IR 05000250/1987006

Insp Repts 50-250/87-06 & 50-251/87-06 on 870112-0209. Violations Noted:Failure to Correct Conditions Adverse to Quality & Failure to Establish & Implement Adequate Procedures

ML20207T749
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	03/05/1987
From:	Brewer D, Macdonald J, Vandyne K, Wilson B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207T684	List: IR 05000250/1987006 ML20207T683 ML20207T714
References
50-250-87-06, 50-250-87-6, 50-251-87-06, 50-251-87-6, NUDOCS 8703240300
Download: ML20207T749 (15)

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n ee! UNITEO STATES '

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NUCLE AM REGULATORY COMMIS$10N f y o MEGION il g, ,j 10l MAMIEf f A STREET, [

t ATL ANTA,0EoMGI A 30323

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j Report Nos.: 50-250/87-06 and 50-251/87-06

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Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company i

9250 West flagler Street

< Miami, FL 33102 l

j Docket Nos.: 50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.: DPR-31 and OPR-41 !

j Facility Name: Turkey Point 3 and 4 *

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Inspection Conducted: January 12 - February 9, 1987

! Inspectors: b' .

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! . R. lirewer, Senior s dont inspector One Signed '

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D K. W. Van Dy e, Resident Ins _ ctor

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. B. Macdonald, Resident liispect6r

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Date Signed Approved by: luu d . Ow f!T5 7 Date' Signed t

Bruct' Wilson.~Section Chief  !

Division of Reactor Projects a

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SUMMARY

i Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed direct inspection at the ;

i site, including backshift inspection, in the areas of annual and monthly ,

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surveillance, maintenance observations and reviews, operational safety, and plant event ,

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j Results: Violations - Failure to meet the requirements of Technical Specifica-

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tion (TS) 6.8.1 (paragr&oh 6), and failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR :

j 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (paragraph 7).  !

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REPORT DETAILS l Persons Contacted

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Licensee Employees

• C. M. Wethy, Vice President - Turkey Point

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• C. J. Baker, Plant Manager-Nuclear - Turkey Point l F. H. Southworth, Maintenance Superintendent - Nuclear

*D.A.Chaney,SiteEngineeringManager(SEM)

l D. D. Grandage Operations Superintendent and Acting Plant Manager

• T. A. Finn, Operations Supervisor

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J. Webb, Operations - Maintenance Coordinator  ;

l *J. W. Kappes, Performance Enhancement Coordinator l *R. A. Longtemps, Mcchanical Maintenance Department Supervisor l 0. Tomasewski, Instrument and Control (IC) Department Supervisor '

J. C. Strono, Electrical Department Supervisor  ;

• W.Bladow,QualityAssurance(QA) Superintendent

• R. E. Lee. Quality Control Inspector M.J.Crisler,QualityControl(QC) Supervisor

• J. A. Labarraque, Technical Department Supervisor

! R. G. Mende, Reactor Engineering Supervisor l *J. Arias, Regulation and Compliance Supervisor

• R. Hart, Regulation and Compliance Engineer

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W. C. Miller, Training Supervisor P. W. Hughes. Health Physics Supervisor G. Solomon, Regulation and Compliance Engineer

• J. Danis, Engineering Department Supervisor J. J. Zudans, Nuclear Engineering, Human Factors Performance

• R. L. Wade, Engineering Ocpartment

• W. J. Pike. Safety Engineering Group Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included construction craf tsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, and electrician * Attended exit interview nn February 11, 1987, Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were suninarized during management

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interviews held thrnughout the resorting period with the Plant Manager-l Nuclear and selected members of h<s staff. An exit meeting was conducted I on February 11, 1987. The areas requiring management attention were reviewed. The licensee acknowledged the findings without exception, r l The licensee did not identify as prnprietary any of the materials provided tn or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

! Two violations were identified:

Failure to meet the requirements of TS 6.8.1, in thatt the in-plant equipment clearance order procedure was not properly implemented (paragraph 6) (250,251/07 06 01).

