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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20205C4171999-03-25025 March 1999 Special Rept 99-02:on 801027,Commission Approved for publication,10CFR50.48 & 10CFR50 App R Delineating Certain Fire Protection Provisions for Nuclear Power Plants Licensed to Operate Prior to 790101.Team Draft Findings Reviewed ML20207K2051999-03-0505 March 1999 Special Rept 99-01:on 990128,DG Tripped After 2 H of Operation During Loaded Operation for Monthly Test.Caused by Several Components That Were Degraded or Had Intermittent Problems.Parts Were Replaced & Initial Run Was Performed ML20196D4171998-11-24024 November 1998 Special Rept 98-02:on 981112,failure to Implement Fire Watches in Rooms Containing Inoperable Fire Barrier Penetrations,Was Determined.Repair of Affected Fire Barriers in Progress ML20151W3521998-09-0808 September 1998 Special Rept 98-01:on 980819,maint Could Not Be Performed on FPS Due to Isolation Boundary Leakage.Caused by Inadequate Info Provided in Fire Impairment Plan.Isolated Portion of FPS Was Returned to Svc ML20148A9881997-05-0101 May 1997 Special Rept 96-04-02:on 970429,groundwater Level at Well Mk GWA-2 Was in Alarm for 7 Days.Caused by Precipitation During Previous Week.Verified That No Other Groundwater Monitoring Instruments Were in Alarm ML20137P0711997-04-0707 April 1997 Special Rept 97-01:on 970226,Peak Accelerometer,1MIMT-5030, Removed Under WO 95092624 as Part of SG Replacement Project. Accelerometer Will Return to Svc Prior to Unit 1 Startup ML20133L6051997-01-0909 January 1997 Special Rept 96-04,Rev 1,groundwater Level at Well Mk GWA-2 Monitored by 2WZLS5060 Was in Alarm for 7 Days.Verified That No Other Groundwater Monitoring Instruments in Alarm ML20134N0261996-11-14014 November 1996 Special Rept:On 961006,groundwater Alarm Was Received & Entered in TS Action Item List for Tracking.Field Survey of Surrounding Areas Was Performed to Verify That No Water Was Percolating to Surface That Would Indicate Pipe Leak ML20116K0331996-08-0909 August 1996 Special Rept 96-03:on 960611,identified Broken Secondary Contact Blocks.Caused by Mishandling of Breakers or over- Torquing of Mounting Bolts.Breaker 2BYA Repaired,Tested & re-installed in Cabinet ML20086G9601995-07-12012 July 1995 Special Rept 95-002:on 950612,turbocharger Failed,As Detected by Excessive Noise & Vibration.Engine Subsequently Secured.Damaged Components Replaced & DG 2A Returned to Operable Status ML20080G4421995-02-0303 February 1995 Special Rept 95-01:on 950104,personnel on Unit 2 Operating in Solid Condition During Fill & Vent of Nc Sys ML20078R7651994-12-15015 December 1994 Special Rept 94-06:on 941012,fatigue Usage to SI Sys Piping by Manually Initiating Flow Through B Cold Leg from Fwst During Testing for Valve 1NI-71 Intentionally Increased. Startup of Facility Discontinued to Repair Valve ML20078L6571994-11-22022 November 1994 Special Rept SR-94-05:on 941024,Channel 3 of Vibration & Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Noise.Channel 3 of V&Lpm Will Be Repaired Under WR 94043758 or Replaced by Nsm MG-12096 During Outage 1EOC10 ML20073C2451994-09-14014 September 1994 Special Rept 94-004:on 940821,valid Failure of DG 1A Occurred Due to Failure of Series Boost exciter-regulator (Voltage Regulator).Isolation Transformer T54 & Current Transformers CT1,CT2 & CT3 Will Be Inspected ML20065K2501994-04-15015 April 1994 Special Rept 94-03:on 940210,during Testing PORV Observed to Hang Open in Absence of air-assisted Closure.Caused by Incomplete Testing of Porvs.Compensatory Measures Reanalyzed & Reestablished Addressing Fire & Security Issues ML20064K0311994-03-15015 March 1994 Special Rept 94-01:on 940215,DG 2A Tripped W/Low Lube Oil Pressure Indication During Routine Surveillance Test.Caused by Pressure Too Low in Bldg Up in Sensing Lines.Test Satisfactorily Repeated ML20058M4281993-09-27027 September 1993 Special Rept 93-09:on 930920,notifies of Alarm Condition Showing Alert on Ground Water Level Outside 1A DG Room.Work Order 93063348 Initiated by Wc Personnel to Have Iae Personnel Check Operation & Calibr ML20056F8561993-08-23023 August 1993 Special Rept 93-06:on 930405,discovered Debris on Unit 1 Lower Core Plate.Four Other Unidentified Objects Noted During Video Insp of Lower Core Plate ML20126B5051992-12-15015 December 1992 Inplant Review Rept 92-20,special Rept Re Postulated Scenario That Could Introduce Air Into AFW Suction Piping. Caused by Functional Design Deficiency.Setpoints of Affected Pressure Switches Increased ML20106D7401992-10-0909 October 1992 RO 92-19:on 920804,discovered That Drive Shaft on Pump 1MNVPU0046 Was Rotating in Opposite Direction than Specified on Pump Casing.