05000311/LER-1983-012, Forwards LER 83-012/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 83-012/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20074A805
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	04/28/1983
From:	Zupko J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Allan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20074A806	List: 05000311/LER-1983-012, Forwards LER 83-012/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8305160096
Download: ML20074A805 (3)

LER-2083-012, Forwards LER 83-012/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3112083012R00 - NRC Website

text

r c0 PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station April 28, 1983 Mr. J. Allan Acting Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Dear Mr. Allan LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-012/03L .

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-012/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

- 2.1 p J. M. Zupko, Jr.

General Manager -

Salem Operations I

i RF:ksfdp CC: Distribution 8305160096 830428 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDR g.

h The Energy People

% uncy , o m

9-Report Number: ~83-012/03L

-Report Date:- 04-27-83 Occurrence Date: 04-06-83 Facility:- Salem Generating Station Unit 2=

Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge,.New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Plant Systems - Low Pressure CO2 Systems - Improper Valve Lineup.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-062.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 6 - RX Power 0 5 - Unit Load 0 MWe, DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

LAt 1730 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.58265e-4 months <br />, April 6, 1983, during routine shift rounds, an Equipment Operator discovered the 10 Ton Cardox System pilot valve in the_ closed position.

The valve is normally locked open to insure pilot gas is available for actuation of the individual system master and master selector valves. All low pressure CO2 systems were declared inoperable, and Technical Specification 3.7.10.3a was entered. At 1756 hours0.0203 days <br />0.488 hours <br />0.0029 weeks <br />6.68158e-4 months <br />, April 6, 1983, the pilot valve was opened and locked-in position, restoring the low, pressure CO2 systems-to an operable status.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation of the occurrence revealed that a check of the position of the pilot valve was not' included in routine surveillance testing.

On March 8, 1983, the selector valve for the Diesel Fuel Oil ~ Transfer Pump Rooms had been opened twice for testing of system alarm and automatic damper actuation features. No problems were noted at that

time, although subsequent' testing revealed that, due to residual pilot l line pressure, a master or master selector valve could be opened four times following isolation of the pilot valve.

r

( A search of the Tagging Request and Inquiry System revealed no tagging requests issued for the system since November 2, 1982. System

recharging had been performed on March 4, 1983; the investigation

revealed that no procedure was in effect for the evolution. As l indicated by subsequent testing, selector valve operation on March 8 i could have been completed with the pilot. valve being closed during the i' recharging operation on March 4. The valve may therefore have been inadvertently manipulated at the time of the recharging, although no l other evidence. supporting this conclusion was identified.

t i

'LER 83-012/03L '

AMALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The' operability of the fire suppression systems ensure that adequate capability is available to confine and extinguish fire firessuppressiog,in occurring any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located. The collective capability of the fire

. suppression systems is adequate.to minimize the potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection-program.-

The' fire protection program is a design feature which insures that redundant engineered safety features are not rendered inoperable by.a fire. Since a coincidental low probability fire must occur before adverse ' performance. results, however, degradation of the program does not of itself imply adverse performance during accident conditions As demonstrated, a CO2. system could have operated upon receipt of a  ;

valid' actuation signal following. isolation of the pilot line. Due to maintenance-associated with a refueling outage, the Diesel Generator Area automatic actuation feature was disabled, and a continuous fire watch was already in effect in the area (see LER 83-00 8/ 99X-0 ) . As the result of the inoperability of various fire barriers, roving watches were patrolling all other affected spaces.

Finally,_. protection was restored in a timely fashion, in compliance with the action statement. The occurrence therefore involved no risk

-to the health and safety of the public. Due to the possible

-inoperability of required fire suppression systems, the event involved operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation. The occurrence is therefore reportable in accordance with-Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As noted, the pilot valve was opened at 1756 hours0.0203 days <br />0.488 hours <br />0.0029 weeks <br />6.68158e-4 months <br />. April 6, 1983, and Action Statement 3.7.10.3a was terminated. To ensure the valve is maintained locked open, a check of the valve status was incorporated into the monthly surveillance test. A procedure for recharging the i

.Cardox. system will be written to ensure only the required valves are operated during the evolution.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Aplicable Prepared By R. Frahm . 14)

[/ GeVieral Man (rier -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.89-056 l