitors

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A report on the failure of a safety relief valve acoustic monitor to

i indicate valve closure once flow had stopped was reported to the NRC.

This failure was attributed to a chip manufactured by Texas Instruments,

on the TEC 914 Circuit Board, which is qualified for a four year

service life. TEC, manufacturers of the monitor, has provided the

affected licensee with a fix for the problem which consisted of a

circuit board replacement.

Interviews with maintenance personnel at Quad Cities revealed the

TEC monitor problem to be not applicable. Flow detection devices used

at Quad Cities are manufactured by NDT International, Westchester,

Pennsylvania. The inspector reviewed NDT's vendor technical manual,

dated September 1979, however no mention was made as to the shelf

life of their device. These flow detection devices were installed

at Quad Cities in June 1979.

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b. GNB Battery Racks

Analysis by GNB Batteries, Inc. (formerly Gould, Inc.) indicated

batteries and their racks at some nuclear plants may be installed

with an end gap different to that assumed by Gould for seismic

qualification, namely 1/4" maximum.

Quad Cities Station nuclear work request numbers Q41574 and Q41575

indicated that the necessary work was accomplished to reduce the

gap between cell retainer rail and the cells. NRC inspectors

verified that no gaps were in evidence for Unit 1 and Unit 2

battery room cell retainer rails. However, no QA/QC inspection

records were available to assure the work was accomplished in

accordance with documented requirements.

c. GE 4160 Volt Switchgear

During the performance of re-qualification tests on GE switchgear

(4160V-250 and 350 MVA-78,000 amperes momentary) conducted July 11,

1978, test results indicated that the short circuit bus bracing

was not adequate to withstand a 10 cycle 78,000 ampere test. GE

recommended to CECO in a letter dated June 1,1982, that CECO review

and evaluate the specific application of their switchgear equipment

to determine if a capability in excess of 50,000 amperes for 10 cycles

was required. Modification kits with instructions would be available

from GE should changes to the equipment be necessary.

Quad Cities has four busses employing 4KV vertical left swit.agear,

however, the equipment is not used for any safety-related application.

CECO had not modified this equipment as of this inspection.

, d. Ruskin Fire Dampers

The Ruskin Manufacturing Company, in a letter to Quad Cities dated

November 6,1984, under a potential 10 CFR Part 21, indicated that

test methods originally used by Ruskin may not have accurately

depicted actual field conditions for dampers installed inside

ducting. In addition, Ruskin stated such dampers may also fail

to close under actual flow conditions and recommended that-CECO test

the dampers for operability.

CECO's Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED) performed an

evaluation and determined this condition not applicable to Quad

Cities as documented on SNED inter-company memo dated January 17,

1985.

A review by the NRC inspector of the control room HVAC system

indicated the existence of at least one damper (No. CEC 01-9472-01)

which was required to close under flow due to its interface with

area smoke detectors and the control room air supply system.

The failure to properly and accurately evaluate the original

issue raised by Ruskin is considered a potential enforcement

. finding in the area of evaluating defects and noncompliances

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e. Pacific Scientific Mechanical Shock Arrestors

On November 9, 1983, CECO filed a 10 CFR Part 21 report with Region

III concerning Pacific Scientific Mechanical Shock Arrestors, Model

PSA-1 and PSA-3. The specific problem was the failure of the " tangs"

on the capstan spring in a certain series snubbers. This " tang"

failure may cause the snubber to become (1) locked (rigid) or (2)

flexible (non-restraining), depending on where the pieces lodged

internally. For case number 1, this may lead to overstresses in

the piping system, adjacent pipe supports and structural steel

during a thermal transient. For case number 2, similar results

are possible during a seismic event.

Ceco's action was to replace and/or repair the affected snubbers which

totaled 6 in Unit 1 and 7 in Unit 2, all located on safety-related

systems.

f. Nutherm Conductors

A July 11, 1984, Nutherm International, Inc. (NI) letter to the NRC

identified a 10 CFR 21 item concerning NI supplied equipment. The

deficiency involved nicked conductors on shielded electrical cable,

which was installed within the NI supplied electrical panels. Quad

Cities Station nuclear work request numbers Q37610 and Q42215 indicated

that the defective nicked conductor cables were replaced for the four

panels affected. QA surveillance report SR-4-84-88BS and subsequent

revision verified satisfactory inspection and acceptance of the

required work in accordance with applicable requirements. In

addition to the above, the licensee controlled the deficiency with

CECO nonconformance report numbers 29-84 and 42-84.