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Failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, in that the licensee did not take prompt and adequate corrective action to evaluate the safety significance of operating an intake cooling water check valve in a degraded condition (paragraph 7)

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(251/87-0602).

OneUnresolveditem(URI)wasidentified:

NRC review of the licensee's evaluation of the operability of the as-found condition of the Unit 3 and 4 Intake Coolin Water (TCW)

check valves replaced in January 1987 (Paragraph 7)g (URI 250,-

251/87-06-03).

< In-Office Review of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events (90712)

The following Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed and closed baseri on an in-office revie The inspectors verified that reportino require-ments had been met, root cause analysis was performed, corrective actions appeared appropriate, and generic applicability had been considered. In addition, each LER was reviewed for and determined not to require further onsite inspector followu /A6-011, TS Surveillance-Fire Protection Equipment 250/86-013 TSSurveillance-pps(ReactorProtectionSystem]

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250/86-018, ICW fintake Cooling Waterl System

?50/86-019, TS Safety In.icction System 750/86-020 TS Surveillance Motor Driven Fire Pump 250/86-021, RpS Actuation-Reactor Trip 750/86-022 EDG [Emerqency Diesel Generator) -Closed Air Supply Valves 250/86-024, TS ICW pump Unresolveditems(URI)

An URI is a matter at'out which more information is requirect to determine whether it is acceptable or mav involve a violation or deviation. One URI ,

isaddressedinparagraph7(URI250,251/87-0603).

, MonthlySurveillanceObservation(61726)

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The inspectors observed TS required surveillance testino and verificti:

! that the test procedure conformed to the requirements of the TS, that '

testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conttitions for operation (LCO) were met, that test results not acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, that deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and were properly reviewed and resolved by manaqrment personnel and that system restoration l was adequat For completed tests, the inspectors verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individual I l

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The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activi- !

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tiest 3-0SP-041.1, Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Calculation 3-OSP-068.2, Containment Spray Pump Inservice Test Unit 3 4 OSp-06 Containment Spray Pump Intervice Test Unit 4 4-OSP 019.2, Intake Cooling Water System Flowpath Verification OP 0206.4, Periodic Visual Leak Inspection of Systems Outside Containment for Control of Radioactive Material f.eakage No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte . PaintenanceObservations(62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components were observed and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory cuides, industry codes and standards and in conformance with T ,

The following items were considered during this review, as appropriatet that LCOs were met while comocnents or Systems were recoved from services that approvals were obtained prior to initiating works that activities ;

were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as appli- i'

cablet that srocettures used were adequate to control the activityt that troubleshooting activities were controlled and repair records accurately reflected the maintenance performedt that funct'onal testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to services that QC records were maintainedt that activities were accomp-lie.hed by qualified personnelt that parts and materials used were properly certifiedt that radioloqtcal controls were properly implementedt that QC hold points were estah11thed and observed where requiredt that fire prevention controls were implementedt that outside contractor force activittee, were controlled in accordance with the approved QA programt and '

that housekeeping was actively pursue ~

The following maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed Replacement of Unit 3 and tinit 4 Intake Cooling Water Check Valves

Unit 40 Intake Cooling Water Pump replacement Unit 3A? Circulating Water Pump replacement troubleshooting and Repair of Steam Dump Valve CV 2027 l

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a. Between the dates of December 3,1986, and February 5,1987, the licensee failed to follow the instruction of Administrative Procedure (AP) 0103.4, in-Plant Foutpment Clearance Orders, during maintenance l activities requiring the removal of a section of lubricating water l system piping. The effected piping contained valve 3-103, a c1 car-ance boundary valve, which was danger tagged closed under Clearance '

Order 3-86-4-114 to isolate system water pressure. In order to oroperly facilitate the removal of valve 3-103, maintenance personnel ,

lad to close the first valve (3-030) upstream of the af fected piping !

