IR 05000482/1988024

Insp Rept 50-482/88-24 on 880901-30.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Status,Followup on Previously Identified NRC Item,Review of Lers,Operational Safety Verification & Physical Security Verification

ML20195D933
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	10/27/1988
From:	Bruce Bartlett, Chamberlain D, Skow M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20195D927	List: IR 05000482/1988024 ML20195D923 ML20195D930
References
50-482-88-24, NUDOCS 8811070195
Download: ML20195D933 (16)

Text

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. l APPENDIX B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO.YtISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Reporet 50-482/88-24 Operating Licenset NPF-42 Dockett 50-482 Licenseet Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC)

P.O. Box 411 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Facility Name Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS)

Inspection At Wolf Creek Site, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas

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Inspection Conductedt September 1-30, 1988 i

Inspectors ! ah -

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x,T J h - ?- 7 7 T L. Bartlett, Senior Rbsidsnt Inspector,

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Date Projects Section A, Division of Reactor Projects

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/0 t W M. L. Skow, Resident Reactor Inspector, /Da(e Project Section A Division of Reactor Projects ,

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Approvedt tN _l & A

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' If[ Chamberlain, Chlef, Project Section A, bate Division of Reactor Projects

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8811070195 SS102GG.,

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Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted September 1-30, 1988 (Report 50-482/88-24)

Areas inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including plant status, followup on a previously identified NRC item, review of licensee event '

reports, operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, onsite event followup, preparation for refueling, physical security verification, and i radiological protectio Results: Untimely corrective action continues to be a problem '

(paragraphs 4 and 6), the licensee continues to find instances of failure '

to perform Technical Specification (TS) surveillances properly

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(paragraph 4), engineering is still not adequately involved in operability 7 determinations (paragraph 5),thelicenseefailedtounderstandthe -

significanceofcertainTS(paragraphs 5dandSe),andanaccident occurred resulting in the death of one worker (paragraph 8). Within the areas thspected, two violations (failure to implement prompt corrective action, paragraphs 4 and 6, and procedure inappropriate to the circumstances, paragraph 4) were identifie ;

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Personnel B. D. Withers, Presiden' and CEO

• F. T. Rhodes, Vice President, Operations

• R. M. Grant, Vice President, Quality Assurance (QA)

• J. A. Bailey, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services

• G. D. Boyer, Plant Manager R. W. Holloway, Manager, Maintenance and Modifications 0. L. Maynard, Manager, Licensing C. M. Estes, Manager, Operations

• M. G. Williams, Manager, Plant Support tt. E. Parry, Manager, QA

• A. A. Freitag, Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE)

• K. Peterson, Supervisor, Lict.insing

• G. Pendergrass, Licensing

• C. J. Hoch, QA Technologist E. Lehmann, NSE Engineer

• J. Pippin, M3 nager, NPE C. J. Patrick, Supervisor, Quality Systems

• R. L. Gourley, Maintenance and Modification R. H. Belote, Manager, Nuclear Safety Engineering J. L. Blackwell, Fire Protection Coordinator S. D. Austin

• T. S. Morrill, Ope ations lealth Support Physicist

• R. L. Lodgson, Chemist The NRC inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff during the inspection period to discuss identified issue ' Denotes those personnel in attendance at the exit reeting held on October 4, 198 . Plant Status The plant operated in Mode 1, 100 percent power, during the inspection perio On September 10, 1988, the licensee isolated the 78, 68, and 5B high pressure feedwater hecters due to an apparent tube leak in the SB heate The high pressure feedwater heaters are used to increase the thermodynamic efficiency of the secondary side of the plant and are not safety-relate The SB heater can not be completely isolated so repairs will have to be completed during the upcoming refueling outage. Due to the loss of the heaters, the licensee has lost approxir.ately 20 MW electric. On Septenber 30, 1988, the licenset had 225 days of continuous power

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4 Followup on a Previously Identified Inspection Finding (92701)

(Closed) Violation (482/8634-02): Violation of TS-Fire Suppression '

System Surveillance - This violation concerned missing damper actuation requirements from Procedures STS HT-032 STS MT-036, and STS MT-03 These STS procedures have been replaced by: STN FP-400, Revision 0,

