ML20072S413
| ML20072S413 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1983 |
| From: | Corbit C, Martin J Battelle Memorial Institute, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATION |
| To: | Patterson J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8304070171 | |
| Download: ML20072S413 (31) | |
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OBaHelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories y ' 67 P.O. Box 999 March 31, 1983 g Richland, Washington U.S.A. 99352 Telephone (509)
Telex 15 2874 FRINCIPAt. STVN Mr. J. P. Patterson 4 gg -i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9/aA scs Region III 4/RA 50 Office of Inspection and Enforcement 6PRP S t,0 l 799 Roosevelt Road DRw .ac L G1en Ellyn, IL 60137 pE -)/ vfTot3Fi .
Dear Jim:
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MONTICELLO EXERCISE
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Enclosed is the finalized report of G. W. Bethke, C. D. Corbit, G. F. Martin and G. A. Stoetzel, who were the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) observers during the emergency preparedness exercise at the Monticello Nuclear Power Station on February 23, 1983. Only minor editorial changes were made from the rough draft given to the NRC Team Leader, Jim Patterson, prior to leaving the site. Areas covered by PNL were as follows:
G. W. Bethke Control Room, TSC, E0F, Dose Assessment, EALs and Data flow.
C. D. Corbit Control Room, TSC, all Control Room Activities, and some TSC Activities.
G. F. Martin Offsite Monitoring.
G. A. Stoetzel OSC and In-plant Surveys.
We are sorry this report is late; our word processor " lost" the first disk and we had to start over.
If you have any further questions, please contact Carl Corbit on FTS (509) 375-6866.
Sincerely, Jr$n' .
J. Martin C. D. Corbit Technical Leader Staff Scientist Health Physics Technology Section Health Physics Technology Section CDC:db Enclosure cc: F. G. Pagano w/ enclosure K. E. Perkins w/o enclosure S. A. Schwartz w/o enclosure 4g 8364'070171 830331 c. ,
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EMERGENCY EXERCISE OBSERVATIONS MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT FEBRUARY 23, 1983 I
i APR 41983
A. Observer: C. D. Corbit B. Assignment: Control Room, TSC; All Control Room Activities C. Personnel Contacted: Not applicable D. Summary:
Began with observation of normal reactor operations at 7:30 a.m.; all systems normal. At 8:00 two annunciators sounded (simulated); at the indication of a 60 gpm leak rate via the drywell floordrain sump, the Site Superintendent (SS) used EPIP A.2-101 to classify event. By 8:02 an alert was declared, and notifications of Shift Emergency Communicator (SEC) and Shift Technical Advisor (STA) were made; SEC arrived at 8:04 and STA at 8:07. By 8:10 reactor was shutdown and at 8:17 TSC took over Emergency Command.
Turnover in the Control Room, however, was too quick and as a consequence the Emergency Director (ED) kept the SS on the phone too extensively during the early portion of the event. At 8:24 the NRC was on the " hotline," made continuous contact by 8:37. SEC began communications with offsite and onsite checklist at 8:05. Updates of scenario required no contingency messages as all problems encountered by Control Room personnel were properly responded to within specified scenario times. Communications were adequate; ideas from STA/SS for terminating or ameliorating event were properly rejected by the controllers or TSC ED so that scenario would not be terminated.
E. Findings: (See also G. W. Bethke Findings) e Control room phone from TSC would not ring when TSC called for updates. Problem compensated for by Site Superintendent (SS) using full-time communicator to stand by on second phone and alert SS to such calls.
e Most site evacuation sirens did not work; PA system employed instead.
e During personnel accountability prior to evacuation, one emergency participant was unaccounted for initially, but was found rapidly.
According to Control Room critique this was a small communications problem.
F. Chronology:
- 1. CONTROL ROOM Time Event 0750 SS showed observer reactor status, all systems normal 0800 Annunicator alanns; 60 gpm primary system leakage. Instant SS comment as going through EPIPs, "I'm sure we are in alert right away." Takes over as acting Emergency Director.
0802 SS "We are in alert------call STA and SEC."
0803 SS "Begin shutdown" " Seals are OK."
Lead Shift Emergency Communicator (SEC) reports to Control Room, then TSC to implement communications EPIP.
