IR 05000445/1988014

Insp Repts 50-445/88-14 & 50-446/88-12 on 880203-0301.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Applicant Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Followup on Events at Other Similar Facilities & Plant Tours

ML20148D395
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	03/18/1988
From:	Bitter S, Burris S, Joel Wiebe NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
To:
Shared Package
ML20148D360	List: IR 05000445/1988014 ML20148D356
References
TASK-1.C.1, TASK-2.B.2, TASK-TM 50-445-88-14, 50-446-88-12, NUDOCS 8803240030
Download: ML20148D395 (7)

Text

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS NRC Inspection Report: 50-445/88-14 Permits: CPPR-126 50-446/88-12' -CPPR-127 Dockets: 50-445 Category: A2-50-446 Construction Permit Expiration Dates: Unit 1: August 1, 1988 Unit 2: Extension request submitted Applicant: TU Electric Skyway Tower , 400 North Olive Street Lock Box 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Unit 1 and 2 Inspection At: Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas Inspection Conducted:. February 3 through March 1, 1988 Inspector: [[/4/dAsud 8//f/// S.

P.

Burris, Resident Inspector, ' Da't e Preoperational Testing l l f f Y dsnL5A h e9//fM Inspector: S.

D. Bitter, Resident Inspector, Date Operations Y $$$l gam.5 3 h - Sf/? ?? Reviewed by: l J.

S.

Wiebe, Lead Project Inspector ' Dafe ! 8803240030 880318 l PDR ADOCK 05000445 Q DCD

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. Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted: February 3 through March 1, 1988 (Report 50-445/88-14; 50-446/88-12) Areas Inspected: Unannounced resident safety inspection of appli-cant's actions on previous inspection findings, follow-up on events at other similar facilities, preoperational testing program, plant.

tours, and safety issue management system (SIMS) items (I.C.1-open, II.B.2-open).

Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations.

were identified.

No significant conclusions were made on the adequacy, strength,-or weakness in the applicant's program.

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- DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

• R.

P. Baker, Engineering Assurance (EA) Regulatory Compliance Manager, TU Electric

• J.

L. Barker, Manager, EA, TU Electric

• J.

W.

Beck, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering, TU Electric

• W.

H. Benkert, Staff Assistant Manager, Operations Quality Assurance (QA), TU Electric

• R.

D.

Best, Nuclear Operations Inspection Report Item Coordinator, TU Electric

• D.

N. Bize, Regulatory Compliance, TU Electric

• M.

R. Blevins, Manager, Technical Support, TU Electric

• R.

C. Byrd, Quality Engineering (QE) Supervisor, TU Electric

• W.

G. Counsil, Executive Vice President, TU Electric

• R.

D. Delano, Licensing Engineer, TU Electric

• D.

E. Deviney, Manager, Operations QA, TU Electric

• M.

D. Gaden, CPRT, IT Corporation

• T.

L.

Heatherly, EA Regulatory Compliance Engineer, TU Electric

• A.

Hodge, CPRT Interface, TU Electric

• C.

R. Hooten, CPE-Civil Engineering Unit Manager, TU Electric

• J.

J. Kelley, Manager, Plant Operations, TU Electric

• O.

Lowe, Director of Engineering, TU Electric

• D.

M. McAfee, Manager, QA, TU Electric

• C.

Moehlman, CPE-Mechanical Engineering, TU Electric

• D.

Moore, Administrative Assistant, Operations, TU Electric

• L.

D. Nace, Vice President, Engineering & Construction, TU Electric

• D.

E. Noss, QA Issue Interface Coordinator, TU Electric

• M.

J.

Riggs, Plant Evaluation Manager, Operations, TU Electric

• S.

F. Sawa, Assistant Project Manager, Unit 2, TU Electric

• A.

B. Scott, Vice President, Nuclear Operations, TU Electric !

• C.

E.

Scott, Manager, Startup, TU Electric

• J.

C.

Smith, Plant Operations Staff, TU Electric

• M.

R. Steelman, CPRT, TU Electric

• P.

