Text

Monticello Extended Power Uprate (Epu): Response to Request for Additional Information - Electrical Engineering Branch (TAC MD9990), Page 1 of 96 Through Page 57 of 96
	ML13105A188
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	04/10/2013
From:	Schimmel M A; Northern States Power Co, Xcel Energy
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	L-MT-13-034, TAC MD9990
	Download: ML13105A188 (60)
	v • d • e

@XclErgy Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 2807 W County Rd 75 Monticello, MN 55362 April 10, 2013 L-MT-1 3-034 10 CFR 50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Docket 50-263 Renewed License No. DPR-22

Subject:

Monticello Extended Power Uprate (EPU): Response to Request for Additional Information

-Electrical EnQineerina Branch (TAC MD9990)

References:

1) Letter from T J O'Connor (NSPM), to Document Control Desk (NRC),"License Amendment Request: Extended Power Uprate (TAC MD9990)," L-MT-08-052, dated November 5, 2008. (ADAMS Accession No. ML083230111)

2) Letter from T J O'Connor (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC),"License Amendment Request: Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis Plus," L-MT-10-003, dated January 21, 2010. (ADAMS Accession No. ML 100280558)

3) Letter from M A Schimmel (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC),"Monticello Extended Power Uprate: Supplement for Gap Analysis Updates (TAC MD9990)," L-MT-12-114, dated January 21, 2013.(ADAMS Accession No. ML13039A201)

4) Email from T Beltz (NRC) to J Fields (NSPM), "

Subject:

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant -Requests for Additional Information (Electrical Engineering Branch) in Support of the Extended Power Uprate Review (TAC No. MD9990)," dated March 12, 2013.5) Letter from T J O'Connor (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC),"Monticello Extended Power Uprate: Updates to Docketed Information (TAC MD9990)," L-MT-1 0-072, dated December 21, 2010. (ADAMS Accession No. MLI103570026)

Document Control Desk Page 2 6) Letter from M A Schimmel (NSPM) to Document Control Desk (NRC),"Monticello Extended Power Uprate: Supplement to Revise Technical Specification Setpoint for the Automatic Depressurization System Bypass Timer (TAC MD9990)," L-MT-12-091, dated October 30, 2012.(ADAMS Accession No. ML12307A036)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, the Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation (NSPM), doing business as Xcel Energy, requested in Reference 1 an amendment to the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) Renewed Operating License (OL) and Technical Specifications (TS) to increase the maximum authorized power level from 1775 megawatts thermal (MWt) to 2004 MWt.Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, NSPM requested in Reference 2 an amendment to the MNGP Renewed OL and TS to allow operation within the Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis Plus (MELLLA+)

operating domain.The NRC has permitted the linking of these two applications by letter dated November 23, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093160816).

In Reference 3, NSPM submitted supplemental information to the NRC that described changes to EPU documentation that had occurred based on results of a Gap analysis performed at the request of the NRC.Subsequently, in Reference 4, the NRC requested additional information related to the documentation provided in Reference 3.Enclosure 1 to this letter provides a response to the NRC requested information.

Enclosure 2 to this letter contains supplemental information correcting an error in a previous submittal.

The supplemental information provided herein does not change the conclusions of the No Significant Hazards Consideration and the Environmental Consideration evaluations provided in Reference 1 as revised by References 5 and 6 for the Extended Power Uprate LAR. Further, the supplemental information provided herein does not change the conclusions of the No Significant Hazards Consideration and the Environmental Consideration evaluations provided in Reference 2 for the MELLLA+ LAR.In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b), a copy of this application supplement, without enclosures, is being provided to the designated Minnesota Official.Summary of Commitments This letter makes no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

Document Control Desk Page 3 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.Executed on: April lo, 2013 Mark A. Schimmel Site Vice-President Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company-Minnesota Enclosures (2)cc: Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC (w/o enclosures)

Resident Inspector, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, USNRC (w/o enclosures)

Project Manager, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, USNRC Minnesota Department of Commerce (w/o enclosures)

L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 ENCLOSURE 1 RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NRC ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH This enclosure provides a response from the Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation (NSPM), doing business as Xcel Energy, to a request for additional information (RAI) provided by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in Reference 1.Below are the acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this enclosure.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 50.49 10 CFR 50.49 -refers to qualification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49 and Regulatory Guide 1.89 AC alternating current ADS automatic depressurization system AH ampere-hour AWG American Wire Gage CLTP current licensed thermal power CRD control rod drive DBA design basis accident DC direct current DOR Division of Operating Reactors -refers to qualification in accordance with DOR guidelines (as found in IEB 79-01 B) as identified in 10 CFR 50.49 (k)DW drywell ECSA electrical conductor seal assembly EPA electrical penetration assembly EPRI Electric Power Research Institute EPU extended power uprate EQ environmental qualification EQMS Environmental Qualification Management Software FHA fuel handling accident GE General Electric GQE generic qualification evaluation HELB high energy line break HPCI high pressure coolant injection IEB Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc kV kilovolt Page 1 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 LOCA loss of coolant accident LPCI low pressure coolant injection MCC motor control center MNGP Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant MOV motor-operated valve MSIV main steam isolation valve NSPM Northern States Power -Minnesota PAOT post-accident operating time PQE plant qualification evaluation PUSAR power uprate safety analysis report PVC polyvinyl chloride PWC plant worst case PWR pressurized water reactor RB reactor building RCIC reactor core isolation cooling RHR residual heat removal SBA small break accident SBO station blackout SG specific gravity SGTS standby gas treatment system SRV safety-relief valve TB turbine building TID total integrated dose VDC voltage direct current vpc volts per cell Page 2 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 NRC Request No. 1 Please explain what is meant by "Equipment Qualification Program Reconstitution." NSPM Response Reconstitution of the EQ Program included updating the environmental profiles to reflect EPU conditions and all revised HELB inputs. Changes were made within the HELB Program to both liquid (EPU) and steam (non-EPU) breaks. Reconstitution of the EQ Program also consisted of converting the qualification calculations into EPRI's EQMS format.Page 3 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 NRC Request No. 2 Please provide the normal and accident levels for radiation, temperature, pressure, submergence, chemical spray effects, and humidity for all areas in which environmentally qualified equipment is installed in tabular form showing the Pre-EPU and EPU conditions, as well as the qualified values of EQ equipment in those areas.NSPM Response Accident Temperature, Pressure, Submergence The EQ Program has been updated to include EPU conditions and all equipment within the scope of the EQ Program remains qualified.

In L-MT-12-114 (Reference E1-1), Enclosure 1, NSPM provided a comparison of Pre-EPU (called CLTP) and EPU conditions applicable to EQ equipment in the following tables:* Table 26-1 -Turbine Building HELB Results (Turbine Building by volume included maximum pressure, temperature and submergence compared for EPU vs. CLTP)" Table 26-2 -Reactor Building HELB Results (Reactor Building by volume included maximum pressure, temperature and submergence compared for EPU vs. CLTP)* Table 27-1 -Post-LOCA Temperatures Comparison (Reactor Building by volume -EPU vs. CLTP)* Table 27-2 -Reactor Building HELB Peak Ambient Pressure Comparisons (Reactor Building by volume -EPU vs. CLTP)" Table 27-3 -Reactor Building HELB Water Level Comparisons (Reactor Building by volume -EPU vs. CLTP)* Table 27-4 -Reactor Building HELB Peak Temperature Comparison (Reactor Building by volume -EPU vs. CLTP)" Table 27-5 -Difference Between CLTP and EPU Reactor Bldg Volume Temperatures for Post-LOCA and SBA (Reactor Building by volume -EPU vs.CLTP)Based on the above tables providing pre-EPU (CLTP) conditions for pressure and temperature, this information is not repeated below for EPU peak temperature (Table 2-1) and EPU Peak pressure (Table 2-2).The EQ Program qualification is demonstrated below in the Tables 2-1, 2-2, 2-3 and 2-4, which compare EPU peak accident temperatures, pressures and submergence levels to the qualified values of applicable EQ equipment.

Page 4 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 Table 2-1, EPU Peak Accident Temperature vs. Qualification Temperature Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File Category)

RB Volume Temp. (IF) Temp (IF) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note 98-003- Allen Bradley Terminal 37 228 129.5 LOCA N/A-DOR The Allen Bradley terminal strips P0I Boards (DOR) are located in a radiation harsh only area.98-004- ASCO Solenoid Valves 1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 346 338 LOCA+HELB

<15 0 F See below P01 (50.49) 16, 18, 19, 31, 35, 36, 37, 39, 42, 48, DW Although, the peak Drywell temperature is not bounded by the test peak temperature by the recommended margin of+15'F (IEEE Standard 323-1974), the plant conditions are adequately bounded by the test since it had a dual transient exposure and sustained peak temperature conditions exceeding those postulated inside the Drywell.98-004- ASCO Solenoid Valves 9,11, 12, 31 450 310.9 LOCA+HELB

>15°F P02 (50.49)98-004- ASCO Solenoid Valves 1, 3, 9, DW 346 338 LOCA+HELB

<15 0 F See below P03 (50.49)Although, the peak Drywell temperature is not bounded by the test peak temperature by the recommended margin of+15'F (IEEE Standard 323-1974), the plant conditions are adequately bounded by the test since it had a dual transient exposure and sustained peak temperature conditions exceeding those postulated inside the Drywell.98-006- ASCO Pressure 1,3, 9, 11, 12, 225 203.4 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F Pressure switches located in Reactor P01 Switches (50.49) 14, 19,31 Building Volumes 19, and 31 have LOCA only functions 98-007- ASCO Temperature 36, 39 210 129.5 LOCA >15 0 F P01 Switches (50.49)98-008- Automatic Valve DW 370 338 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P0I Company (AVCO) Air Control Assembly (50.49)11

_______________

98-010- Barksdale Pressure 1, 3. 14, 18, 22, 212 197.5 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR See below P01 Switches (DOR) 33 The pressure switch in Reactor Building Volume 33 will be exposed to a HELB peak temperature of 243.77F due to a HPCI steamn line break in the HPCI pump room. All other HELB events affecting Reactor Building Volume 33 have peak temperature conditions less than 2127F and are bounded by the testing. For the HPCI HELB event, a thermal lag assessment evaluated the internal temperature response of the switch to the event indicating a peak temperature less than 200'F.The analysis ran for greater than 30 minutes showing declining internal temperature response over the duration of the analysis.

Equipment located in Reactor Building volumes 14 and 18 have LOCA only functions.

Page 5 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File Category)

RB Volume Temp. (OF) Temp (IF) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note 98-011- Barton Pressure 13, 14, 19 212 185.7 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR Equipment located in Reactor P01 Switches (DOR) Building volumes 1, 3 and 19 have LOCA only functions.

98-012- Barton Pressure 14,18 200 185.7 LOCA+HELB 14.3 OF See below P01 Switches 580A-0, 580A-1 (50.49)Pressure switches in the REC System will be exposed to harsh radiation only while functioning for a LOCA. They are not required to mitigate a HELB. As such, qualification for HELB conditions in Reactor Building Volume 18 is not required.

The temperature margin is slightly less than the 15'F recommended by IEEE 323-74. However, the expected operating time of this equipment is 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Given that the test was conducted at elevated temperatures for 85 days, the accident profile is bounded with adequate margin.98-014- 1 E.F. Johnson Banana 5, 8, 9, 12, 16 315 310.9 HELB N/A-DOR See below P01 Plug (DOR)The selected Accident Area includes peak accident temperature and pressure conditions that bound those specified for Reactor Building Volumes 5, 8, 9, 12, and 16.98-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) ALL 340 338 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR P01 98-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) RB except 16, 236 232.3 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR See below P02 28-32, 40 A thermal lag analysis was conducted, which concluded that the actual cable will not exceed 232.3°F (Volume 8 reaches 296.1°F) during a postulated HELB, which is bounded by the tested temperature of 236°F.98-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) RB except 16, 340 310.9 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR P03 28-32, 40; TB 98-018- General Electric Motors 1, 3 212 146.7 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 (50.49)98-020- General Electric DW 340 338 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR P01 Containment Penetrations (DOR)98-021- General Electric RB, except 16 340 310.9 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR P01 Terminal Blocks (DOR/50.49) 98-021- General Electric 22, 33, 34 340 179.1 LOCA >15 0 F P02 Terminal Blocks (DOR/50.49) 98-022- General Electric MCCs 5,8 131 104.95 HELB N/A-DOR See below P01 (DOR) I I I I Page 6 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File Category)

RB Volume Temp. (OF) Temp (OF) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note A thermal lag analysis was conducted, which concluded that the internal MCC temperature response due to relevant HELB events is 104.95'F, well below 131°F over the very short operating time needed for event isolation.

98-023- Hevi-Duty Electric 37 248 129.5 LOCA N/A-DOR P01 Transformer (DOR)98-024- General Electric Fan 37 251.96 129.5 LOCA N/A-DOR SGTS is only required for LOCA P01 Motors (DOR) events and not Reactor Building HELB events.98-025- Limitorque Motor DW 329 292 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR See below P01 Operators (DOR) I I A thermal lag calculation was conducted by Limitorque, which concluded that at very high superheat conditions, the internal temperature of the valve remains at saturated conditions.

98-025- Limitorque Motor 16 See Note 135 None N/A-DOR See below P02 Operators (DOR)As there is no credited safety function for the component analyzed by this EQ File, it has an operating time of 0 seconds. No evaluation for peak accident conditions is required.