"Single-Zone Halon System Checkout"; STN FP-401, Revision 0, "Two-Zone Halon Systcm Checkout;" and STN FP-402, Revision 0, "Six-Zone Halon System Checkout." These procedures now verify actuatinn of associated ventilation system fire dampers. As discussed in the closeout of LER 87-038, fire protection requirements have been deleted from Technical Specifications, but remain in fire protection procedure . Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER) (92700)

During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors perfortred followup on Wolf Creek LERs. The LERs were reviewed to ensure:

o Corrective action stated in the report has been properly completed or work is in progress, o Response to the event was adequat o Response to the event met license conditions, commitments, or other applicable regulatory requirements, o The infomation contained in the report satisfied applicable reporting requirenent o Generic issues were identifie The LERs discussed below were reviewed and closed:

o 87-002. "Engineered Safety Features Actuation - Safety Injecticn and Reactor Trip." The LER states that the cause of the event was personnel error during calibration testing. The LER also discusses problems with a power operated relief valve following the reactor trip. The NRC inspector reviewed STS IC-507A, Revision 2

"Calibration Steam Line Pressure Transmitters," and found clarification had been made for the perforrer to verify that no partial trips were in prior to placing the channel in test. Work Request (WR) 00087-87 was accomplished to repair the valve and WR 00105-87 adjusted the trip settings on the circuit breaker to the valv This LER is closed, o 87-004, "Reactor Trip Caused By Main Turbine High Vibration." This event appeared to have cccurred due to a spike in the vibration at the No. 12 bearing. The spike was of such short duration that it was not shown on the chart recorder. The licensee has performed a terrporary nodification to the high vibration, turbine trip circtitry to provide an alam function rather than a trip function. During the

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next refueling outage, the licensee intend", to install a modified trip feature with a 3-second time delay. This LER is closed, o 87-011. "Operations Above The Power Level In Operating License 2.C(1)." The LER stated that themal power exceeded the licensed limit of 3411 megawatts by less than 1.0 percent. The NRC inspector reviewed STS SE-002 Revision 0, "Manual Calculation of Reactor Thennal Power," as changed by Temporary Procedure Change MA87-047 that was performed on February 5,1987. Also reviewed as STS SE-001, Revision 6. "Power Range Adjustment to Calor..netric,"

that was performed on February 5,1987. These procedures verified reactor thermal power was within licensed limits. This LER is close o P 1019. "Engineered Safety Features Actuation - Containment Purge isolation and Control Room Ventilation Isolation Due to Faulty Cable Causing Signal Spike on Radiation Monitor." The coaxial cable flexed when opening tha radiation monitor cabinet door. This caused noise spikes which actuated the system. The cable was repaired by WR 01640-87 on May 8. 1987. This LER is close o 87-028. "TS ' violation - Due To Inoperable Class IE Batteries." This LER concerned two occasions when quarterly surveillance tests on Class IE 125 volt batteries indicated certain parameters were outside their TS limit, yet corrective action was not taken. This issue was first raised in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/86-32 issued February 11, 1987. Violation 482/8632-01 was issued identifying a failure of post test review to identify an out-of-specification value and a failure to institute proper corrective action. The licensee's response to this violation (dated March 13,1987) stated that the surveillance personnel involved in that instance had been counseled, that another posttest review step had been added, and that Violation 482/8632 61 had been added to the required readin; for maintenance personnel. However, the response to the Notice of Violation did not address whether or not this had occurred previously. The licensee discovered the two additional examples that were reported in this LER in response to a review of industry information from Cather plant. In response to the sdditional infomation presented by this LER, the licensee revised the quarterly surveillance test in order to eliminate the confusion over acceptance criteria that was contributing to missed TS criteria. This LER is closed, o 87-030. "Reactor Trip Caused By Potential Transformer Failure." This LER concerned a reactor trip caused by a partial loss of offsite power which resulted from a potential transfomer failure. The licensee implemented Plant Hodification Request (PMR) 00935 which installed a diverse power supply to the buses which power the main feedpump controllers. This LER is close _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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o 87-038, "TS Violation - Failure to Properly Verify Operability of  !!