0805 SS used Tech Specs to assure no violation 0806 SS continues shutdown 0807 STA arrives in Control Room
~0810 Reactor scrammed
Time Event 0814 " Max. Cooling, heat exchangers" 0815 Announced - Turbine off line 0817 Designated Emergency Director (ED) arrives in Control Room Announces takeover--goes to TSC 0824 NRC Resident Inspector on NRC hotline 0830 High pressure _in drywell 0835 Loss of condensate pump and load center announced. Auto transfer of load center announced.
Electrician and Operator dispatched to OSC
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0837 0844 SS (after discussion with ED) "We are going to evacuate reactor building due to increased drywell pressure." TSC effects.
1 Update from TSC i
0848 RCIC tripped, manually reset. SS states, "Get Health Physics."
-0852 SS on line to TSC again i
Time Event 0853 Reviewed ARM readings 0855 Local evacuation of Radwaste ordered by TSC 0857 Simulated racking out of circuit breakers at 14 and 15 buses - sent person to check buses 0859 New Message - Lost fdedwater 0900 To TSC, SS; "Must be a major pipe break, coolant at 134', still above fuel."
0902 "RHR running, but not very much, get someone out to see if valve can be operated."
0905 "All isolation valves are closed" - announcement 0906 TSC announces Site Area Emergency 0908 Announced assembly of plant personnel - all sirens not operable -
announced again 0912 HP Technician arrives, made survey l
F Time Event 0914 Electrician deployed to 2012 breaker 0915 Update to TSC 0921 Fan started on RHR 0922 Core Spray Pumps did not start 0925 Attempt to start #11 condensate pump failed - estimate 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to get going.. Both loop core spray valves open, but little spray on reactor core 0930 Valve 2012 will not open electrically- "Try to open manually" 0932 Rad Tech made dose rate reading updates 0937 Team dispatched to cable spreading room to jumper bypass to 2/3 core height 0939 Jumper installed - Torus cooling head spray initiated 0942 Dispatch - going to try to manually open valves 2012 0945 TSC update
Time Event 0955 TSC announces General Emergency - suspect loss of third barrier, fuel failure and degradation of ECCS 0957 Rad Tech ARM update 1000 TSC update - stack release 9 7.8 C1/sec 1006 14 and 16 buses - take 1 day for repair 1006 Valve 2012 opened about 2" (inches) - no change in flow reading--
instrument not sensitive enough 1007 .Drywell temperature and pressure increasing 1009 Activate drywell spray--5000 gpm - done I
l 1011 Moving 2012, but difficult; dose rate 700 mR/hr- " keep working" i
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l 1015 Technician ran Control Room gas sample equipment to remotely operate sample collection--filed out procedure checklist Supplemental personnel sent to assist manual operation of 2012 Personnel sent to close drywell vent valve I
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Time Event 1023 Orywell dose rate = 2000 R/hr 1029 Update ARM readings 1039 TSC called off 2012 crew because LPCI and core spray systems now normal 1042 2012 80% open 1044 Containment air samples taken 1046 Evacuating sectors A,B,C and D - word from TSC 2.3 R/hr @ 2 miles 1055 H.P. survey of control room, 4 mR/hr in Control Room,13 mR/hr at back of panel 2% clad failure announced by TSC - begin lining up reliefs for personnel @ 1800 1059 Vent valves stuck--sent crew to " jack" closed 1100 Update to TSC - conditions improving 1120 ARM update by HP Technician
i Time Event 1130 ' Shutdown diesel - normal power available 1131 Started condensate pump - put on recirc until needed 1136 Update on Control Room dose rates
- 2. TSC Time Event 1239 Updated status boards and dose computation begins 1300 EOF to TSC - downgrading event to Site Area Emergency - Protective actions will remain at General Emergency level 1306' Initiate another cooling sample from running loop 1309 "Take out LPCI, go ahead with core spray actions" 1400 Review of alternative, updates
A. Observer: G. W. Bethke B. Assignment:
Control Room, TSC and EOF, Control Room from 0730-0850 TSC from 0855 to 1230, E0F from 1300 to 1500. Observed all aspects of response including EAL determination (classification), notifications, communications, use of procedures, data flow, dose assessment, protective action decision making, command and control, etc. Emphasis on operational aspect of exercise.
C. Personnel Contacted: Not applicable D. Summary:
This is the first out of 15 sites observed where the TSC personnel had a good nicture of radiation / radiological status in the power block and onsite.
This is attributable to a good rad team, good status boards, and good planning. The Emergency Director properly used the EPIPs in classifying the LOCA with failure of ECCS as a General Emergency (contrary to scenario guidance).