Failure of valve in open or closed position is acceptable.

98-026- Limitorque Motor 3, 10, 11, 13, 343 338 LOCA+HELB

<15 0 F See below P01 Operators (50.49) 19, 20, 21, 22, 31, DW The peak test temperature and pressure exceed the peak required temperature and pressure with margin. Although the margin for temperature does not meet the 15'F margin suggested in IEEE Std. 323-1974, additional margin is demonstrated through the application of a double-peak transient during the testing.98-026- Limitorque Motor 8, 10, 13, 16, 32 358 310.9 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P02 Operators (50.49)98-026- Limitorque Motor 12 250 203.4 LOCA+HELB

>15°F P03 Operators (50.49)98-026- Limitorque Motor 3, 8, 10, 11, 12, 441 338 LOCA+HELB

>150F P04 Operators (50.49) 13, 16, 19, 20, 1, 22, 31 32, DW _ _ ._..98-027- Magnetrol Level 12 281 203.4 LOCA+HELB

>150F P01 Switches (50.49)98-030- MicroSwitch Limit 36, 37, 39 160 129.5 LOCA N/A-DOR See below P01 Switches (DOR) I I The OP-AR limit switches, located in the SGTS Rooms, are only required to function during a LOCA, during which the area is only a radiation harsh environment.

Page 7 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File Category)

RB Volume Temp. (IF) Temp (°F) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note 98-032- Namco EA740/EA180 11 350 203.4 LOCA+HELB

>15°F P01 Limit Switches (50.49)98-032- Namco EA740/EA180 16, 31, DW 353 338 LOCA+HELB 15°F P02 Limit Switches (50.49)98-032- Namco EA740/EA180 9, 11, 12, 18, 353 338 LOCA+HELB 15 0 F P03 Limit Switches (50.49) 19,31.39 98-032- Namco EA740/EA 180 31, DW 378 338 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P04 Limit Switches (50.49)98-033- Namco Quick ALL 353 338 LOCA+HELB 15 0 F P01 Disconnects EC210 (50.49)98-035- Raychem NEIS Seals 9, 11, 12, 18, 366 310.9 HELB >15 0 F P01 (50.49) 19, 31 98-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 357 338 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 Splices (50.49)98-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 390 338 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P02 Splices (50.49)98-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 438 338 LOCA+HELB

>15°F P03 Splices (50.49)98-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 425 338 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P04 Splices (50.49)98-037- Robertshaw Level 18 220 210 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR P01 Switch (DOR)98-038- Rockbestos Coax Cable ALL 346.2 338 LOCA+HELB

<15°F See below P01 (50.49)The test included a dual transient exposure which provides additional performance margin for the installed cables. Therefore there is margin available to compensate for less than recommended margin in the peak temperature.

98-U39- Rosemount Pressure 33,34 360 .7.T-LOCA

,/A-DOr" P01 Transmitter Series A (DOR)98-040- Rosemount 1153 Series 7, 9, 12, 14, 17, 318 310.9 LOCA+HELB

<15 0 F See below P01 B (50.49) 18, 22, 27, 33, 34 The recommended margin ot 157 is met tor all areas except for Reactor Biulding Volume lb. However, there are no Kosemount Model 1153 Series Bs pressure transmitters located in Reactor Building Volume 16. The Volume 16 profile was selected to adequately bound all other applicable areas. Therefore, adequate margin for peak accident temperature has been demonstrated for all locations of the Reactor Building Page 8 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File Category)

RB Volume Temp. (IF) Temp (IF) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note 98-041- Rosemount Conduit RB except 16 440 310.9 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 Seals (50.49) and 28-32 98-042- Rotork "A" Range 1, 3 180 146.7 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR P01 Actuators (DOR)98-043- Rotork Valve Operators 1, 3, 10, 11, 12, 385 310.9 LOCA+HELB

>150F P01 (50.49) 14,31,33 98-044- Static O-ring (DOR) 1,3,22,33 212 195 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR See below P01 A thermal lag evaluation was conducted, which indicates a peak switch temperature condition less than 195°F.98-047- Samuel Moore ALL except 340 310.9 LOCA+HELB

> 15 0 F P0I Instrument Cable DW (50.49)98-049- Valcor Solenoid Valves 18, TB 21 417 146.7 LOCA >15 0 F P01 (50.49)98-049- Valcor Solenoid Valves 11, 19 346 203.4 LOCA >15 0 F P02 (50.49)98-050- DG O'Brien Electrical DW 340 278 LOCA >157F See below P01 Penetrations (50.49)The actual temperature response of the containment penetration, which is located at the containment wall (outboard end in the Reactor Building), has been determined to be lower than the predicted Drvwell air temperature response durine a worst-case steam line break event.ow A thermal lag analysis was conducted, which indicates that the relay within its enclosure would experience a peak transient temperature less than 196°F. The testing with temperatures greater than 2007F for well over an hour envelop the specified plant conditions with margin.98-055- General Atomic DW 365 338 LOCA N/A-DOR P01 Radiation Detector (DOR)Page 9 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File Category)

RB Volume Temp. (OF) Temp (IF) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note 98-059- Kerite 1, 3. 5, 6 355 324.9 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 Cable/Termination (50.49)98-060- Westinghouse Starter 14, 19 260 146.7 LOCA >15°F P01 and Transformer (50.49)98-062- Gould Contactor 37 212 129.5 LOCA >15 0 F See below P01 (50.49)The peak temperature specified for the area is due to post-LOCA operation and SGTS filter heating in the rooms.98-064- Eaton Thermocouple ALL 375 338 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 Extension Cable (50.49)98-065- Brand Rex 600V Cable ALL 385 338 LOCA+HELB

>15°F P01 (50.49)98-066- Boston Control Cable ALL except 340 310.9 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 (50.49) DW 98-067- CONAX Electrical DW 370 338 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 Connector Seal (50.49)98-068- CONAX RTDs (50.49) 9, 10,11,12 376 338 LOCA+HELB

>15°F P01 98-069- Patel Conduit Seals ALL 354 338 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 (50.49)98-070- Patel Conformal ALL except 358 310.9 LOCA+HELB

>15°F POI Coating (50.49) DW 98-071- EGS Grayboot ALL 450 338 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 Electrical Connectors (50.49)98-072- EGS Ouick Disconnect ALL 452 338 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 (50.49)98-073- Swagelok/Raychem

-7,14, 18, 22, 350 310.9 HELB >15 0 F P0I Conduit Seal (50.49) 33, 34 98-075- Weed Thermocouples DW 500 338 LOCA >15 0 F P01 (50.49)98-076- Rome Cable Type SIS 5, 8 303 296.1 HELB N/A-DOR PO1 (DOR)Page 10 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File Category)

RB Volume Temp. (IF) Temp (IF) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note 98-077- Eaton Cutler-Hammer 22, 33, 34 232 146.7 LOCA >15 0 F P01 Relays (50.49)98-078- PEI/FENWAL 5, 8,9, 12, 16 355 310.9 HELB >15 0 F P01 Temperature Switch (50.49)98-079- ITT-Royal PVC Cable 14, 18, 19, 22, 211 195 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR P01 (DOR) 33 98-080- Okonite Control Cable 5, 14, 17, 18, 22 236 232.3 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR See below POI (DOR)A thermal lag analysis was conducted, which concludes that the peak temperature of the cable remains below the test temperature of 236°F.98-081- Triangle Triolene 17, 18 236 213.6 LOCA N/A-DOR See below P01 Control Cable (DOR)A thennal lag analysis was conducted, which concludes that the peak temperature of the cable remains below the test temperature of 236°F.98-082- MNGP-A Cable RB, except 16, 236 235.1 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR See below P01 (DOR) 28-32, 40 A thermal lag analysis was conducted, which concludes that the peak temperature of the cable remains below the test temperature of 236°F.98-083- MNGP-B Cable RB, except 16, 286 239.7 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR See below P01 (DOR) j 28-32, 40 A thermal lag analysis was conducted, which concludes that the peak temperature of the cable remains below the test temperature of 2867F.98-084- Amphenol Connectors 1, 3, 14, 18, 19, 266 243.7 LOCA+HELB N/A-DOR P01 (DOR) 22,33 98-085- Pyco Temperature 28 410 310.9 HELB > 15 0 F P0I Elements (50.49)98-086- SOR Pressure Switches 14, 18,22,33 350 310.9 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 (50.49)98-103- Patel P-1 Thread ALL 400 338 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 Sealant (50.49)98-104- Rockbestos Firewall SR ALL 351.2 338 LOCA+HELB

<15 0 F See below P01 Cable (50.49) 1 1 The slightly less than +15'F margin recommended for peak temperature is inconsequential considering the test applications of a dual transient exposure and the duration of maintained peak conditions during the test.98-107- Rockbestos Firewall ALL 342 338 LOCA+HELB

<15 0 F See below P01 IlI/SIS Cable (50.49)Page 11 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File Category)

RB Volume Temp. (IF) Temp (IF) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note The slightly less than +I5'F margin recommended for peak temperature is inconsequential considering the test applications of a dual transient exposure and the duration of maintained peak conditions during the test.98-108- Rockbestos Firewall EP ALL except 327.2 324.9 LOCA+HELB

<15 0 F See below P01 Cable (50.49) DW Temperature margin is acceptable given that plant conditions includes bounding temperature rise effects on worst-case bounding HELB or post-LOCA heatup conditions.

Furthermore, the #12 AWG test cables were energized with 20 amp load during simulated accident, but no temperature rise was added to test conditions.

Test had sustained oeak temperature for a greater duration than the specified peak conditions.

98-109- Valcor MSIV Solenoid 16 360 310.9 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 Valves (50.49)98-128- UCI Tape Splice ALL except 375 324.9 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 (50.49) DW 03-096- Loctite PST 580 Thread ALL 364 338 LOCA+HELB

>15°F P01 Sealant (50.49)03-105- EGS/Scotch 130C and ALL except 372 324.9 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 69 Electrical Tape DW Splice (50.49)05-137- Fisher E/P Transducer 2,4 320 146.7 LOCA >15 0 F P01 (50.49)05-138- Cutler-Hammer Motor 14, 19 253 146.7 LOCA >15°F P01 Starter/Control Transformer (50.49)08-013- McDonnell

& Miller 37 212 129.5 LOCA+FHA >15 0 F P01 Flow Switches (50.49)08-014- Amphenol Connectors 1, 3, 14, 18, 19, 325.3 272.8 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 (50.49) 22, 33 08-015- AVCO Scram Solenoid 14, 18 331 272.8 LOCA+HELB

>15°F P01 Valves (50.49)08-016- Rosemount 1154 1, 3, 9, 12, 19 450 310.9 LOCA++/-ELB

>15°F P01 Transmitters (50.49) 1 1 08-017- Struthers-Dunn 18 228 155 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F See below P01 CX-3964NE Relay Sockets (50.49)A thermal lag analysis was conducted, indicating that the relay socket within its enclosure would experience a peak transient temperature less than 155°F throughout these bounding HELB scenarios.

The testing with temperatures greater than 200'F for over well over an hour envelop the specified plant conditions with significant margin.Page 12 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File Category)

RB Volume Temp. (OF) Temp (IF) Accident Margin EPU Evaluation Note 10-001- Schulz Electric Fan 37 365 129.5 LOCA > 15 0 F P01 Motors (50.49)10-002- Okonite 5kV Power 1,3,5,6 345 319.3 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 Cable (50.49)10-003- SOR Differential 14, 18 370.9 310.9 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 Pressure Switches (50.49)10-004- Raychem Medium 1,3 414 319.3 LOCA+HELB

>15 0 F P01 Voltage Terminations and Splices (50.49)10-004- Raychem Medium 5,6 325 319.3 LOCA+HELB

<15 0 F See below P02 Voltage Terminations and Splices (50.49)For accident temperature, an additional

+30.4 0 F temperature rise for energized power cable post-accident was included.

Although the temperature margin is not the recommended

+157F, the method of constructing the Accident Area with temperature rise has excess conservatism which ensures that the temperature margin of test conditions on this profile construction remains adequate.Page 13 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Table 2-2, EPU Peak Accident Pressure vs. Qualification Pressure Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File Category)

RB Volume Press. (psig) Press. (psig) Margin EPU Evaluation Note 98-003- Allen Bradley Terminal 37 0 0 N/A -DOR This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P01 Boards (DOR)98-004- ASCO Solenoid Valves 1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 16, 110 44.1 >+10% Equipment in Volumes 11, 36 and 37 have P01 (50.49) 18, 19, 31, 35, 36, LOCA only finctions.

37, 39, 42, 48, DW 98-004- ASCO Solenoid Valves 9, 11, 12,31 86 6.18 >+10% Equipment in Volumes 9 and 11 have LOCA P02 (50.49) only functions.

98-004- ASCO Solenoid Valves 1, 3, 9, DW 110 44.1 >+10% Equipment in Volume 9 has a LOCA only P03 (50.49) function.98-006- ASCO Pressure Switches 1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 14, 2.2 1.09 >+10% Equipment in Volume 31 has a LOCA only P01 (50.49) 31 function 98-007- ASCO Temperature 36, 39 2.2 0 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P01 Switches (50.49)98-008- Automatic Valve Company DW 67 44.1 >+10%P01 (AVCO) Air Control Assembly (50.49)98-010- Barksdale Pressure Switches 1, 3, 14, 18, 22, 33 0.25 0.26 N/A-DOR See below P01 (DOR) I I The 0.01 psi difference in specified and test pressure is insignificant considering the construction of the switch and the very short duration of the plant HELB pressure conditions in the Reactor Building.

