05000272/LER-1983-005, Forwards LER 83-005/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 83-005/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20079M824
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	02/22/1983
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20079M827	List: 05000272/LER-1983-005, Forwards LER 83-005/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8303030257
Download: ML20079M824 (4)

LER-2083-005, Forwards LER 83-005/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2722083005R00 - NRC Website

text

O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station February 22, 1983 Mr. R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of* Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-005/03L 4 Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.c, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-005/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,. , WN bw& H. J. Midura General Manager - Salem Operations RF:ksp/J CC: Distribution 8303030257 830222 i PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR The Energy People p+

                                                                                               % 2130 (20M) 1181

4 Report Number: 83-005/03L P Report Date: 02-17-83 i Occurrence Date: 01-21-83 Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company i Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF_0CCURRENCE: Emergency Core Cooling Systems - Missed Surveillance of Residual Heat Removal System Automatic Isolation and Interlock Function. This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-016. EDHDITIONS PRIOR TO OCQURRENCE:.

                                            - Mode 5 - RX Power 0 % - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: At 0815 hours, January 21, 1983, the Senior Instrument and Control t (I&C) Supervisor reported to the Senior Shift Supervisor that Surveillance Procedure 1PD-14.3.014 had not been performed as required i by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.5.21. Performance of the procedure is required within 7 days prior to placing the' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System in service for cooling ,

                                            -down the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The surveillance demonstrates                                                                                       '

operability of the Valves 1RH1 and 1RH2 automatic isolation interlock. This interlock prevents overpressurization of the RhR System due to l Valves 1RH1 and 1RH2 being open with RCS pressure greater than 580 . psig. Performance of the surveillance had been inadvertently i overlooked during preparation for the plant cooldown earlier that day.

i. No overpressurization of the RHR System occurred; the surveillance was j satisfactorily performed at 0900 hours, January 21, 1983.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENQE: The Technical Specification surveillance of the RHR valves function had formerly been performed by the Operations Dept. The I&C Dept. performed similar. periodic functional checks of.the interlock channels. Procedures 1PD-2.6.070 "1PT-403 Reactor Coolant Pressure . Indication and 1RH1 Interlock" and 1PD-2.6.071 "1PT-405 Reactor ! Coolant' Pressure Indication and 1Rl!2 Interlock" were utilized to-

                                            - perform these checks.                                               The procedures did not satisfy Surveillance Requirement 4.5.21, however.                                                                                                                               ;
!                                            Recently, the responsibility for performing the RHR valves functional testing was shifted to the I&C Dept. Procedure 1PD-14.3.014 "RHR g                                             Automatic Isolation-Interlock Function Verification" was written for                                                                                       :

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LER 83-005/03L . APPARENT CAUSE_OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) the surveillance. A checkoff in Integrated Operating Procedure IOP-6 was added to key the operations shif t to notify the I&C Dept. of the need for performing the test. The new procedures had only been used once since October 1982, when the changes had been implemented. Investigation revealed that the shift had notified the I&C Dept. for performance of the tests and had completed the checkoff in Procedure IOP-6. The I&C Supervisor who was notified, however, interpreted Procedures 1PD-2.6.070 and 1PD-2.6,071 as meeting the surveillance requirements. These procedures had been utilized that day by the same supervisor for the purpose of demonstrating operability of the Pressurizer Overpressurization Protection System. The supervisor had no prior experience with the new procedure; the procedure had not been entered in the department procedure index. The IOP reference did not contain the actual procedure number. The problem thus involved several minor procedural factors and personnel inexperience. A similar problem resulting in the missed surveillance of the Salem Unit 2 reactor trip breakers manual trip function had occurred November 24, 1982 (See Unit 2 LER 82-143/03L) . The events both involved shifting of surveillance responsiblities between departments, and corresponding procedural and administrative changes. The occurrences were otherwise unrelated. ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: The operability of two ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA, assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Each subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period. The RHR interlock is one of several design features which are classified as instrumentation required for safe operation. The function ensures the operability of the RHR System and thus operability of ECCS subsystems. Since, as noted, the operability of the RHR System was maintained, no risk to the health and safety of the public was involved. The occurrence constituted inadequate implementation of administrative or procedural controls which threatened to reduce the redundancy provided in an engineered safety feature system. As such, the event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9c. t

LER.83-005/03L- . CORRECTIVE ACTION: As noted, at 0900 hours, January 21, Procedure 1PD-14.3.014 was satisfactorily. completed. The surveillance was added to the I&C Dept. procedure index, and the supervisor involved reviewed the Technical Specification requirements and the contents of the applicable procedures. No further action was deemed necessary in view of the nature of the occurrence. FAILURE DAIA: Not Applicable Prepared By R. Frahm' / 4tdNw tenfral'Hanager - SORC Meeting No. 82-019 i i i i L }}