to establish a new clnarance boundar Maintenance per'.cnnel failed to follow the instructions of Ap 010 regarding proper request for clearance order processing prior to isolating the system at the 3-030 valvo. Although the 3-030 valve was closed, a clearance order tag was not processed for the valv The potential existed for an individual to open the valve, allowino lubricating water to discharge freely to the intale structure are l Further, maintenance personnel failed to follow AP 0103.4 Sec. 8.8, to properly release the clearance order on valve 3103 prior to physically removing the valve and attached piping from the syste TS 6.8.1 requires that written procedures and administrative policies shall be established, implemented and maintained that ment or exceed the requirement *, of section 5.1 and 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1972 and Appendix A of USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.33. Section 5.1.2 of ANSI N18.7-1972 *pecifies that procedures shall be followe It is essential that rigorous control be maintained over all clear- ,

ance order danger tags within tha plant. Altering the configuration i of a system under clearance without adhering to the requirements of l Ap 0103.4 is a violation (250,751/87-06 01),

b. On Mnuary 17,1987. Unit 3 trippert on low pressuriter pressure from 25% power. The trip occurred during a load reduction that was being performed due to a turbino plant cooling water leak in the main

! generator nciter. During the load reduction T average increased I causing a $/0 safety valve to lif Condenser steam dump valves i l FCV 3 2827 and ?8?8 armed, but FCV 3-?8?7 failed to open. FCV-3 ?8?8 nponed and operateri properl The failure of valvo FCV 3-3827 to open contributed to a large T averanc / T referrree deviation and the Reactor Control Operator (PCO) initiated emergency boration as a corrnctive action. The emergercy boration decreasert T Ave and reactor coolant pressure until a reactor trip was actuated on low pressurfrer pressura. Tho reactor trip was caused by the reactor i control operator over borating the primary system. The over horation caused a larger power reduction and temperature decrease than desired. The reactor plant was subsequently stabilized at Hot Standby (Mode 3). ,

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All equipment operated properly following the trip except for I condenser steam dump valve FCV-3-282 Upon investigation of i FCV-3-2827 it was discovered that instrument air had been isolated to the valve operator. Specifically, two small, unlabeled instrument air valves were found shut. One supplied air to the current to pneumatic (1/P) converter, while the other supplied air to a trip solenold. Prior to this event, on August 21, 1986, Plant Work Order (PWO) 63-6919 was initiated to document that the main steam dump to condenser control valve (FCV 3 2827) did not open at the proper sequenc The PWO also noted that operations personnel had isolated instrument air to the valve to prevent inadvertent openin This PWO had not been worked prior to the reactor trip on January 12, 1987. During the months between August 1986 and January 1987, the operations staff failed to log valve FCV-3-2827 out of service in the Equipment Out of Service (E005) Log when the control air was isolated. Consequnntly, the operations staff did not remember that the valves control air was isolated and believed that the valve failed to operate properly on January 12, 1987 The licensee's procedures do not require that broken nonsafet)

related equipment be logged in the Equipment Out of Service (E005)

log. However, nonsafety related equipment can be added to the log at the discretion of the operations staff. Had the status of FCV-3 2827 been reflected in the E005 log, the staff would have had ample opportunity, during required periodic log reviews, to recall that the valve was out of service. Similarly, had the licensee placed clearance tags on the air valves, routine clearance log reviews would have reminded the staff of the valves' statu . OperationalSafetyVerification(71707)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, observed shif t turn-overs and confirmed operability of instrumentation. The insacetors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, verif'ed that maintenance work orders had been submitted as required and that followup and prioritization of work was accomplished. The inspectors reviewed tagout records, verified compliance with TS LCOs and verified the return to service of affected component By observation and direct interviews, verification was made that the physical security plan was being implemente Plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and implementation of radio-logical controls were observe Tours of the intake structure and diesel, auxiliary, control and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions including potential fire horards, fluid leaks and excessivo vibrations.

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The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety !

related systems to verify operability and proper valve / switch alignmentt l

Emergency Diesel f.enerators .