Equipment in Volumes 14 and 18 function during a LOCA event only.98-011- Barton Pressure Switches 14 0.25 0.12 N/A-DOR PO1 (DOR)98-012- Barton Pressure Switches 14,18 10 0.12 >+10% See below P01 580A-0, 580A-1 (50.49)Pressure switches in the REC System will be exposed to harsh radiation only while functioning for a LOCA. They are not required to mitigate a HELB. As such, qualification for HELB conditions in Reactor Building Volume 18 is not required.98-014- E.F. Johnson Banana Plug 5, 8, 9, 12, 16 See Note 6.18 N/A-DOR See below P01 (DOR)The effects of pressure on the nylon shield have been determined to be minimal. The banana plugs are a hollow shell open to atmospheric conditions on both the inner and outer surfaces.

Because the pressure will be equal on both surfaces, pressure cannot cause a catastrophic failure of the component.

Therefore, the specified accident pressure is insignificant for qualification purposes of the subject banana plugs.Page 14 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File Category)

RB Volume Press. (psig) Press. (psig) Margin EPU Evaluation Note 98-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) ALL 62.5 44.1 N/A-DOR P01 98-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) RB except 16, 28- 13.8 6.18 N/A-DOR P02 32,40 98-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) RB except 16, 28- 62 6.18 N/A-DOR P03 32, 40; TB 98-018- General Electric Motors 1, 3 See Note 0.26 See Note See below P01 (50.49)The marginal pressure increase in the plant will have no impact on motor function since the motor is vented, there will not be a pressure differential imposed on the housing.98-020- General Electric DW 63 44.1 N/A-DOR P01 Containment Penetrations (DOR)98-021- General Electric Terminal RB, except 16 110 6.18 N/A-DOR P01 Blocks (DOR/50.49) 98-021- General Electric Terminal 22, 33, 34 110 0 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P02 Blocks (DOR/50.49) 98-022- General Electric MCCs 5, 8 4.93 1.52 N/A-DOR PO1 (DOR)98-023- Hevi-Duty Electric 37 0 0 N/A-DOR P01 Transformer (DOR)98-024- General Electric Fan Motors 37 0 0 N/A-DOR Po1 (DOR)98-025- Limitorque Motor Operators DW 95 44.1 N/A-DOR P01 (DOR)98-025- Limitorque Motor Operators 16 0 0 N/A-DOR See below P02 (DOR) [ I II I As there is no credited safety function for the component analyzed by this EQ File, it has an operating time of 0 seconds. No evaluation for peak accident conditions is required.

Failure of valve in open or closed position is acceptable.

98-026- Limitorque Motor Operators 3, 10, 11, 13, 19, 20, 110 44.1 >+10%P01 (50.49) 21, 22, 31. DW 98-026- Limitorque Motor Operators 8, 10, 13, 16, 32 120 6.18 >+10%P02 (50.49)Page 15 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File Category)

RB Volume Press. (psig) Press. (psig) Margin EPU Evaluation Note 98-026- Limitorque Motor Operators 12 25 1.09 >+10%P03 (50.49)98-026- Limitorque Motor Operators 3, 8. 10, 11, 13, 16, 74 44.1 >+10%P04 (50.49) 19, 20, 21, 22, 31, 32, DW 98-027- Magnetrol Level Switches 12 18 1.09 >+10%P01 (50.49)98-030- MicroSwitch Limit 36, 37, 39 0 0 N/A-DOR P01 Switches (DOR)98-032- Namco EA740/EAI80 11 76 1.09 >+10%P01 Limit Switches (50.49)98-032- Namco EA740/EAI80 16, 31, DW 72.5 44.1 >+10%P02 Limit Switches (50.49)98-032- Namco EA740/EAI8O

9. 11, 12, 18, 19,31, 72.5 44.1 >+10%P03 Limit Switches (50.49) 39 98-032- Namco EA740/EA180 31, DW 76.8 44.1 >+10%P04 Limit Switches (50.49)98-033- Namco Quick Disconnects ALL 72.5 44.1 >+10%P01 EC210 (50.49)98-035- Raychem NElS Seals 9, 11, 12,18, 19,31 15 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49)98-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 70 44.1 >+10%P01 Splices (50.49)98-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 66 44.1 >+10%P02 Splices (50.49)98-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 132.3 44.1 >+10%P03 Splices (50.49) _98-036- Raychem Low Voltage ALL 123 44.1 70 P04 Splices (50.49)98-037- Robertshaw Level Switch 18 10 0.22 N/A-DOR P01 (DOR)98-038- Rockbestos Coax Cable ALL 122.1 44.1 >+10%P01 (50.49)98-039- Rosemount Pressure 33, 34 120 0.26 N/A-DOR This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P01 Transmitter Series A (DOR) I I I Page 16 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File Category)

RB Volume Press. (psig) Press. (psig) Margin EPU Evaluation Note 98-040- Rosemount 1153 Series B 7,9, 12, 14, 17, 18, 73 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49) 22, 27, 33, 34 98-041- Rosemount Conduit Seals RB except 16 and 120 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49) 28-32 98-042- Rotork "A" Range 1, 3 3.31 0.26 N/A-DOR P01 Actuators (DOR)98-043- Rotork Valve Operators 1, 3, 10, 11, 12, 14, 75 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49) 31,33 98-044- Static O-ring (DOR) 1, 3, 22, 33 See Note 0.26 N/A-DOR See below P01 The 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months of testing at 2127F (0.25 psig) envelop the HELB+LOCA conditions of Reactor Building Volumes 22 and 33, since the operating times of the pressure switches in these locations are short. The pressure switches in Reactor Building Volumes I and 3 have 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months post-accident functions to support ADS.Under HELB, the locations may be subject to slightly increased pressure (0.26 psig), but the peak HELB temperature for either location is less than 120 0 F. At the onset of an accident, RHR or Core spray pump equipment operation in these locations will heatup the rooms and tend to lower the ambient relative humidity.

As such, the 0.26 psig accident pressure specified for Reactor Building Volumes I and 3 is not a concern.98-047- Samuel Moore Instrument ALL except DW 105 6.18 >+10%P01 Cable (50.49)98-049- Valcor Solenoid Valves 18, TB 21 103 0.26 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P0I (50.49)98-049- Valcor Solenoid Valves 11, 19 113 1.09 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P02 (50.49)98-050- DG O'Brien Electrical DW 92 44.1 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P01 Penetrations (50.49)98-051- Reliance Motors (50.49) 1,3, 14, 19 70 0.26 >+10% Equipment in Volumes 14 and 19 have LOCA P01 only functions 98-052- Tavis Flow Transmitter 37 0 0 N/A This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P01 (50.49)98-053- ITT Grinnel/Conoflow 37 0 0 N/A This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P01 Transducer (50.49)98-054- Consolidated Control 18 5.7 0.22 >+10%P01 Relays (50.49)98-055- General Atomic Radiation DW 70 44.1 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P01 Detector (DOR)98-059- Kerite Cable/Termination 1,3,5,6 50 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49)Page 17 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File Category)

RB Volume Press. (psig) Press. (psig) Margin EPU Evaluation Note 98-060- Westinghouse Starter and 14, 19 40 0.26 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P01 Transformer (50.49)98-062- Gould Contactor (50.49) 37 0 0 N/A This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P01 98-064- Eaton Thermocouple ALL 75 44.1 >+10%P01 Extension Cable (50.49)98-065- Brand Rex 600V Cable ALL 113 44.1 >+10%PO1 (50.49)98-066- Boston Control Cable ALL except DW 110 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49)98-067- CONAX Electrical DW 75 44.1 >+10%P01 Connector Seal (50.49)98-068- CONAX RTDs (50.49) 9, 10, 11, 12 88 44.1 >+10%P01 98-069- Patel Conduit Seals (50.49) ALL 77 44.1 >+10%P01 98-070- Patel Conformal Coating ALL except DW 30 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49)98-071- EGS Grayboot Electrical ALL 81 44.1 >+10%P01 Connectors (50.49)98-072- EGS Quick Disconnect ALL 77 44.1 >+10%P0I (50.49)98-073- Swagelok/Raychem

-7, 14, 18, 22, 33, 34 15 6.18 >+10%P01 Conduit Seal (50.49)98-075- Weed Thermocouples DW 75 44.1 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P01 (50.49)98-076- Rome Cable Type SIS 5, 8 66 1.52 N/A-DOR PO1 (DOR)98-077- Eaton Cutler-Hammer 22, 33, 34 0 0 N/A This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P01 Relays (50.49)98-078- PEI/FENWAL Temperature 5, 8, 9, 12, 16 26 6.18 >+10%P01 Switch (50.49)98-079- ITT-Royal PVC Cable 14, 18, 19, 22, 33 See Note 0.22 N/A-DOR See below P01 (DOR)Page 18 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File J Category)

J RB Volume Press. (psig) [ Press. (psig) L Margin EPU Evaluation Note Although the test did not include elevated pressure, potential credible failure modes in cables due to pressure transients is the intrusion of moisture into the insulation due to pressure differential.

The peak HELB pressure for Reactor Building Volumes 14 or 22 (locations of end devices with HELB functions) is only 14.92 psia, or 0.22 psi above atmospheric.

As such, this failure mode is not considered credible when considering that the ITT Royal cables are only used for the short runs between the pressure switch instrument and its local junction box.98-080- Okonite Control Cable 5, 14, 17, 18, 22 13.8 0.36 N/A-DOR P01 (DOR)98-081- Triangle Triolene Control 17, 18 13.8 0.32 N/A-DOR This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P01 Cable (DOR)98-082- MNGP-A Cable (DOR) RB, except 16, 28- 13.8 6.18 N/A-DOR P01 32,40 98-083- MNGP-B Cable (DOR) RB, except 16, 28- 75 6.18 N/A-DOR P01 32,40 98-084- Amphenol Connectors 1, 3, 14, 22, 33 See Note 0.26 N/A-DOR See below P01 (DOR)The specified peak HELB pressure of 0.26 psig over normal ambient conditions is not significant as the test jacks have no collapsible void spaces, the internal and external pressures across the jacks will equalize.98-085- Pyco Temperature Elements 28 63 6.18 >+10%P01 (50.49)98-086- SOR Pressure Switches 14, 18, 22, 33 40 6.18 >+10% Equipment in Volume 33 has a LOCA only P01 (50.49) function.98-103- Patel P-I Thread Sealant ALL 72 44.1 >+10%P01 (50.49)98-104- Rockbestos Firewall SR ALL 132.1 44.1 >+10%P01 Cable (50.49)98-107- Rockbestos Firewall Ill/SIS ALL 107.5 44.1 >+10%P01 Cable (50.49)99-108- Rockbestos Firewall EP ALL except DW 87.2 6.18 >+10%P01 Cable (50.49)98-109- Valcor MSIV Solenoid 16 62 6.18 >+10%P01 Valves (50.49)98-128- UCI Tape Splice (50.49) ALL except DW 74 6.18 >+10%P0I 03-096- Loctite PST 580 Thread ALL 50 44.1 >+10%P01 Sealant (50.49)Page 19 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Title (Qualification Qualified EPU Peak EQ File Category)

RB Volume Press. (psig) Press. (psig) Margin EPU Evaluation Note 03-105- EGS/Scotch 130C and 69 ALL except DW 140 6.18 >+10%P01 Electrical Tape Splice (50.49)05-137- Fisher E/P Transducer 2, 4 75 0.26 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P01 (50.49)05-138- Cutler-Hammer Motor 14, 19 0.6 0 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only finctions.

P01 Starter/Control Transformer (50.49)08-013- McDonnell

& Miller Flow 37 0 0 N/A This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P01 Switches (50.49)08-014- Amphenol Connectors 1, 3, 14, 18, 19, 22, 2.3 0.26 >+10%P01 (50.49) 33 08-015- AVCO Scram Solenoid 14, 18 11.4 0.22 >+10%P01 Valves (50.49)08-016- Rosemount 1154 1, 3, 9,12,19 110 6.18 >+10%P01 Transmitters (50.49)08-017- Struthers-Dunn 18 5.7 0.22 >+10%P01 CX-3964NE Relay Sockets (50.49)10-001- Schulz Electric Fan Motors 37 5 0 >+10% This equipment has LOCA only functions.