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Motor Leads of Subj Pump Reconfigured to Provide Correct Pump Shaft Rotation ML20127E0191992-09-0909 September 1992 Special Rept:On 920421,unusual Event Declared Because Unit 1 Train B of Ssps Inoperable Due to Defective Circuit Card within Ssps.Failed Train B Ssps Circuit Board Replaced & Appropriate Procedures to Be Evaluated ML20101T9441992-07-13013 July 1992 Special Rept for Inplant Review 92-10:on 920610 No Mention Made on Work List of Vent Path Through SG 1B for Incoming SG Crews.Caused by Deficient Communication.Turnover Sheet Established to Document Existing Vent Path Status ML20101P5581992-07-0303 July 1992 In-Plant Review Rept 92-09:on 920619,setpoint Problems Noted W/Ts & Selected Licensee Commitment Values for Listed Field Data.Caused by Discrepancies W/Groundwater Level Monitoring Portion of Wz Sys.Ts Monitor Logged in Unit 2 Logbook ML20086Q1101991-12-20020 December 1991 Voluntary Special Rept 91-23:on 911008,reactor Vessel Lower Internals Contacted Reactor Vessel During Removal.Caused by Inappropriate Operator Action & Mgt Deficiency.Recovery Plan Developed Re Insp of Lower Internals & Refueling Canal ML20086H9431991-12-0404 December 1991 Special Rept 91-24:on 911104-29,concerns Noted Re Possible Leakage of Containment Spray Sys Check Valves Into Annulus, Causing Offsite Radioactive Dose.Caused by Design Deficiency.Check Valve Installed Downstream of Piping ML20091C0851991-08-0101 August 1991 Special Rept PIR 1-M91-0113:on 910616,diesel Engine Cooling Water Leak Discovered on Diesel Generator 1A at Discharge Flange on Intercooler End Bell Cover.Caused by Poor Casting Quality.New Covers Will Be Installed ML20081F7371991-06-0404 June 1991 Rev 1 to Special Rept 91-11 Dtd 910411:on 910215,turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Automatically Started. Caused by Deficient Communication & Lack of Attention to Detail.Pump Speed Reduced & Discharge Valves Closed ML20062E7991990-11-14014 November 1990 Special Rept:On 901011,turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Declared Inoperable W/O Having Made Security Notification.Caused by Inappropriate Action ML20055G2161990-07-12012 July 1990 Ro:On 900602,discovered That Channel 7 of Vibration & Loose Parts Monitor Sys Had Low Noise Level.Probably Caused by Bad or Damaged Sensor Cable.Definite Cause of Failure Undetermined.Sys Scheduled to Be Replaced ML20246F7081989-07-0303 July 1989 Special Rept:On 890601,diesel Generator 1A Shut Down Due to Lack of Oil Flow.Due to Test Being Performed,Normal Stop Would Not Shutdown Engine.New Oil Added & Pumps Primed. Turbocharger Mods Under Investigation ML20247N8841989-05-30030 May 1989 Special Rept:On 890418,vibration & Loose Parts Monitor Failed.Caused by Damaged Cables to Sensors on Each Affected Channel.Vibration & Loose Parts Monitor Will Be Repaired During Next Refueling Outage After New Replacement Received ML20244C6731989-04-0606 April 1989 Special Rept:On 890225,operations Personnel Discovered That Channel 8 of Vibration & Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Had Low Noise Level.Investigation Scheduled to Be Completed During Unit 1 Tube Leak Outage ML20196E8241988-12-0505 December 1988 Special Rept:On 881205,diesel Generator 1B Experienced Invalid Test Failure.Caused by Improper Adjustment of Voltage Regulator Due to Personnel Error.Operations Mgt Will Cover Incident W/Representative from Each Shift ML20196B5211988-11-29029 November 1988 Special Rept:On 881030,Diesel Generator 1B Experienced Invalid Test Failure During