Auxiliary Feedwater Control Room Vertical Panels and Safeguards Racks l Unit 3 and Unit 4 Component Cooling Water Systems

< Unit 3 and Unit 4 Intake Cooling Water Systems J

Unit 3andUnit4S/G(SteamGenerator)feedwaterFlowPlatforms

i Unit 4 Spent Fuel Fool (SFP) Butiding Lighting Concerns On January 27, 1987, the inspectors observed that all the Unit 4 ,

! spent fuel pool (SFP) butiding area lights _were burned out. This l

constituted a )oor lighting conditions which prevented a monitoring

> camera, instal"ed by the International Atomic Energy Aoency (IAEA),

from operating properly due to film underexposure. Add'tionally, the t

poor lightint conditions adversely impacted personnel safety and .

could have h9ndered the licensee's response to an off-nomal SFP l

condition had one occurred. This matter was imediately discussed

with the licensee. The failed light bulbs were imediately replaced i i and this action restored adequate lighting condition I

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] On four previous occasions in 1986 lighting was temporarily inter- .

i rupted in the SFP building, in August 1986 the NRC and the IAEA !

raised concerns over the frequency of these occurrences. The !

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! licensee was aware of the need to minimize losses of illuminatio ,

On January 8, 1987, the IAEA had conducted a routine inspection of i

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the surveillance camera and the SFP area. 111umination was adequate !

for effectivo camera operation. Apparently, between January 8 and !

1 27, successive bulbs burned out one by one. This condition was not

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detected by the licensee untti a complete failure of all lights had i i occurre l

The liransco has taken the following reasures to prevent recurrence of the lighting problem I 1) Once cach day, the Nuclear Operator will observe the SFP lights

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to verify that no more than 2 are out. Satisfactory completion t of this inspection will be noted in the Nuclear Operator's Log

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(KtN0LOGt3). This log receives supervisory review.

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2) The Plant Supervisor Nuclear (PSN) will be notified imediately

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by the Nuclear Operator if more than 2 lights are out. He shall ;

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! the lights to an operable condition as soon as possibl l i 3) The 100 watt bulbs are being replaced with 200 watt long life i bulbs, providing increased illumination and longer bulb endur-

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4) A training brief will be issued to emphasize the importance of :

the SFP lighting, b. Intake Cooling Water Check Valve Concerns i

On January 14, 1987, theinspectorsobservedaPlantWorkOrder(PWO)

deficiency tag on Intake Cooling Water (ICW) check valve 4-311, the l 4A ICW pump discharge check valve. The deficiency description, which '

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was dated October 29, 1986, stated that the " disk may be partially separated from the shaf t." The status of the repair effort was reviewed to verify that appropriate corrective action was being implemente Discussions with members of the maintenance department revealed that approximately 10 weeks had elapsed since PWO 2188 was written. The corrective action request described the problem as " cylinder shaf ts

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do not fully extend while pump is running." The corrective repairs !

were scheduled for the next outage of sufficient duration at which

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time the valve was to be removed from the system, rebuilt and rein- '

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i The design of the check valve was reviewed with the ICW system engineer. The check valve disk is designed to be firmly attached to

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the valve shaft. The shaft extends through the valve body. The ends of the shaft are attached to air cylinders which assist in closing the check valve when its associated ICW pump is turned off. By closing the valve before a backflew condition develops, check valve

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slam is reduced. There is a check valve installed at the discharge j of each Unit 3 and Unit 4 ICW pump. There are three ICW pumps for i cach Uni The licensen's technical department staff believed that the valve disk had become loosened on the valve shaf t. This conclusion was

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based on observations of the valve shaft and air piston assemblies ,

4 during the performance of weekly ICW pump Shifts. When the 4A ICW pump was Started the shaft would not move and consequently the

, attached air pistons would not move. However, the pump developed the i appropriate 20 pst discharga pressure. Apparently the check valve disk was opening to allow flow but the disk rotated without movement of the shaft. When thn pump was stopped the check valve could be heard to slam closed. The absence of reverse flow through the