Fire Pumps Due to Procedural Inadequacy." This LER concerned TS surveillance requirements that were not included in Procedure STS FP-00 This STS has been replaced by STN FP-204, l Revision 0, "Fire System Flow Test, Pump Sequential Start, and Annual l Fire Pump Test." This procedure included the proper pressure and  ;

time delay verifications that were discussed in the LER. These l requirements are no longer included in TS but are included with the -

fire protection procedures. This LER relates to Violation 482/86?4-02 i which is discussed in paragraph 3 of this report. This LER is closed, i

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o 87-039 "Breaker Switch Hispositioned." This LER concerned control room operators discovering that the power had been removed to Pressurizer Block Valve BB HV-8000B. Investigation by the licensee .

revealed that the probable cause for th switch, which controls power  !

to the valve, being mispositiored was centractor personnel  ;

unknowingly bumping the switch with ths.r equipment. Discussinns

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l with contractor personnel were held and the need to be careful .dien 1 working around energized equipment was emphasized. This LER is  !

J close l o 87-040, "TS Violation - Personnel Oversight Results In i

Nonconservative Error In Containment Purge Radiation Monitors j Setpoint for Isolating Containment Ar" " The LER discussed

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containment purge radiation monitors tnac were set at a value less 1 conservative than pemitted by TS. Temporary Procedure

Change MA87-308 was issued on September 18, 1987, to sdjust the monitor bistable trip setpotats. Procedures CHM Obl52 Revision 10,

"Use of the ND 6700 LRW/GRW Systen for Containment Purges," and

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j CHM 03-161, Revision 5. "Preparation of Radioactive Gas Release l

Pennit for Containment Purges," have ban revised to reflect the j current bistable trip setpoints. They also ensure that the bistable trip setpoint is reset if calculations result in a more conservative

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value. This LER is closed, t

! ,87-042, "Personnel Error Leads To Higo Hign Steam Generator Level Resulting In Feedwater Isolation Signal." The operators in this

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event failed to cortpensate for the increasing water level in conjunctio ... the decreasing steaming rate in the steam generator.

l The event Mcp id while the reactor was in hot shutdown and cooling j down. The re ters were counseled on the importance of attention to l detail, bei e ert to developing conc.itions, and teking prompt actNas to avvid unnecessary challenges to n' .nt safety system I This LER is closed.

! o 87-043, "Surveillances of Power Range Low Setpoint and P-8 P-9, and l P-10 Interlocks Not Performed Per TS Due to Procedural Deficiencies."

The licensee stated in this LER that the "Mode change checklist for

! entry into Mode 2 is being revised to require the perfomanae of specific portions of STS 1C-241, STS IC-242 STS IC-243, and

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STS IC-244 if the portions have not been performed within the previous 31 days with the unit in shutdown condition. The event date was September 29, 1987. On September 16, 1988, the NRC inspector found that the mode change checklist still bad not been revised to reflect the stated changes. This was discussed with licensee personnel and on September 20, 1988, the licensee revised the modc change checklist. At the request of. the NRC inspector, the licensee verified that the proper actions had been performed for the three entries into Mode 2 from Mode 3 since this LER event. The failure to prcmptly implement identified corrective action is an apparent violation (482/8824-01). This LER is closed.

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o 87-044, "Personnel Error Leads To Omi; :!on Of Snubber From Inspection Procedure Resulting In TS Violation." The LER stated the a l

typographical error caused a snubber to be omitted during the snubber

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visual inspection in the first refueling outage. The NRC inspector l reviewed Procedure STS HT-011, Revision 4, "Snubber Visual l Inspection." The snubber was included in the procedure. This LER is l closed, o 87-059, "Reactor Trip Caused By Loss Of a Main Feedwater Pump." This l LER concerned a partial loss of feedwater flow which resulted in a l plant trip. The cause of the loss of feedwater flow was a fitting

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sensing line which monitored main feed pcmp header pressure. The licensee reconnected the fitting and inspected all similar fittir.gs

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o 88-014, "TS Violation - Caused by Channel Check Requirements Being Changed in Surveillance Procedure." This LER discussed a

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surveillance requirement to perform a channel check of the auxiliary

' feedwater pump, suction pressure-low, at least once overy 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> The surveillance requiremerit had not been met from May 2,1985, until August 22, 1988, because the wrong instruments were listed in Procedure STS CR-001, "Shif t Logs for Modes 1, 2, & 3." The safety significance of this is mitigated because the licensee successfully performed the required monthly channel operational tests and 18-month channel calibration tests during this time. The NRC inspectors recognized that this was identified by the licensee. However, it went unidentified for over 3 years and there have been previous similar occurrences. Failure to have a procedure appropriate to the circumstances is an apparent violation (482/8824-02). Operat_1onal Safety Verification (71707)