TSC status boards were both the most detailed'and useful of any observed to date. They were also well maintained. The only possible problem is that trending was solely accomplished by the status board phone communicator who could make errors, although no errors were observed.
Accountability and Site Evacuation were carried out in a professional, timely manner. The scenario contained the best set of implant radiological data seen to date.
1 E. Findings:
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- 1. CONTROL ROOM e In the early stages of the exercise (first 1-1/2 hrs) the Site ,
Superintendent (SS) spent considerable time on the phone communicating with the TSC. This somewhat detracted from the SS's ability to manage the safe operation of the plant.
e Emergency Operating Procedures were not carefully referred to (e.g.,
DW high pressure). Actions of reactor operators seemed appropriate, but some possible supplementary actions were missed.
o Controllers in the CR allowed operators to initiate core spray by use of keep full system. This somewhat confused the exercise.
- 2. TSC l-e The Technical Group did not' compute- the time to cladding failure, fuel melt, potential containment failure, etc., following the LOCA with failure of ECCS. The E0F team did not attempt to estimate or calculata these times either, e' lh) dose calculations were performed in the " projection mode" (i.e.,
using drywell radiation levels, drywell/ core fission product 2
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inventory and assumed leakage rates). The first and all subsequent dose calculations were done with measured main stack release rate.
e It appeared cumber:ome to have the TSC turn over control of field monitoring teams to the E0F when the TSC has the only available dose calculation computers, Likewise, the HPN phone communications were turned over to the E0F (real problem is not having a dose assessment capability in the E0F). Calibration stickers on some observed portaM e radio equipment were missing. Radiological personnel questioned weren't sure how they kept track of calibration.
a It took a long time (~1 hr 45 minutes) for radiological personnel to notice that there was an incongruity between coolant activity, containment activity, drywell radiation and release rates.
e The status of the RHR system was not always accurate or understood in the TSC (partly a scenario problem) e.g., no one questioned why drywell temperature following a LOCA was at 150-160*F with no status of containment spray in progress. Likewise, increasing Torus water temperatures were not questioned when the status board showed they were in Torus cooling.
e TSC personnel were slow in demonstrating a concern for contact l radiation levels in the area of the SBGT valves. (Took ~25 minutes before appropriate formula was used - then everything went well).
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e No consideration, or discussion in the TSC was observed concerning l- the possibility of stopping or slowing releases by methods such as securing the SBGT fans (same coment for E0F).
F. Chronology
- 1. CONTROL ROOM Time Event 0800 60 gpm leak rate initiated reducing power with recirc pump runback 0803 Declared " Alert" 0809 Commenced notifications 0812 Plant Manager assumed E.D. role - scrammed the plant 0820 Notifications shifted to TSC 1
0830 2 psig in drywell 0850 Evacuation of RB and RW buildings 0857 EOF activated i
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- 2. TSC Time Event 0900 LOCA occurs 0902 Declared site emergency 0920 E.D. wanted to go to general emergency - stopped by controllers 0930 Accountability and site evacuation complete 0930- Confusion resulting from operators initiating keep full mode of core 0950 spray, drywell spray not simulated and being in Torus cooling - all problems caused by poor controllers 0945 HPN phone turned over to E0F 0955 All dose projections still based on actual stack release - not potential 0956 Declared general emergency - based on LOCA and no ECCS
Time Event 1000 Switched LPCI to B recirc loop, A loop injection valve failed nearly i
shut Field monitoring team control turned over to E0F Release path through drywell vent valves open - up stack via SBGT 1015 Deploying maintenance team to attempt closing DW vent valves 1030 Recovered use of LPCI and CS 1103 SBGT suction path from drywell isolated - release terminated 1107 A long term shift rotation plan has been established 1200 Stopped drill for lunch break and 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time advance
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- 3. E0F Time Event 1300 Exercise commenced i
1300- Questioned tech and radiological teams in E0F to compare mornings 1430 activity in TSC with their thoughts and actions. Same type of problems existed - e.g.:
e Failure to recognize incongruities in drywell/ Torus temperature and pressure and modes of RHR e Failure to recognize inconsistencies in radiological data e Failure to compute cimes to, and consequences of, fuel cladding
, melt, fuel failure and containment failure before events occurred.
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F. Scenario Comments:
- 1. Scenario improperly interpreted current EAL's for General Emergency (missed LOCA and loss of ECCS as criteria for G.E.).