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secured pump indicated that tho valve remained in the closed ,

positio This performance was observed each week between October 29, 1986, and January 14 1987 Prior to October 79, 1986,

thediskinsidecheckvalve431Iappea. red to be firmly attached to the shaft. Weekly pump starts performed between April 1986 and October P9,1986, resulted in movement of the shaf t and expansion of ,

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the attached air pistons as the disk opened. Similarly, the shaft-i rotated when the pump was stopped and this resulted in the air i

plStons applying a force to pull the valve close '

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Since the check valve disk was originally firmly attached to the l shaf t and this design condition no longer existed, and since the loosening of the disk prevented the air pittons from performing as

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cause of the fai'ure and the extent of the degradation, it was l determined that no formal evaluation had been performed to explain why the disk loosened from the shaft. Additionally, no assessment had been performed addressing the potential for the disk to continue to separate from the shaft and no determination had been made as to the existence of failed components inside the valv The licensee first observed the free rotation discrepancy in September 1985 on valve 3-311. No visual inspection of the valve was performe The valve was determined to be operable in engineering letter JPE-PTPM-85-1149, dated October 21, 1985, which described the symptom but did not identify a specific root caus The letter erroneously stated that the valves did not contain keys or keyway Therefore, the envisioned rotation methodology was simplistic and did not account for the key breakage, binding and shaft / disk damage which would exist if keys were present. The valve was repaired in late October 198 No NCR or safety evaluation was written until March 1986 and that evaluation did not mention the as-found condition l of the valve when it was repaired, in March 1986, during inspections associated with NRC inspection report 250,251/86-10 the inspectors identified numerous discrepancies in the ICW pump area (IFl 250,251/86-10-07). This resulted in l renewed licensee efforts to identify and correct all outstanding l concern A NCR and a safety evaluation (JPE-M-86-017) were written to address concerns associated with check valve 3-311. The safety

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evaluation Stated that the valve lacked keys and keyways. The licensee decided to purchase redesigned check valves that used a square key to preclude disk rotation about the shaft. Additionally, a weekly surveillance program was established and implemented to verify that each Unit 3 and 4 valve opened and closed in response to pump flo In August 1906, the surveillance program identified th6t valve 3-321 was rotating freely about its shaft. A concern existed, as expressed

! in PWO 2150, that the valve could bind. The valve was declared out l of service and repairs were performed during a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO. Signifi-

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cant degradation to the keys, keyways and shaft were noted. The shaft was replaced and square keys were installed. Safety evaluation JPE-M 86 017 should have been updated and reanalyzed to reflect the existence of the keys and keyways as well as the damage they could

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cause when they failed. This was not done. No written determination S 'l was made as to whether valve 3 321 was found in an operable condi-

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tion. It appears that the valve was initially found not to be

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acceptable for continued use, since the valve received extensive I

repairs prior to being returned to service. The weekly surveillance I program continue ___a

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In October 1986 the surveillance program identified that valve 4-311 was rotating freely about its shaf PWO 2188 was written and, contrary to PWO 2150 of August 1986, it did not mention a concern for binding. The Technical Department staff relied on safety evaluation JPE-M-86-017 to justify operability._ The Technical Department staff interpreted the evaluation to imply that all relative motion of the disk about the shaft was acceptable. However, the evaluation made no reference to any relative motion other than that which would result from the absence of key and keyways. The valve was not evaluated in light of the August failures associated with valve 3-321. No written assessment of any kind was generated other than letter JPE-PTP-86-1632 stating that the original safety evaluation applied to the Unit 4 as well as Unit 3. Since no NCR was issued, the Engineering Department was not aware that valve 4-311 had begun to display the same symptoms as valve 3-321 had previously displayed. The Engineer-ing Department was not aware that the Technical Department was using letter JPE-PTP-86-1632 to certify that valve 4-311 was suitable for continued service without additional evaluation. The consequence of operating the valve with loose and broken parts was not evaluate No visual inspection of the valve was performed, even though ample time existed in the form of a LC0 to both inspect and repair the valve as was done with valve 3-32 Between January 14 and 16, 1987, the Technical Department maintained that the valve had no keys or keyways to complicate the relative motion between the disk and the shaft. Additionally, the Technical Department staff maintained that, contrary to a statement contained in FPL letter JPE-PTPM-85-1149, the loosening of the disk due to bolt degradation could not be the cause of the relative motion. A written evaluation in support of that position had not been performed and neither had the staff pursued the issue with the vendor as to whether the valves should have had keys. The belief that the valves did not have keys originated during a telephone conversation with the vendor in October 1985. This call does not appear to have been followed up by a letter of confirmation nor did the issue of missing keys receive followup attention from the Quality Assurance Departmen On January 16, 1987, NRC Region II management requested that the licensee determine the root cause for the free rotation of the disk l