P01 (50.49)10-002- Okonite 5kV Power Cable 1,3,5,6 114 1.11 >+10%P01 (50.49)10-003- SOR Differential Pressure 14. 18 7 0.22 >+10%P01 Switches (50.49)10-004- Raychem Medium Voltage 1,3 28 1.11 >+10%P01 Terminations and Splices (50.49)10-004- Raychem Medium Voltage 5,6 11.5 1.11 >+10%P02 Terminations and Splices (50.49)Page 20 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Table 2-3, EPU Peak Accident Submergence Levels in the Reactor Building CLTP EPU EPU RB Submergence Submergence Evaluation Volume Level (inches) Level (inches) Note 1 0.6 7.2 1 2 0.12 0 3 0.6 7.2 1 4 0 0 5 0.6 7.2 2 6 47.4 8.4 1 7 52.56 7.2 3 8 0 7.2 2 9 0.12 7.2 1 10 0 7.2 1 11 0 7.2 1 12 0.12 7.2 1 13 2.88 0 14 3.24 0 15 0.6 1.2 4 16 80.16 69.6 5 17 0 0 18 8.16 0 19 6.36 1.2 4 20 0 1.2 4 21 0 0 22 0 0 23 0 0 24 0 0 25 0 0 26 0 0 27 0.12 0 28 4.56 14.4 6 29 3.6 14.4 6 30 3.24 12 6 31 3.24 12 6 32 2.28 14.4 6 33 0 0 34 0.06 0 35 0.24 0 36 0 0 37 0 0 38 0 0 39 0.12 0 Page 21 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 CLTP EPU EPU RB Submergence Submergence Evaluation Volume Level (inches) Level (inches) Note 40 0 0 41 0 0 42 0.12 0 43 0.12 0 44 0.12 0 45 0.12 0 46 0.24 0 47 0 0 48 0.12 0 Notes for Table 2-3: 1. Post-HELB Submergence levels in the lower Reactor Building elevations are acceptable if they remain below the action levels of Emergency Operation Procedure C.5-1300/1400 as follows: RHR Rooms (RB Volumes 1 and 3): 15 and 53 inches Torus Area (RB Volumes 9 to 12): 32 inches Tank Room (RB Volume 6): N/A 2. RCIC and HPCI room submergence of 7.2 inches is acceptable.

Drawings reveal that the bottom buckets of the MCCs are 8-inches or more above the floor 3. The CRD Pump Room (Reactor Building Volume 7) does not have a safe operating flood level established.

There is only one EQ component in this area.Plant drawings show that the transmitter is located well above the submergence level of 7.2 inches.4. The 1.2 inch potential submergence in RB Volumes 15, 19 and 20 is considered insignificant and does not affect equipment located in these areas.5. There are four EQ components subject to potential submergence.

The submergence of these devices is acceptable as an evaluation shows that there is no impact on plant safety or shut down capabilities.

6. There are no EQ components in RB Volumes 29 and 30. Review of plant drawings show that all other EQ components located in RB Volumes 28, 31 and 32 are above submergence levels.Page 22 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Table 2-4, EPU Peak Accident Submergence Levels in the Turbine Building CLTP EPU TB Submergence Submergence Volume Level (inches) Level (inches)1 66.96 72 2 31.32 36 3 27 36 4 0 0 5 34.2 36 6 36.24 36 7 0 36 8 0 0 9

0 10 1.56 36 11

36 12 0.6 72 13 0.36 72 14 17.28 36 15 13.44 63.12 16 0 1.2 17 0 2.4 18 0 0 19 0 0 20 2.76 0 21 0.12 0 22 0.48 1.2 23 0 0 24 0 0 25 0 0 26 0.72 0 27 0 0 28 0 0 29 0 0 30 0 0 31 0 0 32 0 0 33 0.12 0 34 0.48 3.6 35 0 0 36 0 0 37 4.2 2.4* Volumes newly created for model enhancement Note for Table 2-4 There is no equipment within the scope of the Equipment Qualification Program located at or below the submergence levels in the Turbine Building.Page 23 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Normal and Accident Radiation Table 2-5 demonstrates that all EQ equipment is qualified for EPU normal and accident radiation levels. This table compares CLTP values for normal and accident dose to EPU values for normal, accident and Beta dose. The EPU TID is compared to the qualification TID.The CLTP normal dose rates provided in Table 2-5 were defined by routine radiation surveys. A more recent radiation survey provided the bases for the EPU normal dose values shown below. The EPU normal dose results were adjusted by the expected increase in radiation levels predicted for EPU operation.

In some cases these new surveys resulted in a reduction in normal dose for EPU. These radiation surveys are periodically performed to ensure that the normal dose is properly considered and remains accurate in the EQ files due to possible changes in plant configuration or operation.

Table 2-5, EPU vs. CLTP Normal and Accident Radiation Dose EPUI EPU Title CLTP Normal CLTP Accident (Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. Dose EQ File Category)

RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks 98-003- Allen Bradley 37 6.3 1E+02 6.60E+02 4.OOE+06 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.5 1E+08 N/A -DOR P01 Terminal Boards (DOR)98-004- ASCO Solenoid 1,3,9, 11, 1.26E+05, 6.60E+02 2.61E+07, 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.01E+08 >10% See below P01 Valves (50.49) 12, 16, 18, 1.79E+07, 5.31E+07, 19, 31, 35, 3.79E+05, 2.34E+06.36, 37, 39. 1.01E+05 1.15E+07 42, 48, DW , I _I One solenoid valve is located inside the Dryxvell and has a postulated Beta dose exposure that must be addressed.

Beta qualification is established because the Beta dose to sensitive equipment internals is determined to be less than 10% of the qualified Gamma dose in the EQ File.98-004- ASCO Solenoid 9, 11, 12, 31 1.79E+07 1.19E+05 5.31E+07 1.20E+07 0 1.20E+07 2.05E+08 >10%P02 Valves (50.49)98-004- ASCO Solenoid 1, 3.9, DW 1.01E+05, 1.88E+07 1.15E+07, 5.44E+07 1.00E+08 1.73E+08 2.OIE+08 >10%P03 Valves (50.49) 1.79E+07 5.3 1E+07 98-006- ASCO Pressure 1,. 14, 1 .1.4E+05 1.19E+05 1.15E+07 1.19E+07 0 1.20E+07 1.92E+07 >10% See below P90 Switches (50.49) 12, 14, 19, 31 Page 24 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 EPU EPU Title CLTP Normal CLTP Accident (Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. Dose EQ File Category)

RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks The specified TID bounds the specified TID dose (full 180 day accident doses) for all installed pressure switches except those located in Reactor Building Volumes I and 3. The pressure switches located in Reactor Building Volumes 1 and 3 have LOCA and HELB functions for only 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months post-accident.

The 16-hour dose for Reactor Building Volumes 1 and 3 is 4.60E+06 rad. The 60-year normal dose in these areas is 1.32E+05 Rad as provided by EQ-Part-B.

Thus, the TID for the functional time of the pressure swvitches located in Reactor Building is bounded by the TID for the selected Radiation Area.98-007- ASCO 36,39 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 1.OOE+07 1.20E+07 0 1.20E+07 1.75E+07 >10%P01 Temperature Switches (50.49)98-008- Automatic Valve DW

7.59E+06

5.68E+06 0.OOE+00 1.327E+07 2.55E+07 >10% See below P01 Company (AVCO)Air Control Assembly (50.49)The selected Radiation Area has a TID consisting of a 60-year normal dose of 1.88E+07 Rad, a 180 day accident Gamma dose of 5.44E+07 Rad and an unshielded accident Beta dose of 2.OE+08 Rad. Each of these inputs to the specified TID may be reduced for the AVCO solenoid manifold.

Since the solenoid manifold was only installed in 2009 and has a 20 year thermal qualified life, a reduced normal dose of 7.59E+06 is considered.

This dose is conservative to consider for normal use as it also includes increases due to extended power uprate which was not yet implemented in 2009. The manifold has a conservative I hour operating time, so the gamma accident dose is 5.68E+06.

The solenoid manifold is considered qualified for the specified unshielded 2.OE+08 Rad accident Beta dose because it can be shown that there is sufficient shielding around the sensitive materials to reduce the dose to 10%of Gamma qualification dose. Therefore, a modified TID applicable for the solenoid valve manifold becomes 1.327E+07 Rad. The AC solenoid valves were exposed to 2.55E+07 Rad and the materials of construction of the AC and DC solenoid valves are identical.

Therefore.

the test adequately bounds the TID.98-010- 1 Barksdale Pressure 1, 3. 14., 18. 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 6.OOE+06 4.60E+06 0 4.73E+06 I.OOE+07 N/A -DOR P01 Switches (DOR) 22. 33 The selected Radiation Area has a TID consisting of a 60 year normal dose of 1.32E+05 Rad and a 180 day accident dose of 2.09E+07 Rad. The TID of the selected Radiation Area is bounding over the TID specified for Reactor Building Volumes 1, 3, 14, 18. 22, and 33, the locations of the installed equipment.

Since the maximum operating time for the installed equipment is 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months or less, the accident dose may be reduced. A 16-hour accident dose for the RHR pump rooms, Reactor Building Volumes I and 3, is 4.60E+06 Rad. Therefore, the postulated dose for the Barksdale pressure switches is 4.73E+06 Rad (1.32E+05 Rad normal + 4.6E+06 Rad 16 hour1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months accident dose) which is enveloped by the qualified dose.98-011- T Barton Pressure 1, 3, 14, 19 1.26E+05, 4.49E+05 **, 4.35E+05 0 8.84E+05 1L.OOE+06 N/A -DOR See below P01 Switches (DOR) 1.0IE+05 2.34E+06 The TID for all pressure switches, except those located in Volumes 1 and 3, are bounded by the selected accident area. Pressure switches located in Reactor Building Volumes 1 and 3 only have a 10-minute post-LOCA function.

The accident dose forthe pressure switches in Reactor Building Volumes I and 3 may be conservatively determined by using the post-LOCA dose at 30 minutes (0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months ), which is 6.66E+05 Rad. This. coupled with the normal dose of 1.32E+05 Rad for Reactor Building Volumes I & 3. gives a TID of 7.98E+05 Rad for pressure switches in Volumes I and 3, which is less than the L.OE+06 Rad limitation.

98-012- Barton Pressure 14, 18 3.79E+05 1.58E+06 2.34E+06 2.52E+06 0 4.10E+06 L.OOE+07 >10%P01 Switches 580A-0, 580A-1 (50.49)98-014- E.F. Johnson 5, 8, 9. 12. 2.97E+06 2.97E+06 0 0 0 2.97E+06 4.OE+06 N/A -DOR See below P01 Banana Plug 16 (DOR)Page 25 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 EPU EPU Title CLTP Normal CLTP Accident (Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. Dose EQ File Category)

RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks The selected Radiation Area has a TID consisting of a 60 year normal dose of 2.97E+06 Rad and a 180 day accident dose of 2.73E+06 rad. The specified TID is associated with Reactor Building Volume 16 (Steam Chase). The 60-year normal dose for Volume 16 bounds the normal doses specified for Volumes 5, 8, 9, and 12. The equipment serves HELB detection functions during which there will be no accident dose contribution.

Therefore, the actual anticipated dose to any E.F. Johnson plug is 60 year normal dose of 2.97E+06 Rad.98-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31 E+07 5.44E+07 L.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.OOE+08 N/A -DOR P01 98-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) RB except 6.31E+02 1.32E+05 2.OOE+07 2.09E+07 0 2.IOE+07 2.44E+07 N/A -DOR P02 16, 28-32, 40 98-017- G.E. Cable (DOR) RB except 1.26E+05 2.51E+07 2.61E+07 L.OOE+04 0 2.5 1E+07 4.OOE+07 N/A -DOR P03 16, 28-32, 40; TB 98-018- General Electric 1, 3 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.62E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.10E+07 3.OOE+07 >10%P01 Motors (50.49)98-020- General Electric DW 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.3 1E+07 5.44E+07 L.OOE+08 1.73E+08 3.OOE+08 N/A -DOR P01 Containment Penetrations (DOR)98-021- General Electric RB. except 6.3 1E+02 6.60E+02 1.87E+08 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.20E+08 N/A -DOR P01 Terminal Blocks 16 (DOR/50.49) 98-021- General Electric 22,33, 34 6.31E+02 1.58E+06 1.87E+08 2.52E+06 0 4.10E+06 2.20E+08 >10%P02 Terminal Blocks (DOR/50.49) 98-022- General Electric 5, 8 4.45E+04 7.57E+04 0 0 0 7.57E+04 L.OOE+06 N/A -DOR P01 MCCs (DOR)During the HCPI or RCIC HELB events when either MCC must function, and during any small break LOCA or HELB (that does not render the 1-PCI system inoperable), there will be no accident dose to the MCC units. Because of this, the accident dose for either Reactor Building Volumes 5 or 8 can be disregarded for qualification purposes.

Thus, the 7.57E+04 Rad 60 year normal dose is applicable to both MCC units addressed by this EQ File. The test dose of 1.0E+06 Rad exceeds the maximum required plant dose of 7.57E+04 Rad, gamma (margin on the accident dose is not applicable since there is no accident dose to this equipment).