- 2. Drywell radiation level data low by factor of 10 to 100 with respect to coolant activity, DW atmosphere concentrations and release rates.
- 3. Failed to prompt controllers to make operators use drywell spray following LOCA - this resulted in inconsistent drywell and Torus temperature and pressure data during the scenario.
- 4. Scenario did not have plan to impede use of keep full system via CS to add water to the vessel following LOCA. During the exercise the CR controller allowed operators to do this - caused confusion.
- 5. Most prompting (contingency) messages were timed only 5 minutes after data was provided to require a decision. This is inadequate time to allow participants to demonstrate their decisionmaking ability.
- 6. An error existed in that no core injection was shown on data sheets after 2012 LPCI valve was opened at 0945. This problem was corrected before the exercise.
- 7. The initial drops in drywell and mainstream line radiation levels following the scram were unrealistically l u (i.e., should have dropped more)
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A. Observer: G. Stcettel x ,
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B. Assignment: OSC and Inplant Surveys '
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Observed the activation of OSC, dispatch ani brief tpg of inplant survey 2, -
teams, and performance of inplant survey teams inclyl ding ~ the collection ,
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post-accident samples. ' .
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C. Personnel Contacted: Ed Reilly, Doug Horgen, M, Davis, D. Schwanke D. Summary:
The licensee's response to the simulated accident conditions was adequate in the OSC and during inplant surveys. The OSC was- activated in a timely manner.- The tag board was completed within approximately 15 minutes.
The OSC Coordinator was in command of personnel in the I&C shop (staging area for maintenance personnel and electricians). One comment made about last year's exercise was that the OSC Coordinator was under too much stress (overworked). The OSC was divided into two areas. The access control point managed by the RP Coordinator and the OSC major (I&C shop) managed by the OSC Coordinator. This division of responsibility worked well in reducing the OSC Coordinator's work load.
Maintenance crews and electricians were dispatched from the OSC (18C shop) to the access control point where they received the required dosimeters and were briefed on expected radiation conditions that would be encountered while performing their assignments. HP personnel wrote RWPs for all inplant entries and issued high range dosimeters and extremity dosimeters when necessary.
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The licensee took reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples using the new post-accident sampling system (PASS) located on the 951' level of the turbine building. Several minor problems were encountered while collecting PASS samples. However, these problems were resolved and samples were obtained within one hour after arriving at the sampling location.
Habitability surveys were performed in the OSC and at the access control point. An HP tech was assigned this responsibility and moved between the TSC, OSC, and access control point taking radiation readings.
No communication problems were observed. Inplant teams were equipped with radios for correspondence with OSC and access control point.
E. Findings:
o Assure that changes in emergency class are clearly broadcasted over the plant intercom. A General Emergency was declared at approximately 10:00, however, as late as approximately 10:30 the Chem techs collecting post-accident samples were unaware of the upgrade.
It is possible the noise level where the technicians were working prevented them from hearing the announcements, e The Chem techs should fill out sampling and analysis checklists that are designated in Procedure A.2-413 and A.2-415. Completion of the checklists was not observed.
F. OSC and Inplant Survey Chronology:
Time Event 0807 Alert was declared over PA 0815 OSC Coordinator informs OSC personnel of reactor scram
'0832 OSC Coordinator informed of 14 & 16 bus lockout 0840 OSC Coordinator assembled team to send to 14 & 16 bus. Team sent to access control point for dosimetry and HP briefing 0847 Habitability survey done in OSC 0850 CAM located outside TSC - no calibration sticker was noted on instrument 0852 OSC Coordinator updates OSC personnel on plant status 0905 Site Area Emergency declared over PA 0915 Observed maintenance crew at 14 & 16 bus - team had a radio for connunications and a portable survey instrument
Time Event 0935 Returned to access control point, informed that Chem techs had been dispatched to collect post-accident samples at ~9:30 am 0940 Caught up with PASS team, we're collecting small volume reactor coolant sample first 0950 Problem setting flow rate of 1 gpm on sample return flow (FI-664) 1012 e Reactor coolant sample collection was complete (~40 minutes after arrival) e Sampling and analysis checklist from Procedure A.2-413 was not observed to be completed by Chem techs 1015 Containment air sample initiated i
i 1017 Problem with needle broken in post-accident sampling system - took
- approximately 10 minutes to fix l'
1035 No notification of emergency class upgrade (Site + General) was heard l
l at PASS location I
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Time Event 1040 e Air sample transported to counting room - transport was simulated in a small cask e Sampling and analysis checklist from Procedure A.2-415 was not observed to be completed by Chem techs 1050 Went with team to close failed drywell vent valves. Team comprised of 4 maintenance team members and one HP. All team members were in full anti-Cs and SCBAs 1052 Observed team briefing - RP Coordinator told team (HP) to report back radiation dose rates so access control could track their dose 1100 Simulated closing vent valve 1102 Closure was reported to OSC 1108 Status board at access control point was well maintained l 1130 Observed activities at accats control point l
1131 Returned to TSC '
A. Observer: G. Martin B. Assignment: Offsite Monitoring C. Personnel Contacted: E. Reilly, D. Orrock D. Summary:
In general, from a radiological standpoint, the observed offsite teams performed well. The TSC, and later, the E0F radio operators did an excellent job of keeping the teams informed on the latest plant status. Radio procedures and communications with the teams were good and the recording of data and transmission of data to the plant were also good. Team members made good use of procedures and demonstrated a good working knowledge of the required functions.