for valve 4-311. The licensee complied with this request. The plant staff maintained that the source of the rotation was unimportant because rotation has been determined to be acceptable (in safety

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evaluation JPE-M-86-017) without mention of various potential origi-nating mechanisms. The NRC staff maintained that safety evaluation JPE-M-86-017 may have been deficient in that it assumed that the sole initiating mechanism for rotation resulted from a minimal weakening of the friction grip between a keyless disk and the shaft. It did not address the possibility of bolt, key, keyway or shaft degradation or assess the potential for these complications to affect valve i operability.

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The licensee plans to evaluate the as-found condition of the Unit 3 and Unit 4 ICW check valves to determine whether their degraded condition could have posed an operability problem. Of particular concern is a determination as to whether the broken keys and distorted keyways indicated that the potential existed for check valve binding or contributed to shaft cracking. This evaluation is scheduled for completion by the end of April 198 An additional concern relates to safety evaluation assertion that the air closing cylinders are not required to maintain check valve operability. The air cylinders do not effectively mitigate check valve slam on valves with disks which rotate freely about their shafts. The recently identified broken bolts on valves 4-311 and 4-321 and the cracked shafts on valves 4-321 and 3-311 may invalidate this theor The issue of check valve operability is an unresolved item (URI 250,-

251/87-06-03) pending completion of the licensee's evaluation and NRC review of relevant finding CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, as implemented by Florida Power and Light Topical Quality Assurance Report FPLTQAR 1-76A, Revision 9, and TQR 16.0, Revision 5, entitled Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and correcte FPL Quality Assurance Manual, Quality Procedure 16.1, Revision 8, delineates requirements for assuring that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and correcte Contrary to the above, the licensee did not take prompt and adequate actions to identify and correct a deficient condition in that, after it was determined in August 1986 that broken keys, damaged keyways and a damaged shaft contributed to the degraded condition of Intake Cooling Water (ICW) check valve 3-321, necessitating both key and sheft replacement, insufficient action was taken to evaluate the safety significance of operating ICW check valve 4-311 while it exhibited symptoms of internal key and keyway damage. Consequently, between October 29, 1986, and January 16, 1987, when NRC Region II management questioned valve operability, no written analysis or empirical inspection was performed to determine the root cause of the observed deficiency, no action was taken to repair the deficiency and no determiration was initiated as to whether the discrepancy increased the potential for valve failur The failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

Criterion XVI is a violation (VIO 251/87-06-02). This violation applies only to Unit c. Additional ICW System Problems and Related LC0 Excess l