Start Attempt 602.Applicable Procedures for Diesel Generator Testing Reviewed & Revised If Necessary ML20195H4901988-11-16016 November 1988 Special Rept:On 881017,diesel Generator 1A Started for Operability Test & Subsequently Tripped.Caused by Loose Wire on Jacket Pump Discharge Pressure Switch.Wire Reterminated & Pressure Switch Calibr ML20205G3401988-10-24024 October 1988 Special Rept:On 880916,Tech Spec 3.7.14.a Violated.Caused by Standby Shutdown Facility Being Inoperable for More than 7 Days Due to Transfer Canal Isolating & Draining Utilizing Weir Gate.Special Order 88-13 Issued ML20151R0971988-07-27027 July 1988 Special Rept:On 880627,diesel Generator 1A Failed to Start within 11 S.Caused by Missing Drain Valve on Starting Air Filter Housing on Right Bank Side of Diesel Engine.Work Request Written to Replace Filter Housing ML20151F4911988-07-22022 July 1988 Special Rept:On 880519,diesel Generator 1A Started for Operability Test & After Operating for 10 Minutes, Automatically Stopped & Declared Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Maintain Lubricating Level in Valve 1LD-7 ML20195J3601988-06-22022 June 1988 Special Rept:On 880323,Train a Safety Injection & Main Steam Sys Isolation Signals Received from Unknown Fault Inside Train a Solid State Protection Sys Logic Cabinet.Cause of Fault Could Not Be Isolated.Cabinet Returned to Svc ML20195J6161988-06-20020 June 1988 Advises That Special Rept Re Diesel Generator 1A Incident on 880519 Will Be Submitted by 880708 Instead of 880620 Due to Unresolved Concerns ML20195G2171988-06-17017 June 1988 Special Rept:On 880518,diesel Generator 1B Experienced Valid Failure.Caused by Fuel & Vol of Trapped Air Shook Debris Loose from Engine Mounted Duplex Fuel Filter.Filter Cartridges Replaced.Preventative Maint Procedure Revised ML20151C7691988-04-0404 April 1988 Ro:Change of Commitment Submitted Re Diesel Generator Turbocharger Rotor Assembly Replacement.Turbocharger Inlet Casings Replaced on All Four Engines W/New Design.Dye Penetrant Testing Will Continue to Be Performed ML20147F4311988-03-0303 March 1988 Special Rept:On 880123,Channels 3,4 & 8 of Vibration & Loose Parts Monitor Had Unusual Noise Level.Cause Not Determined Due to Number of Possible Failures & Location of Components within Plants.Monitor Will Be Repaired During 1988 Outage ML20237D1341987-12-14014 December 1987 Special Rept:On 871108,safe Shutdown Facility RCS Wide Range Transmitter Out of Calibr.Instrument Could Not Be Calibrated.Requisition Initiated for Replacement Transmitter ML20236Q1621987-11-13013 November 1987 Special Rept:On 870816,malfunction of Main Turbine Generator Controls Caused Rapidly Decreasing Main Steam Line Pressure Triggering Safety Injection/Reactor Trip.Safety Injection & Unusual Event Terminated & Repairs Completed on 870821 ML20214S5421987-06-0808 June 1987 Special Rept:On 870503,pressurizer PORV 2NC-34A Automatically Opened Due to Pressure Transient in Rcs.Cause Not Determined.Charging & Letdown Flow Adjusted & Procedures Re Allowable Setpoint Range Revised ML20214G7301987-05-13013 May 1987 Special Rept:On 870407 & 08,complete 18-month Insp Required for Standby Shutdown Diesel Generator Determined Not to Have Been Performed on Time.Caused by Personnel Error.Work Request Will Be Issued Prior to 18-month Due Dates ML20213H0591987-05-0808 May 1987 Ro:On 870409,personnel Discovered Monthly Channel Checks on Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation Sys Wide Range Instrumentation Not Performed,Per Tech Specs.Ler Will Be Submitted by 870518 ML20214J1591986-11-21021 November 1986 Ro:On 861029,valves in ECCS Declared Inoperable.Caused by Rotork Motor Switch Settings.Ler for Incident Will Be Delayed Until 861219 to Allow Testing & Evaluation of Units ML20203J6551986-07-28028 July 1986 Ro:On 860626 & 27,small Cylindrical Objects Observed on Upper Core Baffle & in Vicinity of Upender,Respectively.On 860629,objects Confirmed to Be Spent Fuel Pellets.Pellets Vacuumed from Core & Upender 1999-03-05
