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Monticello Extended Power Uprate (Epu): Response to Request for Additional Information - Electrical Engineering Branch (TAC MD9990), Page 1 of 96 Through Page 57 of 96
	ML13105A188
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	04/10/2013
From:	Schimmel M A; Northern States Power Co, Xcel Energy
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	L-MT-13-034, TAC MD9990
	Download: ML13105A188 (60)
	v • d • e

@XclErgyMonticello Nuclear Generating Plant2807 W County Rd 75Monticello, MN 55362April 10, 2013L-MT-1 3-03410 CFR 50.90U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionATTN: Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555-0001Monticello Nuclear Generating PlantDocket 50-263Renewed License No. DPR-22Subject:Monticello Extended Power Uprate (EPU): Response to Request forAdditional Information -Electrical EnQineerina Branch (TAC MD9990)References:1) Letter from T J O'Connor (NSPM), to Document Control Desk (NRC),"License Amendment Request: Extended Power Uprate (TACMD9990)," L-MT-08-052, dated November 5, 2008. (ADAMSAccession No. ML083230111)2) Letter from T J O'Connor (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC),"License Amendment Request: Maximum Extended Load Line LimitAnalysis Plus," L-MT-10-003, dated January 21, 2010. (ADAMSAccession No. ML 100280558)3) Letter from M A Schimmel (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC),"Monticello Extended Power Uprate: Supplement for Gap AnalysisUpdates (TAC MD9990)," L-MT-12-114, dated January 21, 2013.(ADAMS Accession No. ML13039A201)4) Email from T Beltz (NRC) to J Fields (NSPM), "Subject: MonticelloNuclear Generating Plant -Requests for Additional Information(Electrical Engineering Branch) in Support of the Extended PowerUprate Review (TAC No. MD9990)," dated March 12, 2013.5) Letter from T J O'Connor (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC),"Monticello Extended Power Uprate: Updates to Docketed Information(TAC MD9990)," L-MT-1 0-072, dated December 21, 2010. (ADAMSAccession No. MLI103570026)

Document Control DeskPage 26) Letter from M A Schimmel (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC),"Monticello Extended Power Uprate: Supplement to Revise TechnicalSpecification Setpoint for the Automatic Depressurization SystemBypass Timer (TAC MD9990)," L-MT-12-091, dated October 30, 2012.(ADAMS Accession No. ML12307A036)Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, the Northern States Power Company, a Minnesotacorporation (NSPM), doing business as Xcel Energy, requested in Reference 1 anamendment to the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) Renewed OperatingLicense (OL) and Technical Specifications (TS) to increase the maximum authorizedpower level from 1775 megawatts thermal (MWt) to 2004 MWt.Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, NSPM requested in Reference 2 an amendment to theMNGP Renewed OL and TS to allow operation within the Maximum Extended LoadLine Limit Analysis Plus (MELLLA+) operating domain.The NRC has permitted the linking of these two applications by letter dated November23, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093160816).In Reference 3, NSPM submitted supplemental information to the NRC that describedchanges to EPU documentation that had occurred based on results of a Gap analysisperformed at the request of the NRC.Subsequently, in Reference 4, the NRC requested additional information related to thedocumentation provided in Reference 3.Enclosure 1 to this letter provides a response to the NRC requested information.Enclosure 2 to this letter contains supplemental information correcting an error in aprevious submittal.The supplemental information provided herein does not change the conclusions of theNo Significant Hazards Consideration and the Environmental Consideration evaluationsprovided in Reference 1 as revised by References 5 and 6 for the Extended PowerUprate LAR. Further, the supplemental information provided herein does not changethe conclusions of the No Significant Hazards Consideration and the EnvironmentalConsideration evaluations provided in Reference 2 for the MELLLA+ LAR.In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b), a copy of this application supplement, withoutenclosures, is being provided to the designated Minnesota Official.Summary of CommitmentsThis letter makes no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

Document Control DeskPage 3I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.Executed on: April lo, 2013Mark A. SchimmelSite Vice-PresidentMonticello Nuclear Generating PlantNorthern States Power Company-MinnesotaEnclosures (2)cc: Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC (w/o enclosures)Resident Inspector, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, USNRC (w/oenclosures)Project Manager, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, USNRCMinnesota Department of Commerce (w/o enclosures)

L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1ENCLOSURE 1RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONNRC ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING BRANCHThis enclosure provides a response from the Northern States Power Company, aMinnesota corporation (NSPM), doing business as Xcel Energy, to a request foradditional information (RAI) provided by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inReference 1.Below are the acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this enclosure.LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS50.49 10 CFR 50.49 -refers to qualification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49and Regulatory Guide 1.89AC alternating currentADS automatic depressurization systemAH ampere-hourAWG American Wire GageCLTP current licensed thermal powerCRD control rod driveDBA design basis accidentDC direct currentDOR Division of Operating Reactors -refers to qualification in accordance withDOR guidelines (as found in IEB 79-01 B) as identified in 10 CFR 50.49 (k)DW drywellECSA electrical conductor seal assemblyEPA electrical penetration assemblyEPRI Electric Power Research InstituteEPU extended power uprateEQ environmental qualificationEQMS Environmental Qualification Management SoftwareFHA fuel handling accidentGE General ElectricGQE generic qualification evaluationHELB high energy line breakHPCI high pressure coolant injectionIEB Inspection and Enforcement BulletinIEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, InckV kilovoltPage 1 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1LOCA loss of coolant accidentLPCI low pressure coolant injectionMCC motor control centerMNGP Monticello Nuclear Generating PlantMOV motor-operated valveMSIV main steam isolation valveNSPM Northern States Power -MinnesotaPAOT post-accident operating timePQE plant qualification evaluationPUSAR power uprate safety analysis reportPVC polyvinyl chloridePWC plant worst casePWR pressurized water reactorRB reactor buildingRCIC reactor core isolation coolingRHR residual heat removalSBA small break accidentSBO station blackoutSG specific gravitySGTS standby gas treatment systemSRV safety-relief valveTB turbine buildingTID total integrated doseVDC voltage direct currentvpc volts per cellPage 2 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1NRC Request No. 1Please explain what is meant by "Equipment Qualification Program Reconstitution."NSPM ResponseReconstitution of the EQ Program included updating the environmental profiles to reflectEPU conditions and all revised HELB inputs. Changes were made within the HELBProgram to both liquid (EPU) and steam (non-EPU) breaks. Reconstitution of the EQProgram also consisted of converting the qualification calculations into EPRI's EQMSformat.Page 3 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1NRC Request No. 2Please provide the normal and accident levels for radiation, temperature, pressure,submergence, chemical spray effects, and humidity for all areas in whichenvironmentally qualified equipment is installed in tabular form showing the Pre-EPUand EPU conditions, as well as the qualified values of EQ equipment in those areas.NSPM ResponseAccident Temperature, Pressure, SubmergenceThe EQ Program has been updated to include EPU conditions and all equipment withinthe scope of the EQ Program remains qualified.In L-MT-12-114 (Reference E1-1), Enclosure 1, NSPM provided a comparison of Pre-EPU (called CLTP) and EPU conditions applicable to EQ equipment in the followingtables:* Table 26-1 -Turbine Building HELB Results (Turbine Building by volume includedmaximum pressure, temperature and submergence compared for EPU vs. CLTP)" Table 26-2 -Reactor Building HELB Results (Reactor Building by volume includedmaximum pressure, temperature and submergence compared for EPU vs. CLTP)* Table 27-1 -Post-LOCA Temperatures Comparison (Reactor Building by volume -EPU vs. CLTP)* Table 27-2 -Reactor Building HELB Peak Ambient Pressure Comparisons (ReactorBuilding by volume -EPU vs. CLTP)" Table 27-3 -Reactor Building HELB Water Level Comparisons (Reactor Building byvolume -EPU vs. CLTP)* Table 27-4 -Reactor Building HELB Peak Temperature Comparison (ReactorBuilding by volume -EPU vs. CLTP)" Table 27-5 -Difference Between CLTP and EPU Reactor Bldg VolumeTemperatures for Post-LOCA and SBA (Reactor Building by volume -EPU vs.CLTP)Based on the above tables providing pre-EPU (CLTP) conditions for pressure andtemperature, this information is not repeated below for EPU peak temperature (Table 2-1) and EPU Peak pressure (Table 2-2).The EQ Program qualification is demonstrated below in the Tables 2-1, 2-2, 2-3 and 2-4, which compare EPU peak accident temperatures, pressures and submergence levelsto the qualified values of applicable EQ equipment.Page 4 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1Table 2-1, EPU Peak Accident Temperature vs. Qualification TemperatureTitle (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File Category) RB Volume Temp. (IF) Temp (IF) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note98-003- Allen Bradley Terminal 37 228 129.5 LOCA N/A-DOR The Allen Bradley terminal stripsP0I Boards (DOR) are located in a radiation harsh onlyarea.98-004- ASCO Solenoid Valves 1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 346 338 LOCA+HELB <150F See belowP01 (50.49) 16, 18, 19, 31,35, 36, 37, 39,42, 48, DWAlthough, the peak Drywell temperature is not bounded by the test peak temperature by the recommended margin of+15'F (IEEE Standard 323-1974), the plantconditions are adequately bounded by the test since it had a dual transient exposure and sustained peak temperature conditions exceeding those postulated insidethe Drywell.98-004- ASCO Solenoid Valves 9,11, 12, 31 450 310.9 LOCA+HELB >15°FP02 (50.49)98-004- ASCO Solenoid Valves 1, 3, 9, DW 346 338 LOCA+HELB <150F See belowP03 (50.49)Although, the peak Drywell temperature is not bounded by the test peak temperature by the recommended margin of+15'F (IEEE Standard 323-1974), the plantconditions are adequately bounded by the test since it had a dual transient exposure and sustained peak temperature conditions exceeding those postulated insidethe Drywell.98-006- ASCO Pressure 1,3, 9, 11, 12, 225 203.4 LOCA+HELB >150F Pressure switches located in ReactorP01 Switches (50.49) 14, 19,31 Building Volumes 19, and 31 haveLOCA only functions98-007- ASCO Temperature 36, 39 210 129.5 LOCA >150FP01 Switches (50.49)98-008- Automatic Valve DW 370 338 LOCA+HELB >150FP0I Company (AVCO) AirControl Assembly(50.49)11 _______________98-010- Barksdale Pressure 1, 3. 14, 18, 22, 212 197.5 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR See belowP01 Switches (DOR) 33The pressure switch in Reactor Building Volume 33 will be exposed to a HELB peak temperature of 243.77F due to a HPCI steamn line break in the HPCI pumproom. All other HELB events affecting Reactor Building Volume 33 have peak temperature conditions less than 2127F and are bounded by the testing. For theHPCI HELB event, a thermal lag assessment evaluated the internal temperature response of the switch to the event indicating a peak temperature less than 200'F.The analysis ran for greater than 30 minutes showing declining internal temperature response over the duration of the analysis. Equipment located in ReactorBuilding volumes 14 and 18 have LOCA only functions.Page 5 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1Title (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File Category) RB Volume Temp. (OF) Temp (IF) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note98-011- Barton Pressure 13, 14, 19 212 185.7 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR Equipment located in ReactorP01 Switches (DOR) Building volumes 1, 3 and 19 haveLOCA only functions.98-012- Barton Pressure 14,18 200 185.7 LOCA+HELB 14.3 OF See belowP01 Switches 580A-0,580A-1 (50.49)Pressure switches in the REC System will be exposed to harsh radiation only while functioning for a LOCA. They are not required to mitigate a HELB. As such,qualification for HELB conditions in Reactor Building Volume 18 is not required. The temperature margin is slightly less than the 15'F recommended by IEEE323-74. However, the expected operating time of this equipment is 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Given that the test was conducted at elevated temperatures for 85 days, the accidentprofile is bounded with adequate margin.98-014- 1 E.F. Johnson Banana 5, 8, 9, 12, 16 315 310.9 HELB N/A-DOR See belowP01 Plug (DOR)The selected Accident Area includes peak accident temperature and pressure conditions that bound those specified for Reactor