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On February 5, 1987, at 6:57 p.m., Unit 4 entered the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LC0 of TS as a3.4.5.b.2, result ofwhen the actuator the east 4C ICW pump piston(was rod)declared outfrom separating of service the (00S)

fork assembly shaft of the 4C ICW pump check valve. The 4C pump was secured and the 4B pump was placed in service. At 8:16 p.m., on February 5, with the 4C pump 00S, the 4B pump was declared 00S as a result of a failed pump shaft couplin This put Unit 4 into TS 3.0.1 (2 ICW pumps 00S). At 8:32 p.m., on February 5, the 4C pump tested satisfactorily and was declared operable, removing Unit 4 from TS 3.0.1. The original 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LC0 of TS 3.4.5.b.2 continue During the post maintenance IST testing of the 4B pump shaft replace-ment, the motor was discovered to be frozen or seized and was replaced. On February 6,1987, the repairs to the 4B pump motor exceeded the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LC0 and at 8:16 p.m., Unit 4 re-entered TS 3. and an Unusual Event was declared. On February 7,1987, Unit 4 entered Mode 2 at 1:56 a.m., and Mode 3 at 2:10 On February 7, 1987, at 5:35 p.m. , the 48 pump tested satisfactorily and was declared operable and the Unusual Event was terminate On February 8, 1987, at 7:55 a.m., Unit 4 returned to 100% powe In reviewing this event the inspectors determined that the licensee had exceeded the LC0 requirements of TS 3.4.5.b.2, by 79 minutes, and subsequently exceeded the requirements of TS 3.0.1, by 13 minute Due to licensee oversight, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LC0 of TS 3.4.5.b.2 was inadvertently restarted, rather than continued, at 8:16 p.m., on February 5, when the 4B pump was declared 00S. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LC0 of TS 3.4.5.b.2 was actually exceeded and TS 3.0.1 entered at 6:57 p.m., on February 6, since for the entire previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period a maximum of only two ICW pumps were available to the ICW system. Based on entering TS 3.0.1 at 6:57 p.m., on February 6, Unit 4 should have entered Mode 3 by 1:57 a.m., on February 7. Unit 4 actually entered Mode 3 at 2:10 a.m., on February The licensee was immediately made aware of this discrepancy and committed to addressing actions to preclude recurrence in the LER to follo . Engineered Safety Features Walkdown (71710)

, The inspectors verified operability of the Unit 3 and Unit 4 ICW Systems I by performing a complete walkdown of all accessible equipmen The i following criteria were used, as appropriate, during the walkdown:

! System lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuratio Equipment conditions were satisfactory and items that might degrade performance were identified and evaluated (hangers and supports were operable, housekeeping was adequate, etc.). Instrumentation was properly valved in and functioning and calibra-

tion dates were not exceeded.

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12 Valves were in proper position, breaker alignment was correct, power was available, and valves were locked /lockwired as required, Local and remote position indication was compared and remote instru-mentation was functiona Breakers and instrumentation cabinets were inspected to verify that they were free of damage and interferenc The inspectors noted the following Unit 3 concerns to licensee management: ICW pumps 3A and 3B discharge pressure gauges had longstanding PWO tag ICW pump 3A northeast anchor bolt was missing a temporary system alteration ta The inspectors noted the following Unit 4 concerns to licensee management: .ICW pumps 4A, 4B, and 4C discharge pressure gauges had longstanding PWO tags, ICW pump 4A motor upper bearing temperature wiring conduit was broke ICW pump 4A grout was slightly degraded due to crackin ICW pump 4B shaft bearing lubricating water system piping was leaking.

- ICW pump 4B power supply junction box for bearing temperature was missing 6 of 8 screw ICW pump 4B motor ground wire was not properly secure ICW pump 4B grout was slightly degraded due to crackin ICW pump 4C lubricating water piping supports were loos ICW pump 4C power supply junction box support was loose and could bump the motor bo ICW pump 4C motor ground wire was not properly secure Isolation of a portion of the lubricating water system for the ICW system was inadequate as discussed in paragraph . ICW pump bearing cooling water system pressure requirements could not be determine .