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217G7951999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217F3661999-09-22022 September 1999 Rev 18 to McGuire Unit 1 Cycle 14 Colr ML20212D1911999-09-20020 September 1999 SER Accepting Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App A,General Design Criterion 57 Closed System Isolation Valves for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E8851999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999 Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate ML20217G8101999-08-31031 August 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Unit 1 & 2 ML20211G5261999-08-24024 August 1999 SER Accepting Approval of Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan Request for Relief 98-004 for Plant,Unit 1 ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999 Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009 ML20210S2371999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E8951999-07-31031 July 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20209H1631999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20210S2491999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H1731999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology ML20195K3691999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N3511999-05-11011 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety- Related Movs ML20195K3761999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised MORs for Apr 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206R0891999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205L2341999-04-0505 April 1999 SFP Criticality Analysis ML20206R0931999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Repts for Mar 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P8991999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205C4171999-03-25025 March 1999 Special Rept 99-02:on 801027,Commission Approved for publication,10CFR50.48 & 10CFR50 App R Delineating Certain Fire Protection Provisions for Nuclear Power Plants Licensed to Operate Prior to 790101.Team Draft Findings Reviewed ML20207K2051999-03-0505 March 1999 Special Rept 99-01:on 990128,DG Tripped After 2 H of Operation During Loaded Operation for Monthly Test.Caused by Several Components That Were Degraded or Had Intermittent Problems.Parts Were Replaced & Initial Run Was Performed ML20204C8911999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9021999-02-28028 February 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20204C8961999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199E0301998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216F9931998-12-31031 December 1998 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 1998 Annual Rept ML20198A4481998-12-11011 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That for Relief Request 97-004, Parts 1 & 2,ASME Code Exam Requirements Are Impractical. Request for Relief & Alternative Imposed,Granted ML20198D7561998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199E0491998-11-30030 November 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 Re Personnel Exposure ML20199E9651998-11-24024 November 1998 Rev 1 to ATI-98-012-T005, DPC Evaluation of McGuire Unit 1 Surveillance Weld Data Credibility ML20196D4171998-11-24024 November 1998 Special Rept 98-02:on 981112,failure to Implement Fire Watches in Rooms Containing Inoperable Fire Barrier Penetrations,Was Determined.Repair of Affected Fire Barriers in Progress ML20196G0581998-11-0606 November 1998 Rev 17 to COLR Cycle 13 for McGuire Unit 1 ML20196G0761998-11-0606 November 1998 Rev 15 to COLR Cycle 12 for McGuire Unit 2 ML20198D7771998-10-31031 October 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20195E5961998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154L6251998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20195E6021998-09-30030 September 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154B4131998-09-22022 September 1998 Rev 0 to ISI Rept for McGuire Nuclear Unit 1 Twelfth Refueling Outage ML20151W3521998-09-0808 September 1998 Special Rept 98-01:on 980819,maint Could Not Be Performed on FPS Due to Isolation Boundary Leakage.Caused by Inadequate Info Provided in Fire Impairment