Thus, the installed MCC components are conservatively qualified for the required radiation dose.98-023- Hevi-Duty 37 6.31 E+02 6.60E+02 <2.OOE+06 3.58E+06 0 3.58E+06 1.OOE+07 N/A -DOR P01 Electric Transformer (DOR)98-024- General Electric 37 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 1.OOE+06 1.78E+06 0 1.78E+06 4.40E+06 N/A- DOR P01 Fan Motors (DOR)Page 26 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 EPU EPU Title CLTP Normal CLTP Accident (Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. Dose EQ File Category)

RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks 98-025- Limitorque Motor DW 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 2.OOE+07 9.32E+07 2.OOE+08 N/A -DOR See below P01 Operators (DOR)The selected Radiation Area has a TID consisting of a 60 year normal dose of 1.88E+07 Rad, a 180 day accident dose of 5.44E+07 Rad Gamma, and an unshielded accident Beta dose of 2.OE+08 Rad. Beta qualification is established because the Beta dose to sensitive internals is less than 10% of the qualified gamma dose. Beta dose is reduced to 2.00E+07 Rad, giving a TID of 9.32E+07 Rad. Testing demonstrates a radiation level of 2.0E+08, which envelops the 9.32E+07 Rad TID.98-025- Limitorque Motor 16 2.97E+06 2.97E+06 2.54E+06 2.73E+06 0.00E+00 5.70E+06 1.00E+07 N/A -DOR P02 Operators (DOR)98-026- Limitorque Motor 3, 10, 11, 13, 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 2.04E+07 9.36E+07 2.04E+08 >10% See below P01 Operators (50.49) 19. 20, 21, 22, 31, DW The selected Radiation Area TID consists of 1.88E+07 rad 60 year normal gamma dose, a 180 day 5.44E+07 Rad accident gamma dose. and an unshielded 2.0E+08 Rad beta accident dose. Based on material analysis the beta radiation will be reduced to to <10% of the Gamma qualification dose, or 2.04E+07 Rad. This gives a TID of 9.36E+07 Rad, which is bounded by the test.98-026- 1 Limitorque Motor 8, 10, 13, 16, 2.97E+06 2.97E+06 2.54E+06 2.73E+06 0 5.70E+06 1.00E+07 >10% See below P02 Operators (50.49) 32 DC motors are currently installed in RB Volumes 8, 10, 13, 16, and 32. RB Volume 16 has worst-case TID (180-day accident plus 60-year normal) of all areas, except Volume 10.Valve actuators utilizing the DC motors qualified by this EQ File have a travel time (isolation functions) significantly less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months . Considering the 1.06E+05 Rad normal dose in Reactor Building Volume 10 and a conservative 10-hour accident dose for Reactor Building Volume 10, the TID reduces below that for Reactor Building Volume 16, which was selected as the Radiation Area and is bounded by testing.98-026- Limitorque Motor 12 1.14E+05 1.1913+05 1.15E+07 1.199E+07 0 1.20E+07 2.OOE+07 >10%P03 Operators (50.49)98-026- Limitorque Motor 3, 8, 10. I1, 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31 E+07 5.44E+07 2.28E+07 9.60E+07 2.28E+08 >10% See below P04 Operators (50.49) 12, 13, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 31 ,32, DW The selected Radiation Area has a plant-wide bounding TID and includes a 60 year normal dose of 1.88E+07 Rad, a 180 day accident Gamma dose of 5.44E+07 Rad, and an unshielded Beta dose of 2.OOE+08 Rad. Based on material analysis, Beta dose is reduced to a conservative 2.28E+07 Rad, giving a TID of 9.60E+07 Rad, which is bounded by the test.98-027- Magnetrol Level 12 1.14E+05 1.19E+05 1.t15E+07 1.19E+07 0 1.20E+07 2.21 E+08 >10%P01 Switches (50.49)98-030- MicroSwitch Limit 36, 37, 39 6.3 1 E+02 6.60E+02

1.06E+07 0 1.06E+07 1.22E+07 N/A -DOR P01 Switches (DOR) Guidelines 98-032- Namco I I 1.79E+07 1.19E+05 5.311E+07 1.191E+07 0 1.20E+07 2.04E+08 >10%P01 EA740/1EA180 Limit Switches (50.49)Page 27 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 EPU EPU Title CLTP Normal CLTP Accident (Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. Dose EQ File Category)

RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks 98-032- Namco 16, 31, DW 1.79E+07 6.60E+02 5.31E+07 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.04E+08 >10% See below P02 EA740/EA 180 Limit Switches 1 (50.49)The limit switches inside the Drywell all have conduit seals and are otherwise hermetically sealed. With this, and the metallic housing of the limit switch, the external Beta dose will not have any impact on the sensitive non-metallic materials inside the EA740 limit switches for inside Drywell applications.

98-032- Namco 9, 11, 12, 18. 1.79E+07 6.60E+02 5.31E+07 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.04E+08 >10% See below P03 EA740/EA180 19, 31, 39 Limit Switches (50.49)The limit switches inside the Drywell all have conduit seals and are otherwise hermetically sealed. With this, and the metallic housing of the limit switch, the external Beta dose will not have any impact on the sensitive non-metallic materials inside the EAI80 limit switches for inside Drywell applications.

98-032- Namco 31, DW 1.79E;07 6.60E+02 5.31E+07 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.04E+08 >10% See below P04 EA740/EA 180 Limit Switches (50.49)The limit switches inside the Drywell all have conduit seals and are otherwise hermetically sealed. With this, and the metallic housing of the limit switch, the ex-ternal Beta dose will not nave any impact on me sensitive non-metallic materials inside the EA 18u limit switches tor inside ,'well applications.

98-033- Namco Quick ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 L.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.04E+08 >10%P01 Disconnects EC210 (50.49)98-035- Raychem NEIS 9, 11, 12, 18, 1.14E+05 1.32E+05 1.15E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 5.OOE+07 >10%P01 Seals (50.49) 19, 31 98-036- Ravchem Low ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.3 IE+07 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.1OE+08 >10%PO Voltage Splices (50.49)98-036- Raychem Low ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.90E+08 >10%P02 Voltage Splices (50.49)11 98-036- Raychem Low ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.3 1E+07 5.44E+07 L.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.25E+08 >10%P03 Voltage Splices (50.49)98-036- Ravchem Low ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.3 IE+07 5.44E+07 L.OOE+08 1.73E+08 1.96E+08 >10%P04 Voltage Splices (50.49)98-037- Robertshaw Level 18 3.79E+05 3.96E+05 3.30E+05 1.93E+05 0 5.89E+05 L.OOE+06 N/A -DOR See below P01 Switch (DOR) Guidelines Page 28 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 EPU EPU Title CLTP Normal CLTP Accident (Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPUI Qual. Dose EQ File Category)

RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks The selected Radiation Area has a TID that includes a 60 year normal dose of 1.58E+06 Rad and a 180 day accident dose of 2.52E+06 Rad which bounds the specified TID for Reactor Building Volume 18. The subject level switches support HPCI system operation for an operating time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months (includes margin). Furthermore, the 60 year normal dose for Reactor Building Volume 18 is only 3.96E+05 Rad versus the normal dose value of the selected Radiation Area. Therefore, the TID applicable to the level switches installed in Reactor Building Volume 18 may be reduced based on the location specific normal dose and a 4-hour accident dose. Using an operating time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months reduces the postulated accident dose to 1.93E+05 rad. Therefore, the specified TID for the Robertshaw level switches is 5.89E+05 rad (1.93E+05 Rad accident + 3.96E+05 Rad normal).98-038- Rockbestos Coax ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.3 1E+07 5.44E+07 2.OOE+07 9.32E+07 1.71E+08 >10% See below P01 Cable (50.49) 1 1 1 1 1 The selected Radiation Area has a TID consisting of a 60-year normal dose of 1.88E+07 Rad, plus a 180 day accident gamma dose of 5.44E+07 Rad, plus an unshielded accident Beta dose of 2.00E+08 Rad. Per NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B, beta dose may be reduced by a factor of 10 for the first 30 mils of jacket thickness.

The installed cables have a 33 mil jacket (second jacket = 0.033 in.). Therefore the shielded beta dose of 2.OOE+08 rad may be reduced to 2.OOE+07 rad. Therefore, the total radiation dose becomes 9.32E+07 Rad. which is bounded by the test.98-039- Rosemount 33.34 1.14E+05 1.58E+06 1.15E+07 2.52E+06 0 4.10E+06 4.40E+07 N/A -DOR P01 Pressure Transmitter Series A (DOR)98-040- Rosemount 1153 7.9. 12, 14, 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.10E+07 2.62E+07 >10%P01 Series B (50.49) 17, 18, 22.27, 33,34 98-041- Rosemount RB except 1.14E+05 6.60E+02 1.15E+07 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 1.11E+08 >10%P01 Conduit Seals 16 and 28-32 (50.49)98-042- Rotork "A" Range 1,3 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 ** 1.08E+06 0 1.21E+06 4.00E+06 N/A -DOR See below P01 Actuators (DOR)The selected Radiation Area has a TID that includes a 60 year normal dose of 1.32E+05 Rad and a 180 day accident dose of 2.09E+07 Rad. The specified TID bounds the TID for both Reactor Building Volumes I and 3. The installed equipment have a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months post-accident operating time, thus the accident dose can be reduced from the full 180 day specified value.The I hour accident dose is 1.08E+06 Rad for specified for Reactor Building Volumes I and 3. Thus, the bounding TID for the equipment would be 1.21E+06 Rads (I hour accident pius ou year normal closes), wnicn is boundeo Dy me test.98-043- Rotork Valve 1,3, 10, 11, 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.10E+07 2.04E+08 >10%P01 Operators (50.49) 12, 14, 31.33 98-044- Static O-ring 1, 3, 22, 33 4.29E+05 4.49E+05 5.30E+06 4.6E+06 0 5.05E+06 8.OOE+06 N/A -DOR P01 (DOR)98-047- Samuel Moore ALL except 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 1.00E+08 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.01E+08 >10%P01 Instrument Cable DW (50.49)98-049- Valcor Solenoid 18, TB 21 8.84E+04 1.58E+06 1.15E+07 2.52E+06 0 4.10E+06 1.71E+08 >10%P01 Valves (50.49) 1 1 1 1 Page 29 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 EPU EPU Title CLTP Normal CLTP Accident (Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. Dose EQ File Category)

RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks 98-049- Valcor Solenoid 11, 19 8.84E+04 1.19E+05 1.15E+07 1.19E+07 0 1.20E+07 2.00E+08 >10%P02 Valves (50.49)98-050- DG O'Brien DW 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 1.00E+08 1.73E+08 2.23E+08 >10%P01 Electrical Penetrations (50.49)98-051- Reliance Motors 1,3, 14,19 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 2.04E+08 >10%P01 (50.49)98-052- Tavis Flow 37 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 1.00E+06 1.06E+06 0 1.06E+06 1.40E+06 >10%P01 Transmitter (50.49)98-053- ITT 37 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 5.OOE+06 1.06E+06 0 1.06E+06 1.00E+07 >10%P01 Grinnel/Conoflow Transducer (50.49)98-054- Consolidated 18 3.79E+05 4.49E+05 7.OOE+04 4.35E+05 0 8.84E+05 2.31E+06 >10%P01 Control Relays (50.49)98-055- General Atomic DW 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.3 1E+07 5.44E+07 2.OOE+08 2.73E+08 See Note N/A -DOR See below P01 Radiation Detector_ _ (DOR)The specimen was not subjected to irradiation during the testing. The report indicates that the detector has no radiation age-sensitive materials.

The detector is designed to measure high radiation fields and is constructed of metallic or inorganic materials which are insensitive to the effects of the postulated radiation dose. Therefore, the detector is qualified for the postulated plant radiation dose.98-059- Kerite 1.3.5, 6 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 2.20E+08 >10%P01 Cable/Termination 9-6-.(50.49)

______ _____98-060- Westinghouse 14, 19 1.01E+05 1.58E+06 2.34E+06 2.52E+06 0 4.10E+06 5.OOE+06 >10%P01 Starter and Transformer (50.49)98-062- Gould Contactor 37 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 4.OOE+06 3.58E+06 0 3.58E+06 1.00E+07 >10%P01 (50.49)98-064- Eaton ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 1.00E+08 1.73E+08 2.OOE+08 >10%P01 Thermocouple Extension Cable (50.49)98-065- Brand Rex 600V ALL 1.79E+07, l.88E+07 5.31E+07, 5.44E+07 1.00E+08 1.73E+08 2.OOE+08 >10%P01 Cable (50.49) 6.3 1E+02 1.00E+08 Page 30 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 EPU EPU Title CLTP Normal CLTP Accident (Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. Dose EQ File Category)

RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks 98-066- Boston Control ALL except 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 1.00E+08 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 2.OOE+08 >10%P01 Cable (50.49) DW 98-067- CONAX Electrical DW 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.25E+08 >10%P01 Connector Seal (50.49)98-068- CONAX RTDs 9, 10, 11, 12 1.14E+05 1.88E+07 1.15E+07 5.44E+07 1.00E+08 1.73E+08 2.27E+08 >10%P01 (50.49) 1 98-069- Patel Conduit ALL 1.79E+07, 1.88E+07 5.31E+07, 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.OOE+08 >10% See below P01 Seals (50.49) 6.3 1E+02, 1.OOE+08 Beta qualification is established by showing that the beta dose to sensitive internals (i.e. EPDM grommet) is less than or equal to 10% of the qualified gamma dose.98-070- Patel Conformal ALL except 1.14E+05 1.19E+05 1.15E+07 1.19E+07 0 1.20E+07 2.02E+07 >10%P01 Coating (50.49) DW 98-071- EGS Grayboot ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.08E+08 >10%P01 Electrical Connectors (50.49)98-072- EGS Quick ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.3 1E+07 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.OOE+08 >10%P01 Disconnect (50.49)98-073- Swagelok/

7, 14, 18, 22, 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.61 E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 5.OOE+07 >10%P01 Raychem Conduit 33, 34 Seal (50.49)98-075- Weed DW 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 2.OOE+08 2.73E+08 3.03E+08 >10%P01 Thermocouples