B.

Stevens, Manager, Electrical Engineering, TU Electric

• J.

F.

Streeter, Director, QA, TU Electric l

• T.

G. Tyler, Director, Projects, TU Electric i

• R.

D. Woodlan, Supervisor, Docket Licensing, TU Electric l The NRC inspectors also interviewed other applicant employees during this inspection period.

• Denotes personnel present at the March 1, 1988, exit interview.

2.

Applicant Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (Closed) Open Item (445/8718-0-01): Untagged conductors in Termination Cabinet 42.

Procedure STA 602 (referred to in NRC I Inspection Report 50-445/87-18 as STA 402) requires only that l l t l

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the Work-In-Progress (WIP) tag be attached in the immediate vicinity of the work.

However, in this particular case, Step 9 of Attachment 1 to Work Order (WO) C86-3951 requires more explicitly that the WIP tag be attached to the door of the cabinet (TC42).

Examination of the WO indicated that Step 9 had indeed been performed; apparently, the tag had fallen from the cabinet.

The NRC inspector has verified that the tag has been restored to the front of the cabinet.

3.

Applicant's Actions on Previous Violations (92702) (open) Violation (445/87-13-V-01): Flange not properly torqued.

This violation dealt with the applicanc's failure to correctly implement vendor required torque values for a flange cover on the positive displacement charging pump (TBX-CSAPPD01).

The violation identified a weakness of the applicant's administrative procedure for startup work permits, specifically SWP-Z2214, to incorporate the requirements for torquing a cover flange after disassembly.

The applicant subsequently identified this concern in accordance with their Nonconformance Report (NCR) procedure.

Review of these NCRs by the inspectors found that the NCRs addressed the procedural inadequacies.

The retorque requirement could not be verified at this time.

The inspector verified that administrative procedure CP-SAP 6, "Control of Work on Station Components after Release from Construction to Startup," Section 4.2.4 had been revised to include an additional review by the applicable group leader, who is certified in accordance with administra-tive Procedure CP-SAP-19, "Indoctrination / Training /Qualifi-cation Requirements for Startup Personnel."

The inspectors informed the applicant that since the NRC could not verify that the actual retorque requirements had been performed, this item would remain open.

The inspectors will continue to review this item in future inspection periods.

4.

Follow-up on Events at Other Similar Facilities (92701) During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed the applicant's actions to resolve an identified problem which occurred at a similar facility.

The event occurred at the Shearon Harris facility on January 22, 1988, and involved the steam dump control system (SDCS).

The Harris facility experi-enced a problem with the control of their steam dumps during power operations while trying to change the mode of control from the "Tave mode control" to the "pressure mode control."

SDCS cabinet work was a vendor supplied item which was to be l verified correct by the applicant.

However, during the as-built condition verification, the applicant failed to identify that a wiring problem existed for the K 703 valve l relay circuit.

An additional wire had been installed on it j which acted as a sneak circuit between the "Tave mode

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controller" and the "pressure mode controller."

This jumpered circuit left the "Tave mode controller" in the circuit when the "pressure mode controller" had been selected giving erratic control and behavior problems with the SDCS.

CPSES startup personnel were alerted to this problem by their onsite vendor representative on the 29th of January, 1988.

On this date, the startup I&C group initiated review processes to ensure that a similar problem did not exist at the Comanche Peak site because their site has a similar SDCS.

The appli-cant implemented Procedure XCP-EE20, "Continuity and Termina-tion Verification Procedure," which was the controlling document to verify that the as-built wiring was correct compared to the wiring design.

CPSES startup personnel obtained the controlled wiring list and performed a hands-on verification of the installed wiring circuits for all circuits identified as being involved with this problem.

This review verified that the problems experienced at the Harris site do not exist at the Comanche Peak facility.

The inspectors consider this item closed.

5.

Preoperational Testing Program (70301) The inspectors reviewed applicant FSAR Amendment 65, submitted on November 20, 1987.

During the review, the inspector questioned t)~ reason for changes made concerning commitments to the test methodology for Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.68, "Preoperational and Initisl Startup Test Program for Water Cooled Power Reactors."