Plan.Isolated Portion of FPS Was Returned to Svc ML20154L6321998-08-31031 August 1998 Rev 1 to MOR for Aug 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20153B3741998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20236U1601998-07-31031 July 1998 Non-proprietary DPC-NE-2009, DPC W Fuel Transition Rept ML20237B2381998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20153B3931998-07-31031 July 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20236P0451998-07-0808 July 1998 Part 21 Rept Re non-conformance & Potential Defect in Component of Nordberg Model FS1316HSC Standby Dg.Caused by Outer Spring Valves Mfg from Matl That Did Not Meet Specifications.Will Furnish Written Rept within 60 Days 1999-09-30
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. Dae her Comparty T C Mcunus McGuire Nuclear Generation Department Vice President 12709 Hagen Terry Road (MG01A) . (704) Sis-4800
- Hmersntle, NC280it8985 (704)875-4809 fu DUKEPOWER
.w-September 27, 1993 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 Special Report Number 93-09 Problem Investigation Process No.: 1-M93-0852 Gentlemen:
Special' Report Number 93-09 is being submitted to the NRC for.
information persuant to Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9-8. The incident concerned a failure to perform required. remedial action as specified by a Selected Licensee Commitraent. This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.
Very truly yours, Y[e$ w T.C. McMeekin TLP/bcb Attachment xc: Mr. S.D. Ebneter INPO Records Center Administrator, Region II Suite 1500 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1100 Circle 75 Pa;kway 101 Marietta St., NW , Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30339 Atlanta, GA 30323 Mr. Victor Nerses Mr. George Maxwell U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Resident Inspector Office of. Nuclear Reactor Regulation McGuire Nuclear Station Washington, D.C. 20555 9310050217 930927 F) gDR ADOCK 0500
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McGUIRE SAFETY REVIEW GROUP SPECIAL REPORT
- 1. REPORT NUMBER: 93-09 ,
- 2. DATE OF REVIEW September 1 - September 23, 1993
- 3. SUBJECT DESCRIPTION: This review is submitted as a special report pursuant to selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.9-8, remedial action a(2). Problem Investigation Process (PIP) 1-M93-0852 describes an incident in which an alarm condition existed from August 20, 1993 until September 3, 1993, showing an " Alert" Ground Water Indicating (WZ) system level outside the Unit lA Diesel Generator Room. The SLC e commitment remedial action requires that if the inoperable monitor (s) !
I are not returned to operable status within 7 days, a special report documenting the results of the investigation of such an event be !
I submitted to the NRC within 30 days.
- 4. EVALUATION AND COMMENT: !
I Abstract f l
A Technical Specification Action Item Log (TSAIL) entry was made at 1900 ;
on August 20, 1993, indicating that an alarm condition exisced showing ,
an " Alert" ground water level outside the 1A Diesel Generator Room. !
Receipt of this alarm requires verification of whether a high groundwater level exists, and remedial action be performed as specified 3 by SLC commitment 16.9-8. Operations (OPS) personnel generated Work Request (WR) 93028578 to determine the cause of the alarm and take l appropriate remedial action. However, at the time the WR was generated, no reference was made on the WR to the TSAIL entry or the SLC commitment ,
associated with the alarm. Work Control (WC) personnel received WR 93028578 on August 23, 1993, but did not recognize any special commitment associated with the request. On August 30, 1993, OPS personnel noted that the TSAIL item was still outstanding and the 7 day commitment had not been met. They proceeded to inform WC perconnel of the discrepancy. Work Order (WO) 93063348 was initiated by WC personnel l to have Instrumentation And Electrical (IAE) personnel check the operation and calibration of loop IWZLP5090, determine the cause for the alarm on the Groundwater Level Detector for lA Diesel Generator Room !