-(50.49)98-076- Rome Cable Type 5, 8 4.45E+04 2.97E+06 2.54E+06 2.73E+06 0 5.70E+06 5.00E+08 N/A -DOR P01 SIS (DOR)98-077- Eaton 22, 33, 34 4.29E+05 4.49E+05 4.88E+05 4.35E+05 0 8.84E+05 1.50E+06 >10%P01 Cutler-Hammer Relays (50.49)98-078- PEI/FENWAL 5, 8,9, 12, 2.97E+06 1.19E+05 0 1.19E+07 0 1.20E+07 5.06E+07 >10%P01 Temperature 16 Switch (50.49)98-079- ITT-Royal PVC 14, 18, 19, 4.29E+05 1.58E+06 2.34E+06 2.52E+06 0 4.1OE+06 5.OOE+07 N/A -DOR P01 Cable (DOR) 22, 33 98-080- Okonite Control 5, 14, 17, 18, 3.79E+05 1.58E+06 2.34E+06 2.52E+06 0 4.1OE+06 2.44E+07 N/A -DOR P01 Cable (DOR) 22 98-081- Triangle Triolene 17, 18 3.79E+05 1.58E+06 7.OOE+04 2.52E+06 0 4.1OE+06 2.44E+07 N/A -DOR P01 Control Cable (DOR) ___Page 31 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 EPU EPU Title CLTP Normal CLTP Accident (Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. Dose EQ File Category)

RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks 98-082- MNGP-A Cable RB, except 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 2.44E+07 N/A -DOR P01 (DOR) 16. 28-32, 40 98-083- MNGP-B Cable RB, except 1.26E+05 1.19E+05 2.61E+07 1.20E+07 0 1.20E+07 1.70E+07 N/A -DOR P01 (DOR) 16, 28-32, 40 98-084- Amphenol 1, 3, 14, 18, 4.29E+05 1.32E+05 3.50E+06 4.60E+06 0 4.732E+06 6.00E+06 N/A -DOR See below P01 Connectors (DOR) 19,22,33 Guidelines The selected Radiation Area has a TID which includes the 60 year normal and 180 day accident dose applicable for Reactor Building Volumes 1 and 3. The Amphenol test jacks are associated with EQ devices having a general 10-hour maximum post-accident operating time. Accordingly, the accident dose may be reduced based on operating time. The TID that bounds the 60 year normal and 16-hour accident dose for installed plant locations is 4.732E+06 Rad which includes a 60 year normal dose of 1.32E+05 Rad and a 16 hour1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months accident dose of 4.60E+06 Rad. For the two applications of Amphenol test jacks in Reactor Building Volume 14 having 180 day post-LOCA functions, the combined 60 year normal dose of 1.06E+05 Rad and the 180 day accident dose of 2.25E+06 Rad results in a Reactor Building Volume 14 TID of 2.626E+06 Rad which is bounded by the general reduced (16-hour accident dose) TID. Therefore, analysis using a specified TID of 4.732E+06 Rads is conservative.

98-085- Pyco Temperature 28 8.84E+04 1.58E+06 2.34E+06 2.52E+06 0 4.1OE+06 2.20E+08 >10%P01 Elements (50.49)98-086- SOR Pressure 14, 18,22, 4.29E+05 1.58E+06 2.34E+06 2.52E+06 0 4.1OE+06 3.46E+07 >10%P01 Switches (50.49) 33 98-103- Patel P-I Thread ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 2.OOE+08 2.73E+08 1.50E+09 >10%P01 Sealant (50.49)98-104- Rockbestos ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 1.95E+08 >10%P01 Firewall SR Cable (50.49)98-107- Rockbestos ALL 1.79E+07 1.88E+07 5.31E+07 5.44E+07 1.OOE+08 1.73E+08 2.01E+08 >10%P01 Firewall IIf/SIS Cable (50.49)98-108- Rockbestos ALL except 1.26E+05 6.60E+02 2.61E+07 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 1.65E+08 >10%P01 Firewall EP Cable DW (50.49)98-109- Valcor MSIV 16 2.97E+06 2.97E+06 8.uuE+04 2.73E+06 0 5.70E+06 5.00E+07 >10%P01 Solenoid Valves (50.49)98-128- UCI Tape Splice ALL except 1.26E+05 6.60E+02 2.61E+07 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 1.23E+08 >10%P01 (50.49) DW 03-096- Loctite PST 580 ALL 1.26E+05.

1.18E+07 2.61E+07, 5.44E+07 0 6.62E+07 7.37E+07 >10% See below P01 Thread Sealant 1.79E+07 5.31 E+07 (50.49)Page 32 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 EPU EPU Title CLTP Normal CLTP Accident (Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. Dose EQ File Category)

RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) _ (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks The selected Radiation Area has a TID that includes a 60-year normal dose of 1.88E+07 Rad gamma plus an accident gamma dose of 5.44E+07 Rad, and a Beta dose of 2.00E+08 Rad.The first installation of Loctite PST 580 in the Drywell was 2/2000. As a result, the Drywell gamma specified radiation dose becomes 6.62E+07 Rad, consisting of the 31-year normal dose of 1.18E+07 Rad, plus 5.44E+07 Rad. gamma accident dose. The revised Drywell gamma dose for 3 I-year normal life plus 180 day accident bounds the gamma dose of all other plant areas (includes 60-year normal dose plus accident gamma dose) and is bounded by testing. The specified Beta radiation dose is satisfied since the equipment externals provide sufficient shielding such that the Beta dose to sensitive equipment internals is less than 10' of the qualified gamma dose.03-105- EGS/Scotch 130C ALL except 6.31E+02 6.60E+02 L.OOE+08 8.08E+07 0 8.08E+07 1.83E+08 >10%P01 and 69 Electrical DW Tape Splice (50.49)05-137- Fisher E/P 2.4 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 ** 3.14E+06 ** 3.27E+06 6.24E+06 >10% See below P01 Transducer (50.49) , _L I I I The selected Radiation Area provides the contact dose on the RHR heat exchanger and includes a 60 year normal dose of 1.32E+05 Rad and a 180-day accident dose of2.09E+07 Rad.The Fisher Type 546 E/P transducers are located in the RHR Pump Room Stairways, distant from the heat exchanger.

Using the 180 day RHR heat exchanger contact accident dose of the selected Radiation Area accident is overly conservative.

The specific 180 day accident dose for the transducers is 3.14E+06 Rad. The dose is based on transducer location away from the RHR heat exchanger source, but in contact with a 20-inch pipe containing Torus water. Therefore, the total integrated dose for the Fisher Type 546 E/P transducers is 3.27E+06 Rad (1.32E+05 Rad 60 year normal + 3.14E+06 Rad 180 day accident), which is bounded by the test.05-138- Cutler-Hammer

14. 19 3.65E+04 4.49E+05 2.34E+06 4.35E+05 0 8.94E+05 2.80E+06 >10%P01 Motor Starter/Control Transformer (50.49)08-013- McDonnell

& 37 6.94E+02 6.60E+02 1.87E+08 3.58E+06 0 3.58E+06 2.34E+08 >10%P01 Miller Flow Switches (50.49)08-014- Amphenol 1, 3, 14, 18, 3.79E+05 1.32E+05 2.34E+06 2.09E+07 0 2.10E+07 3.16E+07 >10%P01 Connectors (50.49) 19,22,33 08-015- AVCO Scram 14, 18 1.57E+05

7.07E+04 0 2.28E+05 2.49E+05 >10% See below P01 Solenoid Valves (50.49)The selected Radiation Area has a TID consisting of a 60 year normal dose of 1.58E+06 Rad and a 180 day accident dose of 2.52E+06 Rad which bounds the TID specified for Reactor Volumes 14 or 18, the location of the installed equipment.

Since the extended plant license expires in 2030 (September) and the valves were installed in 2009 (March), the remaining plant life is only of 22 years. Also, the installed SSPVs function (de-energize to vent) immediately upon a LOCA or tip to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months under a HELB (manual reactor scram). Under the HELD3 scenario, no accident radiological dose will be experienced at the SSPVs. However, under a LOCA, there will be an accident dose contribution.

Per Regulatory Guide 1.89, qualification shall be established for one hour post-LOCA to demonstrate margin. Thus, reduced normal and accident doses can be used in the radiation qualification analysis.

The 22 year normal dose is 1.57E+05 Rad for either Reactor Building Volume 14 or 18. The 1-hour accident dose for either Reactor Building Volume 14 or 18 is 7.07E+04 Rad. As such, the total specified radiation dose for the SSPV installed in Reactor Building Volumes 14 or 18 is 2.28E+05 Rad. The test radiation exposure of 2.49E+05 Rad (minimum test level) bounds this value with additional margin.Page 33 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 EPU EPU Title CLTP Normal CLTP Accident (Qualification Normal Dose Accident Dose Beta Dose Total EPU Qual. Dose EQ File Category)

RB Volume Dose (Rad) (rad) Dose (rad) (rad) (rad) TID (rad) (rad) Margin Remarks 08-016- Rosemount 1154 1,3,9, 12, 1.26E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 5.55E+07 >10%P01 Transmitters 19 (50.49)08-017- Struthers-Dunn 18 3.79E+05 4.49E+05 7.OOE+04 4.35E+05 0 8.84E+05 2.31E+06 >10%P01 CX-3964NE Relay Sockets (50.49)10-001- Schulz Electric 37 6.94E+02 6.60E+02 1. 16E+06 1.78E+06 0 1.78E+06 1.97E+08 >10%P01 Fan Motors (50.49)10-002- Okonite 5kV 1,3,5,6 6.31E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 2.OOE+08 >10%P01 Power Cable-(50.49)10-003- SOR Differential 14, 18 3.79E+05 1.58E+06 2.72E+06 2.52E+06 0 4.1OE+06 4.1OE+07 >10%P0I Pressure Switches (50.49)10-004- Raychem Medium 1, 3 6.3 IE+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 5.OOE+07 >10%P01 Voltage Terminations and Splices (50.49)10-004- Raychem Medium 5,6 6.31E+05 1.32E+05 2.61E+07 2.09E+07 0 2.1OE+07 2.15E+08 >10%P02 Voltage Terminations and Splices (50.49) 1 Notes for Table 2-5* CLTP values not shown due to different methods of analysis** CLTP accident dose not shown due to change in dose source basis for RHR room*** Qualified to EPU conditions upon initial installation Page 34 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Chemical Spray There is no spray consideration for the Reactor and Turbine Building as the result of either a design basis LOCA or HELB condition.

The initiation of demineralized water and/or sodium pentaborate spray during a Design Basis Accident results in a harsh environment inside the Drywell (primary containment).

Table 2-6 demonstrates qualification of EQ equipment in the Drywell that is exposed to chemical spray conditions.

Table 2-6, EPU Chemical Spray Conditions in the Drywell Qualified Chemical EPU Chemical Spray EQ File Title (Qualification Category)

Spray Type Type 98-004-POI ASCO Solenoid Valves (50.49) Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium Pentaborate A downward pointing street elbow is required on the exhaust port for valves potentially exposed to spray. However, there is only one solenoid valve installed in the Drywell that is qualified by this EQ File that would be subject to spray. Drywell spray is used during design basis LOCA. Under that scenario, this valve will function within 5 minutes. Drywell spray is not initiated until after 10-minutes (after LPCI injection is complete).

Therefore, this solenoid valve does not require exhaust port protection for spray. In summary, no valves qualified by this PQE require exhaust port protection.

98-004-P03 ASCO Solenoid Valves (50.49) Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 9.5 to 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below Pentaborate I Of the valves qualified by this PQE, only the SRV Pilot solenoid valves are exposed to spray as they are located in the Drywell. During testing, the vented exhaust ports of the specimen valves were protected from direct impingement of spray. The exhaust ports were configured with downward facing street elbows.As installed, only the exhaust ports of eight solenoid valves require spray protection.

The exhaust ports of the remaining solenoid valves in the Drywell are piped to the other SRV solenoid valves and are thus inherently protected.

98-008-POI Automatic Valve Company (AVCO) Deionized Water Demin Water/Sodium N/A 7 to 8.58 See below Air Control Assembly (50.49) Pentaborate The spray at Monticello is manually controlled and not automatically initiated under any event. Procedural guidance directs operations to only use spray after the first 10-minutes of a design basis LOCA (after LPCI injection is achieved).

Therefore, the MSIV solenoid cluster will be de-energized prior to being subject to spray. The 20 minute demineralized water spray of the test sufficiently bounds the plant spray conditions.

98-017-POI G.E. Cable (DOR) None Demin Water/Sodium N/A 7 to 8.58 See below Pentaborate Roiutings of GE cable inside the Drywell may be subject to the specified spray conditions.

The cable specimens were not subject to spray during the test. The Drywell spray is not expected to have any detrimental effect on the XLPE insulation based on the submerged IR testing conducted post-LOCA.

During testing conducted by Franklin Laboratories, specimens of similar GE cables were subjected to chemical spray for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . This testing provides additional assurance that the installed cables can withstand the specified spray.Page 35 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 Qualified Chemical EPU Chemical Spray EPU Evaluation EQ File Title (Qualification Category)

Spray Type Type Qualified pH EPU pH Note 98-020-POI General Electric Containment None Demin Water/Sodium N/A 7 to 8.58 See below Penetrations (DOR) Pentaborate The penetration specimen was not subject to spray during the extreme service conditions test. During other emergency environmental testing, GE subjected the various penetration designs to steam/submergence.

The test assemblies were subjected to steam and submerged and no detectable leakage was observed.

In two tests, one end of the test penetration was submerged.

In another two tests, the entire assembly was submerged.

The sensitive materials of the penetrations, excluding the cables (qualified per EQ File 98-017), is epoxy. Material analysis reveals that epoxy resins have broad chemical resistance.

Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the epoxy would not be affected by a slightly basic water/sodium pentaborate spray. In addition, the epoxy is coated with Hypalon paint for more protection.