Building Volumes 5, 8, 9, 12, and16.98-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) ALL 340 338 LOCA+HELB N/A-DORP0198-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) RB except 16, 236 232.3 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR See belowP02 28-32, 40A thermal lag analysis was conducted, which concluded that the actual cable will not exceed 232.3°F (Volume 8 reaches 296.1°F) during a postulated HELB,which is bounded by the tested temperature of 236°F.98-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) RB except 16, 340 310.9 LOCA+HELB N/A-DORP03 28-32, 40; TB98-018- General Electric Motors 1, 3 212 146.7 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 (50.49)98-020- General Electric DW 340 338 LOCA+HELB N/A-DORP01 ContainmentPenetrations (DOR)98-021- General Electric RB, except 16 340 310.9 LOCA+HELB N/A-DORP01 Terminal Blocks(DOR/50.49)98-021- General Electric 22, 33, 34 340 179.1 LOCA >150FP02 Terminal Blocks(DOR/50.49)98-022- General Electric MCCs 5,8 131 104.95 HELB N/A-DOR See belowP01 (DOR) I I I IPage 6 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1Title (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File Category) RB Volume Temp. (OF) Temp (OF) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation NoteA thermal lag analysis was conducted, which concluded that the internal MCC temperature response due to relevant HELB events is 104.95'F, well below 131°Fover the very short operating time needed for event isolation.98-023- Hevi-Duty Electric 37 248 129.5 LOCA N/A-DORP01 Transformer (DOR)98-024- General Electric Fan 37 251.96 129.5 LOCA N/A-DOR SGTS is only required for LOCAP01 Motors (DOR) events and not Reactor BuildingHELB events.98-025- Limitorque Motor DW 329 292 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR See belowP01 Operators (DOR) I IA thermal lag calculation was conducted by Limitorque, which concluded that at very high superheat conditions, the internal temperature of the valve remains atsaturated conditions.98-025- Limitorque Motor 16 See Note 135 None N/A-DOR See belowP02 Operators (DOR)As there is no credited safety function for the component analyzed by this EQ File, it has an operating time of 0 seconds. No evaluation for peak accidentconditions is required. Failure of valve in open or closed position is acceptable.98-026- Limitorque Motor 3, 10, 11, 13, 343 338 LOCA+HELB <150F See belowP01 Operators (50.49) 19, 20, 21, 22,31, DWThe peak test temperature and pressure exceed the peak required temperature and pressure with margin. Although the margin for temperature does not meet the15'F margin suggested in IEEE Std. 323-1974, additional margin is demonstrated through the application of a double-peak transient during the testing.98-026- Limitorque Motor 8, 10, 13, 16, 32 358 310.9 LOCA+HELB >150FP02 Operators (50.49)98-026- Limitorque Motor 12 250 203.4 LOCA+HELB >15°FP03 Operators (50.49)98-026- Limitorque Motor 3, 8, 10, 11, 12, 441 338 LOCA+HELB >150FP04 Operators (50.49) 13, 16, 19, 20,1, 22, 31 32,DW _ _ ._..98-027- Magnetrol Level 12 281 203.4 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 Switches (50.49)98-030- MicroSwitch Limit 36, 37, 39 160 129.5 LOCA N/A-DOR See belowP01 Switches (DOR) I IThe OP-AR limit switches, located in the SGTS Rooms, are only required to function during a LOCA, during which the area is only a radiation harshenvironment.Page 7 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Title (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File Category) RB Volume Temp. (IF) Temp (°F) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note98-032- Namco EA740/EA180 11 350 203.4 LOCA+HELB >15°FP01 Limit Switches (50.49)98-032- Namco EA740/EA180 16, 31, DW 353 338 LOCA+HELB 15°FP02 Limit Switches (50.49)98-032- Namco EA740/EA180 9, 11, 12, 18, 353 338 LOCA+HELB 150FP03 Limit Switches (50.49) 19,31.3998-032- Namco EA740/EA 180 31, DW 378 338 LOCA+HELB >150FP04 Limit Switches (50.49)98-033- Namco Quick ALL 353 338 LOCA+HELB 150FP01 Disconnects EC210(50.49)98-035- Raychem NEIS Seals 9, 11, 12, 18, 366 310.9 HELB >150FP01 (50.49) 19, 3198-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 357 338 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 Splices (50.49)98-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 390 338 LOCA+HELB >150FP02 Splices (50.49)98-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 438 338 LOCA+HELB >15°FP03 Splices (50.49)98-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 425 338 LOCA+HELB >150FP04 Splices (50.49)98-037- Robertshaw Level 18 220 210 LOCA+HELB N/A-DORP01 Switch (DOR)98-038- Rockbestos Coax Cable ALL 346.2 338 LOCA+HELB <15°F See belowP01 (50.49)The test included a dual transient exposure which provides additional performance margin for the installed cables. Therefore there is margin available tocompensate for less than recommended margin in the peak temperature.98-U39- Rosemount Pressure 33,34 360 .7.T-LOCA ,/A-DOr"P01 Transmitter Series A(DOR)98-040- Rosemount 1153 Series 7, 9, 12, 14, 17, 318 310.9 LOCA+HELB <150F See belowP01 B (50.49) 18, 22, 27, 33,34The recommended margin ot 157 is met tor all areas except for Reactor Biulding Volume lb. However, there are no Kosemount Model 1153 Series Bs pressuretransmitters located in Reactor Building Volume 16. The Volume 16 profile was selected to adequately bound all other applicable areas. Therefore, adequatemargin for peak accident temperature has been demonstrated for all locations of the Reactor BuildingPage 8 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Title (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File Category) RB Volume Temp. (IF) Temp (IF) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note98-041- Rosemount Conduit RB except 16 440 310.9 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 Seals (50.49) and 28-3298-042- Rotork "A" Range 1, 3 180 146.7 LOCA+HELB N/A-DORP01 Actuators (DOR)98-043- Rotork Valve Operators 1, 3, 10, 11, 12, 385 310.9 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 (50.49) 14,31,3398-044- Static O-ring (DOR) 1,3,22,33 212 195 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR See belowP01A thermal lag evaluation was conducted, which indicates a peak switch temperature condition less than 195°F.98-047- Samuel Moore ALL except 340 310.9 LOCA+HELB > 150FP0I Instrument Cable DW(50.49)98-049- Valcor Solenoid Valves 18, TB 21 417 146.7 LOCA >150FP01 (50.49)98-049- Valcor Solenoid Valves 11, 19 346 203.4 LOCA >150FP02 (50.49)98-050- DG O'Brien Electrical DW 340 278 LOCA >157F See belowP01 Penetrations (50.49)The actual temperature response of the containment penetration, which is located at the containment wall (outboard end in the Reactor Building), has beendetermined to be lower than the predicted Drvwell air temperature response durine a worst-case steam line break event.owA thermal lag analysis was conducted, which indicates that the relay within its enclosure would experience a peak transient temperature less than 196°F. Thetesting with temperatures greater than 2007F for well over an hour envelop the specified plant conditions with margin.98-055- General Atomic DW 365 338 LOCA N/A-DORP01 Radiation Detector(DOR)Page 9 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1Title (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File Category) RB Volume Temp. (OF) Temp (IF) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note98-059- Kerite 1, 3. 5, 6 355 324.9 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 Cable/Termination(50.49)98-060- Westinghouse Starter 14, 19 260 146.7 LOCA >15°FP01 and Transformer(50.49)98-062- Gould Contactor 37 212 129.5 LOCA >150F See belowP01 (50.49)The peak temperature specified for the area is due to post-LOCA operation and SGTS filter heating in the rooms.98-064- Eaton Thermocouple ALL 375 338 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 Extension Cable(50.49)98-065- Brand Rex 600V Cable ALL 385 338 LOCA+HELB >15°FP01 (50.49)98-066- Boston Control Cable ALL except 340 310.9 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 (50.49) DW98-067- CONAX Electrical DW 370 338 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 Connector Seal (50.49)98-068- CONAX RTDs (50.49) 9, 10,11,12 376 338 LOCA+HELB >15°FP0198-069- Patel Conduit Seals ALL 354 338 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 (50.49)98-070- Patel Conformal ALL except 358 310.9 LOCA+HELB >15°FPOI Coating (50.49) DW98-071- EGS Grayboot ALL 450 338 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 Electrical Connectors(50.49)98-072- EGS Ouick Disconnect ALL 452 338 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 (50.49)98-073- Swagelok/Raychem -7,14, 18, 22, 350 310.9 HELB >150FP0I Conduit Seal (50.49) 33, 3498-075- Weed Thermocouples DW 500 338 LOCA >150FP01 (50.49)98-076- Rome Cable Type SIS 5, 8 303 296.1 HELB N/A-DORPO1 (DOR)Page 10 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1Title (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File Category) RB Volume Temp. (IF) Temp (IF) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note98-077- Eaton Cutler-Hammer 22, 33, 34 232 146.7 LOCA >150FP01 Relays (50.49)98-078- PEI/FENWAL 5, 8,9, 12, 16 355 310.9 HELB >150FP01 Temperature Switch(50.49)98-079- ITT-Royal PVC Cable 14, 18, 19, 22, 211 195 LOCA+HELB N/A-DORP01 (DOR) 3398-080- Okonite Control Cable 5, 14, 17, 18, 22 236 232.3 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR See belowPOI (DOR)A thermal lag analysis was conducted, which concludes that the peak temperature of the cable remains below the test temperature of 236°F.98-081- Triangle Triolene 17, 18 236 213.6 LOCA N/A-DOR See belowP01 Control Cable (DOR)A thennal lag analysis was conducted, which concludes that the peak temperature of the cable remains below the test temperature of 236°F.98-082- MNGP-A Cable RB, except 16, 236 235.1 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR See belowP01 (DOR) 28-32, 40A thermal lag analysis was conducted, which concludes that the peak temperature of the cable remains below the test temperature of 236°F.98-083- MNGP-B Cable RB, except 16, 286 239.7 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR See belowP01 (DOR) j 28-32, 40A thermal lag analysis was conducted, which concludes that the peak temperature of the cable remains below the test temperature of 2867F.98-084- Amphenol Connectors 1, 3, 14, 18, 19, 266 243.7 LOCA+HELB N/A-DORP01 (DOR) 22,3398-085- Pyco Temperature 28 410 310.9 HELB > 150FP0I Elements (50.49)98-086- SOR Pressure Switches 14, 18,22,33 350 310.9 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 (50.49)98-103- Patel P-1 Thread ALL 400 338 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 Sealant (50.49)98-104- Rockbestos Firewall SR ALL 351.2 338 LOCA+HELB <150F See belowP01 Cable (50.49) 1 1The slightly less than +15'F margin recommended for peak temperature is inconsequential considering the test applications of a dual transient exposure and theduration of maintained peak conditions during the test.98-107- Rockbestos Firewall ALL 342 338 LOCA+HELB <150F See belowP01 IlI/SIS Cable (50.49)Page 11 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Title (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File Category) RB Volume Temp. (IF) Temp (IF) AccidentMargin EPU Evaluation NoteThe slightly less than +I5'F margin recommended for peak temperature is inconsequential considering the test applications of a dual transient exposure and theduration of maintained peak conditions during the test.98-108- Rockbestos Firewall EP ALL except 327.2 324.9 LOCA+HELB <150F See belowP01 Cable (50.49) DWTemperature margin is acceptable given that plant conditions includes bounding temperature rise effects on worst-case bounding HELB or post-LOCA heatupconditions. Furthermore, the #12 AWG test cables were energized with 20 amp load during simulated accident, but no temperature rise was added to testconditions. Test had sustained oeak temperature for a greater duration than the specified peak conditions.98-109- Valcor MSIV Solenoid 16 360 310.9 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 Valves (50.49)98-128- UCI Tape Splice ALL except 375 324.9 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 (50.49) DW03-096- Loctite PST 580 Thread ALL 364 338 LOCA+HELB >15°FP01 Sealant (50.49)03-105- EGS/Scotch 130C and ALL except 372 324.9 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 69 Electrical Tape DWSplice (50.49)05-137- Fisher E/P Transducer 2,4 320 146.7 LOCA >150FP01 (50.49)05-138- Cutler-Hammer Motor 14, 19 253 146.7 LOCA >15°FP01 Starter/ControlTransformer (50.49)08-013- McDonnell & Miller 37 212 129.5 LOCA+FHA >150FP01 Flow Switches (50.49)08-014- Amphenol Connectors 1, 3, 14, 18, 19, 325.3 272.8 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 (50.49) 22, 3308-015- AVCO Scram Solenoid 14, 18 331 272.8 LOCA+HELB >15°FP01 Valves (50.49)08-016- Rosemount 1154 1, 3, 9, 12, 19 450 310.9 LOCA++/-ELB >15°FP01 Transmitters (50.49) 1 108-017- Struthers-Dunn 18 228 155 LOCA+HELB >150F See belowP01 CX-3964NE RelaySockets (50.49)A thermal lag analysis was conducted, indicating that the relay socket within its enclosure would experience a peak transient temperature less than 155°Fthroughout these bounding HELB scenarios. The testing with temperatures greater than 200'F for over well over an hour envelop the specified plant conditionswith significant margin.Page 12 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Title (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File Category) RB Volume Temp. (OF) Temp (IF) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note10-001- Schulz Electric Fan 37 365 129.5 LOCA > 150FP01 Motors (50.49)10-002- Okonite 5kV Power 1,3,5,6 345 319.3 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 Cable (50.49)10-003- SOR Differential 14, 18 370.9 310.9 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 Pressure Switches(50.49)10-004- Raychem Medium 1,3 414 319.3 LOCA+HELB >150FP01 Voltage Terminationsand Splices (50.49)10-004- Raychem Medium 5,6 325 319.3 LOCA+HELB <150F See belowP02 Voltage Terminationsand Splices (50.49)For accident temperature, an additional +30.40F temperature rise for energized power cable post-accident was included. Although the temperature margin is notthe recommended +157F, the method of constructing the Accident Area with temperature rise has excess conservatism which ensures that the temperature marginof test conditions on this profile construction remains adequate.Page 13 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Table 2-2, EPU Peak Accident Pressure vs. Qualification PressureTitle (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File Category) RB Volume Press. (psig) Press. (psig) Margin EPU Evaluation Note98-003- Allen Bradley Terminal 37 0 0 N/A -DOR This equipment has LOCA only functions.P01 Boards (DOR)98-004- ASCO Solenoid Valves 1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 16, 110 44.1 >+10% Equipment in Volumes 11, 36 and 37 haveP01 (50.49) 18, 19, 31, 35, 36, LOCA only finctions.37, 39, 42, 48, DW98-004- ASCO Solenoid Valves 9, 11, 12,31 86 6.18 >+10% Equipment in Volumes 9 and 11 have LOCAP02 (50.49) only functions.98-004- ASCO Solenoid Valves 1, 3, 9, DW 110 44.1 >+10% Equipment in Volume 9 has a LOCA onlyP03 (50.49) function.98-006- ASCO Pressure Switches 1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 14, 2.2 1.09 >+10% Equipment in Volume 31 has a LOCA onlyP01 (50.49) 31 function98-007- ASCO Temperature 36, 39 2.2 0 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.P01 Switches (50.49)98-008- Automatic Valve Company DW 67 44.1 >+10%P01 (AVCO) Air ControlAssembly (50.49)98-010- Barksdale Pressure Switches 1, 3, 14, 18, 22, 33 0.25 0.26 N/A-DOR See belowP01 (DOR) I IThe 0.01 psi difference in specified and test pressure is insignificant considering the construction of the switch and the very short duration of the plant HELBpressure conditions in the Reactor Building. Equipment in Volumes 14 and 18 function during a LOCA event only.98-011- Barton Pressure Switches 14 0.25 0.12 N/A-DORPO1 (DOR)98-012- Barton Pressure Switches 14,18 10 0.12 >+10% See belowP01 580A-0, 580A-1 (50.49)Pressure switches in the REC System will be exposed to harsh radiation only while functioning for a LOCA. They are not required to mitigate a HELB. As such,qualification for HELB conditions in Reactor Building Volume 18 is not required.98-014- E.F. Johnson Banana Plug 5, 8, 9, 12, 16 See Note 6.18 N/A-DOR See belowP01 (DOR)The effects of pressure on the nylon shield have been determined to be minimal. The banana plugs are a hollow shell open to atmospheric conditions on both theinner and outer surfaces. Because the pressure will be equal on both surfaces, pressure cannot cause a catastrophic failure of the component. Therefore, thespecified accident pressure is insignificant for qualification purposes of the subject banana plugs.Page 14 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Title (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File Category) RB Volume Press. (psig) Press. (psig) Margin EPU Evaluation Note98-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) ALL 62.5 44.1 N/A-DORP0198-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) RB except 16, 28- 13.8 6.18 N/A-DORP02 32,4098-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) RB except 16, 28- 62 6.18 N/A-DORP03 32, 40; TB98-018- General Electric Motors 1, 3 See Note 0.26 See Note See belowP01 (50.49)The marginal pressure increase in the plant will have no impact on motor function since the motor is vented, there will not be a pressure differential imposed onthe housing.98-020- General Electric DW 63 44.1 N/A-DORP01 Containment Penetrations(DOR)98-021- General Electric Terminal RB, except 16 110 6.18 N/A-DORP01 Blocks (DOR/50.49)98-021- General Electric Terminal 22, 33, 34 110 0 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.P02 Blocks (DOR/50.49)98-022- General Electric MCCs 5, 8 4.93 1.52 N/A-DORPO1 (DOR)98-023- Hevi-Duty Electric 37 0 0 N/A-DORP01 Transformer (DOR)98-024- General Electric Fan Motors 37 0 0 N/A-DORPo1 (DOR)98-025- Limitorque Motor Operators DW 95 44.1 N/A-DORP01 (DOR)98-025- Limitorque Motor Operators 16 0 0 N/A-DOR See belowP02 (DOR) [ I II IAs there is no credited safety function for the component analyzed by this EQ File, it has an operating time of 0 seconds. No evaluation for peak accidentconditions is required. Failure of valve in open or closed position is acceptable.98-026- Limitorque Motor Operators 3, 10, 11, 13, 19, 20, 110 44.1 >+10%P01 (50.49) 21, 22, 31. DW98-026- Limitorque Motor Operators 8, 10, 13, 16, 32 120 6.18 >+10%P02 (50.49)Page 15 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Title (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File Category) RB Volume Press. (psig) Press. (psig) Margin EPU Evaluation Note98-026- Limitorque Motor Operators 12 25 1.09 >+10%P03 (50.49)98-026- Limitorque Motor Operators 3, 8. 10, 11, 13, 16, 74 44.1 >+10%P04 (50.49) 19, 20, 21, 22, 31,32, DW98-027- Magnetrol Level Switches 12 18 1.09 >+10%P01 (50.49)98-030- MicroSwitch Limit 36, 37, 39 0 0 N/A-DORP01 Switches (DOR)98-032- Namco EA740/EAI80 11 76 1.09 >+10%P01 Limit Switches (50.49)98-032- Namco EA740/EAI80 16, 31, DW 72.5 44.1 >+10%P02 Limit Switches (50.49)98-032- Namco EA740/EAI8O 9. 11, 12, 18, 19,31, 72.5 44.1 >+10%P03 Limit Switches (50.49) 3998-032- Namco EA740/EA180 31, DW 76.8 44.1 >+10%P04 Limit Switches (50.49)98-033- Namco Quick Disconnects ALL 72.5 44.1 >+10%P01 EC210 (50.49)98-035- Raychem NElS Seals 9, 11, 12,18, 19,31 15 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49)98-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 70 44.1 >+10%P01 Splices (50.49)98-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 66 44.1 >+10%P02 Splices (50.49)98-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 132.3 44.1 >+10%P03 Splices (50.49) _98-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 123 44.1 70P04 Splices (50.49)98-037- Robertshaw Level Switch 18 10 0.22 N/A-DORP01 (DOR)98-038- Rockbestos Coax Cable ALL 122.1 44.1 >+10%P01 (50.49)98-039- Rosemount Pressure 33, 34 120 0.26 N/A-DOR This equipment has LOCA only functions.P01 Transmitter Series A (DOR) I I IPage 16 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Title (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File Category) RB Volume Press. (psig) Press. (psig) Margin EPU Evaluation Note98-040- Rosemount 1153 Series B 7,9, 12, 14, 17, 18, 73 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49) 22, 27, 33, 3498-041- Rosemount Conduit Seals RB except 16 and 120 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49) 28-3298-042- Rotork "A" Range 1, 3 3.31 0.26 N/A-DORP01 Actuators (DOR)98-043- Rotork Valve Operators 1, 3, 10, 11, 12, 14, 75 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49) 31,3398-044- Static O-ring (DOR) 1, 3, 22, 33 See Note 0.26 N/A-DOR See belowP01The 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months of testing at 2127F (0.25 psig) envelop the HELB+LOCA conditions of Reactor Building Volumes 22 and 33, since the operating times of thepressure switches in these locations are short. The pressure switches in Reactor Building Volumes I and 3 have 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months post-accident functions to support ADS.Under HELB, the locations may be subject to slightly increased pressure (0.26 psig), but the peak HELB temperature for either location is less than 1200F. At theonset of an accident, RHR or Core spray pump equipment operation in these locations will heatup the rooms and tend to lower the ambient relative humidity. Assuch, the 0.26 psig accident pressure specified for Reactor Building Volumes I and 3 is not a concern.98-047- Samuel Moore Instrument ALL except DW 105 6.18 >+10%P01 Cable (50.49)98-049- Valcor Solenoid Valves 18, TB 21 103 0.26 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.P0I (50.49)98-049- Valcor Solenoid Valves 11, 19 113 1.09 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.P02 (50.49)98-050- DG O'Brien Electrical DW 92 44.1 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.P01 Penetrations (50.49)98-051- Reliance Motors (50.49) 1,3, 14, 19 70 0.26 >+10% Equipment in Volumes 14 and 19 have LOCAP01 only functions98-052- Tavis Flow Transmitter 37 0 0 N/A This equipment has LOCA only functions.P01 (50.49)98-053- ITT Grinnel/Conoflow 37 0 0 N/A This equipment has LOCA only functions.P01 Transducer (50.49)98-054- Consolidated Control 18 5.7 0.22 >+10%P01 Relays (50.49)98-055- General Atomic Radiation DW 70 44.1 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.P01 Detector (DOR)98-059- Kerite Cable/Termination 1,3,5,6 50 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49)Page 17 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1Title (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File Category) RB Volume Press. (psig) Press. (psig) Margin EPU Evaluation Note98-060- Westinghouse Starter and 14, 19 40 0.26 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.P01 Transformer (50.49)98-062- Gould Contactor (50.49) 37 0 0 N/A This equipment has LOCA only functions.P0198-064- Eaton Thermocouple ALL 75 44.1 >+10%P01 Extension Cable (50.49)98-065- Brand Rex 600V Cable ALL 113 44.1 >+10%PO1 (50.49)98-066- Boston Control Cable ALL except DW 110 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49)98-067- CONAX Electrical DW 75 44.1 >+10%P01 Connector Seal (50.49)98-068- CONAX RTDs (50.49) 9, 10, 11, 12 88 44.1 >+10%P0198-069- Patel Conduit Seals (50.49) ALL 77 44.1 >+10%P0198-070- Patel Conformal Coating ALL except DW 30 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49)98-071- EGS Grayboot Electrical ALL 81 44.1 >+10%P01 Connectors (50.49)98-072- EGS Quick Disconnect ALL 77 44.1 >+10%P0I (50.49)98-073- Swagelok/Raychem -7, 14, 18, 22, 33, 34 15 6.18 >+10%P01 Conduit Seal (50.49)98-075- Weed Thermocouples DW 75 44.1 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.P01 (50.49)98-076- Rome Cable Type SIS 5, 8 66 1.52 N/A-DORPO1 (DOR)98-077- Eaton Cutler-Hammer 22, 33, 34 0 0 N/A This equipment has LOCA only functions.P01 Relays (50.49)98-078- PEI/FENWAL Temperature 5, 8, 9, 12, 16 26 6.18 >+10%P01 Switch (50.49)98-079- ITT-Royal PVC Cable 14, 18, 19, 22, 33 See Note 0.22 N/A-DOR See belowP01 (DOR)Page 18 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Title (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File J Category) J RB Volume Press. (psig) [ Press. (psig) L Margin EPU Evaluation NoteAlthough the test did not include elevated pressure, potential credible failure modes in cables due to pressure transients is the intrusion of moisture into theinsulation due to pressure differential. The peak HELB pressure for Reactor Building Volumes 14 or 22 (locations of end devices with HELB functions) is only14.92 psia, or 0.22 psi above atmospheric. As such, this failure mode is not considered credible when considering that the ITT Royal cables are only used for theshort runs between the pressure switch instrument and its local junction box.98-080- Okonite Control Cable 5, 14, 17, 18, 22 13.8 0.36 N/A-DORP01 (DOR)98-081- Triangle Triolene Control 17, 18 13.8 0.32 N/A-DOR This equipment has LOCA only functions.P01 Cable (DOR)98-082- MNGP-A Cable (DOR) RB, except 16, 28- 13.8 6.18 N/A-DORP01 32,4098-083- MNGP-B Cable (DOR) RB, except 16, 28- 75 6.18 N/A-DORP01 32,4098-084- Amphenol Connectors 1, 3, 14, 22, 33 See Note 0.26 N/A-DOR See belowP01 (DOR)The specified peak HELB pressure of 0.26 psig over normal ambient conditions is not significant as the test jacks have no collapsible void spaces, the internaland external pressures across the jacks will equalize.98-085- Pyco Temperature Elements 28 63 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49)98-086- SOR Pressure Switches 14, 18, 22, 33 40 6.18 >+10% Equipment in Volume 33 has a LOCA onlyP01 (50.49) function.98-103- Patel P-I Thread Sealant ALL 72 44.1 >+10%P01 (50.49)98-104- Rockbestos Firewall SR ALL 132.1 44.1 >+10%P01 Cable (50.49)98-107- Rockbestos Firewall Ill/SIS ALL 107.5 44.1 >+10%P01 Cable (50.49)99-108- Rockbestos Firewall EP ALL except DW 87.2 6.18 >+10%P01 Cable (50.49)98-109- Valcor MSIV Solenoid 16 62 6.18 >+10%P01 Valves (50.49)98-128- UCI Tape Splice (50.49) ALL except DW 74 6.18 >+10%P0I03-096- Loctite PST 580 Thread ALL 50 44.1 >+10%P01 Sealant (50.49)Page 19 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Title (Qualification Qualified EPU PeakEQ File Category) RB Volume Press. (psig) Press. (psig) Margin EPU Evaluation Note03-105- EGS/Scotch 130C and 69 ALL except DW 140 6.18 >+10%P01 Electrical Tape Splice(50.49)05-137- Fisher E/P Transducer 2, 4 75 0.26 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.P01 (50.49)05-138- Cutler-Hammer Motor 14, 19 0.6 0 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only finctions.P01 Starter/Control Transformer(50.49)08-013- McDonnell & Miller Flow 37 0 0 N/A This equipment has LOCA only functions.P01 Switches (50.49)08-014- Amphenol Connectors 1, 3, 14, 18, 19, 22, 2.3 0.26 >+10%P01 (50.49) 3308-015- AVCO Scram Solenoid 14, 18 11.4 0.22 >+10%P01 Valves (50.49)08-016- Rosemount 1154 1, 3, 9,12,19 110 6.18 >+10%P01 Transmitters (50.49)08-017- Struthers-Dunn 18 5.7 0.22 >+10%P01 CX-3964NE Relay Sockets(50.49)10-001- Schulz Electric Fan Motors 37 5 0 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.P01 (50.49)10-002- Okonite 5kV Power Cable 1,3,5,6 114 1.11 >+10%P01 (50.49)10-003- SOR Differential Pressure 14. 