(1WZPS5091), and calibrate / repair as necessary. On September 3, 1993, IAE personnel performed the required checks and found level transmitter i
J
I l
i 1
. l DPC/MNS SPECIAL REPORT No. 93-09 PAGE 2 1WZLT5090 to be out of calibration. The problem was corrected and the alarm cleared. Unit 1 was in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) at the time this ,
incident occurred. This incident is assigned a cause of Deficient !
Communication because of the lack of communication of the SLC commitment ).
between the groups involved. The Work Management System computer l program will be modified to require notation of Technical Specification l (TS) or SLC associated items on the front of the-WR. Also, specifics of i this incident will be covered with appropriate personnel, i
i Background l The Reactor and Auxiliary Building complex for McGuire incorporates a l permanent groundwater dewatering system that is designed to preclude groundwater from rising above a structural distress level of elevation j 732 ft. mean sea level (MSL), or 28 ft. below the site grade level of ,
760 ft. ISL.
The groundwater drainage system incorporates a grid system beneath the {
I Reactor and Auxiliary Building base mats, 3 sumps in the Auxiliary Building (each with pumps and level alarms), a peripheral exterior drain !
system, and 11 groundwater level monitors. Originally, McGuire 4 incorporated all 11 level monitors as TS monitors.
subsequently, an analysis performed by Design Engineering personnel demonstrated that the Reactor and Diesel Generator Buildings were
! designed to withstand groundwater stresses up to 760 ft. MSL. ,
Therefore, a TS revision was sought and obtained (Amendment Nos. 93 and
- 74) that removed all but 5 of the level monitors from TSs. The other 6 ,
i 1evel monitors were placed in Chapter 16 of the McGuire Final Safety ;
Analyses Report (FSAR) as SLC commitments. These 6 monitors, having ,
locations listed in Table 16.9-6, are to be retained in administrative procedures for the groundwater monitoring program and utilized as an
- indication of any localized groundwater increases that may be indicative of increase due to ruptured pipes, etc..., and as an indication of a i problem with the underground grid system. This commitment was made as I part of the justification for relaxing the groundwater monitoring TS.
{
The commitment states that the groundwater level monitors listed in ;
Table 16.9-6 for the Reactor and Diesel Generator Buildings shall be operable at all times.
._m~ nn ~ w-rw-- -
~- ,m,
I i
F DPC/HNS :
SPECIAL REPORT No. 93-09 l PAGE 3 j J
Description Of Event i I
On August 20, 1993, at 1900, OPS personnel made a TSAIL entry indicating I that an alarm condition existed on the groundwater panel located on 750' i elevation of the Auxiliary Building. The alarm indicated that there was :
I an " Alert" groundwater level indication outside the 1A Diesel Generator >
Room. As a result of the alarm OPS personnel verified that a high !
groundwater level did not exist and initiated WR 93028578 to have .
appropriate personnel investigate the reason for the alarm. Also, at that time, an entry was made in the TSAIL denoting the alarm condition.
However, at that time no contact was made with WC personnel to alert them of the fact that the equipment involved had been logged in the j TSAIL or that a 7 day SLC commitment was associated. No notation or j identifier was placed on WR 93028578 to denote the TSAIL entry or the SLC commitment. !
On August 23, 1993, WR 93028578 was received by WC personnel as a f routine / control room indication problem (CRIP) task. The SLC association of the equipment involved was not recognized by WC personnel who j It was placed in a file of work waiting to be planned. i screened the WR.
l i
On August 30, 1993, OPS personnel reviewing the TSAIL recognized the 7 f day SLC commitment had been missed. They informed WC personnel in the ,
Work Control Center of the discrepancy. WC personnel in the Work Control Center investigated and discovered the WR had not yet been j planned. Appropriate WC personnel were informed of the 7 day SLC ;
commitment associated with the WR. Immediate action was taken to plan j and schedule the task as a high priority item. Consequently, WO {
l 93063348 was initiated to have IAE personnel check the operation and calibration of the associated groundwater loop (lWZLP5090), determine the cause for the alarm on the groundwater level detector for lA Diesel Generator Room, and calibrate / repair the equipment as necessary. No ;
1 notation or step was placed on the WO denoting the associated TSAIL l i
entry or the need for IAE personnel to clear it once the problem was resolved. The WO was then scheduled for IAE shift personnel to be performed on September 3, 1993.
i On September 3, 1993, IAE personnel performed the required checks and found level transmitter 1WZLT5090 to be out of calibration. The problem was corrected and the alarm cleared. The remainder of the equipment was j i
I
I
. 1 DPC/MNS SPECIAL REPORT No. 93-09 l PAGE 4 l
verified to work properly. However, at the time the work was performed, )
i neither the IAE nor the OPS personnel involved recognized the TSAIL ,
i entry existed and the entry was not cleared.
