05000272/LER-1983-017, Forwards LER 83-017/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 83-017/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20072E263
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/11/1983
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20072E267	List: 05000272/LER-1983-017, Forwards LER 83-017/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8303210627
Download: ML20072E263 (3)

LER-2083-017, Forwards LER 83-017/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2722083017R00 - NRC Website

text

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Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station March 11, 1983 Mr. R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-017/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-017/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

\ , )g # V H. J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ksfd CC: Distribution M032!0627 833031

{DRADOCK 05000272 PDR nW The Energy People /)' V m % ,, , n -

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Report 9 Number

. 83-017/03LL q Report Date:- 03-07  !

iOccurrence Date: 102-15 /  : Facility: ' Sales Generating I Station ' Unii 1 1- -

LPublic. Service Electric;&. Gas Company

.Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey,,08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:.

' Reactor: Coolnt a Systems- Leakage Detection Systems - Containment Sump Monitoring' System.- Inoperable..

LThis report'wasjinitiated by'IncidentLReportsB3-044.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 2 - RX? Power 3.5 - Unit' Load'O MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF' OCCURRENCE:

At 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />, February- 15..1983,-during routine operation, tne Control ' Room Operator discovered that.-both 'Nos. 11 and 12.. Containment Sump' Pumps were running continuously. To prevent ~ damage to the pumps, they were de-energized.and their power supplies tagged out. This.

rendered the Containment' Sump Monitoring System inoperable, and Technical. Specification Action Statement 3.4.6.1 was entered.

Redundant Reactor Coolant-System (RCS)-leakage detection systems were operable throughout the occurrence.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRERGE:

. Investigation of the problem. revealed that Containment Sump Level

= Detector LD-7749 was malfunctioning, apparently due to binding in the i magnetic sleeve assembly. The problem was intermittant in nature, periodically preventing the. automatic de-energization of No. 11

' Containment. Sump Pump. No other problems were evident; no recent, similar occurences were noted. The problem was therefore assumed to be--isolated in nature.

ANALYSIS Of OCCURRENCE:

. The-Containment-Sump' Monitoring System is utilized as an RCS leakage n

detection system to1 monitor and detect leakage from the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary. The boundary is one of multiple fission

. product boundaries required to contain radioactive fission products

-during accident conditions.

L 1Since-the redundant leakage detection systems were operable, and no degradation offthe boundaries occurre.4, the event involved no risk to  ;

~

the' health and safety.of the public. Due to the loss of redundancy, ithe.. event; constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a

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LER~83-017/03L

• ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) limiting condition for operation. The occurrence is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

Action Statement 3.4.6.1 requires:

With only two of the above required leakage detection systems operable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the required gaseous and/or particulate radioactivity monitoring system is inoperable; otherwise, be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The -level sensing device was replaced, and containment sump pump operation was satisfactorily tested. No further problems were observed. The Containment Sump Monitoring System was declared operable, and Action Statement 3.4.6.1 was terminated at 0350 hours0.00405 days <br />0.0972 hours <br />5.787037e-4 weeks <br />1.33175e-4 months <br />, February- 16, 1983. No further action was deemed necessary in view of the isolated nature of the occurrence.

FAILURE DATA:

Magnetrol Tandem Style Displacement Type Liquid Level Control Model A103FEP Erratic operation of Level Detector LD7750 on January 29, 1981, documented in LER 81-09/03L, resulted in replacement of the device.

Due to the difference in the failure symptoms, however, the occurrences are apparently unrelated.

Prepared By R. Frahm / b[t' <C

' Ge'nersl Manager -

SORC Meeting No. _83-028

.