18 7 0.22 >+10%P01 Switches (50.49)10-004- Raychem Medium Voltage 1,3 28 1.11 >+10%P01 Terminations and Splices(50.49)10-004- Raychem Medium Voltage 5,6 11.5 1.11 >+10%P02 Terminations and Splices(50.49)Page 20 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Table 2-3, EPU Peak Accident Submergence Levels in the Reactor BuildingCLTP EPU EPURB Submergence Submergence EvaluationVolume Level (inches) Level (inches) Note1 0.6 7.2 12 0.12 03 0.6 7.2 14 0 05 0.6 7.2 26 47.4 8.4 17 52.56 7.2 38 0 7.2 29 0.12 7.2 110 0 7.2 111 0 7.2 112 0.12 7.2 113 2.88 014 3.24 015 0.6 1.2 416 80.16 69.6 517 0 018 8.16 019 6.36 1.2 420 0 1.2 421 0 022 0 023 0 024 0 025 0 026 0 027 0.12 028 4.56 14.4 629 3.6 14.4 630 3.24 12 631 3.24 12 632 2.28 14.4 633 0 034 0.06 035 0.24 036 0 037 0 038 0 039 0.12 0Page 21 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1CLTP EPU EPURB Submergence Submergence EvaluationVolume Level (inches) Level (inches) Note40 0 041 0 042 0.12 043 0.12 044 0.12 045 0.12 046 0.24 047 0 048 0.12 0Notes for Table 2-3:1. Post-HELB Submergence levels in the lower Reactor Building elevations areacceptable if they remain below the action levels of Emergency OperationProcedure C.5-1300/1400 as follows:RHR Rooms (RB Volumes 1 and 3): 15 and 53 inchesTorus Area (RB Volumes 9 to 12): 32 inchesTank Room (RB Volume 6): N/A2. RCIC and HPCI room submergence of 7.2 inches is acceptable. Drawings revealthat the bottom buckets of the MCCs are 8-inches or more above the floor3. The CRD Pump Room (Reactor Building Volume 7) does not have a safeoperating flood level established. There is only one EQ component in this area.Plant drawings show that the transmitter is located well above the submergencelevel of 7.2 inches.4. The 1.2 inch potential submergence in RB Volumes 15, 19 and 20 is consideredinsignificant and does not affect equipment located in these areas.5. There are four EQ components subject to potential submergence. Thesubmergence of these devices is acceptable as an evaluation shows that there isno impact on plant safety or shut down capabilities.6. There are no EQ components in RB Volumes 29 and 30. Review of plantdrawings show that all other EQ components located in RB Volumes 28, 31 and32 are above submergence levels.Page 22 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Table 2-4, EPU Peak Accident Submergence Levels in the Turbine BuildingCLTP EPUTB Submergence SubmergenceVolume Level (inches) Level (inches)1 66.96 722 31.32 363 27 364 0 05 34.2 366 36.24 367 0 368 0 09

010 1.56 3611

3612 0.6 7213 0.36 7214 17.28 3615 13.44 63.1216 0 1.217 0 2.418 0 019 0 020 2.76 021 0.12 022 0.48 1.223 0 024 0 025 0 026 0.72 027 0 028 0 029 0 030 0 031 0 032 0 033 0.12 034 0.48 3.635 0 036 0 037 4.2 2.4* Volumes newly created for model enhancementNote for Table 2-4There is no equipment within the scope of the Equipment Qualification Program locatedat or below the submergence levels in the Turbine Building.Page 23 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Normal and Accident RadiationTable 2-5 demonstrates that all EQ equipment is qualified for EPU normal and accident radiation levels. This tablecompares CLTP values for normal and accident dose to EPU values for normal, accident and Beta dose. The EPU TID iscompared to the qualification TID.The CLTP normal dose rates provided in Table 2-5 were defined by routine radiation surveys. A more recent radiationsurvey provided the bases for the EPU normal dose values shown below. The EPU normal dose results were adjusted bythe expected increase in radiation levels predicted for EPU operation. In some cases these new surveys resulted in areduction in normal dose for EPU. These radiation surveys are periodically performed to ensure that the normal dose isproperly considered and remains accurate in the EQ files due to possible changes in plant configuration or operation.Table 2-5, EPU vs. CLTP Normal and Accident Radiation DoseEPUI EPUTitle CLTP Normal CLTP Accident(Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. DoseEQ File Category) RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks98-003- Allen Bradley 37 6.3 1E+02 6.60E+02 4.OOE+06 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.5 1E+08 N/A -DORP01 Terminal Boards(DOR)98-004- ASCO Solenoid 1,3,9, 11, 1.26E+05, 6.60E+02 2.61E+07, 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.01E+08 >10% See belowP01 Valves (50.49) 12, 16, 18, 1.79E+07, 5.31E+07,19, 31, 35, 3.79E+05, 2.34E+06.36, 37, 39. 1.01E+05 1.15E+0742, 48, DW , I _IOne solenoid valve is located inside the Dryxvell and has a postulated Beta dose exposure that must be addressed. Beta qualification is established because the Beta dose to sensitiveequipment internals is determined to be less than 10% of the qualified Gamma dose in the EQ File.98-004- ASCO Solenoid 9, 11, 12, 31 1.79E+07 1.19E+05 5.31E+07 1.20E+07 0 1.20E+07 2.05E+08 >10%P02 Valves (50.49)98-004- ASCO Solenoid 1, 3.9, DW 1.01E+05, 1.88E+07 1.15E+07, 5.44E+07 1.00E+08 1.73E+08 2.OIE+08 >10%P03 Valves (50.49) 1.79E+07 5.3 1E+0798-006- ASCO Pressure 1,. 14, 1 .1.4E+05 1.19E+05 1.15E+07 1.19E+07 0 1.20E+07 1.92E+07 >10% See belowP90 Switches (50.49) 12, 14, 19,31Page 24 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1EPU EPUTitle CLTP Normal CLTP Accident(Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. DoseEQ File Category) RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin RemarksThe specified TID bounds the specified TID dose (full 180 day accident doses) for all installed pressure switches except those located in Reactor Building Volumes I and 3. Thepressure switches located in Reactor Building Volumes 1 and 3 have LOCA and HELB functions for only 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months post-accident. The 16-hour dose for Reactor Building Volumes 1 and3 is 4.60E+06 rad. The 60-year normal dose in these areas is 1.32E+05 Rad as provided by EQ-Part-B. Thus, the TID for the functional time of the pressure swvitches located in ReactorBuilding is bounded by the TID for the selected Radiation Area.98-007- ASCO 36,39 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 1.OOE+07 1.20E+07 0 1.20E+07 1.75E+07 >10%P01 TemperatureSwitches (50.49)98-008- Automatic Valve DW

7.59E+06

5.68E+06 0.OOE+00 1.327E+07 2.55E+07 >10% See belowP01 Company (AVCO)Air ControlAssembly (50.49)The selected Radiation Area has a TID consisting of a 60-year normal dose of 1.88E+07 Rad, a 180 day accident Gamma dose of 5.44E+07 Rad and an unshielded accident Beta doseof 2.OE+08 Rad. Each of these inputs to the specified TID may be reduced for the AVCO solenoid manifold. Since the solenoid manifold was only installed in 2009 and has a 20 yearthermal qualified life, a reduced normal dose of 7.59E+06 is considered. This dose is conservative to consider for normal use as it also includes increases due to extended power upratewhich was not yet implemented in 2009. The manifold has a conservative I hour operating time, so the gamma accident dose is 5.68E+06. The solenoid manifold is consideredqualified for the specified unshielded 2.OE+08 Rad accident Beta dose because it can be shown that there is sufficient shielding around the sensitive materials to reduce the dose to 10%of Gamma qualification dose. Therefore, a modified TID applicable for the solenoid valve manifold becomes 1.327E+07 Rad. The AC solenoid valves were exposed to 2.55E+07 Radand the materials of construction of the AC and DC solenoid valves are identical. Therefore. the test adequately bounds the TID.98-010- 1 Barksdale Pressure 1, 3. 14., 18. 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 6.OOE+06 4.60E+06 0 4.73E+06 I.OOE+07 N/A -DORP01 Switches (DOR) 22. 33The selected Radiation Area has a TID consisting of a 60 year normal dose of 1.32E+05 Rad and a 180 day accident dose of 2.09E+07 Rad. The TID of the selected Radiation Area isbounding over the TID specified for Reactor Building Volumes 1, 3, 14, 18. 22, and 33, the locations of the installed equipment. Since the maximum operating time for the installedequipment is 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months or less, the accident dose may be reduced. A 16-hour accident dose for the RHR pump rooms, Reactor Building Volumes I and 3, is 4.60E+06 Rad. Therefore,the postulated dose for the Barksdale pressure switches is 4.73E+06 Rad (1.32E+05 Rad normal + 4.6E+06 Rad 16 hour1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months accident dose) which is enveloped by the qualified dose.98-011- T Barton Pressure 1, 3, 14, 19 1.26E+05, 4.49E+05 **, 4.35E+05 0 8.84E+05 1L.OOE+06 N/A -DOR See belowP01 Switches (DOR) 1.0IE+05 2.34E+06The TID for all pressure switches, except those located in Volumes 1 and 3, are bounded by the selected accident area. Pressure switches located in Reactor Building Volumes 1 and 3only have a 10-minute post-LOCA function. The accident dose forthe pressure switches in Reactor Building Volumes I and 3 may be conservatively determined by using the post-LOCA dose at 30 minutes (0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months ), which is 6.66E+05 Rad. This. coupled with the normal dose of 1.32E+05 Rad for Reactor Building Volumes I & 3. gives a TID of 7.98E+05Rad for pressure switches in Volumes I and 3, which is less than the L.OE+06 Rad limitation.98-012- Barton Pressure 14, 18 3.79E+05 1.58E+06 2.34E+06 2.52E+06 0 4.10E+06 L.OOE+07 >10%P01 Switches 580A-0,580A-1 (50.49)98-014- E.F. Johnson 5, 8, 9. 12. 2.97E+06 2.97E+06 0 0 0 2.97E+06 4.OE+06 N/A -DOR See belowP01 Banana Plug 16(DOR)Page 25 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1EPU EPUTitle CLTP Normal CLTP Accident(Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. DoseEQ File Category) RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin RemarksThe selected Radiation Area has a TID consisting of a 60 year normal dose of 2.97E+06 Rad and a 180 day accident dose of 2.73E+06 rad. The specified TID is associated withReactor Building Volume 16 (Steam Chase). The 60-year normal dose for Volume 16 bounds the normal doses specified for Volumes 5, 8, 9, and 12. The equipment serves HELBdetection functions during which there will be no accident dose contribution. Therefore, the actual anticipated dose to any E.F. Johnson plug is 60 year normal dose of 2.97E+06 Rad.98-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31 E+07 5.44E+07 L.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.OOE+08 N/A -DORP0198-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) RB except 6.31E+02 1.32E+05 2.OOE+07 2.09E+07 0 2.IOE+07 2.44E+07 N/A -DORP02 16, 28-32,4098-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) RB except 1.26E+05 2.51E+07 2.61E+07 L.OOE+04 0 2.5 1E+07 4.OOE+07 N/A -DORP03 16, 28-32,40; TB98-018- General Electric 1, 3 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.62E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.10E+07 3.OOE+07 >10%P01 Motors (50.49)98-020- General Electric DW 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.3 1E+07 5.44E+07 L.OOE+08 1.73E+08 3.OOE+08 N/A -DORP01 ContainmentPenetrations(DOR)98-021- General Electric RB. except 6.3 1E+02 6.60E+02 1.87E+08 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.20E+08 N/A -DORP01 Terminal Blocks 16(DOR/50.49)98-021- General Electric 22,33, 34 6.31E+02 1.58E+06 1.87E+08 2.52E+06 0 4.10E+06 2.20E+08 >10%P02 Terminal Blocks(DOR/50.49)98-022- General Electric 5, 8 4.45E+04 7.57E+04 0 0 0 7.57E+04 L.OOE+06 N/A -DORP01 MCCs (DOR)During the HCPI or RCIC HELB events when either MCC must function, and during any small break LOCA or HELB (that does not render the 1-PCI system inoperable), there will beno accident dose to the MCC units. Because of this, the accident dose for either Reactor Building Volumes 5 or 8 can be disregarded for qualification purposes. Thus, the 7.57E+04Rad 60 year normal dose is applicable to both MCC units addressed by this EQ File. The test dose of 1.0E+06 Rad exceeds the maximum required plant dose of 7.57E+04 Rad, gamma(margin on the accident dose is not applicable since there is no accident dose to this equipment). Thus, the installed MCC components are conservatively qualified for the requiredradiation dose.98-023- Hevi-Duty 37 6.31 E+02 6.60E+02 <2.OOE+06 3.58E+06 0 3.58E+06 1.OOE+07 N/A -DORP01 ElectricTransformer(DOR)98-024- General Electric 37 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 1.OOE+06 1.78E+06 0 1.78E+06 4.40E+06 N/A- DORP01 Fan Motors (DOR)Page 26 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1EPU EPUTitle CLTP Normal CLTP Accident(Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. DoseEQ File Category) RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks98-025- Limitorque Motor DW 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 2.OOE+07 9.32E+07 2.OOE+08 N/A -DOR See belowP01 Operators (DOR)The selected Radiation Area has a TID consisting of a 60 year normal dose of 1.88E+07 Rad, a 180 day accident dose of 5.44E+07 Rad Gamma, and an unshielded accident Beta doseof 2.OE+08 Rad. Beta qualification is established because the Beta dose to sensitive internals is less than 10% of the qualified gamma dose. Beta dose is reduced to 2.00E+07 Rad,giving a TID of 9.32E+07 Rad. Testing demonstrates a radiation level of 2.0E+08, which envelops the 9.32E+07 Rad TID.98-025- Limitorque Motor 16 2.97E+06 2.97E+06 2.54E+06 2.73E+06 0.00E+00 5.70E+06 1.00E+07 N/A -DORP02 Operators (DOR)98-026- Limitorque Motor 3, 10, 11, 13, 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 2.04E+07 9.36E+07 2.04E+08 >10% See belowP01 Operators (50.49) 19. 