9.0 Evaluation and Implementation of Appropriate Action in Response to

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NRC Information Notices

a. GE Magne-Blast Breakers (IEN 84-29)

IE Information Notice 84-29, " General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit

Breaker Problems" dated April 17, 1984, informed licensees of a

potential generic problem identified with these breakers. The

breakers have a Tuf-Loc sleeve bearing consisting of teflon coated

fiberglass. Several instances had been reported where the sleeve

bearings exhibited more than normal wear. In one case, the teflon

sleeve bearing had worn to the point of metal-to-metal contact

which subsequently caused an emergency diesel generator output

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breaker to fail to close during a test. GE had issued Service

Advice Letters (SAL) 318.1, 318.la, and 318.2 to alert customers

to the problem. The SALs recommended prompt and regular inspection

of the breaker for bearing wear, and/or replacing the Tuf-Loc

bearings with longer life aluminum-bronze bearings.

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Ceco received this notice and completed its review on April 27, 1984.

The followup action taken as recorded on the NRC Document Review

.Completjon Record was to give the electrical maintenance department

a copy of the notice where further action would be taken as deemed

necessary. Four busses at Quad Cities use the type of breaker

discussed in Information Notice 84-29. However, CECO identified

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these breakers as not used in safety related applications.

10.0 Safety-Related Nuclear Work Requests

There appears to be a misapplication of the " routine maintenance" designation

for safety-related jobs being completed using the Nuclear Work Request forms.

Commonwealth Edison's Quality Procedure QP No. 3-52, " Design Control for

Operations - Plant Maintenance," defines routine maintenance as work of

a simple nature that can be accomplished by craft capability with guidance

stated on the work request. The procedure specifies that work, if not

performed correctly, which could have an impact on safety or plant

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reliability, shall not be designated as routine maintenance.

The inspectors reviewed four Ceco Nuclear Work Requests that were designated

as " routine maintenance." However, the systems and components which they

addressed could have impact on safety and plant reliability. Additionally,

the work which was requested did not include adequate craft instructions

to perform the work activities. This was evidenced by the lack of attached

documentation in the form of procedures, travelers or document check lists.

These work requests were previously addressed in Section 6.a.10 and 8 b for

Topaz Inverters and GNB Battery Racks, and as indicated, did not have any

QA/QC verification that the work activities were performed in accordance

with the requirements.

This misapplication of Nuclear Work Request job tesignations is considered

an open item (254/265-85-020/022-02).

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! Attachment A

Documents Examined

The documents listed below were reviewed by the inspectors to the extent

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necessary to satisfy the objectives of the inspection.

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1. Quad Cities Administrative Procedures

Control of Vendor Equipment Technical Information QAP 1800-9 Rev. 1

NRC IE (Bulletins, Circulars, Notices and Generic Letters ) -SNED

Q.39 Rev. 5

Reporting of Defects or Noncompliancies - SNED/PE Q.50 Rev. 0

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10 CFR 21 - Reports to NRC - SNED/PE Q.40 Rev. 2

Administrative Procedure QAP-1800

Nuclear Work Request Procedure QAP 1500-2

Receipt and Processing of GE Vendor Information QAP 400-13 Rev. 1

2. Other Procedures

i *

Control of Vendor Equipment Technical Information - NSD - M02 Rev. 2

,

4KV Horiz. Circuit Breaker Inspection Checklist - QMS 200 - S7 Rev. 3

i '

Diesel Inspection Procedures

Monthly QMS 200-53 Rev. 4

Quarterly QMS 200-S4 Rev. 1

Semi-Annually QMS 200-S5 Rev. 3

,

Document Control Procedures ODM-0 Rev. 36

3. Other Related Documents

Nuclear Work Orders Q 41575, Q 41576, Q 41475, Q 41476

GE Nuclear Systems (Letter G-EB0-4-376)

List of Qualified Vendors and their QA Program - Rev. 0

Inspection Checklists for Breakers (dated 4/85)

Refuel Outage List for September 1980 Outage (dated 9/80)

,

Service Information Letter Status Response (dated 10/83)

4, 10 CFR Part 21 Evaluations

P3ckage # Topic

29 4.16KV Switchgear

38 Nutherm Conductors

46 Ruskin Fire Dampers

48 Topaz Class IE Inverters

5. Vendor Manuals

! *

Fluid Flow Detector, NDT, Westchester, PA

RST LOCA Containment Hydrogen Monitors, Comsip Vendor Manual #1129

Sales Order 80177; Purchase Order #270716

'

.

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