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13 Plant Events (93702)

The following plant events were reviewed to determine facility status and the need for further followup actio Plant parameters were evaluated during transient response. The significance of the event was evaluated along with the performance of the appropriate safety systems and the actions taken by the license The inspectors verified that required notifications were made to the NRC. Evaluations were performed relative to the need for additional NRC response to the event. Additionally, the following issues were examined, as appropriate: details regarding the cause of the event; event chronology; safety system performance; licensee compliance with approved procedures; radiological consequences, if any; and proposed corrective actions. The licensee plans to issue LERs on each event within 30 days following the date of occurrenc On January 12, 1987, Unit 3 tripped on low pressurizer pressure from 25%

power. The trip occurred during a load reduction that was being performed due to a turbine plant cooling water leak in the main generator excite This event is discussed further in paragraph On January 12, 1987, while Unit 4 was at 100% reactor power (Mode 1) the 48 Component Cooling Water (CCW) pump automatically started on low CCW system pressure. The 4A CCW pump which was operating during the event was subsequently declared out of service and an investigation to determine root cause commenced. The following action was taken: all three Unit 4 CCW pumps were performance tested; the CCW header low pressure sensing switch was tested; the 4A CCW pump breaker and the 4B start delay relay were inspected; and system performance was observed under low header pressure condition The CCW system functioned as designed with no apparent equipment faults. No indication of actual low CCW header pres-sure was found and the event was deemed spuriou On January 15, 1987, the emergency notification system (ENS) telephone was found to be inoperable during the execution of an emergency prepared-ness dril Normal commercial telephone communication was available and was used to make the required significant event notification. A repairman was dispatched and the ENS was subsequently returned to service.

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On January 19, 1987, while Unit 3 was in hot standby (Mode 3), partial i

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containment ventilation isolation and control room ventilation isolation occurre Process Radiation Monitor System (PRMS) Channel R-11 (contain-ment air particulate monitor) actuated as a result of maintenance personnel troubleshooting PRMS Channel R-2 The ESF actuation was verified to be spurious and R-11 was rese On January 22, 1987, strong winds, gusting to 60 mph, downed several poles and power lines blocking the main access route to the plant and knocking out power to certain plant auxiliary facilitie The nuclear units were unaffected by this even The alternate evacuation route was used to

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allow plant acces The operability of the emergency sirens via the 72 l

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hour back up batteries was verified, and security personnel instituted compensatory measures to evacuate the affected buildings in the event it became necessar The main access route and and power were restored the same evenin On January 27, 1987, while Unit 4 was in Mode 1 (100% reactor power)

partial containment ventilation isolation and control room ventilation isolation occurred. PRMS Channel R-12 (containment gaseous monitor)

actuated while performing a source check of PRMS Channel R-19 (steam i generator blowdown monitor). The ESF actuation was verified to be spurious and R-12 was rese On January 28, 1987, while Unit 4 was in Mode 1 (100% reactor power)

partial containment ventilation isolation and control room ventilation isolation occurred. PRMS Channels R-11 and R-12 actuated as a result of maintenance personnel troubleshooting PRMS Channel R-1 The ESF actua-tion was verified to be spurious and R-11 and R-12 were rese On January 28, 1987, with Unit 3 in Mode 3 performing a normal heatup, AFW automatically initiated while attempting to place the 3B steam generator feedwater pump (SGFP) in service. The 3A SGFP was previously secure The 3B SGFP failed to start and when the switch was returned to the auto position the logic for automatic start of AFW was completed and it initi-ate The AFW pumps were secured and the standby SGFPs were placed in service until trouble shooting and repair of the 3B SGFP were complete The contacts on the 3B SGFP switch were found to be dirty, they were cleaned, the pump was returned to service, the standby SGFPs were secured, and the heatup continue On January 28, 1987, the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tank was declared out of service. Fuel oil sample analysis revealed that water and sediment acceptance criteria had been exceeded and both units entered TS 3.0.1. Backup samples were taken and analysis revealed that water and sediment were within specificatio The fuel oil storage tank was declared back in service and both units were no longer in TS 3. The licensee's justification for acceptance of the backup sample was based primarily on the belief that the initial sample was not representative of actual storage tank conditions. This belief was supported by satisfactory sample results of the EDG day and skid tanks. In addition, the fuel oil storage tank sampling technique is currently under licensee review to provide more specific guidance on obtaining a fuel oil sample that is more representative of storage tank content .

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