20, 21,22, 31, DWThe selected Radiation Area TID consists of 1.88E+07 rad 60 year normal gamma dose, a 180 day 5.44E+07 Rad accident gamma dose. and an unshielded 2.0E+08 Rad beta accidentdose. Based on material analysis the beta radiation will be reduced to to <10% of the Gamma qualification dose, or 2.04E+07 Rad. This gives a TID of 9.36E+07 Rad, which isbounded by the test.98-026- 1 Limitorque Motor 8, 10, 13, 16, 2.97E+06 2.97E+06 2.54E+06 2.73E+06 0 5.70E+06 1.00E+07 >10% See belowP02 Operators (50.49) 32DC motors are currently installed in RB Volumes 8, 10, 13, 16, and 32. RB Volume 16 has worst-case TID (180-day accident plus 60-year normal) of all areas, except Volume 10.Valve actuators utilizing the DC motors qualified by this EQ File have a travel time (isolation functions) significantly less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months . Considering the 1.06E+05 Rad normal dose inReactor Building Volume 10 and a conservative 10-hour accident dose for Reactor Building Volume 10, the TID reduces below that for Reactor Building Volume 16, which wasselected as the Radiation Area and is bounded by testing.98-026- Limitorque Motor 12 1.14E+05 1.1913+05 1.15E+07 1.199E+07 0 1.20E+07 2.OOE+07 >10%P03 Operators (50.49)98-026- Limitorque Motor 3, 8, 10. I1, 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31 E+07 5.44E+07 2.28E+07 9.60E+07 2.28E+08 >10% See belowP04 Operators (50.49) 12, 13, 16,19, 20, 21,22, 31 ,32,DWThe selected Radiation Area has a plant-wide bounding TID and includes a 60 year normal dose of 1.88E+07 Rad, a 180 day accident Gamma dose of 5.44E+07 Rad, and anunshielded Beta dose of 2.OOE+08 Rad. Based on material analysis, Beta dose is reduced to a conservative 2.28E+07 Rad, giving a TID of 9.60E+07 Rad, which is bounded by the test.98-027- Magnetrol Level 12 1.14E+05 1.19E+05 1.t15E+07 1.19E+07 0 1.20E+07 2.21 E+08 >10%P01 Switches (50.49)98-030- MicroSwitch Limit 36, 37, 39 6.3 1 E+02 6.60E+02

1.06E+07 0 1.06E+07 1.22E+07 N/A -DORP01 Switches (DOR) Guidelines98-032- Namco I I 1.79E+07 1.19E+05 5.311E+07 1.191E+07 0 1.20E+07 2.04E+08 >10%P01 EA740/1EA180Limit Switches(50.49)Page 27 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1EPU EPUTitle CLTP Normal CLTP Accident(Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. DoseEQ File Category) RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks98-032- Namco 16, 31, DW 1.79E+07 6.60E+02 5.31E+07 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.04E+08 >10% See belowP02 EA740/EA 180Limit Switches1 (50.49)The limit switches inside the Drywell all have conduit seals and are otherwise hermetically sealed. With this, and the metallic housing of the limit switch, the external Beta dose willnot have any impact on the sensitive non-metallic materials inside the EA740 limit switches for inside Drywell applications.98-032- Namco 9, 11, 12, 18. 1.79E+07 6.60E+02 5.31E+07 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.04E+08 >10% See belowP03 EA740/EA180 19, 31, 39Limit Switches(50.49)The limit switches inside the Drywell all have conduit seals and are otherwise hermetically sealed. With this, and the metallic housing of the limit switch, the external Beta dose willnot have any impact on the sensitive non-metallic materials inside the EAI80 limit switches for inside Drywell applications.98-032- Namco 31, DW 1.79E;07 6.60E+02 5.31E+07 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.04E+08 >10% See belowP04 EA740/EA 180Limit Switches(50.49)The limit switches inside the Drywell all have conduit seals and are otherwise hermetically sealed. With this, and the metallic housing of the limit switch, the ex-ternal Beta dose willnot nave any impact on me sensitive non-metallic materials inside the EA 18u limit switches tor inside ,'well applications.98-033- Namco Quick ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 L.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.04E+08 >10%P01 DisconnectsEC210 (50.49)98-035- Raychem NEIS 9, 11, 12, 18, 1.14E+05 1.32E+05 1.15E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 5.OOE+07 >10%P01 Seals (50.49) 19, 3198-036- Ravchem Low ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.3 IE+07 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.1OE+08 >10%PO Voltage Splices(50.49)98-036- Raychem Low ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.90E+08 >10%P02 Voltage Splices(50.49)1198-036- Raychem Low ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.3 1E+07 5.44E+07 L.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.25E+08 >10%P03 Voltage Splices(50.49)98-036- Ravchem Low ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.3 IE+07 5.44E+07 L.OOE+08 1.73E+08 1.96E+08 >10%P04 Voltage Splices(50.49)98-037- Robertshaw Level 18 3.79E+05 3.96E+05 3.30E+05 1.93E+05 0 5.89E+05 L.OOE+06 N/A -DOR See belowP01 Switch (DOR) GuidelinesPage 28 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1EPU EPUTitle CLTP Normal CLTP Accident(Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPUI Qual. DoseEQ File Category) RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin RemarksThe selected Radiation Area has a TID that includes a 60 year normal dose of 1.58E+06 Rad and a 180 day accident dose of 2.52E+06 Rad which bounds the specified TID for ReactorBuilding Volume 18. The subject level switches support HPCI system operation for an operating time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months (includes margin). Furthermore, the 60 year normal dose for ReactorBuilding Volume 18 is only 3.96E+05 Rad versus the normal dose value of the selected Radiation Area. Therefore, the TID applicable to the level switches installed in ReactorBuilding Volume 18 may be reduced based on the location specific normal dose and a 4-hour accident dose. Using an operating time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months reduces the postulated accident dose to1.93E+05 rad. Therefore, the specified TID for the Robertshaw level switches is 5.89E+05 rad (1.93E+05 Rad accident + 3.96E+05 Rad normal).98-038- Rockbestos Coax ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.3 1E+07 5.44E+07 2.OOE+07 9.32E+07 1.71E+08 >10% See belowP01 Cable (50.49) 1 1 1 1 1The selected Radiation Area has a TID consisting of a 60-year normal dose of 1.88E+07 Rad, plus a 180 day accident gamma dose of 5.44E+07 Rad, plus an unshielded accident Betadose of 2.00E+08 Rad. Per NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B, beta dose may be reduced by a factor of 10 for the first 30 mils of jacket thickness. The installed cables have a 33 mil jacket(second jacket = 0.033 in.). Therefore the shielded beta dose of 2.OOE+08 rad may be reduced to 2.OOE+07 rad. Therefore, the total radiation dose becomes 9.32E+07 Rad. which isbounded by the test.98-039- Rosemount 33.34 1.14E+05 1.58E+06 1.15E+07 2.52E+06 0 4.10E+06 4.40E+07 N/A -DORP01 PressureTransmitter SeriesA (DOR)98-040- Rosemount 1153 7.9. 12, 14, 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.10E+07 2.62E+07 >10%P01 Series B (50.49) 17, 18, 22.27, 33,3498-041- Rosemount RB except 1.14E+05 6.60E+02 1.15E+07 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 1.11E+08 >10%P01 Conduit Seals 16 and 28-32(50.49)98-042- Rotork "A" Range 1,3 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 ** 1.08E+06 0 1.21E+06 4.00E+06 N/A -DOR See belowP01 Actuators (DOR)The selected Radiation Area has a TID that includes a 60 year normal dose of 1.32E+05 Rad and a 180 day accident dose of 2.09E+07 Rad. The specified TID bounds the TID for bothReactor Building Volumes I and 3. The installed equipment have a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months post-accident operating time, thus the accident dose can be reduced from the full 180 day specified value.The I hour accident dose is 1.08E+06 Rad for specified for Reactor Building Volumes I and 3. Thus, the bounding TID for the equipment would be 1.21E+06 Rads (I hour accidentpius ou year normal closes), wnicn is boundeo Dy me test.98-043- Rotork Valve 1,3, 10, 11, 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.10E+07 2.04E+08 >10%P01 Operators (50.49) 12, 14, 31.3398-044- Static O-ring 1, 3, 22, 33 4.29E+05 4.49E+05 5.30E+06 4.6E+06 0 5.05E+06 8.OOE+06 N/A -DORP01 (DOR)98-047- Samuel Moore ALL except 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 1.00E+08 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.01E+08 >10%P01 Instrument Cable DW(50.49)98-049- Valcor Solenoid 18, TB 21 8.84E+04 1.58E+06 1.15E+07 2.52E+06 0 4.10E+06 1.71E+08 >10%P01 Valves (50.49) 1 1 1 1Page 29 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1EPU EPUTitle CLTP Normal CLTP Accident(Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. DoseEQ File Category) RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks98-049- Valcor Solenoid 11, 19 8.84E+04 1.19E+05 1.15E+07 1.19E+07 0 1.20E+07 2.00E+08 >10%P02 Valves (50.49)98-050- DG O'Brien DW 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 1.00E+08 1.73E+08 2.23E+08 >10%P01 ElectricalPenetrations(50.49)98-051- Reliance Motors 1,3, 14,19 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 2.04E+08 >10%P01 (50.49)98-052- Tavis Flow 37 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 1.00E+06 1.06E+06 0 1.06E+06 1.40E+06 >10%P01 Transmitter(50.49)98-053- ITT 37 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 5.OOE+06 1.06E+06 0 1.06E+06 1.00E+07 >10%P01 Grinnel/ConoflowTransducer (50.49)98-054- Consolidated 18 3.79E+05 4.49E+05 7.OOE+04 4.35E+05 0 8.84E+05 2.31E+06 >10%P01 Control Relays(50.49)98-055- General Atomic DW 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.3 1E+07 5.44E+07 2.OOE+08 2.73E+08 See Note N/A -DOR See belowP01 Radiation Detector_ _ (DOR)The specimen was not subjected to irradiation during the testing. The report indicates that the detector has no radiation age-sensitive materials. The detector is designed to measure highradiation fields and is constructed of metallic or inorganic materials which are insensitive to the effects of the postulated radiation dose. Therefore, the detector is qualified for thepostulated plant radiation dose.98-059- Kerite 1.3.5, 6 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 2.20E+08 >10%P01 Cable/Termination9-6-.(50.49) ______ _____98-060- Westinghouse 14, 19 1.01E+05 1.58E+06 2.34E+06 2.52E+06 0 4.10E+06 5.OOE+06 >10%P01 Starter andTransformer(50.49)98-062- Gould Contactor 37 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 4.OOE+06 3.58E+06 0 3.58E+06 1.00E+07 >10%P01 (50.49)98-064- Eaton ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 1.00E+08 1.73E+08 2.OOE+08 >10%P01 ThermocoupleExtension Cable(50.49)98-065- Brand Rex 600V ALL 1.79E+07, l.88E+07 5.31E+07, 5.44E+07 1.00E+08 1.73E+08 2.OOE+08 >10%P01 Cable (50.49) 6.3 1E+02 1.00E+08Page 30 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1EPU EPUTitle CLTP Normal CLTP Accident(Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. DoseEQ File Category) RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks98-066- Boston Control ALL except 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 1.00E+08 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.OOE+08 >10%P01 Cable (50.49) DW98-067- CONAX Electrical DW 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.25E+08 >10%P01 Connector Seal(50.49)98-068- CONAX RTDs 9, 10, 11, 12 1.14E+05 1.88E+07 1.15E+07 5.44E+07 1.00E+08 1.73E+08 2.27E+08 >10%P01 (50.49) 198-069- Patel Conduit ALL 1.79E+07, 1.88E+07 5.31E+07, 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.OOE+08 >10% See belowP01 Seals (50.49) 6.3 1E+02, 1.OOE+08Beta qualification is established by showing that the beta dose to sensitive internals (i.e. EPDM grommet) is less than or equal to 10% of the qualified gamma dose.98-070- Patel Conformal ALL except 1.14E+05 1.19E+05 1.15E+07 1.19E+07 0 1.20E+07 2.02E+07 >10%P01 Coating (50.49) DW98-071- EGS Grayboot ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.08E+08 >10%P01 ElectricalConnectors (50.49)98-072- EGS Quick ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.3 1E+07 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.OOE+08 >10%P01 Disconnect (50.49)98-073- Swagelok/ 7, 14, 18, 22, 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.61 E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 5.OOE+07 >10%P01 Raychem Conduit 33, 34Seal (50.49)98-075- Weed DW 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 2.OOE+08 2.73E+08 3.03E+08 >10%P01 Thermocouples-(50.49)98-076- Rome Cable Type 5, 8 4.45E+04 2.97E+06 2.54E+06 2.73E+06 0 5.70E+06 5.00E+08 N/A -DORP01 SIS (DOR)98-077- Eaton 22, 33, 34 4.29E+05 4.49E+05 4.88E+05 4.35E+05 0 8.84E+05 1.50E+06 >10%P01 Cutler-HammerRelays (50.49)98-078- PEI/FENWAL 5, 8,9, 12, 2.97E+06 1.19E+05 0 1.19E+07 0 1.20E+07 5.06E+07 >10%P01 Temperature 16Switch (50.49)98-079- ITT-Royal PVC 14, 18, 19, 4.29E+05 1.58E+06 2.34E+06 2.52E+06 0 4.1OE+06 5.OOE+07 N/A -DORP01 Cable (DOR) 22, 3398-080- Okonite Control 5, 14, 17, 18, 3.79E+05 1.58E+06 2.34E+06 2.52E+06 0 4.1OE+06 2.44E+07 N/A -DORP01 Cable (DOR) 2298-081- Triangle Triolene 17, 18 3.79E+05 1.58E+06 7.OOE+04 2.52E+06 0 4.1OE+06 2.44E+07 N/A -DORP01 Control Cable(DOR) ___Page 31 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1EPU EPUTitle CLTP Normal CLTP Accident(Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. DoseEQ File Category) RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks98-082- MNGP-A Cable RB, except 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 2.44E+07 N/A -DORP01 (DOR) 16. 