05000311/LER-1983-015, Forwards LER 83-015/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 83-015/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20074A830
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 05/05/1983
From: Zupko J
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Allan J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20074A831 List:
References
NUDOCS 8305160118
Download: ML20074A830 (3)


LER-1983-015, Forwards LER 83-015/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3111983015R00 - NRC Website

text

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n O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station May 5, 1983 Mr. J. Allan Acting Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Dear Mr. Allan LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-015/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No.

2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-015/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

'/t b}

'VI J. M.

Zupko, Jr.

General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ksf28'jb CC:

Distribution 8305160118 830505 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S

PDR O

The Energy People g

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E Report Number:

83-015/03L Report Date:

05-04-83 Occurrence Date:

04-07-83 Facility:

Salem Generating Station Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Plant Systems - Mechanical Snubbers - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports83-066 and 83-070.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 6 - RX Power 0 % - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On April 7, 1983. during a routine shutdown for refueling. results of testing of 2 mechanical snubbers in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.9c revealed that the snubbers did not meet test acceptance criteria.

The snubbers included one device on the Safety Injection System and another on the Main Steam Drain System (Nos. 2A-SISN-105A and 2P-MSDSN-1003).

Testing was performed by Wylie Laboratories. Huntsville, AL.

Results of additional testing received from Wylie Laboratories on April 22. 1983. revealed 2 more snubbers had failed the functional tests.

Both snubbers were on the Safety Injection System (Nos.

2P-SISN-104 and 2C-SISN-9).

The snubbers involved were all small bore mechanical devices and were of the same manufacture.

Operability of the snubbers is not necessary in Mode 6 since the Safety Injection and Main Steam Systems are not required to be operable.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation of the failures is presently underway.

Two of the devices involved have been sent to the manufacturer for analysis.

In accordance with the Technical Specifications, an additional 10% of the snubbers will be tested, with the sample skewed towards the smaller bore devices.

A detailed evaluation of the failure mechanism.

including identification of potentially generic aspects, will then be performed.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Operability of snubbers on safety-related systems is required to ensure that the structural integrity of the systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.

Operability of the Safety Injection System, as an Emergency

I

'LER 83-015/03L *~

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystem ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA, assuming the loss of one subsystem in accordance with single failure criteria.

Each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode.

When a snubber is found inoperable, an engineering evaluation is performed, in addition to the determination of the snubber mode of failure, in order to determine if any safety related component or system has been adversely affected.

The evaluation specifically shall determine whether or not the mode of failure has imparted a significant effect or degradation on the supported component or system.

The inoperability of a snubber does not of itself imply inoperability of the component or system, and the failures do not necessarily involve any risk to the health or safety of the public.

Due to the possibility of operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, the event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

As noted, 2 of the devices which failed testing have been returned to the manufacturer for analysis.

Additional testing of small-bore snubbers will be performed, in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

Pending the completion of testing and analysis of results, repair or replacement of the devices will be completed as necessary.

Finally, a formal Safety Evaluation will be prepared by the Engineering Department.

A Supplemental Report will be submitted upon final resolution of the problems.

FAILURE DATA:

Pacific Scientific Co.

Small-bore Mechanical Snubbers Models PSA 1/4 and PSA 1/2 l

l

?. j 'l. / 14 l

Prepared By R.

Frahm

/

6eneral Manager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.83-060