RG 1.68, Appendix C, subpara-graph 4.h, as written, specifies that during the Low Power and Power Ascension Test phase, the applicant will "review the completed testing program at each plateau, perform preliminary evaluations, including extrapolation of minimum DNBR and maximum linear heat rate values to the high-flux trip setpoint for the next power level, and obtain the required management approvals before ascending to the next power level or test condition."

In amendment 65, the applicant stipulated that they would verify this commitment by obtaining flux maps at each power plateau and then determine the heat flux hot channel factor (Fxy) and nuclear enthalpy rise hot channel factor (F N delta H).

These values would then be compared and evaluated against the applicable Technical Specification limits for the specific power plateau and next power plateau.

After discussions with the Reactor Physics group, the inspec-tor requested that the applicant provide additic :al informa-tion which the applicant used as basis for this change; i.e., why the commitment in RG 1.68 could not be met as originally written.

This is considered an open item (50-445/88-14-0-01).

6.

Plant Tours (71302) Frequent tours of the applicant's facility were conducted by the inspectors during this inspection period.

Deep back shift

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tours (tours of at least two hours in length, conducted on week days between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m., or conducted on holidays, saturdays, or sundays at any hour) were conducted on four occasions.

Regular back shift tours (tours of at least two hours in length, conducted at other than normal day shift hours) were conducted on six occasions.

These tours were conducted to verify that both routine and nonroutine applicant activities were performed in accordance with the appropriate administrative controls.

The tours included review of the following activities: General housekeeping activities and general cleanliness . of the overall facility to verify maintenance of the correct cleanliness levels.

Fire prevention activities to verify that hazardous . material is being maintained and stored in approved containers and locations.

Activities in areas requiring special cleaning require- . ments to verify implementation of these special require-ments.

In-process work to verify it was being conducted in . accordance with the appropriate work control procedures and the individuals involved were qualified to perform these evolutions.

Control room tours included interviews with operators, review of control room logs, review of current equipment status, review of out of service equipment, review of out of specifi-cation conditions, and control board walkdown.

During one of the deep back shift tours, the inspectors noted that the applicant was installing a chain barrier to control access to and from the control room area.

Control room equipment status and decorum is adequate considering the time to scheduled fuel load.

The inspectors attended several shift turnovers to determine the adequacy and depth of these turnovers by the off going shift to the on coming watch stancers.

Overall, the turnover appeared to be adequate with respect to the quality and content of the information contained in these turnovers.

Tours of equipment spaces were conducted to ascertain the current status of the work progress, equipment completion status, and to identify any abnormal conditions adverse to quality and safety.

No significant findings were identified during these tours.

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. 7.

Safety Issue Management System (SIMS) Items (25565) a.

(Open) 2.C.1 Short Term Accident / Procedure Review The applicant has submitted the plant functional task analysis, the procedure generation package, and the emergency operating procedures to the NRC.

This item is being left open pending approval by NRR and verification of program / procedure implementation.

b.

(Open) II.B.2 Plant Shielding The applicant has submitted the results of its radiation and shielding design review to the NRC.

The NRC staff has concluded in SSER No. 12 that the applicant's des.<gn provides for adequate access to vital areas based in part upon the applicant's commitment to incorporate additional shielding and/or remote operation capability.

This item is being left open pending verification that the appli-cant has met this commitment.

8.

Open Items open items are matters which have been discussed with the applicant, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or applicant or both.

One open item disclosed during the inspec-tion is discussed in paragraph 4.

9.

Exit Interview (30703) ! On February 29, 1988, R.

F. Warnick, H.

H. Livermore, and J.

S. Wiebe met with L.

D.

Nace and A.

B.

Scott to discuss February inspection findings and other matters of interest.

An exit meeting was conducted on March 1, 1988, with the applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this report.

No written material was provided to the applicant by the inspectors during this reporting period.

The applicant did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the resident inspectors during this inspec-tion.

During this meeting, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection. }}