28-32,4098-083- MNGP-B Cable RB, except 1.26E+05 1.19E+05 2.61E+07 1.20E+07 0 1.20E+07 1.70E+07 N/A -DORP01 (DOR) 16, 28-32,4098-084- Amphenol 1, 3, 14, 18, 4.29E+05 1.32E+05 3.50E+06 4.60E+06 0 4.732E+06 6.00E+06 N/A -DOR See belowP01 Connectors (DOR) 19,22,33 GuidelinesThe selected Radiation Area has a TID which includes the 60 year normal and 180 day accident dose applicable for Reactor Building Volumes 1 and 3. The Amphenol test jacks areassociated with EQ devices having a general 10-hour maximum post-accident operating time. Accordingly, the accident dose may be reduced based on operating time. The TID thatbounds the 60 year normal and 16-hour accident dose for installed plant locations is 4.732E+06 Rad which includes a 60 year normal dose of 1.32E+05 Rad and a 16 hour1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months accidentdose of 4.60E+06 Rad. For the two applications of Amphenol test jacks in Reactor Building Volume 14 having 180 day post-LOCA functions, the combined 60 year normal dose of1.06E+05 Rad and the 180 day accident dose of 2.25E+06 Rad results in a Reactor Building Volume 14 TID of 2.626E+06 Rad which is bounded by the general reduced (16-houraccident dose) TID. Therefore, analysis using a specified TID of 4.732E+06 Rads is conservative.98-085- Pyco Temperature 28 8.84E+04 1.58E+06 2.34E+06 2.52E+06 0 4.1OE+06 2.20E+08 >10%P01 Elements (50.49)98-086- SOR Pressure 14, 18,22, 4.29E+05 1.58E+06 2.34E+06 2.52E+06 0 4.1OE+06 3.46E+07 >10%P01 Switches (50.49) 3398-103- Patel P-I Thread ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 2.OOE+08 2.73E+08 1.50E+09 >10%P01 Sealant (50.49)98-104- Rockbestos ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 1.95E+08 >10%P01 Firewall SR Cable(50.49)98-107- Rockbestos ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.01E+08 >10%P01 Firewall IIf/SISCable (50.49)98-108- Rockbestos ALL except 1.26E+05 6.60E+02 2.61E+07 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 1.65E+08 >10%P01 Firewall EP Cable DW(50.49)98-109- Valcor MSIV 16 2.97E+06 2.97E+06 8.uuE+04 2.73E+06 0 5.70E+06 5.00E+07 >10%P01 Solenoid Valves(50.49)98-128- UCI Tape Splice ALL except 1.26E+05 6.60E+02 2.61E+07 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 1.23E+08 >10%P01 (50.49) DW03-096- Loctite PST 580 ALL 1.26E+05. 1.18E+07 2.61E+07, 5.44E+07 0 6.62E+07 7.37E+07 >10% See belowP01 Thread Sealant 1.79E+07 5.31 E+07(50.49)Page 32 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1EPU EPUTitle CLTP Normal CLTP Accident(Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. DoseEQ File Category) RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) _ (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin RemarksThe selected Radiation Area has a TID that includes a 60-year normal dose of 1.88E+07 Rad gamma plus an accident gamma dose of 5.44E+07 Rad, and a Beta dose of 2.00E+08 Rad.The first installation of Loctite PST 580 in the Drywell was 2/2000. As a result, the Drywell gamma specified radiation dose becomes 6.62E+07 Rad, consisting of the 31-year normaldose of 1.18E+07 Rad, plus 5.44E+07 Rad. gamma accident dose. The revised Drywell gamma dose for 3 I-year normal life plus 180 day accident bounds the gamma dose of all otherplant areas (includes 60-year normal dose plus accident gamma dose) and is bounded by testing. The specified Beta radiation dose is satisfied since the equipment externals providesufficient shielding such that the Beta dose to sensitive equipment internals is less than 10' of the qualified gamma dose.03-105- EGS/Scotch 130C ALL except 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 L.OOE+08 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 1.83E+08 >10%P01 and 69 Electrical DWTape Splice(50.49)05-137- Fisher E/P 2.4 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 ** 3.14E+06 ** 3.27E+06 6.24E+06 >10% See belowP01 Transducer (50.49) , _L I I IThe selected Radiation Area provides the contact dose on the RHR heat exchanger and includes a 60 year normal dose of 1.32E+05 Rad and a 180-day accident dose of2.09E+07 Rad.The Fisher Type 546 E/P transducers are located in the RHR Pump Room Stairways, distant from the heat exchanger. Using the 180 day RHR heat exchanger contact accident dose ofthe selected Radiation Area accident is overly conservative. The specific 180 day accident dose for the transducers is 3.14E+06 Rad. The dose is based on transducer location awayfrom the RHR heat exchanger source, but in contact with a 20-inch pipe containing Torus water. Therefore, the total integrated dose for the Fisher Type 546 E/P transducers is3.27E+06 Rad (1.32E+05 Rad 60 year normal + 3.14E+06 Rad 180 day accident), which is bounded by the test.05-138- Cutler-Hammer 14. 19 3.65E+04 4.49E+05 2.34E+06 4.35E+05 0 8.94E+05 2.80E+06 >10%P01 MotorStarter/ControlTransformer(50.49)08-013- McDonnell & 37 6.94E+02 6.60E+02 1.87E+08 3.58E+06 0 3.58E+06 2.34E+08 >10%P01 Miller FlowSwitches (50.49)08-014- Amphenol 1, 3, 14, 18, 3.79E+05 1.32E+05 2.34E+06 2.09E+07 0 2.10E+07 3.16E+07 >10%P01 Connectors (50.49) 19,22,3308-015- AVCO Scram 14, 18 1.57E+05

7.07E+04 0 2.28E+05 2.49E+05 >10% See belowP01 Solenoid Valves(50.49)The selected Radiation Area has a TID consisting of a 60 year normal dose of 1.58E+06 Rad and a 180 day accident dose of 2.52E+06 Rad which bounds the TID specified for ReactorVolumes 14 or 18, the location of the installed equipment. Since the extended plant license expires in 2030 (September) and the valves were installed in 2009 (March), the remainingplant life is only of 22 years. Also, the installed SSPVs function (de-energize to vent) immediately upon a LOCA or tip to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months under a HELB (manual reactor scram). Under theHELD3 scenario, no accident radiological dose will be experienced at the SSPVs. However, under a LOCA, there will be an accident dose contribution. Per Regulatory Guide 1.89,qualification shall be established for one hour post-LOCA to demonstrate margin. Thus, reduced normal and accident doses can be used in the radiation qualification analysis. The 22year normal dose is 1.57E+05 Rad for either Reactor Building Volume 14 or 18. The 1-hour accident dose for either Reactor Building Volume 14 or 18 is 7.07E+04 Rad. As such, thetotal specified radiation dose for the SSPV installed in Reactor Building Volumes 14 or 18 is 2.28E+05 Rad. The test radiation exposure of 2.49E+05 Rad (minimum test level) boundsthis value with additional margin.Page 33 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1EPU EPUTitle CLTP Normal CLTP Accident(Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. DoseEQ File Category) RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks08-016- Rosemount 1154 1,3,9, 12, 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 5.55E+07 >10%P01 Transmitters 19(50.49)08-017- Struthers-Dunn 18 3.79E+05 4.49E+05 7.OOE+04 4.35E+05 0 8.84E+05 2.31E+06 >10%P01 CX-3964NERelay Sockets(50.49)10-001- Schulz Electric 37 6.94E+02 6.60E+02 1. 16E+06 1.78E+06 0 1.78E+06 1.97E+08 >10%P01 Fan Motors(50.49)10-002- Okonite 5kV 1,3,5,6 6.31E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 2.OOE+08 >10%P01 Power Cable-(50.49)10-003- SOR Differential 14, 18 3.79E+05 1.58E+06 2.72E+06 2.52E+06 0 4.1OE+06 4.1OE+07 >10%P0I Pressure Switches(50.49)10-004- Raychem Medium 1, 3 6.3 IE+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 5.OOE+07 >10%P01 VoltageTerminations andSplices (50.49)10-004- Raychem Medium 5,6 6.31E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 2.15E+08 >10%P02 VoltageTerminations andSplices (50.49) 1Notes for Table 2-5* CLTP values not shown due to different methods of analysis** CLTP accident dose not shown due to change in dose source basis for RHR room*** Qualified to EPU conditions upon initial installationPage 34 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Chemical SprayThere is no spray consideration for the Reactor and Turbine Building as the result of either a design basis LOCA or HELBcondition. The initiation of demineralized water and/or sodium pentaborate spray during a Design Basis Accident results ina harsh environment inside the Drywell (primary containment). Table 2-6 demonstrates qualification of EQ equipment inthe Drywell that is exposed to chemical spray conditions.Table 2-6, EPU Chemical Spray Conditions in the DrywellQualified Chemical EPU Chemical SprayEQ File Title (Qualification Category) Spray Type Type98-004-POI ASCO Solenoid Valves (50.49) Boric Acid Demin Water/SodiumPentaborateA downward pointing street elbow is required on the exhaust port for valves potentially exposed to spray. However, there is only one solenoid valve installed inthe Drywell that is qualified by this EQ File that would be subject to spray. Drywell spray is used during design basis LOCA. Under that scenario, this valve willfunction within 5 minutes. Drywell spray is not initiated until after 10-minutes (after LPCI injection is complete). Therefore, this solenoid valve does not requireexhaust port protection for spray. In summary, no valves qualified by this PQE require exhaust port protection.98-004-P03 ASCO Solenoid Valves (50.49) Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 9.5 to 10.5 7 to 8.58 See belowPentaborate IOf the valves qualified by this PQE, only the SRV Pilot solenoid valves are exposed to spray as they are located in the Drywell. During testing, the ventedexhaust ports of the specimen valves were protected from direct impingement of spray. The exhaust ports were configured with downward facing street elbows.As installed, only the exhaust ports of eight solenoid valves require spray protection. The exhaust ports of the remaining solenoid valves in the Drywell are pipedto the other SRV solenoid valves and are thus inherently protected.98-008-POI Automatic Valve Company (AVCO) Deionized Water Demin Water/Sodium N/A 7 to 8.58 See belowAir Control Assembly (50.49) PentaborateThe spray at Monticello is manually controlled and not automatically initiated under any event. Procedural guidance directs operations to only use spray after thefirst 10-minutes of a design basis LOCA (after LPCI injection is achieved). Therefore, the MSIV solenoid cluster will be de-energized prior to being subject tospray. The 20 minute demineralized water spray of the test sufficiently bounds the plant spray conditions.98-017-POI G.E. Cable (DOR) None Demin Water/Sodium N/A 7 to 8.58 See belowPentaborateRoiutings of GE cable inside the Drywell may be subject to the specified spray conditions. The cable specimens were not subject to spray during the test. TheDrywell spray is not expected to have any detrimental effect on the XLPE insulation based on the submerged IR testing conducted post-LOCA. During testingconducted by Franklin Laboratories, specimens of similar GE cables were subjected to chemical spray for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . This testing provides additional assurancethat the installed cables can withstand the specified spray.Page 35 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1Qualified Chemical EPU Chemical Spray EPU EvaluationEQ File Title (Qualification Category) Spray Type Type Qualified pH EPU pH Note98-020-POI General Electric Containment None Demin Water/Sodium N/A 7 to 8.58 See belowPenetrations (DOR) PentaborateThe penetration specimen was not subject to spray during the extreme service conditions test. During other emergency environmental testing, GE subjected thevarious penetration designs to steam/submergence. The test assemblies were subjected to steam and submerged and no detectable leakage was observed. In twotests, one end of the test penetration was submerged. In another two tests, the entire assembly was submerged. The sensitive materials of the penetrations,excluding the cables (qualified per EQ File 98-017), is epoxy. Material analysis reveals that epoxy resins have broad chemical resistance. Therefore, it isreasonable to conclude that the epoxy would not be affected by a slightly basic water/sodium pentaborate spray. In addition, the epoxy is coated with Hypalonpaint for more protection. Therefore, the GE EPAs are qualified for the Drywell spray.98-025-POI Limitorque Motor Operators (DOR) Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 7.67 7 to 8.58 See belowI IPentaborateThe test spray conditions sufficiently bound the specified spray conditions. The motor qualified in this EQ File has no T-Drains, thus Drywell spray is notexpected to migrate into the motor housing. It is further observed that Drywell spray will only commence after the first 10-minutes of inside Drywell accidentconditions. The longer operating time demands for valve closure are due to outside Drywell HELB events during which time there will be no spray inside theDrywell.98-026-PO1 Limitorque Motor Operators (50.49) None Demin Water/Sodium N/A 7 to 8.58 See belowPentaborateA test anomaly as documented in the test resulted in the flooding of the test actuator with water such that the actuator components became submerged during thetesting. A post-test inspection revealed water inside the motor. Additionally, similarly configured Limitorque valve actuators were subjected to PWRcontainment type testing with spray as documented in a separate test report. Based on the discussions in this test, it is evident that valve actuator specimens weresubject to bounding spray conditions. One MOV has a replacement aluminum cover to support ease of maintenance at its confined location in the Toruscompartment (minimize rigging