The NRC inspectors verified that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements by direct obsarvation of j

licensee facilities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operations, and review of facility record The NRC inspectors, by observation of randc,mly selected activities and t - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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interview of personnel, verified that physical . security, radiation prottetion, and fire protection activities were controlle By observing accessible components for correct valve position and ,

electrical breaker position, and by observing control room indication, the NRC inspectors confirmed the operability of selected portions of safety-related systems. The NRC inspectors'also visually inspected safety  !

components for leakage, physical damage, and other impairments that could <

prevent them from performing their designed functions. Selected NRC

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inspector observations are discussed below: NRC Inspection Report 50 482/88-22, paragraph 4.a. discussed a t licensee engineering evaluation on the control room ventilation isolation system (CRVIS). This evaluation'had shown that without the air conditioner-(AC), CAVIS was unable to meet its design basi Prior to this evaluation, whenever the AC units were inoperable, the t licensee did not enter TS 3.7.6 (CRVIS operability requirements). .

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The licensee stated that the reason they did not consider themselves in TS 3.7.6 was that the AC unit was not specifically called out in TS. The NRC inspector was concerned that the initial (incorrect) TS interpretation had been made without input from engineerin ,

Engineering involvement with operational decisions has been an ongoing NRC concern at Wolf Cree On August 29, 1988, when the CRVIS AC operability deteminaticn was t made, the NRC inspector asked the licensee about all other r safety-related coolers that were not specifically called out in T ,

The licensee stated that those coolers would be reviewed for operability determinatio On September 26, 1988, during a routine review of the control room '

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logs, the NRC inspector detemined that Ventilation Unit SGK05B i

(Class 1E switchgear cooler) had tripped at 7:36 a.m. COT cn '

September 25, 1988. The shift supervisor st.thd that even though SGK05B was inoperable, no TS action statement htd been entere [

Discussions with the Manger of Operations and Vice President-Nuclear l Operations, later that day, revealed that the operability determination had bren cade without input from engineering. In response to NRC concerns, the licensee requested engineering to evaluate the need to htye the Class 1E switchgear coolers operabl In order to keep the tteperatures acceptable, the licensee supplied temporary cooling to the areas served by SGK058, as needed. This area will be reviewed further during future NRC inspections, When SGK05B was lost on September 25, 1988, the control room dispatched an operator to the NB02 (yellow train) switchgear room to verify that the room temperature was within TS limits. However, the operator was unable to enter the room when Door 33012 failed to ope Failure of this vital barrier door to open resulted in loss of access tobothswitchgearrooms(Class 1E)andbothemergencydiesel generators. There is an emergency door, but it cannot be accessed

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from the outside. The same situation, of failure of one door denying access to an entire area, exists for the vital batteries, direct current switchgear rooms, and both cable spreading rooms. The licensee was able to get Door 33012 operating again within 30 minutes and then issued a request to engineering to modify certain doors so that an alternate path in to the areas discussed above would be availabl On September 28, 1988, at 4:58 p.m. (CDT), the control room operators determined that both containment humidity detectors (GN AI-27 and 28)

were reading less than zero. Upon checking, the licensee determined that Breakers PG20NBR238 and -239 were in the off position. At the end of this report period, the licensee had not determined how long the breakers had been off, who turned them off, or whether or not security would investigate t?a incident. The containment humidity detectors are not TS items, a e not required for accident analysis or recovery, and are only one of several methods available for detennination of a leak inside containment. The resident inspectors will continue to monitor licensee actions in this are During a routine review of the licensee schedule for the upcoming refueling outage, the NRC inspector developed a concern. The licensee had scheduled maintenance on the residual heat removal (RHR)

system in the latter part of the outar,e. This maintenance would have required one train to be inoperable at that time. During the time the train would nave been inoperable and the reactor would have been in Mode 6 ' refueling) with less the.a 23 feet of water over the fuel (half-pipe). TS 3.9.8.2 requires two independent RHR loops to be

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operable and one in operation during these conditions. Action "a" to TS 3.9.8.2 requires immediate corrective action when less than the required RHR loops are operable. Deliberate entry into an action statement requiring immediate corrective action is not conservativ The licensee modified the refueling schedule prior to the NRC

inspector bringing up his concern. The schedule was modified to meet i the intent of a generic letter on refueling requirements about to be

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issued by the NRC. As part of this schedule change, the reactor > vill

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This alleviates the NRC inspector concern for this particular (

situation.

