IR 05000250/1986023

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Insp Repts 50-250/86-23 & 50-251/86-23 on 860401-04.Major Areas Inspected:Fitness for Duty & Employee Assistance Programs.Programs Do Not Meet Nuclear Industry Stds
ML20198A643
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/29/1986
From: Bush L, Mckee P, Rosano R, Tobin W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198A635 List:
References
FRN-54FR24468, RULE-PR-2, RULE-PR-26 50-250-86-23, 50-251-86-23, AC81-2-091, AC81-2-91, NUDOCS 8605210165
Preceding documents:
Download: ML20198A643 (12)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT AND REGION II Report No.: 50-250/86-23 and 50-251/86-23 Docket No.: 50-250 and 50-251 License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 Licensee:

Florida Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. C. O. Woody Group Vice President Nuclear Energy Department Post Office Box 14000 Juno Beach, Florida 33408

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Facility Name: Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station Inspection at:

Homestead and Miami, Florida Inspection conducted:

April 1-4, 1986

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Type of Inspection: Announced Special Inspection of Fitness for Duty Program

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Inspectors:

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YMNb"6 Qoren L. Bush, Jr4TTenior~ Security Specialist Date

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Division of Inspection Programs, IE

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-Y y t Richard P. Rosano, Security Specialist Date Division of Inspection Programs, IE O#

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r/sww kPgTlliamJ.Tobin,WFniorSecurityInspector Date Region II Approved by:

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'1/L4 /8(e Phillip F. FA:Kee, Chief Date Reactor Programs Branch, IE i

8605210165 860514 DR ADOCK 05000250 PDR-1-

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Inspection Summary Areas Inspected:

Included review of policies, procedures, and practices of the Fitness for Duty (FFD) Program and the Employee Assistance Program (EAP)

applicable to FPL employees and contractors; comparison of the FFD and EAP programs with those recomrrended in the EEI Guide; evaluation of program elements that go beyond the EEI Guide; and evaluation of FPL's ability to detect the presence of drugs onsite.

Significant inspection findings included:

1.

The written policy does not incorporate all of the important features described in the EEI Guide, i.e., many policies and practices are unwritten, offsite and off-duty situations are not covered, and alcohol abuse is not addressed. Written policy only covers

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onsite/on-duty drug involvement.

2.

Supervisory training and awareness appears adequate.

3.

Employee awareness of the fitness for duty program needs improvement.

4.

Chemical testing of body fluids is used for pre-employment and for,

cause; random or periodic testing are not conducted.

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There are no follow-up features in the Employee Assistance Program to determine if there should be restrictions on safety-related duties and to verify continued rehabilitation.

6.

There are no proactive measures that would provide evidence of onsite

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drug problems before they would be manifested in observable aberrant behavior, i.e., no random or periodic chemical tests of body fluids, no searches of the workplace, no mechanism for employees to discreetly express concerns, and investigations are only reactive.

7.

EAP program statistical data are very limited, and neither EAP nor FFD data have been analyzed.

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A.

Key Persons Contacted J. W. Dickey, Vice-President, Nuclear Operations

J. J. Baur, Vice-President, Personnel

C. M. Wethy, Site Vice-President, Turkey Point

C. J. Baker, Nuclear Plant Manager, Turkey Point

K. L. Caldwell, Manager of Corporate Security Services

R. E. Garrett, Security Supervisor, Turkey Point

R. E. Habegger, Nuclear Energy Personnel Coordinator

L. W. Murray, Personnel Coordinator

V. A. Howe, Personnel Coordinator

K. Wisniewski, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer

R. Conway, Manager, Corporate Contracts R. Bumgarner, IBEW Shop Steward R. J. Cartrette, Senior Site Representative, Stone and Webster R. Slover, Project Superintendent, Bechtel T. Peebles, NRC Resident Inspector

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Several other supervisory and non-supervisory personnel were interviewed.

B.

Exit Interviews The inspectors met with the licensee representatives, as indicated above, onsite on April 3,1986 and at Corporate HQ on April 4,1986 to summarize

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the inspection findings.

C.

Approach The inspection team compared the FPL Fitness for Duty Program to each of the Key Program Elements reconnended by the "fCI Guide to Effective Drug and Alcohol / Fitness for Duty Policy Development," revised August 1985

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(hereinafter referred to as the EEI Guide). The FPL program was also compared to miscellaneous features contained in the EEI Guide.