required if the original cast iron cover was used). Limitorque cannot support chemical spray qualification for this actuator basedon testing. However, this is not a concern for the MOV located in the Torus as it will not be exposed to spray conditions. Therefore, the test specimens havedemonstrated the ability to perform their safety function under the postulated spray at MNGP.98-032-P02 I Namco EA740/EA 180 Limit Boric Acid/Water Demin Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See belowSwitches (50.49) [ PentaborateThe test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions consisting of 3000 ppm boron buffered to a pH of 10.5 with sodium hydroxide. The testspecimen was sealed with an EC-210 conduit seal. Therefore, a qualified conduit seal is required to be installed on the limit switch when potentially subjected toa steam environment, which includes all areas subject to spray. The test chemical spray conditions exceed the plant spray conditions because the test spray wasmore caustic. Therefore, the limit switches are qualified for the spray conditions postulated for MNGP.98-032-P04 Namco EA740/EA180 Limit Boric Acid/Water Demin Water/Sodium 9.8 to 10.5 7 to 8.58 See belowSwitches (50.49) Spray PentaboratePage 36 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Qualified Chemical EPU Chemical Spray EPU EvaluationEQ File Title (Qualification Category) Spray Type Type Qualified pH EPU pH NoteThe test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions consisting of 3000 ppm boron buffered to a pH of 10.5 with sodium hydroxide. The testspecimen was sealed with an EC-210 conduit seal. Therefore, a qualified conduit seal is required to be installed on the limit switch when potentially subjected toa steam environment, which includes all areas subject to spray. The test chemical spray conditions exceed the plant spray conditions because the test spray wasmore caustic. Therefore, the limit switches are qualified for the spray conditions postulated for MNGP.98-033-POI1 INamco Quick Disconnects EC210 Boric Acid( PenDemin Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below_______1(50.49)1 etbreIAt various times during the LOCA test, the specimens were exposed to superheated and saturated steam, and chemical spray. The test chemical spray of high pHis a more severe environment than the moderate pH demineralized water spray with sodium pentaborate at MNGP.98-036-POI 1 Raychem Low Voltage Splices Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.5 r 7 to 8.58 See below______j(50.49) 1 Pentaborate 1The test specimens were exposed to chemical spray conditions for the full 30 days of the test. The spray composition consisted of 3000 ppm boron and 0.064molar sodium thiosulfate, buffered to a pH of 10.5 with sodium hydroxide. This exceeds the plant buffered demineralized water spray conditions because the testspray was more caustic. Therefore, the splices are qualified for the spray conditions postulated for MNGP.98-036-P02 [ Raychem Low Voltage Splices Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below______1(50.49) etbreThe test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions starting at the 12 minute point in the test and continuing through the 30-day test duration. Thespray composition consisted of 6200 ppm boron and 50 ppm hydrazine, buffered to a pH of 10.5 with trisodium phosphate. This exceeds the plant buffereddemineralized water spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic. Therefore, the splice kits are qualified for the spray conditions postulated forMNGP.98-036-P03 J Raychem Low Voltage Splices Boric Acid Detain Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below(50.49) Pentaborate 1The test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions for most of the test duration (spray started at the 320'F temperature plateau). The test sprayexceeds the plant's buffered demineralized water spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic. Therefore, the splice kits are qualified for the sprayconditions postulated for MNGP.98-036-P04 ] Raychem Low Voltage Splices Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below________[50.49) I rabrtThe test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions that exceeds the plant buffered demineralized water spray conditions because the test spray wasmore caustic. Therefore, the splices are qualified for the spray conditions postulated for MNGP.98-038-POI [ Rockbestos Coax Cable (50.49) Boric Acid Detain Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See belowI ~ PentaborateIAt various times during the LOCA test, the specimens were exposed to superheated and saturated steam, and chemical spray. The test chemical spray is a moresevere environment than the installed demineralized water/sodium pentaborate spray.Page 37 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1Qualified Chemical EPU Chemical SprayEQ File Title (Qualification Category) Spray Type Type98-050-POI DG O'Brien Electrical Penetrations Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium(50.49) PentaborateThe test specimen was exposed to a caustic water spray during the LOCA test which envelops the specified spray conditions.98-055-POI ] DG O'Brien Electrical Penetrations Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below(50.49) PentaborateThe test spray chemistry exceeds the specified plant spray with regard to pH and boric acid concentration and was applied at a pressure greater than the peakspecified pressure. Therefore, spray qualification is demonstrated.98-064-POI 1 Eaton Thermocouple Extension Cable Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 9.5 to 1L.5 7 to 8.58 See below(50.49) PentaborateThe test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions starting at the 3-hour point in the second transient and continuing for the remainder of the 100-day test. The spray composition consisted of a 0.28 Molar boric acid and a 0.064 Molar sodium thiosulfate, buffered to a pH of 9.5 to 11.5 with sodiumhydroxide. This exceeds the plant demineralized water/sodium pentaborate spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic than the demineralizedwater/sodium pentaborate spray. Therefore, the Eaton cables are qualified for the spray conditions postulated for Monticello.98-065-POI 1 Brand Rex 600V Cable (50.49) Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 8.5 to 10.0 7 to 8.58 See belowPentaborateThe test conditions using boric acid chemical spray are more severe than the demineralized water buffered with sodium pentaborate spray used at MNGP. Thus,the test demonstrates that the installed cables are qualified for the specified spray conditions.98-067-POI CONAX Electrical Connector Seal Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.9 7 to 8.58 See below(50.49) PentaborateThe test spray exceeds the plant demineralized water spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic than the demineralized water and sodiumpentaborate buffer. Therefore, the ECSAs are qualified for the spray conditions postulated for MNGP provided they are installed such that they are shielded fromthe direct impingement of steam or chemical spray.98-069-POl Patel Conduit Seals (50.49) Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 11 7 to 8.58 See belowPentaborateThe test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months consisting of a 0.28 Molar boric acid buffered to a pH of 11.0 with sodiumhydroxide. Subsequently, they were submergence tested using the chemical spray mixture as the submergence fluid. This exceeds the plant demineralized waterwith sodium pentaborate solution spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic. Therefore, the Patel conduit seals qualified for the spray conditionspostulated for MNGP.98-071-POI EGS Grayboot Electrical Connectors Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 11 7 to 8.58 See below(50.49) PentaboratePage 38 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Qualified Chemical EPU Chemical Spray EPU EvaluationEQ File Title (Qualification Category) Spray Type Type Qualified pH EPU pH NoteSince the specimens were tested injunction boxes, all Drywell applications must also be installed within junction boxes, conduits, etc. The test specimens weresubjected to greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of chemical spray. The plant demineralized water/sodium pentaborate spray will have less corrosive effects on the connectorsthan the boric acid chemical spray used in the test and therefore the test envelopes the required conditions.98-072-POI lEGS Quick Disconnect (50.49) Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 8.5 to 11.0 7 to 8.58 See below7 ~ PentaborateIAt various times during the LOCA test, the specimens were exposed to superheated and saturated steam, and chemical spray. The test chemical spray is morecaustic than the demineralized water with sodium pentaborate at MNGP.98-075-POI I Weed Thermocouples (50.49) Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.7 7 to 8.58 SeebelowPentaborateIThe test specimens were subjected to 104 hours0.0012 days 0.0289 hours 1.719577e-4 weeks 3.9572e-5 months of chemical spray. The plant demineralized water (buffered with sodium pentaborate) spray will not havecorrosive effects on the thermocouples, and therefore, the test envelopes the required conditions.98-103-POI : Patel P-I Thread Sealant (50.49) Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 9.93 to 11.73 17 to 8.58PSee below________I j PentaborateThe test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions starting at the 1 minute point in the test and continuing for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The spray compositionconsisted of a 0.28 Molar boric acid and a 0.064 Molar sodium thiosulfate, buffered to a pH of 9.9 to 11.73 with sodium hydroxide. This exceeds the plantdemineralized water buffered with sodium pentaborate spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic. Therefore, the Patel P-I paste thread sealant isqualified for the spray conditions postulated for MNGP.98-104-POI Rockbestos Firewall SR Cable Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.8 7 to 8.58 See below(50.49) Pentaborate I rThe test caustic spray conditions are more severe than the demineralized water with sodium pentaborate solution postulated for MNGP. Therefore, the testingdemonstrates that the cables are qualified for the spray conditions at MNGP.98-107-POI Rockbestos Firewall Ill/SIS Cable Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below(50.49) PentaborateThe test chemical spray conditions are more caustic than the demineralized water with sodium pentaborate solution postulated for MNGP. Therefore, the testingdemonstrates that the cables are qualified for the spray conditions at MNGP.03-096-POI Loctite PST 580 Thread Sealant Demineralized Water Detain Water/Sodium 6.0 to 8.0 7 to 8.58 See belowt (50.49) Pentaborate IThe tested spray adequately simulated the MNGP spray conditions in the drywell. Thus, the Loctite PST 580 thread sealant is qualified for the plant sprayconditions.Page 39 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1HumidityThe Reactor and Turbine building ambient relative humidity is assumed to be 20% to90% during normal plant operation. The Reactor and Turbine building accident relativehumidity is assumed to be 100% in environments where a HELB changes either thenormal pressure or temperature. These assumptions are the same for both CLTP andEPU accident conditions.Normal TemperatureThe Drywell was evaluated and no change in normal temperatures for EPU wasindicated. For general areas of the Reactor Building, there was no increase ofsignificance in normal ambient temperature noted. As such, there is no impact of EPUconditions on normal plant temperature inputs to qualified life assessments. All EQequipment is qualified to the normal ambient conditions in which it is located and thenormal ambient temperatures are not expected to increase due to EPU.Page 40 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1NRC Request No. 3Please modify Figures 27-1 and 27-2 to include the profile of the qualification level ofEQ equipment to show that the EQ equipment will remain bounding under EPUconditions.NSPM ResponseFigures 27-1 and 27-2 from L-MT-12-114 (Reference E1-1) depicted the CLTP and EPUDrywell Temperature and Pressure Profiles. The peak accident temperature of theDrywell increased by 30F due to EPU, which had a minimal effect on qualification ofequipment installed in the Drywell. To demonstrate that this equipment remainsqualified under EPU conditions, excerpts from the EQ Files are provided to compare theEPU accident profile to the qualification profile.Page 41 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1EQ File 98-008-PCI, Automatic Valve Company (A VCO) Air Control Assembly (50.49)EMU rm~m" rffaCnd.&c4 Drywell Accident Pressure*0 Wyle 17614-1 Test PresstxrTime(Secondi)The test profiles envelop the specified profile in magnitude, with the exception of initial heat up.This does not affect the qualification since the test included a dual transient exposure (only thesecond transient is shown) and the test peak temperature existed for a longer duration thanspecified.Page 42 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1EQ file 98-026-P0I, Limitorque Motor Operators (50.49)DMT Pri £mmor' PWC (w/RHR) Accident TempwWe4W 60037SAAccident Test Tempetrature00.00 aTime (Seconds)..... ..... ....