! On September 16, 1988, the manager of nuclear safety l

engineering (NSE) informed the NRC inspectors that one of the engineers in his group had turned in his resignation. With one other engineer having previously turned in his resignation, this meant that the group would soon be dowa to four engineers. TS 6.2.3.2 requires, in part, "The independent safety engineering group shall be compsed

of at least five dedicated, full-time engineers located on site."

l TS 6.2.3.2 has no action statement. The licensee informed the NRC l inspectors that job announcements were being posted and the jobs I would be filled as soon as possible, but that it was likely that NSE

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would be understaffed for several weeks. After consultation with Region IV, the NRC inspectors informed the licensee that failure to

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meet TS 6.2.3.2 would oe an a) parent violation. The licensee informed the NRC inspectors t1at if permane , personnel could not be found, prior to the engineer leaving, temporary engirieers would be utilized as an interim measure,

^ On September ?,1988, the licensee briefly experienced a loss of both fire protection water pumps. Atapproximately9:35a.m.(CDT),a small pressure drop in the fire main header resulted in the automatic starting of the motor driven fire pump and then the diesel fire pum The resulting surge in pressure caused a section of discharge piping i to separate'at a joint. The resulting spray of lake water caused the motor driven pump motor to trip on an indicated overcurrent condition, the wetting down of several other control cabinets, and the roof of

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the building to be damaged. The diesel fire pump was manually

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secured. With the pipe failed, both fire pumps were temporarily unable to perfonn their function. However, after some minor valve manipulations, the licensee succeeded in returning the diesel. fire pump to service. TS Amendment 15 dated February 24, 1988, and effective April 6,1988, removed the fire protection requirements from the TS. However, the licensee maintained .their program requirements in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Due to the loss of both fire pwnps, the licensee entered a 24-hour admini3trative

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limiting condition for operation (LCO). Af ter the diesel was returned 4 to service, the licensee entereo a 7-day administrative LCO. The

, licensee exited the 7-day LC0 on September 8,1988, when the motor

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driven fire pump was restored to service and a rented fire pump was l

tied into the header. The licensee's internal written report has not been issued yet; however, corrective action to date includes a

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100 percent check of all fire protection boltcd connections in the

circulating water screen hous . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the performance of surveillance testing and/or reviewed completed surveillance test procedures to verify that surveillance activities were performed in

accordance with TS requirements and administrative procedures. The NRC l inspectors considered the following elements while inspecting surveillence activities-o Testing was being accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved procedure, o The surveillance procedure conformed to TS requirements.

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o Required test instrumentation was calibrate o TS LCOs were satisfie .

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I o . Test data was accurate and complete. .Where appropriate, the NRC inspectors performed independent calculations of selected test data to verify accurac '

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o The performance of the surveillance procedure conformed to applicable -

administrative procedures, o The surveillance was performed within the required frequency and the test results met the required limit ,

i Surveillances witnessed and/or reviewed by the NRC inspectors are listed below:

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o STS KJ-005A, Revision 11. "Manual / Auto Start, Synchronization, and Loading of Emergency Diesel Generator NE01," performed on September 4,1988 o STS IC-615A, Revision 3, "Slave Relay Test K615A, Safety Injection," t performed on September 4, 1988 l J

o STS AE-201, Revision 6, "Feedwater System Inservice Valve Test," *

performed on September 24, 1988 Selected NRC inspector observations are discussed below:

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During the performance of STS AE-201, Valve AE FV-39 failed to cycle

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during the 10 percent stroke test. The valve was not declared inoperable because the test was using the red train of the actuation systein. The

yellow train was not involved in the test and was considered to have

> remained operable. The valve did not stoke because a four-way valve in

' the actuation system did not move. Maintenance personnel agitated the "M" l i four-way valve. It then operated properly and the licensee considered the

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The NRC inspectors reviewed all previous STS AE-201 performances and found l one other occasion when a stuck four-way valve prevented a main feedwater  !

