05000272/LER-1983-018, Forwards LER 83-018/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 83-018/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20072M724
Person / Time
Site: Salem 
Issue date: 03/24/1983
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20072M727 List:
References
NUDOCS 8304010353
Download: ML20072M724 (3)
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LER-1983-018, Forwards LER 83-018/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2721983018R00 - NRC Website
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text

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o psuc Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 4

Salem Generating Station March 24, 1983 Mr.

R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-018/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical. Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, l

we-are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-018/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, 1

l b

J. M General Manager -

Salem Operations l

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CC:

Distribution l

8304010353 830324 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S

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Report Number:

83-018/03L Report Date:

03-23-83 Occurrence Date:

02-23-83 Facility:

Salem Generating Station Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, liew Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Reactivity Control Systems - Boric Acid Storage System - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-051.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 3 - RX Power 0 % - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTIOfLQF OCCURRENCE:

At 1040 hours0.012 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.9572e-4 months <br />, February 23, 1983, during routine operation, sample results for the Boric Acid Tanks (BATS) indicated that the boric acid concentrations for both tanks were below the Technical Specification limit of 20,100 ppm.

Concentrations were 19,725 and 19,364 ppm for Nos.

11 and 12 tanks respectively.

One of the tanks with proper contained volume and boric acid concentration is required for operability of a boric acid storage system as a borated water source.

With both tanks out-of-specification, the boric acid storage systems were both declared inoperable, and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.1.2.8a was entered.

The redundant borated water source, the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), was operable throughout the occurrence.

APPARENT CA_QSE OF OCCURRENGE:

Investigation of the incident revealed that the tanks contents had apparently been diluted during recovery from a Safety Injection, which had occurred at 2204 hours0.0255 days <br />0.612 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.38622e-4 months <br />, February 22, 1983.

The Safety Injection was associated with a loss of feedwater and reactor trip, which had originated with the failure of the No. 1F Group Bus to automatically transfer to the Auxiliary Power Transformer (see LER 83-012/01T).

During a Safety Injection, the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) is realigned from recirculation with the BATS to the RWST.

The BIT contents are injected into the Reactor Coolant System being displaced by less borated water from the RWST (2,000 ppm).

Restoration of a diluted BIT to recirculation can result in dilution of the BATS.

Review of the procedures involved in recovery from a Safety Injection, and in restoring the BIT to service, revealed that insufficient procedural guidance was provided to insure proper completion of the evolution.

~

LER 83-018/03L ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Borated water sources are part of the Boron Injection System, which insures negative reactivity control is available during each mode of f acility operation.

Above 200 F, a minimum of two redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event one system is inoperable due to an assumed failure.

Allowable out-of-service periods insure that corrective action may be completed without undue risk of injection system failures during the period.

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a shutdown margin of 1.6 delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200 F.

Since, as noted, the redundant injection system was operable, no risk to the health and safety of the public was involved.

Due to the loss of redundancy, the occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation.

The event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

Action Statement 3.1.2.8a requires:

With the boric acid storage system inoperable, restore the storage system to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a shutdoun margin equivalent to at least 1% delta k/k at 200 degrees F; restore _the boric acid storage system to operable status within the next 7 days or be in cold shutdown within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Boric acid was added and recirculated.

Samples of the BATS showed that the concentrations were within specification.

At 1830 hours0.0212 days <br />0.508 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.96315e-4 months <br />, February 23, 1983, the. boric acid storage systems were declared operable, and Action Statement 3.1.2.8a was terminated.

Operating Instruction OI II-4.3.5 " Flushing, Draining and Filling the BIT" was revised to provide detailed guidance for restoring the BIT to recirculation following either dilution or draining.

FAILURE DATA:

A similar dilution of the BATS occurred January 26, 1982, following maintenance and refilling of No. 12 BAT (see LER 82-008/03X-1).

I 1

Prepared By R.

Frahm j

'V Generai" Manager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.89-038 l

l l

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