E. Findings:
e The differences in maps carried with survey teams (e.g., markings of survey points, road locations) should be resolved.
e The sample locations and TLD stations should be clearly marked for ease of location by field teams (i.e., signs on poles, markings with number of sample location).
e When only two teams are available for plume monitoring, monitoring "behind" the plume should not be undertaken.
e A detailed radio survey should be performed to determine dead spots at or near all environmental stations.
. . 0ffsite survey kits should contain 0-5 R dosimeters to enable team members to determine when their whole body doses approach the administrative control level'.
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F. Offsite Monitoring Chronology:
i Time Event 0810 Alert declared 0814 Reactor scram announced 0820 Offsite teams formed and started for E0F 0835 Teams arrive at E0F; Pick-up survey kits 0844 Teams establish radio contact with TSC 0851 Teams sent to map location E3 Note: Did not observe teams perform an inventory of kit; did observe instrument battery checks 0901 Arrive at map location E3 Radio communications are adequate 0943 Plant teams recalled to EOF replaced by Prairie Island (PI) teams
- 3 Time Event 0959 Prairie Island (PI) team sent to map location B-1. PI teams have large area maps as well as segmented maps contained in the procedures.
1004 General Emergency declared - good status briefings by dispatcher to teams Performed readings in transit - held meter out window as per procedure 1007 Sweep between map locations D2 - Q2 1011 Elevated release began at 1000 - team used data sheet to record data 1022 E0F asks team to observe dosimeter.and respiratory requirements 1034 First check of personnel dosimeters Note: Controller has no data for personnel dosimeters - this should be considered in future exercises / drills.
1048 Team sweeping between map location,s B3 & C3; other team is being sent through same area - ineffective use of teams - don't need both teams in same area.
No air samples requested yet.
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- e Time Event 1054 There are some differences between the small maps, attached to the EPIPs and the large maps contained in the P.I. kits. Location R4 is marked on the large map and R3A on the small map - H2 on large map is H3A on small map - small map shows a road between location R3 & C3.
The large map doesn't show the road (the road.does not exist)
Note: 1) Need to resolve differences in map sets, 2) some means are needed to clearly designate monitoring locations for easy identification by teams (i.e., signs, pole markers, etc.)
1114 Release secured - still in General Emergency Team proceeds to map location J2 - N2 this is way out of plume path (180*) with only two teams in the field supplying the plant data, one should not monitor behind the plume, the priority should be to characterize the plume accurately.
1138 Proceed to map location G3 - still not near plume 1141 E0F requests personnel dosimeter readings (no data available) 1150 Proceed to E0F for lunch L
Time Event 1300 Time lapse and restart of exercise Team sent into field for radiological samples Note: Teams equipped with 0-200 mR and 0-1 R pocket dosimeters -
procedure A.2-410 states that team is to " frequently check personal dosimeters and request relief if cumulative exposure approaches administrative control levels." Administrative control level is ~2200 mR - the 0-1 R dosimeter is not adequate to determine when this level is approached. Suggest 0-5 R dosimeters be used.
1335 TLD locations are not clearly marked 1358 At map location C9A radio contact with EOF is lost - they can hear team, but team cannot hear them Reception at map location B6 is poor No reception at map location A10
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Note: Suggest radio survey for dead spots 1455 Return to E0F L