isolation valve from passing a 10 percent stroke test. On June 25, 1988, AE FV-39 failed to cycle because the yellow train four-way valve stuc [

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Haintenance personnel agitated the four-way valve and it then operated  !

properly. STS AE-201 requi.es that when the feedwater valves do not Operate properly, a work request (WR) must be issued. WR 02575-88 was

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issued on June 25, 1988. The NRC inspectors found that WR 02575-88 had not been completed. The surveillance test routing shr.et indicated that

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the four-way valve was agitated and reset. It then operated properly and

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valve sticking on June 25, 1988, and to take prompt corrective action is  ;

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another example of the violation (482/8824-01) noted in paragraph 4 of this repor i

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7. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The NRC inspectors observed maintenance activities performed on safety-related systems and components to verify that these act1vities were

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conducted in accordance with approved procedures, TS, and applicaule industry codes and standards. The following elements were considered by the fiRC inspectors during the observation and/or review of the maintenance activities:

o LCOs were met and, where applicable, redundant components were operable, o Activities complied with adequate administrative controls, o Where required, adequate, approved, up-to-dato procedures were used, o Craftsmet were qualified to accomplish the designated task and technical expertise (i.e., engineering, health physics, operations)

was made available when appropriat e Replacement parts and materials used were properly certifie o Required radiological controls were implemente o Fire prevention controls were implemented i:here tppropriat o Required alignments and surveillan'is to verify post-maintenance operabiiity were performe o Quality control hold po ats and/or checklists we~e used when appropriate and quality coni.rol personnel obser fd designated work activitie Selected portions of the maintenan:e activities accomplished on the WR listed below were obse- and reluted docuinentation reviewed by the NRC inspector:

N Activity WR 51856-88 Safety Injection hmp B motor seni-annual oil change WR 51857-88 Safety injection Pump B-2 year maintenance WR 51858-88 Safety Injection Pump B-semiannual oil change Selected NRC inspector observations are discussed below:

o WR 51856-88 was observed during its performance by several NRC inspectors. All courents on this WR have been discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/8S-27

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No violations or deviations were identifie .- Onsite Event Followup (92700)

At 1:45 p.m. on September 13, 1988, a contract electrician was electrocuted. The event occurred while an electrical crew was pulling new cable to an electrical panel for a 480-volt lighting circuit. Another electrician was also injured due to electrical shock when he tried to-dislodge the worker from the electrical source. A third electrician heard the e?ectrocution and tripped all the circuit breakers in the breaker panel deenergizing the shorted circuit. First aid was given the victim, first by the less injured electrician, then by responding personnel. Both electricians were taken to the Coffey County Hospital. One electrician was pronounced d'ead on arrival. The other electrician was treated and release The accMent occurred at the 2000-foot level of the auxiliary building in Ge overhead of the hallway outside of the south penetration roo This was in a radiologically controlled area, but not a coi'.aminated are The electrical crew was pulling new cables through an existing conduit which contained other energized wires. There was vapor barrier material in the conduit near a pullbox. The vapor barrier material prevented the electricians from pushing their "fish tape" through the conduit. The electricians disconnected the ends of the 3-foot section of conduit to dig

.out the vapor barrier material. At one end of the conduit section, the wires inside apparently worked against the edge of the conduit and the insu?ation of one wire was scraoed open to expose the conductor. This apparently energized the conduit and ca sed the electrocutio The senior resident inspector responded to the e' rent location and the resident inspector responded to monitor control room activities. As the event developed, the licensee anticipated later issuing a press release and notifying the occupational safety and health administration (OSHA).

Thus, the shift supervisor made a nonemergency 4-hcur report to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(vi). Later, the press release was issued and OSHA was notified. The licensee has assembled a safety team to investigate this incident and the resident inspectors will monitor licensee actions. This event is also being reviewed by an NRC Region IV specialist inspecto No violations or deviations were identifie . Preparation For Refueling (60705)

The NRC inspectors througn review of licensee procedures, interviews with licensee personnel, attendance of licensee meetinge, and observations of licensee controls, evaluated the licensee's preparation for the upcoming refueling outage (Refuel III). The areas reviewed included:

o Technical adequacy of approved procedures

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.o Administrative controls for refueling operations o' Administrative controls for plant conditions during refueling o Implementation.of controls *

Selected NRC . inspector observations are discussed below:

f As stated in-NRC Inspection Report 50-482/88-14 (SALP), licensee management "

oversight of Refuel II'was.less than adequate. Weaknesses in licensee '

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-managemtnt oversight resulted in an NRC issuance of a Civil Penalty and a performance Category 3 in the SALP outage functional area. The licensee's  ;

response to the SALP report (Letter WM 88-0207 dated August 19,1988)

states that, in order to ensure the events' of Refuel II do not repeat themselves, organizational relationships and personnel changes had been  !