Therefore, the GE EPAs are qualified for the Drywell spray.98-025-POI Limitorque Motor Operators (DOR) Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 7.67 7 to 8.58 See below I IPentaborate The test spray conditions sufficiently bound the specified spray conditions.

The motor qualified in this EQ File has no T-Drains, thus Drywell spray is not expected to migrate into the motor housing. It is further observed that Drywell spray will only commence after the first 10-minutes of inside Drywell accident conditions.

The longer operating time demands for valve closure are due to outside Drywell HELB events during which time there will be no spray inside the Drywell.98-026-PO1 Limitorque Motor Operators (50.49) None Demin Water/Sodium N/A 7 to 8.58 See below Pentaborate A test anomaly as documented in the test resulted in the flooding of the test actuator with water such that the actuator components became submerged during the testing. A post-test inspection revealed water inside the motor. Additionally, similarly configured Limitorque valve actuators were subjected to PWR containment type testing with spray as documented in a separate test report. Based on the discussions in this test, it is evident that valve actuator specimens were subject to bounding spray conditions.

One MOV has a replacement aluminum cover to support ease of maintenance at its confined location in the Torus compartment (minimize rigging required if the original cast iron cover was used). Limitorque cannot support chemical spray qualification for this actuator based on testing. However, this is not a concern for the MOV located in the Torus as it will not be exposed to spray conditions.

Therefore, the test specimens have demonstrated the ability to perform their safety function under the postulated spray at MNGP.98-032-P02 I Namco EA740/EA 180 Limit Boric Acid/Water Demin Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below Switches (50.49) [ Pentaborate The test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions consisting of 3000 ppm boron buffered to a pH of 10.5 with sodium hydroxide.

The test specimen was sealed with an EC-210 conduit seal. Therefore, a qualified conduit seal is required to be installed on the limit switch when potentially subjected to a steam environment, which includes all areas subject to spray. The test chemical spray conditions exceed the plant spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic. Therefore, the limit switches are qualified for the spray conditions postulated for MNGP.98-032-P04 Namco EA740/EA180 Limit Boric Acid/Water Demin Water/Sodium 9.8 to 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below Switches (50.49) Spray Pentaborate Page 36 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Qualified Chemical EPU Chemical Spray EPU Evaluation EQ File Title (Qualification Category)

Spray Type Type Qualified pH EPU pH Note The test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions consisting of 3000 ppm boron buffered to a pH of 10.5 with sodium hydroxide.

The test specimen was sealed with an EC-210 conduit seal. Therefore, a qualified conduit seal is required to be installed on the limit switch when potentially subjected to a steam environment, which includes all areas subject to spray. The test chemical spray conditions exceed the plant spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic. Therefore, the limit switches are qualified for the spray conditions postulated for MNGP.98-033-POI1 INamco Quick Disconnects EC210 Boric Acid( PenDemin Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below_______1(50.49)1 etbreI At various times during the LOCA test, the specimens were exposed to superheated and saturated steam, and chemical spray. The test chemical spray of high pH is a more severe environment than the moderate pH demineralized water spray with sodium pentaborate at MNGP.98-036-POI 1 Raychem Low Voltage Splices Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.5 r 7 to 8.58 See below______j(50.49) 1 Pentaborate 1 The test specimens were exposed to chemical spray conditions for the full 30 days of the test. The spray composition consisted of 3000 ppm boron and 0.064 molar sodium thiosulfate, buffered to a pH of 10.5 with sodium hydroxide.

This exceeds the plant buffered demineralized water spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic. Therefore, the splices are qualified for the spray conditions postulated for MNGP.98-036-P02

[ Raychem Low Voltage Splices Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below______1(50.49) etbre The test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions starting at the 12 minute point in the test and continuing through the 30-day test duration.

The spray composition consisted of 6200 ppm boron and 50 ppm hydrazine, buffered to a pH of 10.5 with trisodium phosphate.

This exceeds the plant buffered demineralized water spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic. Therefore, the splice kits are qualified for the spray conditions postulated for MNGP.98-036-P03 J Raychem Low Voltage Splices Boric Acid Detain Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below (50.49) Pentaborate 1 The test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions for most of the test duration (spray started at the 320'F temperature plateau).

The test spray exceeds the plant's buffered demineralized water spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic. Therefore, the splice kits are qualified for the spray conditions postulated for MNGP.98-036-P04

] Raychem Low Voltage Splices Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below________[50.49)

I rabrt The test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions that exceeds the plant buffered demineralized water spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic. Therefore, the splices are qualified for the spray conditions postulated for MNGP.98-038-POI

[ Rockbestos Coax Cable (50.49) Boric Acid Detain Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below I ~ PentaborateI At various times during the LOCA test, the specimens were exposed to superheated and saturated steam, and chemical spray. The test chemical spray is a more severe environment than the installed demineralized water/sodium pentaborate spray.Page 37 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 Qualified Chemical EPU Chemical Spray EQ File Title (Qualification Category)

Spray Type Type 98-050-POI DG O'Brien Electrical Penetrations Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium (50.49) Pentaborate The test specimen was exposed to a caustic water spray during the LOCA test which envelops the specified spray conditions.

98-055-POI

] DG O'Brien Electrical Penetrations Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below (50.49) Pentaborate The test spray chemistry exceeds the specified plant spray with regard to pH and boric acid concentration and was applied at a pressure greater than the peak specified pressure.

Therefore, spray qualification is demonstrated.

98-064-POI 1 Eaton Thermocouple Extension Cable Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 9.5 to 1L.5 7 to 8.58 See below (50.49) Pentaborate The test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions starting at the 3-hour point in the second transient and continuing for the remainder of the 100-day test. The spray composition consisted of a 0.28 Molar boric acid and a 0.064 Molar sodium thiosulfate, buffered to a pH of 9.5 to 11.5 with sodium hydroxide.

This exceeds the plant demineralized water/sodium pentaborate spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic than the demineralized water/sodium pentaborate spray. Therefore, the Eaton cables are qualified for the spray conditions postulated for Monticello.

98-065-POI 1 Brand Rex 600V Cable (50.49) Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 8.5 to 10.0 7 to 8.58 See below Pentaborate The test conditions using boric acid chemical spray are more severe than the demineralized water buffered with sodium pentaborate spray used at MNGP. Thus, the test demonstrates that the installed cables are qualified for the specified spray conditions.

98-067-POI CONAX Electrical Connector Seal Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.9 7 to 8.58 See below (50.49) Pentaborate The test spray exceeds the plant demineralized water spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic than the demineralized water and sodium pentaborate buffer. Therefore, the ECSAs are qualified for the spray conditions postulated for MNGP provided they are installed such that they are shielded from the direct impingement of steam or chemical spray.98-069-POl Patel Conduit Seals (50.49) Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 11 7 to 8.58 See below Pentaborate The test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months consisting of a 0.28 Molar boric acid buffered to a pH of 11.0 with sodium hydroxide.

Subsequently, they were submergence tested using the chemical spray mixture as the submergence fluid. This exceeds the plant demineralized water with sodium pentaborate solution spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic. Therefore, the Patel conduit seals qualified for the spray conditions postulated for MNGP.98-071-POI EGS Grayboot Electrical Connectors Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 11 7 to 8.58 See below (50.49) Pentaborate Page 38 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Qualified Chemical EPU Chemical Spray EPU Evaluation EQ File Title (Qualification Category)

Spray Type Type Qualified pH EPU pH Note Since the specimens were tested injunction boxes, all Drywell applications must also be installed within junction boxes, conduits, etc. The test specimens were subjected to greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of chemical spray. The plant demineralized water/sodium pentaborate spray will have less corrosive effects on the connectors than the boric acid chemical spray used in the test and therefore the test envelopes the required conditions.

98-072-POI lEGS Quick Disconnect (50.49) Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 8.5 to 11.0 7 to 8.58 See below 7 ~ PentaborateI At various times during the LOCA test, the specimens were exposed to superheated and saturated steam, and chemical spray. The test chemical spray is more caustic than the demineralized water with sodium pentaborate at MNGP.98-075-POI I Weed Thermocouples (50.49) Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.7 7 to 8.58 Seebelow PentaborateI The test specimens were subjected to 104 hours0.0012 days 0.0289 hours 1.719577e-4 weeks 3.9572e-5 months of chemical spray. The plant demineralized water (buffered with sodium pentaborate) spray will not have corrosive effects on the thermocouples, and therefore, the test envelopes the required conditions.

98-103-POI

Patel P-I Thread Sealant (50.49) Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 9.93 to 11.73 17 to 8.58PSee below________I j Pentaborate The test specimens were exposed to a chemical spray conditions starting at the 1 minute point in the test and continuing for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The spray composition consisted of a 0.28 Molar boric acid and a 0.064 Molar sodium thiosulfate, buffered to a pH of 9.9 to 11.73 with sodium hydroxide.

This exceeds the plant demineralized water buffered with sodium pentaborate spray conditions because the test spray was more caustic. Therefore, the Patel P-I paste thread sealant is qualified for the spray conditions postulated for MNGP.98-104-POI Rockbestos Firewall SR Cable Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.8 7 to 8.58 See below (50.49) Pentaborate I r The test caustic spray conditions are more severe than the demineralized water with sodium pentaborate solution postulated for MNGP. Therefore, the testing demonstrates that the cables are qualified for the spray conditions at MNGP.98-107-POI Rockbestos Firewall Ill/SIS Cable Boric Acid Demin Water/Sodium 10.5 7 to 8.58 See below (50.49) Pentaborate The test chemical spray conditions are more caustic than the demineralized water with sodium pentaborate solution postulated for MNGP. Therefore, the testing demonstrates that the cables are qualified for the spray conditions at MNGP.03-096-POI Loctite PST 580 Thread Sealant Demineralized Water Detain Water/Sodium 6.0 to 8.0 7 to 8.58 See below t (50.49) Pentaborate I The tested spray adequately simulated the MNGP spray conditions in the drywell. Thus, the Loctite PST 580 thread sealant is qualified for the plant spray conditions.

Page 39 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Humidity The Reactor and Turbine building ambient relative humidity is assumed to be 20% to 90% during normal plant operation.

The Reactor and Turbine building accident relative humidity is assumed to be 100% in environments where a HELB changes either the normal pressure or temperature.

These assumptions are the same for both CLTP and EPU accident conditions.

Normal Temperature The Drywell was evaluated and no change in normal temperatures for EPU was indicated.

For general areas of the Reactor Building, there was no increase of significance in normal ambient temperature noted. As such, there is no impact of EPU conditions on normal plant temperature inputs to qualified life assessments.

All EQ equipment is qualified to the normal ambient conditions in which it is located and the normal ambient temperatures are not expected to increase due to EPU.Page 40 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 NRC Request No. 3 Please modify Figures 27-1 and 27-2 to include the profile of the qualification level of EQ equipment to show that the EQ equipment will remain bounding under EPU conditions.

NSPM Response Figures 27-1 and 27-2 from L-MT-12-114 (Reference E1-1) depicted the CLTP and EPU Drywell Temperature and Pressure Profiles.

The peak accident temperature of the Drywell increased by 3 0 F due to EPU, which had a minimal effect on qualification of equipment installed in the Drywell. To demonstrate that this equipment remains qualified under EPU conditions, excerpts from the EQ Files are provided to compare the EPU accident profile to the qualification profile.Page 41 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 EQ File 98-008-PCI, Automatic Valve Company (A VCO) Air Control Assembly (50.49)EMU rm~m" rffaCnd.&c 4 Drywell Accident Pressure*0 Wyle 17614-1 Test Presstxr Time(Secondi)

The test profiles envelop the specified profile in magnitude, with the exception of initial heat up.This does not affect the qualification since the test included a dual transient exposure (only the second transient is shown) and the test peak temperature existed for a longer duration than specified.

Page 42 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 EQ file 98-026-P0I, Limitorque Motor Operators (50.49)DMT Pri £mmor' PWC (w/RHR) Accident TempwWe 4W 60037SAAccident Test Tempetrature 00.00 a Time (Seconds).....

..... ....*1 PWCAccident Pressure*40 600376A Accident Test P0ess1)e 120 1100 250 1W0 300 20-000.00 Time (Seconds)The test profile envelops the specified profile in magnitude (peak temperature), but not in duration.

This is evaluated further in the PAOT in the EQ File. The excerpt of this section is also provided.Page 43 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 Post Accdent Operating Time (dys OE Reslt(clays)

Ddrns 1.7t02 3.SW+ 0 0.32 DAflT Iar~tulagtf Inmst Value.I eeew ) I a ion1!m l I () S t a rt T o o (6 ) .e 0 Y 14.06660000M 06000 1 Ackhmt m Tmnmatre PmkgMW 1 IWC (w/RHR) Accident 0E TempAcaturen T roftle Name 600376A Accident Test Tempeature Pot ccdnt jimitU Tie Car 4* PWC (w/RIIR) Accident Temperatue

1 GOO3lGAccident Test Temperature 4 Start Time 400 I I Time (Seconds)The test profile was evaluated against the specified profile using Arrhenius methodology with the inputs and results shown in the above computation.

The analysis shows that the test profile envelops the PAOT requirement of 180-days with significant margin.Page 44 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 EQ File 98-025-P0I, Limitorque Motor Operators (DOR)0 Drywelt ACC~dentTempetetme

WM0IAccident Test Tmipereturo Time(Seconds) 0 Dq-wel ACctidetPeSsuo 00GM198NAcciftnt TostPressur 110 100'I Time(Stcoaads)

The test profile does not envelop the plant specified profile in magnitude (peak temperature).