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addition, the team also examined the FPL program for elements that would supplement those recommended in the EEI Guide, particularly those that would be included in proactive measures to detect the presence of drugs onsite. The report is formatted to reflect this approach.

D.

Implementation of EEI Guide Following are the inspectors' findings with respect to the implementation of each of the Key Program Elements recommended by the EEI Guide.

1.

Written Policy FPL written policy does not include all of the important features described in the EEI Guide.

It does address onsite/on-duty drug involvement, but does not make clear definitive statements on alcohol abuse, offsite/off-duty situations, nor the special handling of

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Denotes those present at the exit interview at Corporate Headquarters.

  • Denotes those present at the onsite preliminary exit interview.

Denotes those present at both exit interviews.

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employees with safety-related duties in designated positions. This

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special handling would consist of determination if duty restrictions are appropriate, return to the position only when satisfactory professional assurances are received, and measures to verify continued rehabilitation.

FPL was reluctant to state, as recommended by the EEI Guide, that "whenever possible, the company will assist employees in overcoming drugs, alcohol, and other problems... ".

The inspectors noted that many policies and practices are unwritten.

For example, although the policy is silent on alcohol abuse, actions have been taken for employees whose abuse of alcohol affected job performance. Furthermore, FPL staff stated that as a matter of

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practice an employee charged with offsite use, possession, or sale of drugs would be suspended (when FPL learned of the charges), and if the employee were conv!cted, FPL would consider termination, as has been done in the past.

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2.

Top Management Support Based upon employee interviews and reviews of the disposition of reported cases (see Paragraph D.4, below) the inspectors concluded

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that management has been fair and impartial in enforcing FPL policy, and has tended to support rehabilitation and reassignment as a means

of retaining employees. Although management has supported the policy, it appears that their demonstrated support, particularly

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efforts to communicate the policy, could be improved (see next paragraph). The problem with demonstrated support is compounded by the fact that program managers are assigned at the Corporate level only, and no one onsite has clear responsibility for managing and communicating the program.

3.

Effective Policy Communication f

FPL reported that all-employees were provided an initial program l

briefing and booklet in late 1984, and that fitness for duty is occasionally discussed during monthly safety meetings which are open

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l to all cmployees. Occasional articles have appeared in the company newsletter.

New employees have received the same information as part

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of their orientation.

The inspectors interviewed several licensee employees and a few l

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contractors, and determined they were aware of the Fitness for Duty Program (FFD) and the Employee Assistance Program (EAP).

Employees are instructed to contact their supervisor for expressing concerns about a fellow worker or during the onset, of personal problems; however, they appeared to lack knowledge of possible alternatives if they were reluctant to contact their supervisor, as several of those interviewed stated they were (also see Paragraph F.5.d below).

Communication problems were also evidenced by the fact 'that many of the employees interviewed seemed to believe that the

$100 provided by FPL for initial consultation fees was all that would be provided for long-term treatment of alcohol or drug abuse, when in fact insurance would cover such expenses. Also, many of those interviewed-2-

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P seemed unaware of how the EAP program worked, and were not aware that their families could participate in the EAP or of the contribution the family could make through the EAP to the employee's health.

Due to limitations on time, findings concerning contractor employees are inconclusive.

FPL staff has recommended implementation of an information campaign for all employees, to include meetings and development of a booklet and information package.

4.

Behavioral Observation Training for Supervisors It appears that FPL has placed heavy reliance for success of the program on behavioral observation, particularly on the ability of supervisors to detect indications of degradation of job performance.

All personnel who have been in supervisory positions for 6 months or more have been trained. Some assigned for shorter periods have not

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yet been trained, as permitted by FPL policy. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this training, the inspectors were provided data

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which indicate that 13 cases have been reported by FPL supervisors at both Turkey Point (which includes one case at the fossil fuel units)

and St. Lucie since the inception of the FFD program in the fall of 1984.

The unsegregated data showed that 8 cases of aberrant behavior

(2 of which were caused by drug abuse) and 5 cases of alcohol abuse.

were reported. To supplement supervisory observation of behavior,

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FPL has trained reactor operators (SR0s and R0s), all members of the

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security organization, and the fossil plant supervisors in behavioral observation. Based upon a brief review of the documented training program, limited interviews, and the supervisory observations reported above, it appears that training in this area for FPL supervisors is adequate.

Based upon limited interviews, it appears

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that training for contractor supervisors is adequate.

5.

Policy Implementation Training for Supervisors Supervisors have been trained in FPL policies regarding FFD within 6 months of their appointment in accordance with FPL policy. Several supervisors appointed less than 6 months ago have not been trained as yet.