On September 7, 1993, the Safety Review person investigating the incident discovered the TSAIL entry had not been cleared. Appropriate WC personnel were informed and; consequently, the TSAIL entry was cleared.
Conclusion This incident is assigned a cause of Deficient Communication because of ;
the lack of communication of the SLC commitment associated with the ;
equipment involved on the WR sent to WC personnel and later on the WO sent to IAE personnel.
The WR initiated by OPS personnel should have denoted the SLC $
association of the equipment involved and the associated time clock which had been started with the TSAIL entry. irir could have been ,
accomplished by a notation on the Special Inscruction field of the WR or more appropriately the Technical Specification Related field of the WR ;
e at the time it was generated. With no notation or " Flag" on the WR, WC l personnel did not recognize that a 7 day clock had been started. 1 l
This type of notification had been accomplished in the past by use of a red stamp denoting a TSAIL entry ant' associated time requirements on the front of a WR when it was initiated or whenever an associated TSAIL entry was made. However, with the advent of the Work Management System (WMS) computer program, a paper copy of the WR up front was eliminated. J With no paper copy to stamp, this means of communication has been lost l on the initiation of WRs associated with TSAIL entries. The personnel involved must take responsibility to identify TS or SLC related items on 1
the electronic fields designated for those purposes or the information will not be transmitted. This discrepancy with the WMS computer program had been noted prior to this incident and will be rectified by changes already proposed to WMS. An entry into a data field on the front of the WR will be automatically required for items recognized by the computer program as TS or SLC related. This change to the WMS program should be j
4 in place by February 28, 1994. In the interim, the TSAILs will be reviewed daily and WC personnel will insure WOs exist and are scheduled 1
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. i DPC/HNS !
SPECIAL REPORT No. 93-09 l PAGE 5 i appropriately to meet timeframes as specified by the TSAIL entries.
Also, OPS personnel will evaluate the flow of WR for review after they
~
V are originated. Appropriate changes will be made to insure proper f notations are made to reflect TS or SLC related items and associated j committed actions required. 1 The WC personnel involved should also have included a note or step on l
the associated WO, to cause the IAE personnel performing the work to j recognize the TSAIL entry associated with the equipment'and the need to j clear it. The lack of any such note or step led to the TSAIL entry remaining open from September 3, 1993 to September 7, 1993, even though !
the alarm was cleared. This could have caused unnecessary delays and f uncertainty of the validity of the alarm status by OPS personnel. ;
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- 5. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: t Immediate: None PIP l-M93-0852 was initiated to investigate the -i Subsequent: 1) circumstances surrounding the incident, determine the cause or causes, and appropriate !
l resolutions for problems identified. i e
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- 2) Specifics of the incident were discussed with appropriate OPS and WC personnel.
Planned: 1) Changes will be made to the WMS computer program that will cause recognition of TS and SLC associated components and require entry of appropriate data on the front page of WRs when ,
they are initiated.
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- 2) OPS personnel will evaluate the flow of WR which ,
involve TS or SLC related equipment and take ,
appropriate steps to insure that these WRs receive proper review prior to approval.
- 3) OPS Shift Managers will perform a daily review of TSAIL entries and include all outstanding' ,
't f
\
d . * .
DPC/MNS SPECIAL REPORT No. 93-09 PAGE 6 L identified items in the associated Shift Manager :
Unit Logbook. ;
t 4} WC personnel will review the Shift Managers Unit ;
Logbooks once per day, insure that all TSAIL [
?
items listed as outstanding have an associated- ,
WO, and that the WOs involved
- e scheduled in a l time frame and with the prop r , 'ority to i insure the specified time fra.m.- are met.
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