05000272/LER-1983-006, Forwards LER 83-006/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 83-006/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20071D100
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 02/25/1983
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20071D101 List:
References
NUDOCS 8303090175
Download: ML20071D100 (5)
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LER-1983-006, Forwards LER 83-006/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2721983006R00 - NRC Website
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text

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PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station February 25, 1983 Mr.

R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICF?1SE NO. DPR-70 DOCFIT NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-006/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-006/03L.

This repor' is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, hh*

H. J.

Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RFksh[Vj 6'

CC:

Distribution 8303090175 830225 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S

PDR The Energy People gg@

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Report Number:

83-006/03L Report Date:

02-23-83 Occurrence Date:

01-26-83 Facility:

Salem Generating Station Luit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

A.C. Electrical Power Sources - Emergency Diesel Generators -

Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports83-026 and 83-028.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 5 - RX Power 0 % - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1640 hours0.019 days <br />0.456 hours <br />0.00271 weeks <br />6.2402e-4 months <br />, January 26, 1983, during a routine refueling shutdown, the Senior Shift Supervisor was informed that non-seismically qualified components had been installed in the Class 1E control power DC feeds to the emergency diesel generators.

The feeds had been modified during the current refueling to provide an alternate source of control power to the generators.

Design Change Request (DCR) 1EC-1355 installed fusible disconnects in separate DC power selector boxes, to allow shifting from normal to alternate control power sources.

The alternate source was provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Alternate Shutdown criteria.

During the normal DCR follow-up, it was discovered the disconnects were non-seismically qualified.

Nos. 1 A, 1B and 1C Emergency Diesel Generators were declared inoperable, and Technical Specification Action Statements 3.8.1.2 and 3.8.2.2 were entered.

Core alterations and positive reactivity changes were immediately suspended, and containment integrity was maintained.

Work was immediately commenced to restore the control power feeds to seismic specifications.

Following completion of the changts, Nos. 1A and 1B Emergency Diesel Generators were satisfactorily tested.

The generators were declared operable, and Action Statements 3.8.1.2 and 3.8.2.2 were terminated at 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br />, January 27, 1983 At 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />, January 28, 1983, the Senior Shift Supervisor was notified that the diesel generator control power selector boxes-were still not seismitilly qualified.

Further reviea of the installation had revealed that the boxes were inadequately supported.

The diesel generators were declared inoperable a second time, and aince the plant

LER 83-Oco/03L L DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) had entered Mode 4, Action Statement 3.8.1.1d was entered.

The operability of the two offsite A.C. circuits was immediately demonstrated.

Seismically qualified supports were installed, the generators were declared operable, and at 2207 hours0.0255 days <br />0.613 hours <br />0.00365 weeks <br />8.397635e-4 months <br />, January 28, 1983, Action Statement 3.8.1.1d was terminatec.

No significant seismic events were observed during the time period involved in the occurrence; in the absence of such events the generators were capable of meeting AC power requirements for refueling, shutdown, and normal operation.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRERfE; Installation of the pull-type fusible disconnects and new power boxes was completed on No. 1C Diesel Generator October 30, 1982; on No. 1B Diesel Generator November 6, 1982; and on No. 1A Diesel Generator November 22, 1982.

Investigation of the problem revealed thri the occurrence involved an oversight of seismic requirements 'n the design of the alternate control power modificatica.

As nM ed, the design changes had been made in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R; the appendix does not require alternate shutdown components to. meet seismic design criteria.

The control power selector box and components involved both the normal and alternate power feeds, however.

In spe:1fying the fusible disconnects to facilitate switchover from normal to standby control power, and in designing the power selector box supports, application of the seismic design requirements was overlooked.

A review of the engineering program procedures and administration revealed no inadequacies, and the problem was assumed to be isolated in nature.

ANALYSIS Of OCCURRENCE:

The operability of the A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment for safe shutdown of the facility and mitigation of accidents.

The requirements are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the accident analyses, and are based on maintaining a single supply with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of the other A.C.

source.

Operability of the power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that the facility can be maintained in those conditions for extended time periods and that sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the facility status.

p LER 83-006/03L ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Installation of the non-seismically qualified components resulted in the remote possibility that, during a seismic ev6at, the diesel generators would not start automatically and could not be started remotely from the control room.

Starting of the generators vould have required re-establishment of the control power at the local control panel.

Due to the refueling outage and resultant low core decay heat' conditions, had a seismic event caused the loss of both the diesel control power circuits and the offsite A.C. sources, a significant amount of time was available to restore control power to the diesels.

Since no significant seismic event occurred, the emergency diesels were, in fact, capable of meeting the power requirements for shutdown, refueling, and normal operation.

Due to the timeliness in which the problem was discovered and corrected, and the availability of time for restoration of diesel control, the event involved no risk to the health and safety of the public.

The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification C.9.1.9b.

Action Statement 3.8.1.1d requires:

With two or more of the abvve required diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the operability of two offsite A.C circuits by performing surveillance requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter; restore at least two of the inoperable diesel generators to operable status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the Tollowing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Restore three diesel generators to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from the time of initial loss or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 Lours.

Action Statement 3.8.1.2 requires:

With less than the minimum required A.C. electrical power sources cperable, suspend all operations involving core alterations or positive reactivity changes until the minimum required sources are restored to operable status.

l Action Statement 3.8.2.2 requires:

l l

With less than two A.C. electrical bus trains operable, energized, and aligned to an operable diesel generator, establish containment integrity within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE-AQTION:

As noted, in the first instance, core alterations and positive reactivity changes were suspended, and containment integrity was l

l

LER 83-006/03L l

CORRECTIVE ACTION

(cont'd) maintained, in compliance with Action Statement 3.8.1.2.

The pull-out links were replaced with seismically qualified terminal blocks and

- jumpers.

As stated, the generators were declared operable, and at 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br />, January 27, 1983, Action Statements 3.8.1.2 and 3.8.2.2 were terminated.

On the second occasion, as noted, operability of the redundant sources was demonstrated and the plant was already in Mode 4, in compliance with Action Statement 3.8.1.1d.

Additional support braces and gussets for the power selector boxes were designed to seismic standards.

The supports were installed, the generato;~ s were declared operable, and at 2207 hours0.0255 days <br />0.613 hours <br />0.00365 weeks <br />8.397635e-4 months <br />, January 28, 1983, Action Statement 3.8.1.1d was terminated.

Personnel involved in the design of the modifications reviewed the FSAR design bases and appropriate seismic standards.

Due to the apparently isolated nature of the occurrence, no further action was deemed necessary.

FAILURE DjIA:

Not Applicable Prepared By R.

Frahm l'

General Manager -

SORC Meeting No.83-022

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