However, a thermal lag was conducted that justifies qualification.

The testing envelopes the conservative 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months operating time with significant margin.Page 45 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 EQ File 98-032-P02, Namco EA740/EA 180 Limit Switches (50.49)DBA TImmbWur BMd amulmn*0 PWC (wARlR) Accident Temperature

-0 Namco QTR-I4, TestTemperature 380 Time(Seconds)

WCAccidenlt Pressure TNamco 1T.t 40 Test2Pressure Time (Se'conds)

The test profile envelops the specified profile in magnitude (peak temperature), but not duration.This is evaluated further in the PAOT in the EQ File. The excerpt of this section is also provided.Page 46 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 Post Accident Operating Time Accidet Ar" cciden Aoesoime(1 226E+02 1 I 7.99E.02 I2rnarab ( baF) ~ s IV 141.60 j 6 6400.00 0.8W4 MM-0 3000 1120-0 2600 Acddent Area TemerUAtre Proftile Niame 21OD-W 26.00 PWC (w/PIHR) Accident Temperature 300 210 226000 GOF Temwerature Profile Name 2. Q0# 273- Namnco QTR-140 Test Temperature

l PWVC (wlftHIR)

Accidelt Temperatt'e

0 Nameo 01f-440 Test Temperahir.

Time Time ($scond$1 The test profile was evaluated against the specified profile using Arrhenius methodology with the inputs and results shown in the above computation.

The analysis demonstrates that the test profile envelops the PAOT of 180 days with adequate margin.Page 47 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 EQ File 98-055, General Atomic Radiation Detector (DOR).~m a a -.Ed-* ~DBA S*M~n-*OWAIN ACddsr Prow-*OAR~ E-234-900 Accidur TeO Pmn"' (LOCA so 70 10 30 112 Iteif if The test profile bounds the peak drywell conditions in magnitude, but not in duration.

However, the General Atomic Radiation monitor has no susceptible materials to thermal degradation.

While the test profile envelops the specified conditions for both peak temperature and pressure Page 48 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 with adequate margin, the duration of the test does not bound the 12 day operating time.However, qualification is sufficiently demonstrated because the radiation detector is constructed almost entirely out of metal and inorganic parts. The most susceptible components of the detector assembly are the Raychem cable splice and the coaxial cable, both of which are qualified in separate EQ files Page 49 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 EQ File 98-004-P03, ASCO Solenoid Valves (50.49)0 PWC (wlo RHR) Accident Temperature

*AQS-21678

+ER 177 Test Temperature 400 360 W20 Time (Seconds)*1 PWC Accident Pressure*

Test Pressure 120r *110 " ' **30 240 Time (Seconds)Testing bounds the specified plant conditions for both temperature and pressure.

The test provides approximately 8°F of temperature margin. This is not a concern given the fact that the testing included a dual transient exposure and sustained peak conditions significantly longer then specified for the plant. Furthermore, later ASCO testing included exposure to peak accident conditions of greater than 400°F.Page 50 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 EQ File 98-004-POI, ASCO Solenoid Valves (50.49)MATenumw~ahim Proffl Comparison I* P&C(wfiRHft)AccidentTemnpenatia

AQS-2t678 Test TempeataU"s Tim.(Soconds)

J M UUMM Wane CMDar'sm ,4AOS-21678 Test Presswre I Time(Soconds)

The test profile envelops the specified temperature profile for the entire 30-day test period with the exception of initial rise time to peak test conditions.

This has no consequence given the test had a dual transient exposure and sustained peak conditions significantly greater than the plant specified dwell at peak temperature.

Long-term post accident operation is evaluated in the PAOT section of this EQ File. The excerpt of this section is also provided.Page 51 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 Post Accident Operating Time S 2.09E+02 4.71E+02 124.89 1 pAOT CA~lmlefn Input Vallues 14.60 1 327600.00 1____Accddent Ame Teml~erature Prt lname PWC (w/RHR) Accdent Temperature GOEQ TmW=rat Profile Name AQS-21678 Test Temperature Pct ddt JeMp TIeChr 4D PW~C (wIRHR)ACCideitT*MP~ratW#

4 Start Tim*1 AOS-21 678 Test Ternperaotu Time (Seconds)The MNGP specified profile was evaluated against the test profile using Arrhenius methodology with the inputs and results shown in the above computation.

The analysis starting point was selected to align with the beginning of the final test temperature plateau. The analysis demonstrates that the test profile exceeds the specified post-accident operating time with significant margin.Page 52 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 EQ File 98-075-POI, Weed Thermocouples (50.49)im-W PWC (w)RHR) AcidefltTemnpefatur

0 W~sbnghouseS8-0460AccddntTestTemp~rin 320 T 840-3200----------------

24Sco so Time(Secondls)

L_V V-Po 11 mtýI'lI -4 1 1 a. 'II .".The test profile envelops the specified profile in magnitude (peak temperature), with the exception of the initial rise to the peak temperature and the drop and subsequent rise to the Page 53 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 peak temperature between the first and second transient.

These short periods are shown to be approximately one second each. The test profile does not envelop the plant specifications in duration; this is evaluated in the PAOT section. The excerpt of this section is also provided.Post Accldent Operating Time Aecdý A,".mu -I:jG o*(" I 95E402 1 77E+04 M0022.-AOT uawlatio nu ahXms Ak. artTime(s)AdimabonwyI T-eý(F ZV ,_,_ fi fl 2620 40 PWC (w/RNR) Accident Temperabre 432 ib 21 .M 100 0 M 34000 GOI TeM re r aftue p jMa W 10.0 Westingiouse 86-0450 Accident Test Teoperature D.... IW*, PWC (wA/tf.t)

Accident Temperette

e Westinghouse O.-4s0OAcident Test Tempergzne diStart Tlme 43.D Is 10150 486.00I ! I Time (Seconds)The test profile was evaluated against the specified profile using Arrhenius methodology with the inputs and results shown in the above computation.

The analysis demonstrates that the test Page 54 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 profile envelops the Post-Accident operating time requirement of 180-days with significant margin.EQ File 98-020-PCI, General Electric Containment Penetrations (DOR)fMA Tw m Zpmrde U1 0 Drywefl AeddwdnT~mpeabae

GEFOl ActidoentTetmperstutt rime*(SecndS)

DfAPissus mofis a~mpa 0 Dqywll Accident Pressure* GE FO1 Accident Test Pressure Time(Seconds)

Page 55 of 96 L-MT-1 3-034 Enclosure 1 The test profile envelops the specified profile in magnitude, but not in duration.

The long-term evaluation is provided in the PAOT section of this EQ File. The excerpt from this section is also provided.Post Accident Operating Time IAOT A,

A,",cmE t s(a)I T(F) , 0.00 33s40 00O (dys fGOE RA d(doo) Ww.dcm 435E.0ý2 1.09E03 160-97 J PAO ClcultimInm alims T~r~w~xe F) utIT-00(a)

Aiw 1120-00 1(P 0-10 1 0.8100 28.D 26-0 2440O 0-0 Acddet Area T BI~rfi Name Drywell Accident Temperature OI.E Tempeature PrfileM GE F01 Accident Test Temperature

I Diyweti Accidet Toinperatus

O GEOlF0 Accldelt Test TemperlltweStart Time Time (Seconds)The test and specified profiles were evaluated using Arrhenius methodology with the inputs and results shown in the above computation.

This analysis demonstrates that the test profile envelops the specified profile with a greater than 10% margin.Page 56 of 96 L-MT-13-034 Enclosure 1 EQ File 98-050-P01, DG O'Brien Electrical Penetrations (50.49)IlllEh m miM. Ewrim , r, m Will DA& SAmWRAd* DW (Wall, DUA LOCA) Accident Pressure ,0 D.G Oinen E.R-2WU AcidenM Test PresSure 110 F--100 + -30 20 -10 0 Time (Seconds)Page 57 of 96

v t e Letter Sequence Response to RAI
TAC:MD9990, Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request Acceptance, Acceptance Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement Administration Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance, Withholding Request Acceptance Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting, Meeting Questions 16 December 2008 11 February 2009 11 March 2009 12 March 2009 18 March 2009 18 March 2009 19 March 2009 20 March 2009 23 March 2009 29 March 2009 28 March 2009 28 March 2009 6 April 2009 6 April 2009 29 April 2009 26 June 2009 2 July 2009 2 July 2009 14 July 2009 14 July 2009 5 November 2009 16 March 2011 12 September 2011 4 October 2012 8 November 2012 28 March 2013 17 May 2013 9 July 2013 26 November 2013 18 December 2008 18 December 2008 19 March 2009 25 October 2009 15 February 2013 12 March 2013 10 May 2013 24 April 2013 Answers 25 January 2010 28 September 2010 13 January 2012 21 December 2012 7 March 2013 21 March 2013 10 April 2013 18 July 2013 18 July 2013 2 August 2013 18 May 2016 19 July 2012 31 January 2013 29 March 2013 10 April 2013 Results Approval, Approval, Approval, Approval, Approval, Approval Other: L-MT-08-091, Calculation 0801040.301, Steam Dryer Outer Hood Submodel Analysis., L-MT-09-002, Response to NRC Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Branch Requests for Additional Information (Rais) Dated December 5, 2008, L-MT-09-003, Response to NRC Environmental Branch Requests for Additional Information (Rais) Dated December 18, 2008, L-MT-09-004, Enclosure 1 (Continued) to L-MT-09-004, NSPM Response to Containment & Ventilation Branch RAI Number 2, Copy of MNGP Appr T0406 Data Transmittal Pages 1 of 538 Through Pages 538 of 538, L-MT-09-026, Calculation 0000-0081-6958 MNGP-PRNMS-APRM Calc-2008-NP, Rev. 1, Average Power Range Monitor Selected Prnm Licensing Setpoints - EPU Operation (Numac), L-MT-09-027, Extended Power Uprate: Response to Instrumentation and Controls Branch RAI No. 3 Dated April 6, 2009, L-MT-09-044, Extended Power Uprate: Response to NRC Mechanical and Civil Engineering Review Branch (Emcb) Requests for Additional Information (Rais) Dated March 28, 2009, L-MT-09-049, Drawing C.5-2007, Revision 15, Failure to Scram, L-MT-09-073, Extended Power Uprate: Response to NRC Containment and Ventilation Review Branch (Scvb) Requests for Additional Information (Rais) Dated July 2, 2009 and July 14, 2009, L-MT-09-083, Extended Power Uprate: Limit Curves Requested by the Mechanical and Civil Review Branch (Emcb) Associated with Requests for Additional Information (Rais) Dated March 20, 2009, L-MT-09-088, Extended Power Uprate: Revision to Clarify Text in Enclosures 5 and 7 of L-MT-08-052, L-MT-09-097, Extended Power Uprate: Acknowledgement of NRC Review Delay, L-MT-10-025, Extended Power Uprate (Epu): Response to NRC-NSPM February 25, 2010 Conference Call, L-MT-10-072, Extended Power Uprate: Updates to Docketed Information, L-MT-11-044, Uprate (Epu): Update on EPU Commitments, L-MT-12-056, WCAP-17549-NP, Rev. 0, Monticello Replacement Steam Dryer Structural Evaluation for High-Cycle Acoustic Loads Using ACE, L-MT-12-090, Westinghouse, LTR-A&SA-12-8, Rev. 1, Attachment B, Recommendations for Inspections of the Monticello Replacement Steam Dryer., L-MT-12-114, Drawing C.5-2007, Rev. 17, Failure to Scram, L-MT-13-020, Enclosure 1 - Responses to the Gap Analysis, L-MT-13-029, Enclosure 14 to L-MT-13-029 - WCAP-17716-NP, Revision 0, Benchmarking of the Acoustic Circuit Enhanced Revision 2.0 for the Monticello Steam Dryer Replacement Project., L-MT-13-091, WCAP-17716-NP, Revision 1 - Benchmarking of the Acoustic Circuit Enhanced Revision 2.0 for the Monticello Steam Dryer Replacement Project, Enclosure 14, L-MT-13-092, Extended Power Uprate (Epu): Completion of EPU Commitments, Proposed License Conditions and Revised Power Ascension Test Plan, L-MT-13-096, GE-MNGP-AEP-3304R1, Enclosure 4, NEDC-33435 Corrected Pages, L-MT-13-126, Enclosure 3, GE-MNGP-AEP-3306, Enclosure 2 GEH Response to Mella+ Eicb RAI and Affidavit, L-MT-14-023, Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis Plus: Technical Specification Clarifications, L-MT-15-074, Enclosure 7, WCAP-18604-NP, Revision 0, Monticello EPU Main Steam Line Strain Data Evaluation Report., L-MT-16-017, Revised Commitment to Reconcile Analysis of Bypass Voiding for Transition to Areva Analysis Methodology, L-MT-16-071, Submittal of 2016 Annual Report of Changes in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.46, ML083230111, ML083400402, ML083500575, ML083570610, ML083590127, ML090710680, ML090710683, ML090710684, ML091120578, ML091140470, ML091410121, ML091410122, ML091410123, ML091410124, ML091760769, ML092290250, ML092810554, ML093160816, ML093220925, ML093220964, ML093620024, ML100280558... further results
MONTHYEAR2009-02-24 [Table View]

ML13105A188

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