Based upon a brief review of the documented training program and limited interviews, it appears that training in the implementation of FPL's policies and procedures is adequate.

However, it should be emphasized that the written policies and procedures, upon which the training is based, are deficient ( see Paragraph D.1, above).

6.

Union Briefing

The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) bargaining unit representing FPL employees was informed of the policies, was consulted during the development of the Employees Assistance Program and provided input to the drug policy.

The bargaining unit appears to accept and support the program, even though the signed agreement between FPL and IBEW is silent on this point.

FPL staff stated that although the IBEW bargaining unit representing the construction crafts objects to the programs primarily as an invasion of privacy,

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I the IBEW International does not object primarily because fitness for duty is considered a disciplinary matter which is the prerogative of the employer.

7.

Contractor Notification Contractors are given the option of using the FPL fitness for duty program or implementing their own, provided it is acceptable to FPL.

A consortium of small contractors called Atlantic Group, and 4 other contractors have their own fitness for duty program.

Bechtel and Stone and Webster have adopted the FPL Fitness for Duty program and have their own EAP programs, although Bechtel's Employee Assistance Services program is not provided to their nonsalaried employees, such as trade craftsmen. Wackenhut has also adopted the FPL Fitness for Duty program, but has no EAP program. Therefore, Wackenhut employees and certain Bechtel employees are not provided the EAP element of the EEI Guide.

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Licensees have the option of " devitalizing" vital areas during cold shutdown or refuleing operations to reduce the access screening burden. This technique could also be used to eliminate the need for a fitness for duty program during these periods. The instructors

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noted that FPL requirements regarding fitness for duty of contractors (and FPL employees) would not change during these periods.

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8.

Law Enforcement Liaison Due to limitations on time, the inspectors did r.ot contact the local law enforcement authorities. Based on statements made by FPL staff in conjunction with information obtained by Region II inspectors

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during previous security inspections, it would appear that the liaison is governed by the Dade County Metro Police Department interest in drugs which is essentially limited to significant amounts.

9.

Chemical Testing of Body Fluids Chemical testing of body fluids has been used for preemployment

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screening since October 1983 and is used for cause; random or periodic chemical tests are not conducted. Therefore, most employees have not been chemically tested and have been de facto " grandfathered."

The FPL staff has recomended that urinalysis be conducted for investigations of accidents where operator error is suspected.

Samples are sent to the SmithKline Chemical Laboratories for analysis.

Documents provided the inspectors indicate that the examining physician is responsible for ensuring that valid samples are collected, that the samples are accurately labeled, and measures are taken to prevent contamination of the sample. These documents also indicate that SmithKline also provides a courier service to transport the specimens from the physician to the laboratory, that the chain of-4-

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custody is documented, that laboratory standards and procedures exist that minimize the possibility of error, that confirmation of all ositives is made by a different chemical process, and that another p(reference) laboratory confirms positive findings.

Due to limitations on time, the inspectors did not verify through observation and interview that the above are properly executed.

Also, the inspectors did not determine how promptly tests for cause had been conducted after the condition had been noted.

10.

Employee Assistance Programs The EAP is intended to provide all employees and their families with confidential professional assistance in resolving personal problems.

The program is not well publicized; the employees interviewed, although aware of the existence of the program, seemed unaware of how

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the program works, how they and their families could participate, and how they would benefit (see Paragraph D.3, above).

Based upon the inspectors' understanding of the FFD and EAP program records (see Paragraphs D.4, above, and E.1, below), it appears that since the fall of 1984 only one employee has self-enrolled in the EAP program - just before being confronted by his supervisor. Therefore, early intervention through self or family referral, a key

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characteristic of EAP programs, appears deficient, and may be due to lack of employee and family awareness of the EAP program.

Because of how the EAP program is organized and administered, including its confidentiality, FPL has no knowledge of the nature of the employee's problem, whether the problem has been solved, what may

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be needed to verify continued rehabilitation, whether there should be restrictions on safety-related duties, and whether past safety-related work needs to be double checked.

Since there is no feedback built into the EAP program, FPL staff could not determine if the program was effective. However, a FPL staff " Fitness for Duty" Task Team recently completed an evaluation of the existing FPL policies compared to the EEI Guide, and programs at other utilities. They concluded that the EAP program " lacks the leadership, direction, and resources needed to be a highly effective program." The Task Team recommended that an EAP professional be hired to evaluate the present program, make recommendations to upgrade the program, and then implement and administer the program.