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implemented. During the performance of this inspection, the NRC inspectors verified that, as stated in WM 88-0207, two senior supervisors had been ,

added to the outage group, the outage group now reports to the plant manager, and scheduling personnel receive direction directly from the 1 outage group. In addition, containment outage coordinators have been

. assigned for the upcoming outage. However, the NP.C inspectors also '

deter.nined that the target dates for outage planning listed in

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Administrative Procedure ADM 01-108, "Outage Planning," were routinely not

met. Step 5.4.1 states that 9 months prior to the outage all PMRs to be 4 implemented during the outage should be identified and approved for implementation. Interviews with licensee personnel stated that a lar number of PMRs (safety-related, special scope, and nonsafety-related)ge did not meet this date. Step 5.4.2 states that 6 months prior to the outage engineering should be complete for outage PMRs. This too was not me l'

1, Step 5.4.6 states that 30 days prior to the outage all work packages scheduled for the outage should be complete. During this inspection period, numerous work activities still had not received health )hysics' as  ;

low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) review. Examples include )oth

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activities that are not routine for every outage (e.g. control rod i ultrasonic inspection activity) and some activities that are parfonned  :

every outage (e.g. fuel transfer tube blank flange removal / replacement).  ;

This failure to comply with the recommendations in ADM 01-108 does not necessarily mean that problems with the outage will result. However, it .

does cause additional work load at a time when management and staff l

) attention should be devoted to onguing outage activitie l

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The NRC inspectors reviewed the following procedures: l t

o ADM 01-108. Revision 4 "Outage Planning"  !

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o GEN 00-005, Revision 11. "Plant Shutdown From 20% Minimum Load to '

Hot Standby"

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o GEN 00-006,' Revision 12. "H'ot Standby to Cold Shutdown" o GEN 00-007, Revision 9. "Mode 5-RCS Drain Down" o FHP 02-001, Revision 7 "Refueling Procedure" o FHP 02-011, Revision 9. "Fuel Shuffle and Position Verification" o 0FN 00-015, Revision 5 "L'oss of Shutdown Cooling (RHR)"

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o 0FN 00-018, Revision'2 "Fuel Handling' Accident" o 0FN 00-028, Revision 0, "IDLE RHR Train Temperature Control Modes 1-4" The resident inspectors will continue to monitor licensee effectiveness during outage activitie No violations or deviations were identifie . Physical Security Verification (71881)

The NRC inspectors verified that the facility physical security plan (PSP)

is being complied with by direct observation of licensee facilities and

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acurity personne The NRC inspectors by observation of randomly selected activities verified that search equipment was operable, the protected area barriers and vital area barriers were well maintained, access control procedures were followed, and appropriate compensatory measures were followed when equiptc.ent was inoperable.

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For discussion of a security-related event, see paragraph Sb.

l l During this month, physical security verification was also verified through an inspection performed by Region IV security personnel. For the results of that inspection, sea NRC Inspection Report 50-482/88-2 No violations or de.viations were identifie . Radiological Protection (71709)

l By performing the following activities, the NRC inspectors verified that radiologically related activities were controlled in accordance with the licensee's procedures and regulatory requirements:

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o Reviewed documents such as active radiation work permits and the health physics shift turnover lo o Observed personnel activities in the radiologically controlled area (RCA)suchas:

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. Use of the required dosimetry equipment,

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. "Frisking out" of the RCA, and

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. Wearing of appropriate anti-contamination clothing where require o Inspected postings of radiation and contaminated area o Discussed activities with radiation workers and health physics supervisor During this month, additional inspection in this area was performed by Region IV personnel. For the results of that inspection, see NRC Inspection Reports 50-482/88-27 atid 88-2 No violation; or deviations were identified.

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1 Exit Meeting The NRC inspectors met with licensee personnel to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection on October 4, 1988.

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