*1 PWCAccident Pressure*40 600376A Accident Test P0ess1)e1201100 250 1W0 30020-000.00Time (Seconds)The test profile envelops the specified profile in magnitude (peak temperature), but not induration. This is evaluated further in the PAOT in the EQ File. The excerpt of this section isalso provided.Page 43 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1Post Accdent Operating Time(dys OE Reslt(clays) Ddrns1.7t02 3.SW+ 0 0.32DAflT Iar~tulagtf Inmst Value.I eeew ) I a ion1!m l I () S t a rt T o o (6 ) .e 0 Y14.06660000M 06000 1Ackhmt m Tmnmatre PmkgMW1 IWC (w/RHR) Accident 0E TempAcaturen T roftle Name600376A Accident Test TempeaturePot ccdnt jimitU Tie Car4* PWC (w/RIIR) Accident Temperatue *1 GOO3lGAccident Test Temperature4 Start Time400IITime (Seconds)The test profile was evaluated against the specified profile using Arrhenius methodology withthe inputs and results shown in the above computation. The analysis shows that the test profileenvelops the PAOT requirement of 180-days with significant margin.Page 44 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1EQ File 98-025-P0I, Limitorque Motor Operators (DOR)0 Drywelt ACC~dentTempetetme* WM0IAccident Test TmipereturoTime(Seconds)0 Dq-wel ACctidetPeSsuo00GM198NAcciftnt TostPressur110100'ITime(Stcoaads)The test profile does not envelop the plant specified profile in magnitude (peak temperature).However, a thermal lag was conducted that justifies qualification. The testing envelopes theconservative 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months operating time with significant margin.Page 45 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1EQ File 98-032-P02, Namco EA740/EA 180 Limit Switches (50.49)DBA TImmbWur BMd amulmn*0 PWC (wARlR) Accident Temperature-0 Namco QTR-I4, TestTemperature380Time(Seconds)* WCAccidenlt PressureTNamco 1T.t 40 Test2PressureTime (Se'conds)The test profile envelops the specified profile in magnitude (peak temperature), but not duration.This is evaluated further in the PAOT in the EQ File. The excerpt of this section is alsoprovided.Page 46 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1Post Accident Operating TimeAccidet Ar" cciden Aoesoime(1226E+021 I 7.99E.02I2rnarab ( baF) ~ s IV141.60 j 6 6400.00 0.8W4MM-0 3000 1120-0 2600 Acddent Area TemerUAtre Proftile Niame21OD-W 26.00 PWC (w/PIHR) Accident Temperature300 210 226000 GOF Temwerature Profile Name2. Q0# 273- Namnco QTR-140 Test Temperature*l PWVC (wlftHIR) Accidelt Temperatt'e *0 Nameo 01f-440 Test Temperahir.* TimeTime ($scond$1The test profile was evaluated against the specified profile using Arrhenius methodology withthe inputs and results shown in the above computation. The analysis demonstrates that the testprofile envelops the PAOT of 180 days with adequate margin.Page 47 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1EQ File 98-055, General Atomic Radiation Detector (DOR).~m a a -.Ed-* ~DBA S*M~n-*OWAIN ACddsr Prow-*OAR~ E-234-900 Accidur TeO Pmn"' (LOCAso701030112 Iteif ifThe test profile bounds the peak drywell conditions in magnitude, but not in duration. However,the General Atomic Radiation monitor has no susceptible materials to thermal degradation.While the test profile envelops the specified conditions for both peak temperature and pressurePage 48 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1with adequate margin, the duration of the test does not bound the 12 day operating time.However, qualification is sufficiently demonstrated because the radiation detector is constructedalmost entirely out of metal and inorganic parts. The most susceptible components of thedetector assembly are the Raychem cable splice and the coaxial cable, both of which arequalified in separate EQ filesPage 49 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1EQ File 98-004-P03, ASCO Solenoid Valves (50.49)0 PWC (wlo RHR) Accident Temperature* *AQS-21678 +ER 177 Test Temperature400360W20Time (Seconds)*1 PWC Accident Pressure* Test Pressure120r *110 " ' **30240Time (Seconds)Testing bounds the specified plant conditions for both temperature and pressure. The testprovides approximately 8°F of temperature margin. This is not a concern given the fact that thetesting included a dual transient exposure and sustained peak conditions significantly longerthen specified for the plant. Furthermore, later ASCO testing included exposure to peakaccident conditions of greater than 400°F.Page 50 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1EQ File 98-004-POI, ASCO Solenoid Valves (50.49)MATenumw~ahim Proffl ComparisonI* P&C(wfiRHft)AccidentTemnpenatia* AQS-2t678 Test TempeataU"sTim.(Soconds)JM UUMM Wane CMDar'sm,4AOS-21678 Test PresswreITime(Soconds)The test profile envelops the specified temperature profile for the entire 30-day test period withthe exception of initial rise time to peak test conditions. This has no consequence given the testhad a dual transient exposure and sustained peak conditions significantly greater than the plantspecified dwell at peak temperature. Long-term post accident operation is evaluated in thePAOT section of this EQ File. The excerpt of this section is also provided.Page 51 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1Post Accident Operating TimeS 2.09E+02 4.71E+02 124.89 1pAOT CA~lmlefn Input Vallues14.60 1 327600.00 1____Accddent Ame Teml~erature Prt lnamePWC (w/RHR) Accdent TemperatureGOEQ TmW=rat Profile NameAQS-21678 Test TemperaturePct ddt JeMp TIeChr4D PW~C (wIRHR)ACCideitT*MP~ratW#4 Start Tim*1 AOS-21 678 Test TernperaotuTime (Seconds)The MNGP specified profile was evaluated against the test profile using Arrhenius methodologywith the inputs and results shown in the above computation. The analysis starting point wasselected to align with the beginning of the final test temperature plateau. The analysisdemonstrates that the test profile exceeds the specified post-accident operating time withsignificant margin.Page 52 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1EQ File 98-075-POI, Weed Thermocouples (50.49)im-W PWC (w)RHR) AcidefltTemnpefatur*0 W~sbnghouseS8-0460AccddntTestTemp~rin320 T840-3200----------------24ScosoTime(Secondls)L_VV-Po 11 mtýI'lI -4 1 1 a. 'II .".The test profile envelops the specified profile in magnitude (peak temperature), with theexception of the initial rise to the peak temperature and the drop and subsequent rise to thePage 53 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1peak temperature between the first and second transient. These short periods are shown to beapproximately one second each. The test profile does not envelop the plant specifications induration; this is evaluated in the PAOT section. The excerpt of this section is also provided.Post Accldent Operating TimeAecdý A,".mu -I:jG o*("I 95E402 1 77E+04 M0022.-AOT uawlatio nu ahXmsAk. artTime(s)AdimabonwyIT-eý(F ZV,_,_ fi fl2620 40 PWC (w/RNR) Accident Temperabre432 ib 21 .M 100 0 M 34000 GOI TeM re r aftue p jMaW 10.0 Westingiouse 86-0450 Accident Test TeoperatureD.... IW*, PWC (wA/tf.t) Accident Temperette* e Westinghouse O.-4s0OAcident Test TempergznediStart Tlme43.D Is 10150 486.00I ! I Time (Seconds)The test profile was evaluated against the specified profile using Arrhenius methodology withthe inputs and results shown in the above computation. The analysis demonstrates that the testPage 54 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1profile envelops the Post-Accident operating time requirement of 180-days with significantmargin.EQ File 98-020-PCI, General Electric Containment Penetrations (DOR)fMA Tw m ZpmrdeU10 Drywefl AeddwdnT~mpeabae* GEFOl ActidoentTetmperstuttrime*(SecndS)DfAPissus mofis a~mpa0 Dqywll Accident Pressure* GE FO1 Accident Test PressureTime(Seconds)Page 55 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034Enclosure 1The test profile envelops the specified profile in magnitude, but not in duration. The long-termevaluation is provided in the PAOT section of this EQ File. The excerpt from this section is alsoprovided.Post Accident Operating TimeIAOT A,

A,",cmE t s(a)I T(F) ,0.00 33s40 00O (dys fGOE RA d(doo) Ww.dcm435E.0ý2 1.09E03 160-97 JPAO ClcultimInm alimsT~r~w~xe F) utIT-00(a) Aiw1120-00 1(P 0-10 1 0.810028.D 26-0 2440O 0-0 Acddet Area T BI~rfi NameDrywell Accident TemperatureOI.E Tempeature PrfileMGE F01 Accident Test Temperature*I Diyweti Accidet Toinperatus *O GEOlF0 Accldelt Test TemperlltweStart TimeTime (Seconds)The test and specified profiles were evaluated using Arrhenius methodology with the inputs andresults shown in the above computation. This analysis demonstrates that the test profileenvelops the specified profile with a greater than 10% margin.Page 56 of 96 L-MT-13-034Enclosure 1EQ File 98-050-P01, DG O'Brien Electrical Penetrations (50.49)IlllEh m miM. Ewrim , r,m Will DA& SAmWRAd* DW (Wall, DUA LOCA) Accident Pressure,0 D.G Oinen E.R-2WU AcidenM Test PresSure110 F--100 -90 -+ -3020 -100Time (Seconds)Page 57 of 96

v t e Letter Sequence Response to RAI
TAC:MD9990, Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions (Approved, Closed) TAC:MD9990, Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request Acceptance, Acceptance Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement Administration Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting Questions 16 December 2008 11 February 2009 11 March 2009 12 March 2009 18 March 2009 18 March 2009 19 March 2009 20 March 2009 23 March 2009 29 March 2009 28 March 2009 28 March 2009 6 April 2009 6 April 2009 29 April 2009 26 June 2009 2 July 2009 2 July 2009 14 July 2009 14 July 2009 5 November 2009 16 March 2011 12 September 2011 4 October 2012 8 November 2012 28 March 2013 17 May 2013 9 July 2013 26 November 2013 18 December 2008 18 December 2008 19 March 2009 25 October 2009 15 February 2013 12 March 2013 10 May 2013 24 April 2013 Answers 25 January 2010 28 September 2010 13 January 2012 21 December 2012 7 March 2013 21 March 2013 10 April 2013 18 July 2013 18 July 2013 2 August 2013 18 May 2016 19 July 2012 31 January 2013 29 March 2013 10 April 2013 Results Approval, Approval, Approval, Approval, Approval, Approval Other: L-MT-08-091, Calculation 0801040.301, Steam Dryer Outer Hood Submodel Analysis., L-MT-09-002, Response to NRC Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Branch Requests for Additional Information (Rais) Dated December 5, 2008, L-MT-09-003, Response to NRC Environmental Branch Requests for Additional Information (Rais) Dated December 18, 2008, L-MT-09-004, Enclosure 1 (Continued) to L-MT-09-004, NSPM Response to Containment & Ventilation Branch RAI Number 2, Copy of MNGP Appr T0406 Data Transmittal Pages 1 of 538 Through Pages 538 of 538, L-MT-09-026, Calculation 0000-0081-6958 MNGP-PRNMS-APRM Calc-2008-NP, Rev. 1, Average Power Range Monitor Selected Prnm Licensing Setpoints - EPU Operation (Numac), L-MT-09-027, Extended Power Uprate: Response to Instrumentation and Controls Branch RAI No. 3 Dated April 6, 2009, L-MT-09-044, Extended Power Uprate: Response to NRC Mechanical and Civil Engineering Review Branch (Emcb) Requests for Additional Information (Rais) Dated March 28, 2009, L-MT-09-049, Drawing C.5-2007, Revision 15, Failure to Scram, L-MT-09-073, Extended Power Uprate: Response to NRC Containment and Ventilation Review Branch (Scvb) Requests for Additional Information (Rais) Dated July 2, 2009 and July 14, 2009, L-MT-09-083, Extended Power Uprate: Limit Curves Requested by the Mechanical and Civil Review Branch (Emcb) Associated with Requests for Additional Information (Rais) Dated March 20, 2009, L-MT-09-088, Extended Power Uprate: Revision to Clarify Text in Enclosures 5 and 7 of L-MT-08-052, L-MT-09-097, Extended Power Uprate: Acknowledgement of NRC Review Delay, L-MT-10-025, Extended Power Uprate (Epu): Response to NRC-NSPM February 25, 2010 Conference Call, L-MT-10-072, Extended Power Uprate: Updates to Docketed Information, L-MT-11-044, Uprate (Epu): Update on EPU Commitments, L-MT-12-056, WCAP-17549-NP, Rev. 0, Monticello Replacement Steam Dryer Structural Evaluation for High-Cycle Acoustic Loads Using ACE, L-MT-12-090, Westinghouse, LTR-A&SA-12-8, Rev. 1, Attachment B, Recommendations for Inspections of the Monticello Replacement Steam Dryer., L-MT-12-114, Drawing C.5-2007, Rev. 17, Failure to Scram, L-MT-13-020, Enclosure 1 - Responses to the Gap Analysis, L-MT-13-029, Enclosure 14 to L-MT-13-029 - WCAP-17716-NP, Revision 0, Benchmarking of the Acoustic Circuit Enhanced Revision 2.0 for the Monticello Steam Dryer Replacement Project., L-MT-13-091, WCAP-17716-NP, Revision 1 - Benchmarking of the Acoustic Circuit Enhanced Revision 2.0 for the Monticello Steam Dryer Replacement Project, Enclosure 14, L-MT-13-092, Extended Power Uprate (Epu): Completion of EPU Commitments, Proposed License Conditions and Revised Power Ascension Test Plan, L-MT-13-096, GE-MNGP-AEP-3304R1, Enclosure 4, NEDC-33435 Corrected Pages, L-MT-13-126, Enclosure 3, GE-MNGP-AEP-3306, Enclosure 2 GEH Response to Mella+ Eicb RAI and Affidavit, L-MT-14-023, Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis Plus: Technical Specification Clarifications, L-MT-15-074, Enclosure 7, WCAP-18604-NP, Revision 0, Monticello EPU Main Steam Line Strain Data Evaluation Report., L-MT-16-017, Revised Commitment to Reconcile Analysis of Bypass Voiding for Transition to Areva Analysis Methodology, L-MT-16-071, Submittal of 2016 Annual Report of Changes in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.46, ML083230111, ML083400402, ML083500575, ML083570610, ML083590127, ML090710680, ML090710683, ML090710684, ML091120578, ML091140470, ML091410121, ML091410122, ML091410123, ML091410124, ML091760769, ML092290250, ML092810554, ML093160816, ML093220925, ML093220964, ML093620024, ML100280558... further results
MONTHYEAR2009-02-24 [Table View]

ML13105A188

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