ML20094K053

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Special Rept:On 920218,fire Barrier Between Corridor 4 & Room 21 Breached by Removal of Floor Plug to Support Installation Mod.Fire Barrier Remains Breached at Present & Will Be Restored by End of 1992 Refueling Outage
ML20094K053
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 03/13/1992
From: Gates W
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LIC-92-059S, LIC-92-59S, NUDOCS 9203180077
Download: ML20094K053 (2)


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Omaha Public Power District 444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha, Nebraska 68102-2247 _

402/636-2000 March 13, 1992 LIC-92-0595 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission =

Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station PI-137 -

Washington, DC 20555

Reference:

Docket No. 50-285 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

Special Report on Inoperability of Fire Protection Equipment The Omaha Public Power District (0 PPD), holder of Operating License DPR-40, submits this report pursuant to the requirements of Fort Calhoun Station (FCS)

Unit No. 1 Technical Specification (lS) 2.19, " Fire Protection Systems".

FCS Technical Specification Section 2.19(1) requires that the fire detection zones protecting safety-related areas be operable. With a fire detection zone inoperable, within one hour, an hourly fire watch patrol is to be established to inspect the detection zone with the inoperable instruments. The inoperable fire detection zone must be restored to operable status within 14 days or, failing that, a report to the Nuclear Regu'atory Commission pursuant to TS 5.9.3 is to be prepared and submitted within an additional 30 days.

FCS Technical Specification Section 2.19(7) requires that all penetration fire barriers protecting safety-related areas shall'be functional (intact). With a penetration fire barrier non-functional, within one hour, either a continuous fire watch is to be established on at least one side of the affected penetration, or the operability of fire detectors on at least ore side of the penetration is to be verified and an hourly fire watch patrol established. The non-functional

. penetration must be restored to functional status within seven days or, failing that, a report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to TS 5.9.3 is to be prepared and submitted within an additional 30 days.

On February 18, 1992, the fire barrier between Corridor 4 and Room 21 was breached by removal of a floor plug to support installation of a modification.

Appropriate compensatory measures, as required by TS 2.19(7), were instituted at the time of the breach and will remain in place until the fire barrier is restored. The fire barrier remains breached at this time. This impairment will be restored by the end of the 1992 Refueling Outage.

92031.80077 920313 PDR ADOCK 05000285 PDR f, 4s-sn4 S ,

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LIC-92-0595 Page Two On February 21, 1992, fire detection zone 41 was removed from service due to numerous spurious false alarms caused by a faulty thermistor wire. At the time that the dettction zone was removed from service, the appropriate compensatory '

measures, as required by TS 2.19(1), were in place and will remain in place until the detection zone it restored. Maintenance activities to restore this zone to operability are on-going and Zone 41 is expected to be returned to service by April 6, 1992.

On February 23, 1992, the Containment Equipment Hatch was opened to support on-going 1992 Refueling Outage activities. Appropriate compent,atory measures, as -

required by TS 2.19(7), were instituted at the time of the impairment and will remain in place until the Equipment liatch is closed. The Equipment Hatch remains open at this time. -This impairment will be restored by the end of the 1992 Refueling Outage, s

If you should have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,

$(A ./$. b W. G. Gates Division Manager Nuclear Operations NGG/ die c: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae R. D. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV D. L. Wigginton, NRC Senior Project Manager

, S. D. Bloom, NRC Project Engineer R. P. Hullikin, NRC Senior Resident inspector I

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