The Task Team anticipates that better management and marketing of the program will increase its utilization.

FPL management is considering

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these staff recommendations.

E.

Miscellaneous EEI Guide Features Following are the inspectors' findings with respect to miscellaneous features of the EEI Guide.

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System of Records and Reports Although data has been collected on experiences with the Fitness for Duty Program, the data have not been analyzed to enhance management

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attention is warranted.

FPL does not collect data on contractor administration of the program nor do they ensure that the contractors coordinate their programs; i.e., a person terminated for drug abuse

'by one contractor could be hired for work onsite by another contractor. Due to the way that the Employee Assistance Program is organized and administered, influenced to some extent by the need for confidentiality, EAP program data (other than numbers enrolled) are not collected and analyzed.

FPL staff has recommended a system to collect and facilitate analysis of fitness for duty data.

It is assumed that if FPL implements staff

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recommendations to hire an EAP professional, that person would collect and analyze EAP data.

Integration end analysis of data from both programs then may be considered.

2.

Periodic Audits

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Although informal reviews have been conducted, no audits have been

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completed as yet.

FPL audit staff is being trained an~d criteria are

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being developed.. When developed, the audit criteria will be based upon FPL's promulgated program documents and contract provisions rather than the EEI. Guide.

The audit will not be an independent

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professional review for judging the effectivenees of the program.

The c;dit steff will include 3 auditors dedicated full-time to fitness for duty audits of the licensee's an.1 vendor (contractor)

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programs and 7 auditors who will include fitness for duty audits as part of routine contract / vendor audits.

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On a related atter, the inspectors were informed that FPL will conduct a pre-award audit of the contractor who will be performing their new pre-employment screening program (similar to the proposed 10 CFR 73.56, Access Authorization Rule).

3.

Posting of Signs Signs were not posted at the North Gate / employee entrance to notify those seeking access to the site that alcohol and drugs arem prohibite,d.

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F.

Supplemental Program Elements - Not in EEI Guidh 4

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Following are the inspectors' findings with respect to program efements that would supplement those recommended in the EEI Guide, particularly

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proactive measures to detect the presence of drugs onsite.

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1.

Written Procedures Written procedures are intended to implement the policy, define actions to be taken in certain situations, and assign responsibilities to ensure proper accomplishment of the action.

Procedures would also reduce the likelihood that the actions would be mishandled.

Althcugh a few procedures have been developed by FPL, many situations are dealt with through unwritten practices. The inspectors noted, specifically, that procedures had not been developed for:

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handling situations involving critical jobs, b,

dealing with an employee who has been in a rehabilitation program, including assurance of rehabilitation and continued

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rehabilitation, c.

evaluating impact on safety of past and future work, d.

handling refusal or failure to respond to treatment / assistance, e.

handling detection or sale of drugs,

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processing appeals, g.

actions to be taken when problems are detected, suspected, or reported offsite and off-duty,

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actions to be taken when employee reports use of prescription h.

substances that could impair judgment or reactions, i.

handling abuse of prescription drugs, and J.

handling anti-social or counter-institutional behavior that would affect job performance, such as vandalism, threats, and assaults.

2.

Professional Counseling Services Professional counseling services would manage and carry out the program, and provide initial diagnosis of the problem and referral to the proper profecsional care. This would be particularly important in the diagnosis and treatment of substance abuse and emotional instability.

  • Professional counseling services are available offsite through agreements with FPL. Although the method preferred by FPL for obtaining the services is through the supervisor, alternative courses are available, but not well publicized nor understood by non-supervisory employees. As stated in Paragraph D.10, above, FPL staff has recommended hiring an EAP professional who would perform this function.

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3.

Employment Screening Practices

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Employment screening practices are intended to assure that employees

are reliable and trustworthy and to eliminate from consideration those known to be unreliable, i.e., a drug abuser without evidence.of rehabilitation. The practices would include background investigations, psychological tests, interviews, and periodic rescreening (similar to the contents of the proposed 10 CFR 73.56, Access Authorization Rule).

Current screening practices for FPL employees are consistent with ANSI N18.17-1973, i.e., investigation to disclose adverse character traits, examination for indications of emotional instability, and continued observation by supervisors for indications of aberrant behavior.

Current screening practices for contractor employees are less stringent than for FPL employees and permit acceptance of a letter certifying tenure of trustworthy employment in lieu of the investigation and examination.

