05000272/LER-1983-010, Forwards LER 83-010/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 83-010/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20069D383
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/08/1983
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20069D384	List: 05000272/LER-1983-010, Forwards LER 83-010/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000272/LER-1983-010-03, /03L-0:from 821016-830205,during Testing of Type B & C Components,Three Containment Isolation Valves Exhibited Leakage Rates in Excess of Test Equipment Range. Valves 1CC215 & 1VC8 Restroked.Valve 14GB4 Reworked
References
NUDOCS 8303180361
Download: ML20069D383 (3)

LER-1983-010, Forwards LER 83-010/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2721983010R00 - NRC Website

text

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PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station March 8, 1983 Mr.

R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue Kirig of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

IICENSE NO. DPR-70 DUCKET YO. 50-272 Rff?ORTALLE OCCURRENCE 83- 010/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No, 1, Technical Specificaticns, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are sQmitting Li.censee Event F.eport for Reportable Occuirence 83-010/03L.

This report is required within thirty (?0) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, lle \\}<blwJ H. J.

Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ks CC:

Distribution T

Q 8303180361 830308 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S

PDR The Energy People

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R0 port Nunbsr:

83-010/03L Report Date:

03-07-83 Occurrence Date:

02-05-83 Facility:

Salem Generating Station Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Containment Systems - Containment Type B and C Leak Rate -

Out-of-Specification.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-118.

.CMQ1TIONS PRI.01 TO GCIUl!EElqE:

Mode 5 - RX Power 0 $ - Unit Load 0 MNe.

DESC_RIETION OF GCCURRENCS:

From October 16, 1982 to February 5. 1983, during a scheduled refueling, routine surveillance of Containment Type B and C ccmponents revealed three containrent isolztion valves with leakage rates greater than the maximum range of the leak rate test equipment (20,000 secm).

Tne components involved were Containmerit isolation Valves 1CC215, 14GB4 and 1VC8.

Since actual leakage due to each vcive could nct be ascertained, it was not possible to demonstrate that the total Type E and C leakage was less than 0.60 La as required by Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.1.2b (applicable only in Modes'l through 4).

The integrity of redundant containment boundaries had been maintained during previous operation; total leakage past redundant containment isolation valves did not constitute an abnormal portion of the total allowable leakage.

The valves involved were repaired and satisfactorily tested; combined Type B and C leakage was determined to be within specification prior to returning to Mode 4 operation.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation revealed that the stroke of Valves 1CC215 and 1VC8 was out of adjustment.

Disassembly of Steam Generator Blowdown Valve 14GB4 revealed that the valve seating surfaces were damaged by wire cutting.

Both Valves 1CC215 and 14GB4 had failed the previous leak

. rate testing in 1980-81, and had been reworked at that time.

The range of the test equipment in use at the time, however, was insufficient to allow quantification of lesser leakage (maximum range 2,000secm).

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the accident analyses at the peak accident pressure of 47 psig.

~

LER'83-010/03L

' ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) i Action. Statement 3.6.1.2Erequires:

With eitherfthe measured overall integrated containment-leakage rate exceeding 0.75.La, or with the. measured combined leakage 4

rate-for_all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests exceeding 0.60 La, rest' ore the leakage rate (s) to within i

'the_ limit (s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

- temperature-above 200 F.

[

Leakage? rate limits 'during performance of-periodic tests incorporate conservatism to account for possible. degradation of the leakage

. barriers between testing.

The combined leakage rate had previously been demonstrated within specification during leak rate cesting. n i

1980-81.. As roted, the valves were~ repaired and total leakage was

- demonstrated to;be within, specification during the recent testing.

Finally. redundant barriers and therefore containment integrity were maintained.

The occurrence thue. did not involve any riek to the health and safety of the public.

Due to the loss of redundancy in containment barriers, the,cVent constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a liniting' condition for operation.

The occurence is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Valves 1CC215 and 1VC8 were restroked and satisfactorily tested.

. Valve 14GB4 internals were reworked, the gasket and packing were replaced, and the valve was also satisfactorily tested.

With the valves repaired, and no further problems ~ encountered, on: February 5, 1983, the' final results of Type B'and C leak rate testing demonstrated

~

combined leakage was within. specification.

Due to the recurrence'of excessive leakage by two'of the valves, particularly Valve 14GB4, the Nuclear Engineering Department was notified of the cccurrence.

Appropriate corrective action will be implemented pending investigation of the problems.

FAILURE DATA:

Masoneilan International, Inc.

3 inch Control Valve t

Model-38-20721 i

" Prepared By R.

Frahm dendral Manager -

3 l

Salem Operations l

.SORC Meeting No.89-028 4

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b