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FPL staff has recognized their current program is inadequate and plans to upgrade their preemploymant screening, for both FPL employees and contractor employees, to the proposed 10 CFR 73.56 criteria - with an additional condition that prohibits "grandfathering" of individuals screened under the current program.

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4.

Legal Reviews

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Legal reviews would assure that company policies and procedures, contracts, and union agreements meet legal requirements concerning fitness for duty. The inspectors determined that legal reviews of the above are sufficient, that bid responses are reviewed to assure that all bid provisions concerning FFD are met, and no legal or social issues have been encountered that would not be generic to

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these programs in the nuclear industry.

5.

Proactive Measures to Detect the Presence of Drugs Onsite These measures are intended to provide evidence of onsite drug

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l problems before they would be manifested in observable aberrant i

behavior. These measures could alsa provide a deterrent to onsite drug abuse. One FPL senior manager was concerned that the proactive

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measures could adversely affect emoloyee trust.

Another senior manager was of the opinion that an anonymous reporting system would be disruptive and not be effective.

a.

Chemical testing of body fluids. As described in paragraph D.9, above, random and periodic chemical tests are not conducted, b.

Searches.

Searches of the workplace, including the use of drug detector dogs, are not conducted.

FPL staff reported that such searches were conducted a few years ago during the steam generator outage, and that they were less than satisfied with the results, i-8-

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c.

Investigations.

In accordance with FPL policy, investigations are only reactive. No proactive or covert / undercover investigations are conducted.

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Mechanism for discreet expression of concerns. There is no procedure established to permit confidential and anonymous reporting of known or suspected drug activity, nor is there a procedure that would assure that employees and contractors leaving Turkey Point are interviewed and afforded the opportunity to report known or suspected drug activity.

e.

Information from law enforcement authorities.

It shoyld be noted that law enforcement authorities have no obligation to report information on drug activities to NRC licensees.

Furthermore, as indicated in Paragraoh D.8 above, information on anything less than major drug trafficking probably will not be

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available from the local law enforcement authorities.

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Assessment on Whether There Exists an Ongoing Drug Problem Detennination of the existence of an ongoing drug problem was attempted through interviews; a more complete inquiry was not practical.

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those interviewed expressed knowledge 6i ongoing drug problems.

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Furthermore, FPL management knows of no ongoing drug or alcohol abuses at

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Turkey Point.

This could be due to the fact that there is no drug

problem, or because the licensee's program has not yet detected it.

FPL's fitness for duty program records for Turkey Point and St. Lucie indicate two FPL employees were found since the fall of 1984 to be drug abusers after being confronted by their supervisors for aberrant behavior. NRC records indicate that FPL reported three drug related events, one each in

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1977, 1981, and 1982. Other than the recent allegations of drug sale and use occurring at Turkey Point during the period 1981-1984, the NRC has no reports or data that would indicate s e existence of recent or ongoing drug problems. As stated in Paragrav. E.1, above, FPL does r.ct collect data on contractor administration of the program, and as stated in Paragraphs D.3 and 7, above, NRC findings concerning contractor employees are inconclusive due to time constrairts. There was insufficient data obtained to permit the inspectors to conclude without reservation, whether or not there exists an ongoing drug problem at Turkey Point.

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Adequacy of Fitness fcr Duty Program to Deal with Drug Problems In order to deal with a problem, there is an obvious need to be able to detect its er.istence. As noted in the precedirg paragraph, FPL management and employees know of no ongoing drug abuse problem onsite, possibly because the licensee's program is unable to detect it.

Except for isolated cases of impairment which are readily obs"rvable to supervisors, it is doubtful that FPL could detect or. site abuses within the ranks of its own employees or its contractors. The licensee's FFD program' places he6vy reliance on supervisor detection of aberr6nt behavior and not on a well-rounded program of other assorted elements.

In addition, lack of feedback built into the EAP program, as described in Paragraph D.10 above,

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has a potential for preventing the licensee from dealing with some drug problems and from taking proper action on related potential safety problems.

Recommendations by the FPL staff, as described in this report to improve policy communication, (Paragraph D.3), conduct chemical testing after accidents (Paragraph D.9), upgrade the EAP (Paragraph D.10), collect and analyze data (Paragraph E.1), and improve preemployment screening (Paragraph F.3), along with the implementation of audits (Paragraph E.2),

should improve their FFD program.

As described in this report, FPL does deal with drug problems when they are known to management. However, in the absence of measures other than behavioral observation to detect drug use, there is doubt about the ability of the licensee's program to deal with drug problems.

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